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Licentious Topographies: Space and the Traumas of Colonial Subjectivity in Modern 
Egypt 
Ahmed Diaa Dardir 
 
This dissertation explores the history of the counterrevolutionary tradition that 
characterizes political dissidents as licentious and failed subjects. From a 
contemporary vantage point shaped by the predominance of this tradition in post 2011 
Egyptian counterrevolutionary propaganda, this study provides a genealogy of this 
tradition that reveals its anchoring in Western philosophical-ideological interventions 
that trace themselves back to the ancient Greeks, in Western counterrevolutionary 
rhetoric that harks back to the French Revolution and is consolidated in the attacks on 
the Paris Commune, and in their deployment in colonial, anti-colonial, and 
postcolonial settings. Moving across the Egyptian, European, and colonial histories of 
these ideological and political traditions, this study charts various licentious 
topographies (the crowd, the political organization, the Satanist cult, the Orient) in 
which bad subjects are ensconced in accordance with the dominant ideologies of the 
State since the 19th century, and examines the figures, motifs, and topoi which 
constitute these bad subjects. In providing a history of the bad subject, the dissertation 
intervenes in the discussions surrounding subjectivity by positing that in addition to 
identifying with certain notions, ideals, and ideal images, proper subjectivity is also 
constituted through identifying against the bad egos and bad imagoes that constitute 
the bad subject. Paying special attention to the gendering and especially the 
racializing of the latter, the study exposes the subjective trauma effected by the 

























As I was heading from Cairo to New York to defend this dissertation, and 
after a seven-year residency in New York City, I was stopped by Homeland Security, 
questioned at length, and sent back to Egypt. Eventually, I was forced to defend this 
dissertation online. As I acknowledge everyone who made this manuscript and its 
defense possible, there is no escape acknowledging the kind of world we live in; a 
world wherein the realities of empire draw us to the imperial metropole (through the 
concentration of knowledge production in Western, especially North American, 
centres in my case) and yet put obstacles in the way of this imperial centripeting, or 
otherwise tokenize us, the centripetal subjects of the empire, as signs of how tolerant 
and welcoming the empire has been – a pretense Trumpism has started doing away 
with. As we acknowledge our lingering yet fleeting privilege as the subjects of the 
waning centripetal forces of empire, it is important to acknowledge those who never 
enjoyed this privilege; all the victims of the empire, whether in the Americas or all 
around the globe; all those who have been forcibly removed, dispossessed, 
expropriated, or exterminated; against whose plight ours seems like a privilege. Let us 
acknowledge the native land and the slave labor that were expropriated to create 
Columbia University (a settler entity which continues to dispossess the residents of 
Harlem), and by extension acknowledge our attachment to a settler society, even as 
some of us try our best not to be settlers. Let us then try not to be settlers by 
acknowledging the Lenape people on whose lands we stayed, and cherish the few 
moments of recognition in which we (as students and scholars, as residents of 




Native American peoples and their struggles. It is through these moments that I can 
claim any legitimacy concerning my sojourn in New York. 
In a similar vein, as we acknowledge places, peoples, and struggles, let us 
acknowledge Tahrir Square and the events of 2011 that inspired this manuscript. I am 
wary of narratives that overglamorize or overromanticize the events of 2011, partly 
because these accounts do the struggle of the Egyptian people disservice by masking 
critique and glorifying defeat; and yet it is impossible not to stand in awe and 
admiration in front of the 18 days that put a halt to the rule of former Egyptian 
President Muhammad Husni Mubarak and paralyzed the Egyptian State; even if this 
admiration is burdened with the knowledge that the movement was duped and 
defeated on its 19th day. It is impossible to think of the conception of this dissertation 
without remembering the endless hours we, Egyptians in the diaspora, spent 
compulsively poring over news, YouTube clips, satires, comedy shows, propaganda 
footage, and other source material pertaining to the uprising and its aftermath 
(sometimes to the detriment of our research, other times inspiring research projects, 
including this one). It was at one of these trances that I noticed the licentious motif in 
counterrevolutionary representations of the 2011 uprising, which then came to shape 
this dissertation project.  
Of course musings, obsessions, trances, online rabbit holes, and political 
concernment do not a doctoral dissertation make. I would not have been able to 
transform any of this into research had it not been for the wonderful professors, 
friends, and interlocutors I was surrounded with. My largest debt, as far as my 
academic career and my writing go, is without doubt to my professor, mentor, ally, 
friend, and dissertation supervisor Joseph Massad. Intellectually, there are no words 




this manuscript with a footnote stating “I thank Joseph Massad for this point”). His 
patience and generosity, his thought provoking comments, his sincere engagement, 
were as paramount for the conception and completion of this project as his written 
work was. This project is largely the child of Massad’s published work, especially 
Desiring Arabs (though I am not sure how Massad would react to the notion that DA 
is procreative). Personally, Massad’s friendship and his unrelenting political and 
personal solidarity sustained me through my seven years in the US. His generous 
dinner invitations, our extended conversations, our chats over coffee, our peripatetic 
meetings, our discussions of theory, politics, society, Fairouz, and many other 
matters, are among the New York memories I cherish most.  
My gratitude also goes to Timothy Mitchell for believing in this project and 
for being part of the advising committee since the beginning. My research questions 
and methods are largely indebted to Mitchell’s work (especially his Colonising 
Egypt). His comments and advice have guided me through many stages of this 
project, and alerted me to the importance of the economy and the ideologies of work 
for conceiving good subjectivity (though I must admit I took these recommendations 
in directions other than the ones he intended). His writing tips were equally as 
important for the completion of this manuscript.   
During my first year at Columbia, I was fortunate enough to work with a 
number of professors who taught me new ways of questioning and critique. Audra 
Simpson taught me to see colonialism where it hides (i.e. everywhere). Elizabeth 
Povinelli’s exceptional ability to explain, dissect, and visualize theory was exactly 
what I needed to start a graduate programme. I cannot imagine being able to go 
through the PhD programme with competence, or to write a dissertation that engages 




Culture, and Power during my first semester. During the same semester, Partha 
Chatterjee’s rare ability to make complex theories accessible and applicable largely 
shaped my research questions and sharpened my research tools. In a way everything I 
know about Gramsci is a stem from what I learned from Chatterjee’s lectures and 
writings. I further thank both Professors Povinelli and Chatterjee for agreeing to be on 
my doctoral committee and for their engagement and invaluable comments at the 
defense.  
This project is indebted in many ways to Judith Butler. In addition to the 
obvious debt to her published work, the frugal yet incisive (and generous yet deeply 
critical) directives Butler so generously provided during the conception of this project 
played an immense role in shaping the course of my research. I am particularly 
grateful that, even though I did not have the privilege of taking classes with her, 
Butler agreed to be part of this project and to be part of my dissertation committee.  
Many of the ideas and themes in this dissertation were developed in 
conversation with (comrade) Mohammed Sa‘id Ezzeddine (more commonly known as 
al-usturah, partly because he is a legendary friend, and partly because when he 
disappears it becomes impossible to ascertain whether he truly existed or was merely 
a figment of our imagination). My friendship and camaraderie with Ezzeddine have 
extended far beyond my New York residence, ever since we participated together in 
student activities as undergraduates back in Cairo. In New York, we faced together 
hurricane Sandy, the white gaze, and the enthrallment and tribulations of our 
estrangement in the US. I am not sure I would have been able to get over the feeling 
of exile (being in New York while the uprising unfolded in Egypt), let alone turn this 
exile into an intellectual project, had I not had comrade Ezz to commiserate with, 




New York was Menna Khalil. I thank her for discussing this project with me in all its 
various stages, as well as for the dinner invitations, the writing sessions, the city 
excursions (in New York, Chicago, and Cairo) and all the culinary adventures. Menna 
has also read and commented on the introduction and Chapter 5 of this dissertation, 
for which I am eternally grateful. 
From solidarity events, to study Wednesdays, to coffee and chocolate breaks, 
Hanine Hassan was the most loyal ally, colleague, and friend. Hanine was always 
available to brainstorm and discuss ideas. She helped me analyze 19th century French 
reports on the Commune, alerting me to subtle gendered and racialized biases that 
were not clearly captured in the available English translations. Hanine generously 
read and commented on chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this dissertation. Her substantive 
comments as well as her copy edits helped move the dissertation to another level. 
Karim Malak proved to be the most trustworthy colleague, interlocutor, and friend. 
He has always been generous with comments and source material, and was always 
more than eager to provide copies rather than drop suggestions. This has been 
particularly helpful during the busy weeks leading to my final departure from New 
York, and especially after this departure. His encyclopedic knowledge of Egyptian 
and Ottoman histories (let alone the history of the Coptic Church) proved more than 
valuable for this project. This was only matched by his knowledge of the best dining 
spots in Manhattan: another thing I would miss about the city. I also thank Karim al-
Haies for sharing ideas and book recommendations (and flying books and source 
materials from New York to Cairo on a number of occasions), and I especially thank 
him for the movie nights he hosted in Queens. I also thank Thaer Deeb for his 
friendship and his political and intellectual camaraderie. Discussing the effect of 




ongoing struggle rather than a finished project. Mariam Abu Ghazi was always 
generous with discussing, testing out, and interrogating ideas. Her comments were 
particularly helpful with the conception of the relationship between the orgy, the 
mask, and the confessional in Chapter 2, the conception of the civilizational façade 
and its relationship to the white gaze in Chapter 4 and the Conclusion, as well as with 
the organization of Chapter 1. She was also generous enough to read and comment on 
an early draft of Chapter 2, and spent considerable time dissecting with me articles 
from the 19th century French royalist mouthpiece Gazette de France. I thank Shehab 
Fakhry for helping me navigate the labyrinth of Dar al-Kutub, for suggesting and 
sharing source material (be it modern news reports on licentious Islamists or 
theoretical exegeses on the works of Hegel), and for going swimming when our 
writing schedules allowed. I am also indebted to my colleague and friend Max 
Shmookler, with whom I had the pleasure of discussing Arabic literature, the various 
genres of adab, Dickens, and the orgy. Max has also generously read and commented 
on early versions of Chapters 2 and 3. In addition, Max possesses a rare attention to 
detail and a rare generosity in translating this attention into elaborate notes and copy 
edits (pulling a Shmookler, we used to call it in the dissertation colloquium). An 
earlier draft of Chapter 2 was discussed in MESAAS dissertation colloquium for the 
year 2016- 2017. I thank all my colleagues who took the time to read and comment on 
the chapter. I particularly thank Nasser Abourahme, Souzan Kassem, and Vivek 
Yadav for their engagement. I also thank Sahar Ullah for trying to make me believe in 
‘the light at the end of the tunnel’. I further thank Jessica Rechtschaffer for all her 






The help I received from friends outside Columbia University and outside 
academia was also invaluable. Special thanks go to Mona Anis for sharing a plethora 
of important documents and information concerning the ‘Urabi revolt and the fate of 
Ahmad ‘Urabi. Mona Anis possesses a goldmine of information pertaining to the 
events of 1881-1882, and I hope she would one day write about the subject. I thank 
Yasir ‘Abdallah for his precious input. Yasir does not know that he helped out this 
project, but it was a facebook post by him that first alerted me to the reference to the 
Paris Commune in al-Jawa’ib newspaper’s coverage of the ‘Urabi revolt, which 
opened to me the question of the mapping of the Commune onto uprisings in Europe’s 
colonies. I thank Mustafa Sa‘id, the famed musician and music archivist and the 
director of the Foundation for Arab Music Archiving and Research (AMAR), for his 
generosity with his time, with his source material, with tea, and with pizza. Sa‘id was 
generous enough to host me many times in his house in Cairo as well as his house and 
research centre in Qurnet al-Hamrah in Mt. Lebanon, and spent considerable time 
discussing with me the music history and significance of Sayyid Darwish and his 
Shahrazad (which I discuss in Chapter 5 of this dissertation). These conversations 
helped me go beyond the common clichés associated with the nationalist narrative on 
and appropriation of Darwish. He also spent an equally considerable amount of time 
providing me with copies from AMAR’s archive of rare musical records.  
At the American University of Beirut I thank Hana Sleiman and Angela 
Haddad for going through the trouble of scanning important articles for me. I also 
thank Sara Catherine Mourani (Cara) for helping me procure important materials on 
Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq. I particularly thank my professor, friend, and interlocutor 
Maher Jarrar for believing in my project even when it was in its earliest forms. When 




the Commune and the ‘Urabi Revolt with Professor Jarrar during a research trip to 
Beirut in Fall 2014, Maher, always on the lookout for new ideas and always 
supportive of his former students, invited me to share these findings in a talk he 
organized in his capacity as the director for the Arts and Humanities Initiative (AHI). 
I also thank Rita Basil, AHI’s programme manager, for organizing my talk and my 
trip in April 2015, and thank the audience, especially Ali Wick, for their comments. 
This event has indeed helped me fine tune and further develop many of my ideas, and 
strengthened my belief in this project.   
And then there is help that goes beyond the research materials but that is 
equally invaluable. Many thanks to Alexandra Kassir for (in addition to helping with 
19th century French texts) sharing dissertation horror stories and dreaming of a future 
where we will be making desserts rather than dissertations. Thanks to Sa‘d al-Kurdi 
for flying three kilos of ground coffee from Beirut to New York. Thanks are also due 
to the guys at Kuro Kuma for providing a friendly atmosphere, a cozy place for 
discussions (and patience when these discussions got loud), and hands down the best 
coffee in Morningside Heights. I also thank Falafel on Broadway for providing the 
closest thing to authentic Arab food and atmosphere, and a place where we could 
embrace the loud Arab stereotype.  
Thanks are also due to my family; my utmost gratitude goes to my parents, 
Heba el-Zawahry and Diaa Dardir, for all their continuous support on many levels, 
my brother Mahmoud and my sister Maha for being there for me, and Radwa ‘Azzam 
for helping me with the bibliography. I also thank Hamdi Abu Faysal for all his 




During my stay in New York I was supported by a faculty fellowship from 
the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. My summer research was also supported 
by travel grants from the latter. My fieldwork in Cairo, Paris, and London through the 








In Fall 2010, still uncertain of what ̒case study’ I was going to pursue, I started 
charting a doctoral research project on the State and subjectivity; I was planning to 
investigate the parallels between the late 19th century concept of the self—
consolidated/explicated/critiqued by the Freudian psychoanalytic understanding of the 
psyche, and the modern nation state (through identifying the leader with the ego-ideal 
as per Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, which has been central 
for modern theories of subjectivity from Louis Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatus”  to Ernesto Laclauʼs On Populist Reason), and the ways whereby 
colonialism has universalized and perpetuated this self-state ensemble. Although 
some of these questions were carried over to this dissertation, I am not sure if a 
project of that sort would have progressed in any direction. Soon enough, the 
Egyptian uprising of 2011 broke out, leaving its permanent mark on the intellectual 
path and research questions of my graduate student cohort; there is not, perhaps, a 
single Egyptian student of the Humanities who did not at least toy with the idea of 
working on ‘the revolution’. Instead, I decided to work on the counterrevolution. 
A curious feature of the counterrevolutionary discourse during and after the 
18-day sit-in that ousted Egyptian President Muhammad Husni Mubarak (January-
February 2011) was the characterization of Tahrir Square – or in broader and more 
abstract terms the sit-ins, the protests, the ‘revolution’—  as a licentious space: a 
space of bad hygiene, immoral behavior, intoxication, and illicit (almost public) sex. 
These claims were famously and explicitly made by a second rate (though not 
unpopular) Egyptian comedic actor who stated on a sports television channel that, 




under conditions of revolutionary chaos, a hotbed for immoral behavior ranging from 
dance to intoxication to “full-fledged sexual relations.”1 Claims of the sort placed 
questions of moral behavior (with emphasis on intoxication and sex) at the centre of 
public political discourse, to the effect of eclipsing political and social questions. A 
trend of making similar claims was observable throughout the aftermath of the 2011 
uprising, not only by pro-regime figures but also by members of the opposition. 
Various opposition factions used this discourse against one another, culminating in a 
war of sexual libel that unfolded in 2013 between the Muslim Brothers (then 
nominally in power through the elected president Muhammad Mursi, and camping in 
Rabi‘ah al-‘Adawiyyah Square to thwart an impending coup d’état) and the ‘secular’ 
opposition (camping in Tahrir Square to protest the rule of Muhammad Mursi and, 
wittingly or/and unwittingly, lending support to the impending coup).  As I set out to 
explore the history behind such claims, I came upon a running theme in various forms 
of media not only in Egypt but also in Europe and the United States, that spanned the 
last century and a half, from the Paris Commune (1871) to Occupy Wall Street 
(2011), of maligning spaces of protest and other spaces that are imagined to evade the 
gaze and/or control of the state as spaces of license and degeneration. Such 
representations posited members of the crowds that inhabited and inhabit these spaces 
as bad, failed, and licentious subjects. My study of subjectivity proceeds through 
providing a history of these representations.  
The counterrevolutionary depiction of the ‘revolutionary space’ as a space of 
failures, of the failure of state power to penetrate the social sphere, or conversely the 






observe proper behavior and to inhabit proper subjectivity, ultimately the failure of 
subjectivation (both in terms of subjection to state power, and of becoming a proper 
subject through this subjection), resonated with the theoretical questions of State and 
subjectivity which I was initially interested in exploring. Subjectivity can be an 
elusive topic of study: how can one discern what constitutes a proper subject, how the 
State expects its proper subjects to act, and the kinds of spaces populated by proper 
subjects and/or engendering good subjectivity? When looking at subjectivity in 
moments of crisis, however, in moments when State officials and propagandists are 
anxious about the reach of State power, its ability to subject its citizens, and the kind 
of activity these bad/failed subjects engage in, one can begin to discern, by contrast, 
what good subjectivity entails, and in what kinds of spaces these good subjects 
live/are produced. In other words, this study looks at what is to be repressed, 
suppressed, abnegated, produced as licentious, or otherwise marked as bad or other, 
for the proper subject to emerge. 
My departure from my earlier incomplete theoretical musings to my 
Egyptian case-study notwithstanding, the tension between the attempt to provide a 
global (and inadvertently and inevitably Eurocentric) history of the State and the 
subject, and the attempt to provide a Middle Eastern case study, persists through this 
project. I ask of my readers to bear the tension with me: it is not possible to provide a 
history of subjectivity in a postcolonial context in isolation from the history of the 
colonizer’s forms of power and subjectivity – and vice versa. As I am examining 
these questions in the context of European colonialism and neocolonialism, the 
question of Europe’s self-constitution through its colonial ventures and of the 
constitution of whiteness through racialization of all peoples around the globe 




collective for the individual subject to emerge (hence the centrality of the crowd to 
my analysis) and the repression and abnegation of various versions of the indigenous 
self for the modern subject modeled on the imago of Western colonial modernity, to 
emerge (perhaps rendering this study a footnote to the work of Frantz Fanon, but so is 
all postcolonial theory). These two themes are furthermore imbricated: I will show in 
Chapters 2 and 3 how individuality is the exclusive trait of whiteness, indeed that 
whiteness as such is imagined to be constituted through individuation, and how 
colonialism imagined the natives of the colony to live in a pre-individual collective 
state of being. Repressing the collective and repressing non-whites, therefore, are two 
integral parts of the same process of colonial subjectivation and individuation. This 
twofold repression is at the base of subjectivation both in the colony/postcolony (e.g. 
Egypt) and in the Western metropole, as I will show throughout this study (especially 
in Chapter 3). 
 
A	Reverse	Study	of	Subjectivity	
This is a study of subjectivity in reverse. A forward study of subjectivity would look 
at the kinds of model subjects that emerge in State and public discourse, would 
investigate the ideal images/imagoes and ideal egos (if the study wishes to take a 
psychoanalytic or Althusserian turn) through which good subjects identify/are 
interpellated, the kinds of spaces, social institutions, or ideological state apparatuses, 
that foster, engender, and produce good subjects, and the kind of good behavior which 
is the characteristic of every good subject. Instead, I study subjectivity through its 
failures, its shortcomings, the moments theories of subjectivity seem not to apply, 




the success or failure of state interpellation is not at stake as much as the perception 
and representation thereof is concerned; as this is not an ethnography, I am not going 
to interview or observe subjects in real life to discern the extent to which they were 
successfully or failurefully interpellated). Instead of looking at model subjects, ideal 
egos, and ideal images/imagoes through which proper subjects are constituted, I look 
at bad subjects, subjects that fail to become proper subjects, or fail to uphold proper 
behavior. Instead of looking at proper spaces that could double as ideological state 
apparatuses, I look at spaces that escape and defy, or are imagined to escape and defy, 
the State’s power to surveill and regiment, spaces that harbor all kinds of licentious 
behavior and host and further foster all kinds of bad, failed, and licentious subjects. It 
is only in the final chapter that I turn my attention to the proper spaces and to the 
proper subjects they produce.  
Spaces	and	Subjects 
This dissertation approaches subjectivity via space: it studies bad subjects via 
licentious spaces (Chapters 1-4) and contrasts them to good subjects via proper spaces 
(Chapter 5). While the term proper spaces, in the context of this study, can be easily 
replaced by ideological state apparatuses (in Chapter 5 I study the family, an 
ideological state apparatus par excellence, and the army, a repressive state apparatus 
which is studied here in its ideological capacity, as models of proper spaces), 
licentious spaces are the spaces that fail to produce proper state subjects (thus 
producing bad, failed, and licentious subjects), or conversely they are the spaces 
which the State fails to appropriate and mobilize in the process of producing and 
interpellating proper subjects (something the original Althusserian framework did not 




study of 19th, 20th, and 21st century representations), to the ways in which they are 
imagined and conceived (their topoi, how they are imagined to escape the state gaze, 
thus mixing subversive political activities with moral license) to how they are 
defined/cast-out as licentious as part of the process by which the modern State 
defines, organizes, surveys/surveills, and controls space. 
Modern states, as we learn from Timothy Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt, are 
predicated on a modernist epistemology, or metaphysics, which defines and organizes 
space, as part of its larger weltanschauung that only perceives the world as an 
exhibition which is or should be organized according to a plan.2 Licentious spaces, in 
my conception, are spaces that stand in opposition to or defy this epistemic and 
metaphysical organization and regimentation (hence the importance of the crowd as a 
quintessential licentious space, opposed to the state-defined and regimented spaces of 
work, of public/state-run and private institutions, of the domestic, etc.). This 
organization and definition of space, in addition to being modern, is essentially 
colonial, as Mitchell shows throughout Colonising Egypt,3 thus revealing how the 
Western colonization of Egypt was integral to the state-building project. Indeed, my 
account will strive to reveal the colonial nature of the process of defining space and 
organizing it into that which is proper and licentious, from the adoption of Western 
conceptions through which the licentious space is imagined and constructed (Chapters 












State organized and defined space (Chapters 3-5). Proper spaces are themselves 
products, one way or another, of the colonial process (not necessarily through creating 
colonial structures ex nihilo, but rather by transforming indigenous structures along 
colonial lines, the transformation of the family, revisited in Chapter 5, is a case in 
point). The reverse is also true; as the State attempts to modernize space along 
Western-colonial lines, the spaces that are left out of this process, i.e. spaces that 
remain, one way or another, unmodern, anti-modern, and/or indigenous, become cast 
out as licentious. 
 My account, however, will also pay attention to some of the attempts, made 
in the fields of state politics, journalism and public culture, to reverse or subvert this 
colonial conception/organization of space, showing how many (though not all) of 
them re-produce the same colonialist assumptions they seek to respond to or reverse. 
After examining subjectivity via space (and colonialism via space and subjectivity), 
the dissertation will seek to answer the following question: what is the outcome of a 
mode of subjectivation predicated on a colonizing process, one that redefines spaces 
along colonial lines, promotes colonially-created ideal images, and invites, nay forces, 
national subjects to identify with them, while abnegating spaces and extant versions 
of the self that resist this colonization? The short answer is indeed the Fanonian 
understanding of colonial trauma (which throughout this study I will also refer to as 
colonial neurosis, the Fanonian trauma, and Fanonian neurosis),4 namely, a split 










predicated, a trauma imbued with colonial violence.5 This is not to argue that the 
experience in postcolonial Egypt is the same as the experience in colonial Algeria or 
in Martinique. As far as the colonized are concerned, the Fanonian colonial trauma is 
universal but its experience is specific. One of the goals of this study, perhaps its 
ultimate goal, is to examine, via the study of space and subjectivity, some of the 
articulations and etiologies of the Fanonian colonial trauma in modern Egypt.  
	
Licentious	Spaces,	Licentious	Subjects	
So far I have been throwing around the term ‘licentious space’ in the abstract. It is 
necessary, for the purpose of this introduction, to outline what I mean by licentious 































As far as this study is concerned, the licentious space is the space that 
escapes state discipline, surveillance, and regimentation.  The licentious subject is the 
subject inhabiting this space and is produced by/through it. The licentious subject thus 
escapes norms of proper behavior sanctioned by the dominant ideology and which 
produce the proper subject. While this may explain what these terms mean in the 
context of this study, it does not fully explain why I use the term licentious. Beyond 
the catchiness of the term (which I admit is one of the factors behind my choice), I 
chose the term licentious for its capacity to cover a number of disparate – though not 
unrelated— notions, which I call forth in my analysis. First, the term licentious refers 
to the state of license imagined to take place once state sanction, discipline, and 
surveillance are in suspension. The term licentious – in a semantic stretch I took 
license to perform—refers, for the purpose of this study, not only to the license taken 
by the occupants of the licentious space, but also to the license taken by the state to 
enact various kinds of violence –ranging from the symbolic to the physical, and from 
sexual violence to outright massacres, against the occupants of these spaces. To that 
effect, the licentious space is comparable to the camp in Giorgio Agamben’s 
conceptualization of the suspension of life by a mode of power that produces 
biological life as a political question.6 Indeed, in various examples throughout this 
study, Giorgio Agamben’s notion of the homo sacer as a subject consecrated to death 
will prove useful in conceptualizing the licentious subject and the forms of violation 
this subject is subjected to. Despite the importance of Agamben’s work in conceiving 
this project, a major drawback in Agamben’s concept of homo sacer (which prevents 








licentious subject) is its decentring of how race and gender work in the production of 
a subject consecrated to death.7 Even if we accept with Agamben that modern 
biopower turns everyone into potential hominus sacri,8 the figure of Europe’s racial 
other is essential in casting European populations for violation (e.g. the racialization 
of European Jews as non-European as prelude to the Holocaust, or the racialization of 
the French revolutionary crowd as akin to Arabs and Native Americans to justify 
counterrevolutionary violence as I will show in Chapter 3). More sensitive to the 
racialized and gendered dynamics, and more attune to my conception of the licentious 
subject, is the precarious, violable, and ungrievable in the work of Judith Butler, 
especially in Precarious Life and Bodies that Matter (Butler’s terminology, especially 
concerning the violable and the ungrievable will be used in Chapter 2 when licentious 
representations are clearly used to suspend the value of life. In this context I will also 
add the term uncountable to describe the state of suspension/dissolution of 
individuality into the collective, which serve to render its subject ungrievable through 
their uncountability). The term licentious, furthermore registers and alludes to a 
number of theoretical interventions from which this study benefits. It brings forth the 
feminist dissection of the distinction, foundational to both the ancient Greek and 

















masculine mind that transcends the body and its licentiousness.9 Both the body as the 
realm of licentiousness and the feminization of the licentious are themes that recur in 
our archive and will be useful to our subsequent analysis. Along with its gendered 
overtone, the term licentious indexes a civilizational (culturalist and racist) discourse 
on the permissive, sensual, and licentious Orient (or more broadly, non-white and 
therefore savage geographies/topographies) as opposed to the disciplined and 
restrained Occident (a dichotomy that corresponds to that between the licentious 
feminine body and the rational masculine mind). In a memorable passage, Fanon 
summarized this discourse on the sexual licentiousness of the primitive and attributed 
it to the white man’s projection of his repressed unconscious desires onto the 
licentious primitive (who happens to remind the white man of an imagined earlier 
stage in his developmental path). Fanon notes: “The civilized man retains an irrational 
nostalgia for the extraordinary times of sexual licentiousness,10 orgies, unpunished 
rapes, and unrepressed incest” (emphasis added).11 My understanding of the licentious 
as a concept that operates along a civilizational grid is informed by Joseph Massad’s 
explication, in Desiring Arabs, of how the question of license versus restraint came to 
dominate the civilizational discourse surrounding representations of Arab culture, in a 
manner that internalizes conservative and colonial Western (especially Victorian) 
biases and assumptions.12 The licentious subject, following these conceptions, is the 











subjectivation; it brings together a femininity/feminization/failed masculinity and an 
indigeneity which colonial modernity aimed to transcend. Finally, I use the term 
licentious for its ability to amass a number of Arabic terms that recur in the archive, 
many of which will be used throughout this study (many of them in the original). 
Among the Arabic terms that could be translated into licentious are ibahi (which 
comes from the verb abaha, to permit or give license to, ibahi can thus be translated 
as permissive or licentious) and mutahattik (a term that refers to moral licentiousness 
but literally means dilapidated or falling apart, perhaps a reference to the break of 
restraint, or the degeneration of the body that is associated with moral degeneration. 
The verb hataka - from which tahattuk is derived- can mean to break, transgress, or 
violate, perhaps tahattuk can be read thus as a reference to violability of the licentious 
body). More importantly, licentiousness in terms of the setting loose of restrictions 
can be easily translated into the Arabic word infilat, a term that was used in 2011 to 
describe the situation in Egypt following the withdrawal of State functions in the 
aftermath of the January uprising. Licentiousness can also be translated to inhilal, a 
term that recurs, from the 19th to the 21st centuries, in discourses on revolution and 
opposition, and which can, depending on the context within which it is invoked, refer 
to moral and/or biological degeneration. 
The	Bad,	the	Failed,	and	the	Licentious	
This study works with three interrelated concepts; licentious, failed, and bad subjects. 
At times I use these terms interchangeably, as they refer to different (sometimes 
overlapping) aspects of the same phenomenon. For the purpose of this introduction, 
however, it is necessary to explain what these different aspects are, and highlight their 





 The licentious subject, like the space that produces him or her, is the subject 
exhibiting license, and thus giving the State license to violate him or her through 
various modes of violence. He, but more commonly she, embodies the licentiousness 
explained in the previous section: licentiousness qua degeneration, licentiousness qua 
femininity/feminization/failed masculinity, licentiousness qua violability, 
licentiousness qua racial otherness (with whiteness setting the frame of reference).13 
Of course the characterization here is less about what certain persons do and more 
about how they are imagined and represented, how they exist as subjects in discourse.  
The failed subject is not even properly a subject; it fails to form as a subject, 
and exists in a precarious pre-subject condition.14 In her reading of Althusser, Judith 
Butler posits that the “bad subject” within an Althusserian conception of subjectivity, 
“tends toward the oxymoronic,” for “[t]o be bad is not yet to be a subject, not yet to 
have acquitted oneself of the allegation of guilt.”15 This oxymoronic not-yet-subject 
will be at the center of our analysis. Indeed, this failed subject is commonplace in the 
Egyptian and Arab postcolonial archives. In Desiring Arabs, Joseph Massad notes 
how various works of fiction “narrate the difficulties facing the emergence of the 



















autonomous, because masculine, man. [‘Alaa’] al-Aswani’s novel [The Ya‘qubian 
Building] will insist … that the postcolonial male subject is stillborn and that the only 
kind of subject that emerges through colonial and postcolonial violence (physical, 
social, economic, and epistemic) is the degenerate, the corrupt, and the sexual 
deviant”16 (emphasis in original). My search for licentious and failed subjects can be 
viewed as further elaboration on this passage (indeed the degenerate and the sexual 
deviant reappear throughout this study, usually with the racialized and civilizational 
underpinnings with which Desiring Arabs is primarily concerned).17 It is important 
here to note how colonial violence (sustained and perpetuated by the postcolonial 
state through economic dependency, through political clientelism, and through 
upholding Western models of subjectivity) is responsible for the stillborn status of, 
for aborting, the postcolonial subject. 
The failed subject, however, fails to capture all the manifestations of bad 
subjects in the discourse I am set to examine. In addition to subjects that fail to 
approximate good and proper subjectivity, there are subjects that deviate from such 
models and therefore attain a model of bad subjectivity. There seems to be, therefore, 
a bad model, a bad ego-ideal, a set of bad imagoes, through which bad subjects are 
characterized and interpellated as bad. This study will reveal how, more often than 













specifically the Arab. In Chapters 1 and 3, we will see how the late 19th century 
French royalist mouthpiece, the Gazette de France used the figure of ‘Arabi (based on 
a corruption of the name of the Egyptian leader Ahmad ‘Urabi and a 
racial/civilizational stereotyping and caricaturizing of his character) to construct the 
bad subjectivity of both its French and its Egyptian adversaries. This was not an 
isolated instance. The Arab and the Muslim have continued to provide models of bad 
subjectivity until our very day, as I show in Chapter 3.  
For Egyptian publics subjected to and subjectified by a postcolonial state that 
subscribes to colonial models and who are interpellated by the international media 
(i.e. the ideological state apparatuses of US imperialism), as much as by an Egyptian 
media open to international influences, this meant that a certain image of the self 
(even when idealized) is cast for abnegation, abjection, and repression, while a distant 
image of the idealized white (male) subject is cast for identification; Egyptians can 
aspire to but never become this image.19 Hence the importance of colonial violence in 
the conception of Massad’s stillborn subject, and the larger significance of Desiring 
Arabs as an exposition of how physical and epistemic colonial violence led Arab 
authors to adopt a civilizational discourse predicated on their abnegation. The 
Fanonian neurosis that pervades the postcolonial condition and forces the 
colonial/postcolonial subject to yearn for an image of the colonizer he or she is never 
allowed to attain, also produces a stereotypical image of the native through which the 
State interpellates its enemies – whether in the colonial/postcolonial State or in the 












So far I have brought together the production of subjects, their subjection, 
subjectivation and interpellation. While these words may seem to belong to different 
schools of thought (production and subjectivation are generally thought of as 
Foucauldian, while interpellation, subjectivity, and the subject are clearly 
Althusserian), I use them simultaneously, though not interchangeably. First, the 
conception of subject formation: this study assumes that a subject is produced since, 
or prior to, birth through various modes of power (mostly connected to the State and 
the spaces sanctioned by it, its ideological apparatuses to gesture to the Althusserian 
conception of subjectivity). This process of subject formation results in the ability of 
the State to name, identify, and call forth its subjects, in other words, to interpellate 
them (to invoke, once more, the Althusserian lexicon). Subjectivation, as far as this 
study is concerned, refers to the whole process of subject formation, the various 
relationships to power, that makes one subject. Interpellation, on the other hand, refers 
to the moment when a subject is defined as such or called forth as a subject by the 
State. This is not only the end product of subjectivation but also an integral part of it; 
interpellation, according to Althusser, happens before even an individual is born and 
takes place throughout the life of the subject- not only when he or she is hailed by the 











oneself to or being subjected by the hold of power, something that relates to but fails 
to exhaust the notion of subjectivation.21 
In a similar vein, throughout this study I will use the terms ideology (used 
mostly in the Althusserian sense, as explicated in his foundational essay “Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses”) and discourse (mostly in the Foucauldian sense, 
as the overall system of gestures, speech, speech-acts, representations, images, etc. 
which is conditioned by power relations and which dictates material existence) 
liberally. This, again, is not to be seen as a mere slippage from the Althusserian to the 
Foucauldian, nor an attempt to find the academic Holy Grail, the missing link 
between Althusser and Foucault. Discourse (as a field of symbolic and semiotic 
exchange and their underlying power relations), in the context of this study, can be 
thought of as one of the ways in which ideology materializes, or conversely a field of 
interactions, of power relations and force confrontations (to go back to the 
Foucauldian formulation), which can be usurped and appropriated by the dominant 
ideology. My purpose here is not to establish whether ideology produces or 























appropriates discourse (for that matter, it can simultaneously do both). My purpose is 
rather to argue that there is a hierarchical ideological structure behind power relations, 
even in the instances when these power relations come from everywhere.– Even in 
Foucault’s formulation of power that comes from everywhere, the possibility of an 
end structure, a hierarchy of power relations, is accounted for, but instead of this 
hierarchy being “given at the outset,” it constitutes “the terminal forms power takes,” 
according to Foucault.22 Here I brush aside the question of whether these hierarchies 
are given at the outset or are terminal forms- once again, as far as this study is 
concerned, it may be both. To use a typical Althusserian example, the act of 
recognizing someone on the street, greeting them, performing the salutation ritual, be 
it the handshake or any other type of ritual,23 is discourse. The predisposition to do so, 
which in turn is sustained by the ritual, is ideology. Similarly, genuflection and 
supplication (to use Althusser’s re-reading of the philosophy of Blaise Pascal)24 is 
discourse, but the Catholic faith, both cause and effect of this ritual, is ideology. This 
last example also goes to show how, in Althusser’s thought, discourse/ritual/practice 
can shape and/or sustain ideology, and not only vice versa. 
It is perhaps already clear that my understanding of subjectivity is anchored 
in an Althusserian-Lacanian framework; and by this I do not mean a framework that 
mixes the theories of Lacan with Althusser, but rather one that builds on the 
(mis)conception of Lacanian psychology in the writings of Althusser. My 









analysis of relations of production and the ideologies that sustain and re-produce 
them, to Lacanian-Freudian psychoanalysis; for, after all, what are imagoes (the ideal 
images that set off and sustain identification, starting with the famous mirror image) 
and ideal egos if not ideological tools through which subjects are interpellated from 
childhood, beginning with the mirror image that is the materialization of and anchor 
for the ideology of the individual,25 to the various on-screen imagoes Hollywood and 
other ideological state apparatuses bombard us with from birth to death?26 The 
ideological role of imago and ideal ego runs throughout Althusser’s analysis, but is 
perhaps most evident in the moment of identification between subject and Subject. 
For ideology to work, according to Althusser, it has to construct a Subject at its 
center, with which the subject identifies.27 This subject-Subject relationship 
corresponds to that of the subject-imago and subject-ego ideal in Lacanian-Freudian 


























to the image of God, imago Dei, from which psychoanalysis and media studies 
borrow the term imago (and hence, throughout this study, when I refer to imago, or 
image, unless I am referring to an image in the literal sense, the reference is to this 
loose psychoanalytical, Althusserian-Lacanian conception of the image and the role it 
plays in interpellation).29 Just like humans, in Christian ideology, are made to believe 
they are created in the image of God, the subject, in Althusser’s explication of 
ideological subjectivation, is forced to identify with the imago of the Subject. 
Althusser shows, through a brief rereading of the crucifixion drama (a reading 
reminiscent of Hegel’s,30 in spite of all the attempts by Althusser to contend that 
Hegel is irrelevant for a structural Marxist analysis), 31 God becomes a Subject not 
only for subjects to identify with but also to aspire to re-enter (Jesus through 
resurrection, believers through reuniting with God on the day of judgment), recalling 





























the relationship between the mirror image and the subject in Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
The following  passage gestures towards the Lacanian mirror stage (or a revised 
version thereof) though it does not explicitly reference it: 
We observe that the structure of all ideology, interpellating individuals as subjects in the 
name of a Unique and Absolute Subject is speculary, i.e. a mirror-structure, 
and doubly speculary: this mirror duplication is constitutive of ideology and ensures its 
functioning. Which means that all ideology is centred, that the Absolute Subject occupies 
the unique place of the Centre, and interpellates around it the infinity of individuals into 
subjects in a double mirror-connexion such that it subjects the subjects to the Subject, while 
giving them in the Subject in which each subject can contemplate its own image (present and 
future) the guarantee that this really concerns them and Him, and that since everything takes 
place in the Family (the Holy Family: the Family is in essence Holy), ‘God 
will recognize his own in it’, i.e. those who have recognized God, and have recognized 
themselves in Him, will be saved32 (all emphases in original). 
Gestures towards the Freudian-Lacanian destination of the Althusserian 
project are made throughout Althusser’s writings, especially his essay on Freud and 
Lacan,33 but all these attempts came to a halt; to use the words of Althusser himself: 
The only thing that I can tell you with some certainty... is that I stopped short (quite clearly) 
before the question that interests you about the “relations” between ideology (or concrete 
ideological formations) and the unconscious. I have said that there must be some relation 
there, but at the same time I forbade myself from inventing it considering that it was for me 
a problem provisionally without solution … And naturally in refusing to go any further, I 
refused to follow those well-known figures who had attempted to go further, such as 
[Wilhelm] Reich or others. The place where I went the furthest must be in the final notes for 
the article “Freud and Lacan,” but there too, in the articles on state ideological apparatuses, 
there is a limit that has not been crossed. Thus, when you level at me “the question” “How 
do you see a conceptual elaboration between the unconscious and ideology?” I can only 
reply that I don’t see it. If Freud were alive (and thought today what he thought during his 
lifetime) and you were able to ask him, “How do you see the elaboration of the relation 
between biology and the unconscious?” he would more or less tell you what he wrote, 
namely, that there is surely a relation, but that he did not see how to elaborate it 
conceptually. Every question does not necessarily imply an answer.34 
My aim, of course, is not to leap where Althusser “stopped short” (though, I 
admit, my initial graduate student hubris was leading me in that direction, until I was 









failure to make the leap and my own reluctance thereof, as well as the failure of the 
Egyptian ‘revolution’- is to study the moments where the Althusserian-Lacanian 
structures of interpellation fail, and how these failures produce their own set of bad 
imagoes and bad subjects.  
Ideology,	Impulsive	Cultural	Imposition,	and	the	Colonial/Postcolonial	Condition	
My deployment of an Althusserian-Lacanian understanding of ideology and 
subjectivity, however, fails to remain faithful to Althusser’s original framework. One 
element that is not explicated (though not entirely missing) in Althusser’s conception 
of subjection, but which is important for this study, is the limitation of this mode of 
identification. There is always a Subject the subject is invited to identify with but 
never allowed to fully emulate: the king in medieval Christendom, God in 
anthropomorphic Western Christianity, the military commander in a fascist society, 
‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi for a contemporary Egyptian, the colonizer for the colonized 
(hence the relevance of the Fanonian framework as a corrective to Althusser’s, even 
as the former predates the latter).35 In addition, this study introduces and explores bad 



















Frantz Fanon, on the other hand, explained what Althusser did not account 
for. In the course of Black Skin White Masks two sets of imagoes appear (manifesting 
themselves in two Others). One is modeled on the white man, and starts with the 
Lacanian mirror image with which the white man identifies, and with which the non-
whites are forced to mis-recognize themselves (until this identification is shattered 
through the experience of denied-recognition by the colonizer, in Fanon’s 
explication). The other is the image of the non-white, always to be abhorred and 
distanced, as if serving as the antithesis to or the undoing of the Lacanian mirror 
image, the other to Lacan’s Other. To this effect Fanon revises the Lacanian 
formulation, exposing its limitations in a colonial/postcolonial setting. Fanon notes: 
On the basis of Lacan’s concept of the mirror stage it would be certainly worthwhile 
investigating to what extent the imago that the young white boy constructs of his fellow man 
undergoes an imaginary aggression with the appearance of the black man. Once we have 
understood the process described by Lacan, there is no longer any doubt that the true ‘Other’ 
for the white man is and remains the black man, and vice versa. For the white man, however, 
‘the Other’ is perceived as a bodily image, absolutely as the non ego, i.e. The unidentifiable, 
the unassimilable (emphasis in original).36 
In opposition to this mode of subjectivation, through which the white (ideally 
male) subject simultaneously identifies his own mirror image and rejects its non-white 
other, the non-white (the Antillean in Fanon’s explication) identifies not with the 
actual mirror image but instead with an imago produced through imaginations 
conditioned by dominant whiteness: “It might be argued that if the white man 
elaborates an imago of his fellow man, the same should be the case for the Antillean, 
since it is based on a visual perception. But we would be forgetting that in the Antilles 
perception always occurs on the level of the imagination.”37 Hence, the colonized 







colonized/non-white populations, despite their actual mirror image, until the reality of 
colonialism confronts them with their own otherness.38  
I depart from this Fanonian formulation in two ways. First, my concern is not 
only with how the non-white comes to idealize the white imago while abnegating an 
imago predicated on the non-white’s self-image, but also how this non-white bad 
imago, through its repudiation, plays a role in producing and interpellating the good 
subject as its other (which is already hinted at but not fully accounted for in Fanon’s 
explication as evident the above quoted passage). This point becomes central to my 
argument in Chapter 3, when I trace the appearance of the savage and the Oriental in 
the representations of the European metropolitan crowd. Second, while in Fanon’s 
conception the Antillean’s identification with the white imago is only shattered at the 
encounter with the white man (in the colony or the metropole, but typically the latter), 
In Egypt the workings of colonialism and the articulations of the colonial trauma take 
a different course. In Chapter 4 I will argue that in an Egyptian culture conditioned by 
colonial education and colonial media, and thus a colonial omnipresence even in the 
absence of actual metropolitan subjects, any Egyptian is interpellated through 
identification with the white imago while at the same time being reminded of his or 
her distance from this imago. Unlike Fanon’s Antillean, the Egyptian in my 
explication does not need to set foot in the metropole or to encounter actual white 
persons or metropolitan subjects in order to experience the self “in the third person.”39 








after official ‘decolonization’) as a colonial ideology,40 or tracing the effects of 
colonialism in this ideology—itself the logical extension of the now commonplace 
conceptualization of the national(ist) postcolonial state as a continuation, one way or 
another, of colonialism, an argument that started as a prophecy by Fanon41 and was 
largely taken up by area studies and postcolonial theory. In concluding his study of 
postcolonial Indian nationalism titled Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A 
Derivative Discourse?, Partha Chatterjee shows how the realities of global capital, 
which have not escaped the “metropolitan capitalist dominance,” wherein capitalism 
masks itself as or continuously co-opts reason, have also dictated an 
epistemological/ideological colonial nature of the nationalism underlying the 
postcolonial state.42 Thus, “[t]he political success of nationalism in ending colonial 
rule,” according to Chatterjee, offers only “a false resolution which carries the marks 
of its own fragility.”43 The tensions underlying this imposition and this fragility “often 
appear as fervently anti-modern, anti-Western strands of politics,” according to 
Chatterjee.44 This characterization, though based on Chatterjee’s observations 




















seem than how they are) to represent faithfully the Islamist organizations in Egypt 
and elsewhere. Indeed the Islamists will appear in our analysis among the figures of 
the licentious subjects, but even beyond the Islamists and beyond strands of politics, 
my analysis will concern itself with how the licentious is imagined in opposition to 
modernity embodied within the State. Here I am looking at the picture painted by 
Chatterjee from the other side: not the emergence of dissidents as anti-modern, but 
their representation and production, in state ideology and public discourse, as anti-
modern, and how this anti-modern version is identified against, whereas a modern 
version of the self, coming from abroad and circulating through colonial channels, is 
forcefully identified with.  
Fanon characterizes the psychic effects of the colonized’s forced 
identification with the colonizer, and the subsequent othering from oneself, as an 
impulsive cultural imposition.45 This unique conception, which Fanon posits to 
counter the Jungian conception of a collective unconscious, is akin to Althusser’s 
concept of ideology; both signify the weight of the dominant culture in dictating 
certain modes of subjectivation and identification (largely read through a 
psychoanalytic Freudian-Lacanian lens). Thus, I will use the term cultural imposition 
to supplement, and sometimes supplant, the Althusserian notion of ideology, 
especially when referring to ideological effects that are exercised through colonial 
power relations. Consistent with my earlier argument that the forced identification 
with the colonizer happens not only in the typical colonial context but also in a 
nationalist post/neo-colonial context, I treat this impulsive cultural imposition as a 






My study proceeds through exploring the psychic and subjective effects of 
this colonial nature of the nationalist state. Through this process of cultural 
imposition, identities have been produced along colonial epistemological and 
ontological lines (as per Massad’s Desiring Arabs), space has been defined and 
organized along colonial lines (as per Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt), and anti-modern 
versions of the indigenous self have emerged in antithesis to the nation(alist) State (as 
per Partha Chatterjee’s concluding remarks in Nationalist Thought and the Colonial 
World). In the course of my analysis I will explore how the self was experienced in 
opposition to the identities that were produced, how various versions of this self were 
produced as anti-modern and by extension as anti-State, ultimately as licentious, and 
how the colonial definition and discursive organization of space engendered and 
sustained these psychic and subjective effects.  
 
The	Archive	and	the	Postcolonial	Condition		
The above theoretical sketch was largely influenced by this study’s archive. In fact, 
through my archival research, I was engaged in a conscious and deliberate effort to 
suspend theory. This was not only in search for theoretical novelty (itself a legitimate 
motivation for a dissertation project), but also a postcolonial precaution. To impose a 
theoretical framework devised in and for Europe onto a country from (for the lack of a 
better term) the Arab world, is to add intellectual insult to colonial injury. Yet, 
eschewing Western theory and European history when studying Egypt would be to 
pretend that colonialism never happened, and therefore miss the paramount impact of 
colonialism on Egyptian history, on modes of subjectivity in modern Egypt, and on 




that was an Ottoman domain until the onset of modern colonialism (and remained one 
in the thought of Egyptian nationalists at least until the severance of its ties to its 
Ottoman suzerain by British colonialism in 1914), had its first encounter with modern 
colonialism with the Napoleonic invasion of 1798. The so-called French campaign 
aggressively stifled the intellectual life in the country especially through its targeting 
of the leading local scholarly/cultural institute, al-Azhar.  This targeting took the form 
of the cooption of al-Azhar scholars at the onset of the invasion, and the massacring 
of its students when they rose against the occupiers in 1798 and 1800.  In 1801 the 
French were defeated by a British-Ottoman coalition and in the ensuing years an 
ambitious Ottoman Albanian general, Muhammad ‘Ali, rose to power, eventually 
becoming the province’s viceroy in 1805. Haunted by memories of defeat and 
inaugurating a new Egyptian polity into a world structured by colonial relations, 
Egypt’s ambitious ruler/founder relied on French experts to design policies, 
institutions, and urban spaces. Educational institutions modeled on their French (and 
to a lesser extent on their English) counterparts were introduced and soon eclipsed al-
Azhar (to name one example relevant for the rest of our analysis). French colonialism 
was soon replaced, however, by British colonialism and in 1882 Britain invaded the 
country and turned it into a British protectorate (though initially only unofficially so). 
In 1914, fearing that the Egyptians would side with their Ottoman caliphate, Britain 
severed Egypt’s Ottoman ties, inventing Egypt for the first time as an entity separate 
from the Islamic caliphate (this also coincided with the official declaration of Egypt 
as a British protectorate by the British authorities). Though Egypt gained nominal 
independence from Britain in 1936, British troops remained in the country and British 
colonial officials continued to meddle in the affairs of the country. In 1952 a junta of 




(later dubbed a revolution), whereby they deposed King Faruq (the last of the 
Muhammad ‘Ali dynasty) and abolished the monarchy. In 1954 the strong man of the 
free officers, Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir, became Egypt’s second president, and negotiated a 
British withdrawal (which was not taken into full effect until 1956 when three 
colonial powers, Britain, France, and Israel, staged a failed tripartite aggression 
against Egypt, leading to the effective British withdrawal and a new era of Egyptian 
anti-colonial politics). Nasir’s regime attempted to maneuver the (im)possibilities of 
conducting nationalist anti-colonial politics through institutions that were inherited 
from colonialism, in a world shaped by the supremacy of the US and the USSR. 
These anti-colonial politics received a blow when Egypt was militarily defeated by 
the forces of colonialism and imperialism (Israel supported by the United States) in 
the 1967 war, and later came to a complete halt with the death of Nasir in 1970. 
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, the third Egyptian president, foresaw a different role of 
Egypt in the service of, rather than in opposition to, modern colonialism and US 
imperialism. Although Sadat was able to conduct a limited war and gain a limited 
victory against the forces of imperialism in 1973, his politics marked a shift from the 
anti-colonial stances of his forerunner. Starting 1973, Sadat pursued a peaceful 
resolution with Israel, which culminated in his visit to Occupied Palestine in 1977, the 
Camp David Accords in 1978, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979. This was 
part of a policy of realignment with US imperial interests which also entailed the 
opening up of the country to international capital; in 1977 this became known as the 
policy of infitah, or opening (also commonly referred to as the open door policy). In 
1981 Sadat was assassinated by a group of army officers who belonged to a hardline 
Islamist organization (which cited the services he rendered to imperialism as one of 




Muhammad Husni Mubarak, the country’s fourth president, carried out his 
forerunners policies until he was ousted in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising; in fact 
the growing opposition to Mubarak’s rule was born in the context of the anti-colonial 
struggle; it was the Egyptian solidarity movement with the second Palestinian 
intifadah (2000-2002) and the Egyptian movement in opposition to the US war on 
Iraq (2003) that raised openly, perhaps for the first time, the slogan ‘down with 
Mubarak!’ Post-Mubarak, Egyptian rulers did little, or nothing, to reverse their 
predecessor’s pro-colonial policies. This is especially the case with the current 
president ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, who came to power through a military coup d’état in 
2013 and who makes up for missing legitimacy through courting Western/imperialist 
support (for example by tightening the siege on Gaza, and by spending huge sums of 
money on gratuitous arms deals with Western powers-cum-arms dealers, in addition 
to conducting a foreign policy subservient to US and Saudi Arabian designs). In 
addition, al-Sisi was the first to inaugurate colonial ideology as explicit presidential 
discourse. In October 2017, after conducting an arms deal with the French 
government al-Sisi declared, in a shared press conference with French President 
Emmanuel Macron, in response to a question about the status of human rights in 
Egypt  (and after looking at his French counterpart while repeating the question and 
stuttering, as if asking the white man in power for an answer): “we are not in Europe, 
with its intellectual, cultural, civilizational, and human progress; we are in a different 
region.” We see, therefore, that the history of Western colonialism is inseparable from 
Egyptian history, that it was indeed Western colonialism that created the conditions of 
possibility for the existence of Egypt as a separate entity, that colonial institutions 
remained part of the Egyptian postcolonial state, and that Egyptian political history 




that the Saidian and especially the Fanonian are as important to this study as the 
Althusserian-Lacanian. In terms of archive, this means that, for a history of the 
licentious spaces and subjects in Egypt, the Western archive is as important as the 
Egyptian.  
Many of the disciplines, bodies of knowledge, and discourses that defined 
subjectivity and space since the late 19th century and through the 21st were developed 
in response to, crystallized around, or coincided with the Paris Commune. For an 
Arabic readership, the Commune was their first encounter with a discourse on the 
crowd (mainly through the popular Istanbul-based Arabic newspaper, al-Jawa’ib). 
The Paris Commune would become an important recurring moment for the 
subsequent account throughout this study. In Chapters 1 and 3, I will further explain 
the relevance and centrality of the Commune to the emergence of a discourse on bad 
subjects, licentious spaces, and the crowd, and the intersection of the discourse on the 
Commune with colonial networks of power, whether in terms of exporting the nascent 
European bourgeois discourse to the colony, or the ways whereby the anti-Commune 
rhetoric made use of colonial and Orientalist tropes in producing the communards as 
bad subjects.  
The relevance of the Western archive to this study, however, is not limited to 
the Paris Commune. The Western archive on crowd and revolution and the Western 
conceptions of space and subjectivity came to shape Egyptian discourse through 
colonial (epistemic and physical) violence; in Chapter 3, I explain how two 
paradigmatic European texts on the crowd, namely Gustave LeBon’s The Crowd and 
Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities, came to be landmarks of the Egyptian cultural 
sphere, and how they acted alongside physical colonial violence. Shunning the 




symptoms while ignoring the trauma that produced them. In Chapter 2 I offer a 
rebuttal to the hypothetical question of why I would seek the origins of the Egyptian 
licentious spaces in Western topoi (like the Dionysian orgy) rather than in Islamic 
history. Colonialism, moreover, has shaped the conceptions of space in Europe, and 
therefore the “Oriental” archive is relevant to Europe as much as the “Western” 
archive is relevant to Egypt. 
This preoccupation with colonialism has in many ways shaped the 
periodization of this study. I chose to look at the roots of the discourse on space and 
the subject in the late 19th century; a time the Egyptian landscape was being 
transformed along colonial lines before it fell to complete military occupation and 
colonial dominance by Britain in 1882. Other factors, however, have shaped this 
periodization. A more thorough explanation of this dissertation’s periodization is 
necessary, given the diachronic nature of the subsequent account and its frequent time 
lapses or its zooming-out over episodes of time. 
 
Periodization	and	Temporality	
The purview of this study spans two centuries. Covering the history of Egypt from 
(roughly) 1805 (when the modern Egyptian polity was created by the Ottoman 
Albanian general Muhammad ‘Ali) to 2017 (when this manuscript is being finalized) 
or 2011 (the year when the events this study sets to explore took place) is impossible 
within the context of one dissertation or the course of one doctoral degree. For this 
purpose, this study focuses on two defining moments in Egyptian history, the turn of 
the 19th/20th century, and the turn of the 20th/21st century; all other historical moments 




The turn of the 19th/20th century, as mentioned earlier, is a crucial time for 
studying the role of colonialism in Egypt. It was the time when Egypt was officially 
occupied by Britain. It was also a time that witnessed two large anti-colonial revolts 
in 1881/82 and 1919 respectively. The former, the ‘Urabi revolt, will be of particular 
importance for this study. In 1881, at the onset of the reign of Khedive Tawfiq, 
Egyptian army colonel Ahmad ‘Urabi and a group of Egyptian soldiers started a 
reformist movement whereby they demanded better rights for Egyptian-born officers 
within the army, better pay and rights within the army, and a set of constitutional 
rights outside. Events escalated as the colonial powers, suspicious of Egyptian 
soldiers and wary of granting Egyptians any constitutional or liberal rights, sided with 
the old guard and the Khedive. The insistence of colonial powers to control the 
Egyptian budget ran against the nationalist and constitutional aspirations of the 
‘Urabists and their allies, who wanted to subject the Egyptian budget to parliamentary 
supervision.  Eventually, in the summer of 1882, the British fleet laid siege to and 
bombed Alexandria, starting 72 years of military occupation. The siege and the 
bombardment led to confrontations between Alexandrian locals and the foreign 
merchants/settlers (conceived, perhaps rightly, as clients of the colonizing force and 
its invading army). The 1882 archive thus inaugurates the first appearance of the 
Egyptian crowd in discourse. The archive of the ‘Urabi revolt also inaugurates one of 
the earliest articulation of Egyptian nationalism. The second wave of Egyptian 
nationalism would also appear during the turn of the 19th/20th century at the hands of 
the nationalist leader Mustafa Kamil and the two organs he created, al-Liwa‘ 
newspaper and the National Party. While these two waves had their differences (the 
subsequent account would reveal the contempt with which Mustafa Kamil and his 




sentiments of the larger Egyptian populace at the time.  The emergence of Egyptian 
nationalism under conditions of Ottoman loyalty, and, especially since 1882, under 
anxieties concerning the fate of Egypt’s Ottoman allegiance and to the fate of the 
Ottoman Sultanate46 and the Muslim Caliphate, provides a rich archive for studying 
the emergence of Egyptian subjectivity in crisis. 
This sense of crisis, and the ensuing need to sustain and reinstate the notions 
of self and State through discourse, gives this moment precedence over other possible 
moments wherein the beginning of an Egyptian polity can be studied (like, for 
example, the inauguration of Muhammad ‘Ali’s reign in the early 19th century). 
Furthermore, this was the time that witnessed the proliferation of the Egyptian Arabic 
press. This makes the late 19th century more suited to the study of ideology and 
discourse than the early 19th century, when the press was limited, and not intended for 
wide circulation – let alone for an Egyptian readership for that matter, and was mainly 
published in Ottoman Turkish. Thus, when dealing with the events of the ‘Urabi 
revolt, for example, as the first instance of an emergence of a discourse on the 
Egyptian crowd, it is not to argue that there were no instances of confrontation 
between masses of people and state power before that moment; indeed there were 
peasant revolts under the rule of Muhammad ‘Ali, demonstrations of Cairenes 
championing Muhammad ‘Ali and opposing the Ottoman Viceroy Khurshid Pasha 














the French army during “the French Campaign.” None of these events, however, 
created a popular discourse on the crowd intended for mass consumption: newspapers, 
as just mentioned, were neither printed in Arabic nor intended for mass circulation 
during these periods- and the same goes for ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti’s classic 
historiography of the French invasion, which mentioned the details of the Cairo 
revolts against the French and the rise of the Cairenes in support of Muhammad ‘Ali, 
but which did not aspire to mass circulation, written at a time before the widespread 
availability of the printing press in Egypt.  
It was only the ‘Urabi revolt, coinciding with the age of print press and the 
spread of journalism, that achieved this status. The revolt also coincided with the rise 
of the bourgeois sciences, modern counterrevolutionary discourse, and the discourse 
on the crowd, in the aftermath of the Paris Commune as mentioned earlier (in 
Chapters 1 and 3, I will discuss how the Commune shaped the understanding of and 
the response to the ‘Urabi revolt by various Arab and European observers, to the point 
of declaring ‘Urabi himself as a communard, both by sympathetic French leftists and 
hostile French conservatives). It is also a time when the discourse on evolution was 
consolidated, and the discourse on degeneration emerged,47 thus producing the 
successful subject as evolved and the failed subject as degenerate (almost always with 
racial overtones, a point I further explore throughout this study, especially in Chapter 
1). It was at this time, moreover, when ideas of a national body, national vitality, and 












(thus lending support to the notions that the State is the custodian of national health, 
that licentious spaces are spaces of sickness and degeneration, and that the bad subject 
is a form of social disease). All these reasons contributed to my decision to focus on 
the late 19th/early 20th century as a crucial moment in Egyptian history. 
The turn of the 20th/21st century is equally interesting. It is the time that led 
up to the uprising of 2011. Many of the tropes, themes, topoi, and discursive arsenal 
of the 2011 counterrevolutionary discourse were synthesized and put to the test then. 
It also witnessed many challenges to the Egyptian regime, around which a discourse 
on the licentious space and the bad subject emerged. In the 1980s and especially the 
1990s, the Egyptian State was engaged in a confrontation on all levels with armed 
(and unarmed) Islamist groups. Around the same time, the State48 was depicting itself 
as the custodian of national morality, and was casting the licentious youth as the 






























State’s values. The conflation between the licentious youth and political activists, 
sometimes even the licentious youth and the Islamists specifically, in the discourse of 
the regime’s propagandists, was commonplace (a point I will explore repeatedly 
throughout this study, especially in Chapters 1 and 2).  
In 1996-97 the scandal of the so-called Satanists erupted: Ruz al-Yusuf (the 
same propaganda magazine that spearheaded the campaign against the Islamists) 
alleged that heavy metal music clubs were a mask for a satanic cult, triggering a wave 
of police arrests (which Ruz al-Yusuf later criticized). For a few months in 1997, the 
Egyptian public sphere was dominated by the Satanists’ scandal. The Satanists 
became the epitome of the licentious type and their emergence in print brought 
together the discursive tools developed against the licentious youth with the 
discursive tools developed against the Islamists. This kinship-in-bad-subjectivity 
between the Islamists and the Satanists will be examined in Chapter 2.  The alliance, 
or kinship, between political activists (Islamist or otherwise), and the licentious youth 
(Satanist or not), would also appear in public discourse, especially in cinematic 
production, in the 1990s and also in the first decade of the 21st century, setting the 
blueprint for the counterrevolutionary propaganda of 2011. 
Finally, the 1990s were marked by a number of anxieties that were mostly 
associated with globalization: anxiety about the family, anxiety about national 
sovereignty (especially in the aftermath of the Iraq war and in anticipation of the 
invasion of Iraq which would take place a decade later), and anxiety about sexuality 
and its relation to personal and national health – especially in the aftermath of the 




agenda.49 All these anxieties had a role to play, one way or another, in the elaboration 
of licentious spaces and subjects.  
Before proceeding from this discussion of periodization to a closer 
discussion of the archive, I have to concede that the two episodes I chose as my focus 
points fit too neatly with the standardized turn of time in accordance with the 
Gregorian calendar. Instead of viewing this neat-fitting choice as a concession to the 
hegemony of the Gregorian calendar— or the standardization of time more broadly—
I invite my readers to consider it as an acknowledgment of the hegemonic effect of 
standardized time and the Gregorian calendar on the authors and players I am reading. 
In both turns of the century, authors and political figures were exhibiting an 
awareness of this temporal threshold, sometimes with messianic anticipation and/or 
apocalyptic urgency.  
The turn of the 19th/20th Gregorian centuries coincided with the turn of the 
13th/14th Hijri centuries; the Gregorian year 1882, which witnessed the ‘Urabi revolt 
and the British invasion, coincided with the Hijri year of 1299. This temporality, 
though arbitrary, led many political players and authors to view the events with 
anticipation for an impending, messianic/apocalyptic change. For example Egyptian 
newspapers would invoke a prophetic tradition stating that God sends to the Muslim 
ummah “at the head of every 100 years” someone to rejuvenate its faith. This saying 
was interpreted, in different contexts and by different authors, as referring to ‘Urabi 









two waves of early Egyptian nationalism as their caliph, at least until he was ousted 
by the Young Turks movement). 
In the 1990s the world witnessed a similar anticipation, sometimes 
messianic, others apocalyptic; let us not forget how computer scientists in the “West” 
adopted an apocalyptic turn and prophesied an electronic apocalypse at the start of the 
year 2000. The Egyptian archive I consulted for the purpose of this study shows a 
similar apocalyptic/messianic anxiety; on the one hand there was the apocalyptic 
anxiety about AIDS as a millennial disease, about the demise of the family in an age 
of globalization, and the overall anxiety of not being able to keep up with, not being 
able to ‘enter’ the new century (a point that unfortunately falls out of the scope of this 
study, though related to the conception of the indigenous subject as lagging in 
development, and thus as failed and/or degenerate). Standard time, in its Hijri and 
especially its Gregorian versions, was thus part of the ideological worlds that shaped 
the archives I consult and the authors I read. As a result, the decision to focus on the 
two turns of century, even if conceding to Gregorian hegemony, is justifiable in a 
study concerned with ideology. 
 
Archive	and	Method	
As evident from the exposition above, this study employs an eclectic archive, ranging 
from written texts to visual representations, and from news reports to works of fiction.  
Every episode of history dictates its own archive. For example, in the late 19th 
century, newspapers were founded and many leading Egyptian thinkers took up 
journalistic writing as a means of expression and dissemination of ideas; to mention 




turned to journalism and issued a landmark newspaper, al-Tankit wa al-Tabkit.50 In 
the summer of the same year, al-Nadim became involved with the ‘Urabi revolt –
eventually becoming its main orator, propagandist, and spokesperson. Al-Nadim then 
changed his newspaper’s title to al-Ta’if (the Roamer), a publication that came to an 
untimely end when the British forces invaded the country and silenced the nationalist 
press.51 Al-Nadim himself was forced into hiding, only to come back in the 1890s 
with a new publication, al-Ustadh (meaning the master, the teacher, and/or the 
educator, revealing the educational role al-Nadim envisioned for journalism). Al-
Nadim was not a singular example, at the time there were other pro-‘Urabi 
publications, most notably al-Mufid, anti-‘Urabi ones (including al-Burhan) and a 



































nationalism followed suit; in 1900 the nationalist leader Mustafa Kamil established 
the newspaper al-Liwa’, from which the National Party emerged (in a curious case 
where the mouthpiece predated the party). Thus, newspapers of this era represent a 
most suitable medium for studying the articulations of identity, self, and nation, and 
the subjective relation between Egyptians and the State that rules them and the space 
they inhabit.52 
In the subsequent years, newspapers would not cease to be important. 
However, in the early 20th century, other forms of fiction writing would appear and 
provide a suitable medium for testing the dissemination of ideological notions beyond 
news reports and political analysis (a role that would be played by cinema later in the 
20th century).  In the second decade of the 20th century, especially during and after 
WWI, the British authorities imposed martial law on the country and censorship on its 
press. This measure does not diminish the importance of journalism for studying the 
ideological notions of the time; on the contrary, it is important to discern what the 
British authorities wanted said– and for that purpose newspaper reports will be read 
alongside official British correspondence and reports. The dissemination of certain 
notions beyond British and pro-British discourse, or the shortage thereof, can be 
tested through examining protest songs and other forms of artistic production- a 
musical play emerging from the tradition of protest songs will be examined in Chapter 
5 as part of a search for the moments of emergence of militarism in Egyptian anti-
colonial revolutionary discourse (an emergence that would be later appropriated by 








In the late 20th century and through what elapsed of the 21st, cinema and 
television became prominent ideological tools, and thus most suitable media for the 
study of subjectivity (since, once more, this study follows the Althusserian 
assumption that subjectivity is a materialization of ideology). The scope and length of 
this dissertation does not allow for the study of relevant television series and 
advertisements. Instead, I will look at films and, when relevant, television interviews 
with celebrities – the surface apolitical nature (surface because deep down everything 
is political) of mainstream cinema and celebrity talk-shows allows for a chance to 
study ideology beyond political rhetoric (and here I say rhetoric instead of discourse 
because even if they are apolitical in rhetoric, mainstream cinema and television 
cannot be thought of in isolation from political discourse). If the licentious 
revolutionary appears even in commercial films not intended (solely) as political 
propaganda, and even in a talk show by Tal‘at Zakariyya, a comedic actor with little 
involvement in politics (and on a sports channel, in a talk show hosted by a former 
football player),53 then one can show the proliferation of a dominant ideology beyond 
direct state command or the party-line of the regime. In fact, governmental directives 
and official regime statements are less likely to be a suitable medium for the study of 



















government or an army general are less likely to make statements about 
revolutionaries engaging in illicit sexual affairs in sit-ins (though an unnamed army 
general, who is thought by many observers to be none other than current Egyptian 
president ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, made a statement to this effect when declaring, in 
defense of subjecting a number of female activists to virginity tests, that these women 
“are neither like your daughters nor like mine”).54 These claims are more likely made 
by propagandists, some of whom work in cinema and television (like Tal‘at 
Zakariyya), others in the field of journalism (especially Akhbar al-Yawm and Ruz al-
Yusuf, two unapologetically pro-regime publications on which this study heavily 
relies). 
This eclecticism also applies to the European archive I am using. Newspaper 
reports, government documents, and works of political propaganda will be read side 
by side works of literature— and occasionally cinematic and television 
representations. Amongst the works of literature I will read, Charles Dickens’ A Tale 
of Two Cities is of paramount importance. It is simultaneously a paradigmatic 19th 
century text on the crowd and the threat it poses to proper spaces (especially the 
domestic) and a landmark of Egyptian culture (a point I further explain, with special 















novel to be translated into Arabic and is perhaps one of Dickens’ most popular works 
among Arab readers.55 It surfaced many times in Egyptian pro-State and 
counterrevolutionary rhetorics as a cautionary note against revolutionary excess. This 
role was inaugurated by its translation into Arabic by Muhammad al-Siba‘i (an 
operative of cultural colonialism and an agent of cultural imposition, as I will show in 
Chapter 3), who denounced both the French Revolution and Egyptian culture in his 
preface to the translation. Al-Siba‘i thus effaced any ambiguity the Tale showed 
towards the revolutionary crowd and instead mobilized it for a blatantly 
counterrevolutionary agenda, a role the Tale would return to play in post-2011 
Egyptian pro-regime rhetorics, whereby the so-called “lessons of the French 
Revolution” would be invoked to warn against revolutionary justice and revolutionary 
excesses. This was the case, for example, with al-Ahram columnist Hazim ‘Abd al-
Rahman’s article “Nurid Muhakamatan la Intiqaman” (We Want a Trial, Not 
Vengeance). This article opens by dramatically invoking the Tale’s malign 
representation of revolutionary women as vengeful: “We all remember the story of 
Lady Vengeance (al-sayyidah intiqam) in A Tale of Two Cities, which tells the story 
of the Revolution. Everyone thought she was knitting table-cloths, while she was 
recording the names of the perpetrators of injustice.”56 (Obviously, not all of us 
remember her, but those who do, remember that her name was Therese Defarge not 
Lady Vengeance. The Vengeance was her aide.) The article then moves to oppose 
justice to vengeance, calling for pursuing the former and shunning the latter when 
trying Mubarak. The article quickly moves, however, from calling for a fair trial for 








there is a “silent majority” still sympathetic to the former president, and characterizes 
their sympathy as “humane” and “noble.” Although ‘Abd al-Rahman is displacing 
sympathy with Mubarak to unnamed others – the “silent majority”- instead of 
proclaiming it as his own, he concludes the first segment of his article by enumerating 
the reasons why one should sympathize with Mubarak. A Tale of Two Cities here is 
invoked to caution against revolutionary justice, yet as a pretext for sympathy with the 
ancien régime (in spite of Dickens’ lack of sympathy towards the French ancien 
régime, which he blamed for the excesses of the Revolution).  
 Perhaps the clearest invocation of the Tale as a lesson comes from Ayman 
al-Jundi’s Al-Misri al-Yawm article “likay la tatakarrar qissat madinatayn”57 (So that 
A Tale of Two Cities would not be Repeated). While crediting Egyptians with a gentle 
spirit that inoculated them against the revolutionary terror France went through, al-
Jundi finds it important to learn the lessons of the Tale, “the tale of revolution when it 
deviates from the path of reform, and of the drive to vengeance when let loose/left 
without restraintنانعلا اھل قلُطی نیح. This is the lesson we should learn so that A Tale of 
Two Cities not be repeated in our beloved Egypt.” Before jumping to this conclusion, 
al-Jundi paints the picture of the riffraff and the vulgar (ri‘a‘ and ghawgha’) shedding 
blood, spreading chaos, inciting and perpetrating acts of violence, and forming their 
committees that put people on trial and punish them on a whim.  This description of 
Revolutionary terrors zeroes in on Dickens’ depiction of the September Massacre and 
makes it a “nightly incursion” in which the “ghawgha’ min al-wataniyyin” (roughly 
the vulgar patriots, or the vulgar among the patriots) massacre prisoners upon 







they slaughter while singing and dancing.” (We see here an orgiastic representation of 
revolutionary violence, consistent with the orgiastic representations in the Tale and 
the wider theme of orgiastic representations that we will explore throughout this 
study). A cursory reference to the Tale was also provided by ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Sa‘id 
(who was a member of Mubarak’s entourage of journalists and a vehement supporter 
of his policies but was able to rebrand himself as neutral during the downfall of the 
president) in an essay titled “Min al-Qahirah: Charles Dickens” [From Cairo: Charles 
Dickens].58 Sa‘id starts off his essay by quoting the famous opening passage of the 
Tale “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times …” and then uses it to 
describe the ambiguity of revolutionary times (as if to justify his own ambiguity 
towards both the revolution and the dictator whom he previously served). Although 
Sa‘id’s article fails to engage with the Tale on any level beyond quoting its opening 
passage, the ambiguity/ambivalence of the passage (it was simultaneously the best of 
times and the worst of times), which in the novel foreshadows Dickens’ ambivalence 
towards the Revolution, becomes an alibi for Sa‘id’s own ambivalence. After cryptic 
and (morally and representationally) ambiguous references to the Tale and to 
revolution (“vigorous and young– ‘atiyyah fatiyyah- facing the future with her mind 
and heart, while the present calls like the Siren – al-naddahah- to where no one goes, 
away from the past that throws its heavy weight on a looming and glooming present” 
– whatever all this is supposed to mean) Sa‘id concludes that there is a “historical 
responsibility” to make the right choice at the times of revolution – but never tells us 
what his historically responsible choice is. When not invoked as a 







alibi for morally ambiguous positions taken by serial turn-coats who neither want to 
antagonize the public nor to confront the authorities (which perhaps is truest to the 
ambiguity of the novel towards the French Revolution). Counterrevolutionary 
invocations of the Tale continued to appear as late as 2014 when Dot Misr (a 
counterrevolutionary online media outlet created by ‘Abd Allah Kamal, who would 
resurface as a regime propagandist throughout our study) published an article titled 
“Ghazl al-Sayyidah Difarj” [Madame Defarge’s knitting] wherein the author warns 
against revolutionary excesses and revolutionaries who do not know where to 
stop59(this comes in 2014, at a time when putschists and Sisi apologists thought it was 
time for upheaval and agitation to stop).  Therefore, A Tale of Two Cities is as 
relevant to studying post-2011 Egyptian ideologies and discourse the same way it is 
relevant for studying 19th century Victorian and European notions of revolution and 
the Crowd. To that effect, reading the Tale alongside the European and Egyptian 
archives helps us explore 19th century European notions of the crowd and revolution 
and trace their travel to the Egyptian cultural and political spheres, as well as the 
colonial channels that ensured their persistence.  
In all these examples, in both the Egyptian/Arabic and the European 
archives, I read together a disparate range and genres of sources, written in different 
styles, intended for different audiences, some of them fiction, while others are 
intended to be factual (a point I take with a grain of salt; regime propagandists are not 
always honest or realistic in their representations/fabrications, as some of the 
examples given throughout this study will show, especially in Chapter 2). This 







(or between literary fiction and state propaganda fiction), is merited by the 
Althusserian conception of ideology as an imaginary relationship to the real world. In 
his foundational essay on Ideology, Althusser notes: 
Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence. We commonly call religious ideology, ethical ideology, legal ideology, political 
ideology, etc., so many ‘world outlooks’. Of course, assuming that we do not live one of those 
ideologies as the truth (e.g. ‘believe’ in God, Duty, justice, etc…. [ellipsis in original]), we 
admit that the ideology we are discussing from a critical point of view, examining it as the 
ethnologist examines the myths of a ‘primitive society’, that these ‘world outlooks’ are largely 
imaginary, i.e.  do not ‘correspond to reality’.  
However, while admitting that they do not correspond to reality, i.e. that they constitute an 
illusion, we admit that they do make allusion to reality, and that they need to be ‘interpreted’ 
to discover the reality of the world behind their imaginary representation of that world 
(ideology = illusion/allusion).60 (all emphases in original) 
Ideology, ideological representation (or, one may simply say, representation, as all 
representations are ideological) therefore, is a fiction, yet a fiction anchored in reality 
–  or in a set of realities; not only in the reality of the thing being (mis)represented, 
but also in  the realities of power that shape the thing, its conception/misconception, 
and its mode of representation. It is this fiction, this illusion/allusion that I am 
interested in, be the sources I read (nominally) factual or fictive. It matters little 
whether the account on the sexual proclivities of political activists in Tahrir Square 
and other sit-ins in Egypt and elsewhere rested on factual reality or was entirely 
fictional. What is at stake, as far as this study is concerned, is the ideological work 
this depiction performs and/or exposes, the relationship of illusion/allusion that 
produces these claims as objects of public discourse, that adds political salience to this 
claim, and that rests on and further reinforces a set of state ideologies (the bourgeois 
ideology of the family that looks with moral suspicion on any convention, celibate let 
alone sexual, outside of the bounds of the family, or any social formations, kinship 






nuclear monogamous family- a point I further explore in Chapter 5, the ideology of 
work that looks with suspicion and dismisses as wasteful, playful, and disruptive, any 
convention outside the spaces of work, the military ideology that looks down on 
civilians as licentious, feminine, and lacking in discipline, etc.). In other words, I 
examine accounts of political protest and other spaces that escape the State’s gaze in 
the Egyptian and European archives, regardless of whether they were intended as fact 
or fiction, “as the ethnologist examines the myths of ‘primitive society’, [assuming] 
that these ‘world outlooks’ are largely imaginary, i.e. do not ‘correspond to reality’,” 
while “[admitting] that they do make allusion to reality.”61 
This is not to say that the distinction between genres, especially between the 
factual and the fictive, is completely irrelevant. In fact, in order to establish the 
dominance of a certain ideology or a certain mode of ideological representation, it is 
important to show how the same pattern of ideological representation can be observed 
across genres. Only then we can argue that the ideology in question is pervasive, 
hegemonic, and dominant; that it dominates both our perception of what is real and 
our imagination of what is unreal or only relatively real, that it comes out in 
imagination and fiction, as much as it shapes reporting on reality. That the licentious 
revolutionary comes out in journalistic reports (in Arabic, English, and French, 
ranging from the sensationalist {e.g. Ruz al-Yusuf} to the more serious {e.g. Akhbar 
al-Yawm and al-Jawa’ib}, and spanning the 19th to the 21st century) in the speeches of 
army generals, in films, and in commentaries by second rate comedic actors-cum-
propagandists appearing on sports talk shows, in colonial reports and 19th century 






the licentious revolutionary is an effect of a dominant ideology or a set of dominant 
ideologies that persist across time and are able to materialize in disparate and 
generically distinct discourses. 
Thematic	Mappings 
This study starts off with the question of what/who are the bad subjects and what are 
the spaces that produce them. Throughout this study, the crowd (especially the 
revolutionary crowd) along with other spaces of protest will recur as the natural 
habitat of the licentious subject and the quintessential licentious space. This 
dissertation, however, is not a study of the crowd per se, but rather a search for 
licentious, failed, and bad subjects in spaces that evade the State’s gaze or lack its 
sanction. Chapter 1 pursues the question of what happens, according to statist 
representations, when the power of the State to survey/surveill and discipline 
collapses, weakens, or is evaded. Opposed to the metaphysics of the State, or the 
metaphysics of modernity (as per Timothy Mitchell’s formulation) which are 
embodied in the modern State, there is a metaphysics of disorder, of perversion, of 
things that the State should have otherwise restrained going astray, of moral and 
biological degeneration, of chaos and licentiousness. In the Arabic archive, these 
physical and metaphysical conceptions of chaos were coded in terms like infilat 
(setting loose, letting go of bounds, a term which also gives the sense of a 
deterioration) inqilab (overturning), inhilal (coming undone, dissolution, 
degeneration) and fawda (chaos). Chapter 1 examines the appearance of these terms, 
with special attention to the various connotations of degeneration leading up to sexual 
chaos—  and thus revisits the representation of the 2011 Tahrir Square sit-in as a 
scene of utter sexual chaos. Chapter 2 uses these representations of sexual chaos to 




orgy (through taking up and revising Ernst Curtius’ concept of the literary topos). Just 
like sit-ins and other licentious spaces, the Dionysian orgy constituted a space that 
escaped the public gaze and was therefore suspected of all sorts of license, from dance 
and intoxication to illicit sex. The explicit and implicit recurrence of the orgy (and its 
successor, the Satanic ritual)62 in the archive (both the colonial and the Egyptian 
postcolonial, as well as other counterrevolutionary discourses in 20th century Euro-
America) suggests that a modern reimagining of the Dionysian orgy by colonial and 
counterrevolutionary ideologists shaped the conception of licentious space. 
Furthermore, the orgy represented a collective in which individuality dissolves, 
causing not only regression to a pre-individual (and thus pre-civilizational) phase, but 
also further defiance of the State’s gaze, bent to count its subjects. In that effect, the 
orgy is like the crowd, offering the same challenge to a State that interpellates its 
subjects as individuals. This similarity explains the common conflation of crowds 
with orgies in various 19th and 20th century representations. Chapter 2 closes with a 
discussion of the orgy and the crowd. This discussion also shows how both the crowd 
and the orgy were always projected onto the Orient.  
The search for bad subjects in the licentious spaces they inhabit uncovers the 
Social Darwinist basis inherent in the formation of the modern subject (already coded 
in Freud’s appropriation of Ernst Haeckel’s notion that “ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny”), thus placing colonialism at the centre of this study. In Chapter 1, the 
degeneration of the subject along biological, racial, and civilizational lines appears as 
a recurrent attribute of the licentious space and subject. In Chapters 1 and 3 the Arab 







appears as a model of bad subjectivity, used both in the colony and the metropole. 
Chapter 2, although not dealing with race, argues that the use of the topos of the orgy 
in Egypt was an effect of a colonial process, or of impulsive cultural impositions that 
erased earlier less voyeuristic modes of power. This chapter also shows how “Oriental 
mysteries” have consistently played a part in the imagining of licentious spaces, 
whether in the imagining of the Dionysian orgy as an Oriental mystery, or in 
imagining the Orient as a space beyond representation and order (which places the 
Orient in the same category as the crowd). Chapter 3 discusses how European 
colonialism produced the concept of licentious space, not only in Egypt or the colony 
more broadly, but also in the metropole. It explores how the process of cultural 
colonialism produced a discursive revolving door through which Europe’s racial 
others (including the Muslim and the Arab) were subsumed into Europe’s notion of its 
metropolitan licentious crowd, while projecting its licentious crowds and its notions 
of licentiousness onto the colonies (including Egypt). The Egyptian discourse on the 
licentious crowd was thus largely shaped under colonial conditions that already 
mapped the Egyptian onto the abnegated and the licentious. Chapter 4 examines the 
discursive effects of this psychic trauma, which posits a certain version of the self as 
the licentious other. It explores how Arab and especially Egyptian representations of 
licentious space, even (especially) the ones that aim to reverse the Orientalist trope of 
a sensual and licentious Orient by depicting the licentious space as essentially 
Western or Westernized, ultimately re-produce the colonial biases they seek to 
subvert. It will also examine how the Nasserist discourse on the masses was able to 
subvert some of the modernist/colonialist conceptions of the licentious space while 
abiding by others. Ultimately notions of licentious versus proper space, even in the 




and colonial institutions, especially the family and the army, as the proper spaces par 
excellence.  
Chapter 5 examines these proper spaces. It starts with an account of the 
family as a colonial institution that was presented as a model for good spaces and an 
incubator of good subjectivity. The modern family (nuclear, bourgeois, monogamous, 
and most importantly officially registered) does not only enjoy state sanction but also 
submits mating and procreating habits to the attention of the biopolitical State through 
marriage contracts and birth certificates. Similarly the army, though having a more 
fraught history with colonialism than the family, is shown to be an institution modeled 
on, among other things, the colonial army, and thus one that played a central role in 
universalizing Western modes of subjectivity. This chapter concludes with a 
discussion of how the family and the army (amongst other modern institutions, or 
ideological state apparatuses) worked together to promote an Oedipal and 
particularly Western mode of subjectivation. Chapter 5 and the conclusion examine 
what this colonial definition of space and subjectivity entails for the Egyptian subject, 
what it means for the colonized to be subjectivated through an ideology (and an 
ideological organization and division of space) that not only idealizes the colonizer 
but also abnegates the colonized (the short answer is, obviously, a Fanonian trauma).  
Final	Notes	on	Terminology	Transliteration	and	Citation	
Throughout this study, many Arabic terms will appear, in their original form, not only 
as empirical samples but also as conceptual and theoretical tools.  My insistence on 
theorizing through Arabic terms is not to be seen as an attempt to render the Arabic 
archive, and the Arabic concepts and terms found in it, distant, inaccessible, or exotic. 




although I attempt to theorize the archive on its own terms, my analysis will show that 
European concepts (like civilization and degeneration) dominated Arab- or at least 
Egyptian thought, at least since the late 19th century (to various degrees and with 
various levels of internalization). Instead, my purpose is to invoke the richness of 
these Arabic terms and the array of concepts they cover. Despite this richness, 
throughout the 19th-21st centuries, these terms were mobilized in a manner that 
rendered Arabic modern discourse a mimicry or derivative of (and in rare cases a 
response to)  Western discourses. Even then, nevertheless, the Arabic terms can better 
refer to the specific articulation of colonial concepts within an Arab context. The term 
inhilal, for example, brings together the breaking loose of state bounds with the 
concepts of biological and moral degeneration (concepts that are interrelated in the 
colonial episteme) in ways the term degeneration does not. In addition, sometimes the 
Arabic translations, through their rich semantic valence, signify layers of meaning 
that are implicit though not semantically registered in the English and French terms. 
The term inqilab (which was used to translate upheaval and revolution among other 
terms, and which in modern Arabic means a coup d’etat), for example, especially in 
its usage in late 19th century texts, signifies an overturning of an upright order of 
things under revolutionary chaos, a feature that belongs to 19th century Western 
conceptions of the State but is not clearly captured by any of the English terms used 
(unless we understand revolution as literally overturning). My usage of Arabic terms 
is therefore not different from the usage of German terms in explications of Hegelian 
thought or the usage of French terms in explications of structuralist thought. While 
some of the Arabic terms I use were coined in the 19th century as translations of 
English and French terms, studying the Arabic term registers the circulation of the 




Arabic terms stems from my rejection of the notion that European languages are 
research languages while Arabic is an archive language. If this inadvertently or 
inevitably adds a layer of inaccessibility to these terms and the archive they come 
from, so be it.  
For the Arabic terms I will be using the transliteration system used by the 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES) with slight modifications- 
for example the terminal  ه and ة will be transliterated as ah rather than a— a grave 
phonetic mistake with grave consequences in terms of prosody which IJMES insists 
on ignoring. When a term is circulated in its vernacular Egyptian form, I will provide 
transliteration in both the fusha and the colloquial. Arabic terms will only be italicized 
when referenced as terms– consistent with the italicization of words used as terms as 
per the Chicago Manual of Style. Lengthy quotations and block quotes will be 
provided in the original Arabic script. Given the richness of the Arabic language and 
the type of sources I will use (which include poetry, belle-lettre, satire, cartoons, etc.), 
it will be impossible to provide an accurate translation of all Arabic quotations. When 
an exact translation is not possible, I will paraphrase the text as part of my analysis. 
The same method will be followed with French citations. 
Consistent with the Chicago Manual’s recommendations concerning 
classical English poetry, all poems (English, Arabic, and French) will only be cited in 
text through providing their title. Publication details will only be provided when the 
discussion pertains to the specific details of the print edition.  
All citations from Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities refer to the Dover 
edition, in a departure from the standard practice in Dickensian and English Literature 




edition was the one readily available for purchase while I was working on this 
dissertation. Other than that, citations from the Tale will follow the standard practice 







The State and Its Discontents: The Mythologies of Order and Chaos 
	
This study posits that modern political conceptions of the State entrust the latter with 
Order, with restraining what should be restrained, and with repressing what/who 
should be repressed, all of which are mystified under the guise of the comfort and 
security of the members of society. Conversely, political dissent, revolt, revolution, 
and activities that are perceived to challenge the State one way or another, are 
produced in dominant ideologies as the eruption of disorder, chaos, and 
licentiousness. This chapter will mostly strive to explore the latter, though an 
overview of the former is in order. 
The triumph of this conception of the State was played out in two inseparable 
battlegrounds, one theoretical, the other practical-material. In the first battleground, a 
litany of ideological discourses venerating the State, positing it as the custodian of the 
natural order of things, and entrusting it with the wellbeing of its subjects, was 
produced, circulated, and canonized as political theory. The second battlefront was the 
material: the material events through which the State identified its enemies, subjected 
them to disciplinary practices and/or to sheer violence, and stressed its presence at 
their expense. This battleground comprised (at least) two battlefronts: one against 
revolutions, uprisings, and revolts in the European metropole, in other words the 
battle to subdue, contain, and repress the metropolitan crowd; the other against the 
colonies. To refer to this battleground as material, acknowledging the material events 
around which these battles were fought and articulated, is not to deny the discursive 
aspect of these battles. In addition to political theories which were involved in and/or 




confrontations engendered various discursive effects: novels (like Dickens’ A Tale of 
Two Cities, which deals with the French Revolution but is written in the aftermath of 
the 1848 revolutions), bodies of knowledge on the crowd  (like Gustave LeBon’s The 
Crowd, written in the aftermath of – and largely as a response to- the Paris Commune 
of 1871),63 and scientific discourses on deviance, insanity, and gender (most notably 
surrounding the Paris Commune, coinciding with the rise of bourgeois sciences, as I 
will show throughout this chapter and in Chapter 3), effects which outlived the 
respective events in which they were anchored.  
The two battlegrounds, the theoretical and the material, were of course 
inseparable (indeed the Althusserian formulation to which this study subscribes 
acknowledges the materiality of ideology);64 indeed my separation of the material and 
the theoretical through the metaphor of battlegrounds has its limitations. Theories in 
general, political theories in particular, and especially theories of the State are not 
suspended in a vacuum: they are articulated through events which simultaneously 
shape and are shaped by them (and here I deal with political theory as inseparable 
from, yet irreducible to, the discourse surrounding the material political and social 

















Egyptian Statist and counterrevolutionary discourses are concerned, the series of 
material events to which the discourse, theories, and ideologies of the State were 
anchored included the French Revolution (the counterrevolutionary representation 
thereof largely available to an Egyptian audience through Dickens’ A Tale of Two 
Cities) the Paris Commune (an important moment, as I will show throughout this 
study, in the rise of the discourses, ideologies, and bodies of knowledge surrounding 
the State and subjectivity, and an event which presented the Arabic readership, in 
Egypt and elsewhere, with the first mass-mediated encounter with crowd and 
revolution, mainly through the Istanbul based al-Jawa’ib newspaper), the ‘Urabi 
revolt (the first Egyptian experience in revolt in the age of crowds, or in other words 
the first Egyptian mass mobilization to be mass-mediated, thus producing the first 
discourse on the Egyptian crowd, and also an event which marked the birth of the first 
wave of Egyptian nationalism, and ultimately an apt occasion for 
counterrevolutionary authors and forces – Arab and European- to deploy the 
discursive tools that were developed as a response to the Commune in considering the 
Egyptian crowd), the ensuing British occupation, the 1919 revolt, the Mubarak 
regime’s confrontations with the Islamists and other licentious internal others (most 
notably the Satanists) in the 1990s, and of course the confrontations between the 
Egyptian State and the opposition in the early 2000s, culminating in the 2011 
showdown and later in the 2013 coup d’état.  












Since this chapter aims to understand what happens, according to the 
ideological conception of the State which fixes the latter as the upholder of Order, 
when this State is challenged, I will first examine briefly what the State is imagined to 
hold in place, and how Order is coded and/or entrusted with the State. This 
necessitates an overview of some of the dominant theories-cum-ideologies of the 
State.  
As the Ethnologist Examines the Myths of a ‘Primitive Society’: A Brief Survey of 
the Mythologies of the State 
In the introduction, I have invoked Althusser’s argument that to study ideology “from 
a critical point of view” one needs to approach ideological beliefs the way one would 
myths, thus exposing the relationship of allusion/illusion they bear to the world they 
represent and the relations of power that produce them. For our study this means 
considering theories of the State as mythologies. In this light, I will start this chapter 
by exploring a number of theories of the State, specifically those that reify, venerate, 
or champion the State or sovereign power, as mythologies, exposing the running 
mythologeme of order (or Order, in the absolute) as something that is embodied 
within the State.  As I am dealing with the State as a modern structure that was 
imposed through colonial modernity, and given the constraints of space, my account 
will deal with Western theories of the State, bracketing the question of whether there 
were alternative genealogies that were part of the production of the modern State in 
Egypt. By establishing the mythologeme of order, in theories/ideological 
representations/mythologies of the State, I will lay the groundwork for exploring the 
kinds of disorder and chaos that are produced through these mythologies (and through 




ideologists, and propagandists) as the telos of revolt, revolution, or any other form of 
evading, challenging, or eschewing the gaze of the State.  
	
 The first ideologist-mythologist of the State, or at least the first among the 
ones canonized as theorists and political philosophers, is, without a doubt, Plato.66 For 
Plato, government can only be good and true when a strict hierarchy is followed: the 
guardians; the people of wisdom, at the top, followed by auxiliaries, the people of 
higher passions (like courage and enthusiasm) who are suitable for military training 
and who could put their passions to good use under the rule of the guardians, and then 
finally the common people, (sometimes called artisans, husbandmen or producers, 
depending on the translation) whose base desires need to be subjected to the control of 
the rationality of the guardians, via the military prowess of the auxiliaries. This 
topology of power codes class and political hierarchy as a natural order of things, and 
further mystifies it as a reflection of a natural and metaphysical order: a natural 
hierarchy of the immaterial forms, which needs to be faithfully reenacted in the 
material world. 
This Platonic conception of political order as reflective of a general 
metaphysical order of things was later synthesized (by Muslim and medieval 
Christian philosophers-cum-ideologists alike) into the neo-Platonic notion of the 
Great Chain of Being: a strict hierarchy of the metaphysical and physical orders, with 
God atop the metaphysical order, and the king atop the physical-political order. 
Breach of sovereign power, according to this theory/ideology/mythology, is a breach 







various natural and supranatural perversions; this conception was most lucidly 
presented in the writings of William Shakespeare, where the usurpation of political 
power led to wild storms in King Lear, and in Macbeth to storms and to owls hawking 
and preying on falcons (mirroring the reversal of the order of things when Macbeth 
killed Duncan and usurped his throne), to horses simultaneously rebelling against the 
authority of men  (paralleling the rebellion of subservient men against their naturally 
ordained sovereign) and practicing cannibalism (paralleling the perversion of 
Macbeth killing his own kin).67 Five or six centuries later, propagandists and 






















all) from these conceptions. The discourse on fire spreading at moments of political 
chaos, which, as I will show, has been a salient and persistent feature of 
representations of revolution, from the Paris Commune to the 2011 uprising, 
recapitulates the notion that a breach of political order results in natural and supra-
natural perversions. The Egyptian State will echo this conception of Order by 
inventing effeminate men, manly women, sexual deviants, and Islamists as 
perversions of nature and/or degenerate forms of life that only surface when the 
State’s gaze is averted, and by representing the sit-in of January-February 2011 as 
populated by such figures.  
In the sixteenth century, these metaphysical conceptions of Order were 
supplanted (though only partially and temporarily) by materialist and practical 
conceptions that preserved the coding of order into sovereign power (or what could be 
considered as primordial forms of the State): this is indeed the case with the theories 
of Thomas Hobbes. While Hobbes shunned – one could even say dispelled or strove 
to dispel- the metaphysical and religious foregroundings and justifications of 
sovereign power, he provided more material and practical justifications for 
authority.68 More importantly, Hobbes preserved the dichotomy of order and chaos, 
both conceived in practical and material terms, rather than in the earlier metaphysical 
ones (which makes submitting to this power more urgent: what is at stake for Hobbes 
is no longer the metaphysical and mystical harmony of things, but the subject’s own 
comfort, security, and life). For Hobbes, sovereignty, the Leviathan, or what we call 







everyman.”69 Disorder, which predates and continues to underlie and haunt sovereign 
power, and is imminent in its collapse, is a general state of torment in which “life of 
man [is] solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”70 By coding this state of disorder 
as a state of nature, Hobbes registered the emerging dichotomy of culture versus 
nature, and marked the inauguration of the entrustment of the former to the State. In 
addition, by using the “savage people in many places of America” as an exemplar to 
the state of nature, Hobbes fixed to political theory the relegation of Europe’s racial 
others – along with the very concept of disorder— to a backwards stage that is closer 
to nature, and that the modern European State was thought to surpass. For Hobbes, 
political disorder is Native American—or more broadly, savage. Later representations 
(which I will examine throughout this study) did not depart from this Hobbesian 
understanding. Any time the power of the State is challenged, the inherent risk in such 
a challenge is the reversion not only to a state of chaos and strife, but also to a lower 
evolutionary stage closer to nature, and to the warring tribes of America, Africa, and 
Arabia. 
We have, therefore, two intersecting trends: One is metaphysical, wherein 
the State is predicated on and upholds a natural, physical and metaphysical order of 
things, the breach thereof leads to all forms of natural and supra-natural perversities; 
the other is material, wherein the State prevents a general state of war and strife, and 
therefore any breach of State power will lead to people reverting back to war, killing, 
pillaging, and raping one another. Notions of disenchantment and progress 








lead us to think that the metaphysical aspect of the State was dealt the fatal blow by 
Hobbes, never to return. Nothing, however, can be further from the truth. Western 
political thought entered the 19th century with a revamped version of the theories of 
divine right of government, of political power as fixed into a metaphysical order, and 
of the State as “the march of God in the world.” This was clearly the thought of Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the thinker who set the intellectual tone for the 19th century 
(at least until Marx overturned his philosophy).  
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel tells the story of the mystical being he 
calls Spirit, and how it comes to know itself – in a way the history of the divine 
coming to realize itself in the human subject and vice versa, a fable for the 
Althusserian mode of (mis)recognition between subject and Subject, elevated to the 
level of an absolute truth.71 Throughout the Phenomenology, nevertheless, Hegel does 
not tell us what this Spirit is, or, if we interpret the Spirit to be a divine being, what 
the vehicle of recognition between this divine and the human is – though hints are 
dropped in his section on the terror, which ambiguously tells the story of the French 
Revolution. In this section, titled “Absolute Freedom and Terror,” Hegel relates the 
story of how the Spirit aimed to supersede individual consciousness for the sake of a 
collective general will. The Spirit, however, was only able to supersede the individual 
through a blood bath, thus bringing its own destruction (which has commonly been 












to come back now loaded with the universal. Through this individual subject coming 
back to individuality while loaded and seasoned with the experience of the universal 
(i.e. through what sublates the French Revolution, in other words through the 
Napoleonic State) the Spirit came a step closer to knowing itself.73  Only in the 
Phenomenology’s sequel, the Philosophy of Right, does Hegel clarify that by 
providing the history of the Spirit, he was providing a history of the State. Hegel 
notes: 
The state as a completed reality is the ethical whole and the actualization of freedom. It is 
the absolute purpose of reason that freedom should be actualized. The state is the spirit, 
which abides in the world and there realizes itself consciously; while in nature it is realized 
only as the other of itself or the sleeping spirit. Only when it is present on consciousness, 
knowing itself as an existing object, is it the state. In thinking of freedom we must not take 
our departure from individuality or the individual’s self-consciousness. Let man be aware of 
it or not, this essence realizes itself as an independent power, in which particular persons are 
only phases. The state is the march of God in the world; its ground or cause is the power of 
reason realizing itself as will74 (emphases added). 
 
This passage is key for deciphering Hegel’s Phenomenology. Now that we know that 
“[t]he state is the spirit” we can justify our earlier interpretation of the terror in Hegel 
as the French Revolutionary Terror, and the Spirit that comes out of this Terror 
knowing itself as the post-French Revolution, (i.e. the Napoleonic) State. We can 
now comprehend Alexandre Kojève’s interpretation of the Phenomenology as the 
history of the rise of the modern nation State, an ode to the Napoleonic state and a 
prophecy for its triumph (a prophecy that was fulfilled as Hegel was finishing the 










Hegel’s perfect and self-conscious Man, standing at the precipice of Absolute 
Knowledge (thus conquering the world both materially and ideologically, both 
subjectively and objectively) is, according to the Kojèvean reading, the conqueror and 
the philosopher combined, or, to put it in more cynical terms, Napoleon if he hires 
Hegel as an advisor.76 
The metaphysical fanfare of Hegel’s theories was later routinized into more 
rational and disenchanted theories of the State; clearly in Max Weber’s early 20th 
century proclamation of the state to be “a human community that (successfully) 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” 
(emphasis in original).77 The statement can be read as positive or normative, a simple 
empirical observation that “if no social institutions existed which knew the use of 
violence, then the concept of ‘state’ would be eliminated,” or an ideological 
upholding of the State as “the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence.” Yet, even if 
we read Weber’s statement as positivist and empirical,78 and even if we brush aside 
empirical data which trouble or put in question Weber’s empirical proposition (which 
states at the time of Weber’s famous speech – 1919-  did in fact successfully 
monopolize physical force or lay an exclusive claim to the legality of exercising 
violence?) a statist ideology is at play: through a performative tautology, Weber 















produces violence that is not practiced or sanctioned by the State as illegitimate. This 
dichotomy that places legitimate violence on the side of the State and illegitimate 
violence on the side of non-state actors persists in the global discourse on terrorism 
and insurgency, including its Egyptian subsidiary; the army demolishing homes in 
Sinai is practicing legitimate violence, while terror attacks by Sinai based Islamist 
insurgents are illegitimate, not only from a legal viewpoint but also from the 
viewpoint of media representations, the same way a US or Israeli missile is legitimate 
while a bomb by an insurgent organization (Islamist or otherwise) is terrorism.79 Or, 
to take the discussion back to the case of Egyptian counterrevolutionary discourse, the 
police and the army brutally suppressing or slaughtering demonstrators (like they did 
in the massacre of Rabi‘ah al-‘Adawiyyah in 2013) are carrying out their prerogative 
as agents of order and of its legitimate violence, while protestors engaged in arson or 
in exchanging fire with the police are criminals committing illegitimate acts of 
violence.  
In fact, the State’s monopoly over legitimate violence is but an index of the 
larger state monopoly over legitimacy as such. The end of the 19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th century marked the moment of the consolidation of the 
(Western) model of the State that recognizes legitimate property, legitimate marriage 
contracts and birth certificates (to mention an example that will recur throughout this 
study), legitimate scientific certifications and academic degrees (through producing 
the educational institution as a state apparatus or a state-sanctioned apparatus), etc. In 









and philosopher Pierre Bourdieu summarized this notion through a reformulation of 
the Weberian idiom: “one may generalize,” Bourdieu noted, “Weber’s well known 
formula and see in the state the holder of the monopoly of legitimate symbolic 
violence. Or, more precisely, the state is a referee, albeit a powerful one, in struggles 
over this monopoly.”80 Unlike Weber, however, Bourdieu was quick to note the 
contingency and frailty of this monopoly: “there are always in any society” Bourdieu 
noted with emphasis in the original transcription of his lecture, “conflicts between 
symbolic powers that aim at imposing the vision of legitimate divisions.”81 The late 
19th and early 20th century also marked the universalization and imposition of this 
model, through colonialism, which we will revisit throughout this study.  
We see therefore a trend, from Plato to Weber and beyond, in associating the 
State with the natural and metaphysical order of things, with the comfort and security 
of its members, with legitimacy and with defining what is legitimate and what is not. 
The conceptions thereof have ranged from the metaphysical (like Plato’s and Hegel’s) 
to the fiduciary (like Hobbes’ and Weber’s, the latter’s mystifying tautology and 
appeal to the metaphysical and mythological concept of the legitimate 
notwithstanding).  
This mythological conception of the State was coded, especially in the 19th 
century, in the term Order, which conjured at once the notions of political order and 
the natural order of things – and which also became the name of Europe’s 
quintessential counterrevolutionary party, the Party of Order, representing the claims 







Beyond the claims of the defeated monarchy, Order was consistently attributed to 
what lied on the side of the State. During the armed confrontations preceding the 
downfall of the Paris Commune, for example, the army of Versailles was referred to 
as the army of order (in a manner that anticipated the Weberian formulation: only the 
army of the State-cum-counterrevolution, with its legitimacy over the use of force, is 
an agent of order).82 Consistent with this appellation, the powers of the State, of 
counterrevolution, or of Versailles in the case of the Commune, were presented as 
bringing peace and order, while the rebels bringing destruction and anarchy/chaos 
(and were produced and represented through a panoply of perversions including 
degeneration, hysteria, and insanity/pyromania). 
In Arabic, in the late 19th century, this mystifying notion of Order was 
commonly referred to using the yet more mystifying term Rahah (lit. comfort).  The 
term was used, for example by the ‘Urabist press, which tried to claim that, under the 
‘Urabi government, things were in order (or, to be literal, in comfort).83 It was used in 
the same context by Istanbul-based detractors of ‘Urabi, arguing for an absence of 
order-qua-comfort that could only be restored through a direct Ottoman military 


















the State’s monopoly over legitimate force (again in anticipation of Weber) is 
embodied. By using comfort as a signifier of Order, the emergent modern Arabic 
discourse reveals something that was already implicit in Western Statist discourse: 
namely that political order instills a general state of harmony that results in the 
general comfort of society (clearly an ideological concept conflating the comfort of 
society with that of its ruling classes). Rahah is indeed the opposite of a life that is 
nasty, poore, brutish, and short. Although the term rahah was soon replaced by the 
sterner signifier nizam,85 the conception of the State as the custodian of order-qua-
comfort, and of revolution and rebellion as a breach of this order and that comfort, 
persists. Counterrevolutionary depictions of the uprising of 2011, reduced the events 
to prison break-outs, looting, arson, the obstruction of traffic, the delay of public 
works, the inability to cash salaries and other payments, to shop, to go to work, to 
send children to schools, to buy food, in other words, an all-encompassing state of 
discomfort. Mythologies of the State have thus consistently mystified State power as 
Order, and confused the latter with comfort. In the subsequent sections we will not 
examine order, comfort, or rahah but rather their discontents.  
 
The	Signifiers	of	Disorder	
Disorder, on the other side, acquired a number of signifiers including infilat 
(looseness, letting loose, which was sometimes used to depict the events of 2011, 











restrained by the State),  fawda (chaos/anarchy), thawrah (which in the 19th century 
meant excitement and invoked a certain lack of restraint, before it later came to mean 
revolution), hayaj/hayajan (which like thawrah signified a state of 
excitement), fitnah (sedition, discord, confusion, strife), inqilab (the overturning of 
things, before it came to mean coup d’état), and inhilal (becoming loose, coming 
undone, dissolution, degeneration, decadence).  
Among the discontents of rahah, at least two terms (thawrah and 
hayaj/hayajan) signify a state of excitement, excess, and lack of restraint (thus in a 
way anticipating infilat). It is also interesting that these two terms, in a certain 
context, can acquire sexual connotations. This is especially the case with the term 
hayaj/hayajan, which, in the contemporary Egyptian vernacular (and a number of 
other Arabic colloquials), mostly refers to sexual excitement and arousal, or functions 
as a tongue-in-cheek reference thereof. It is as if sexual chaos as the telos of political 
dissent (something this study aims to dissect) is already coded in the terminology 
used. In a similar manner, the terms infilat and inhilal may in a certain context 
suggest moral looseness and moral degeneration. While I argue throughout this 
chapter that the association between revolution and political chaos on the one side, 
and moral looseness and sexual chaos on the other, is an ideological association rather 
than one that is semantic or that has always already been coded in language, it is 
useful to think of how terminology lent support to this ideological association, and 
how the coding of the withering or collapse of State power in terms that may in other 
contexts suggest looseness, falling apart, or the collapse of restraint, suggests a 19th 





The terms inqilab and inhilal both signify through negation a normal or 
natural order that is preserved by the State and is otherwise being overturned or taken 
apart. These two terms appeared early on in Arabic representations of revolution and 
revolt; they begin to appear in the 1871 coverage of the Paris Commune by the 
Istanbul-based al-Jawa’ib newspaper, which was one of the most important 
newspapers of the time, widely read and referenced by other newspapers, and 
enjoying the patronage of the Egyptian Khedives Isma‘il and Tawfiq, of the Ottoman 
Sultan at some points, and of the British government at others.86 Its owner and editor 
in chief, Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, was a leading intellectual figure at the time. In 
addition to his journalistic career, al-Shidyaq was a professional translator (whose 
translation of the bible was rejected by the mostly foreign European and Euro-
American protestant missionaries in Syria because of how it attempted to mimic the 
eloquence of the Qur’an), and a belle-lettrist, whose avant-garde fictionalized 
autobiography al-Saq ‘ala al-Saq fi ma Huwa al-Faryaq is sometimes credited of 
being the first Arabic novel. He is also credited with coining modern Arabic 
expressions such as bakhirah (for steam ship) and, more importantly for the context of 
this study, both shuyu‘iyyah (communism) and ishtirakiyyah (socialism). The 
appearance of certain terminology in his coverage, therefore, cannot be taken as 














In 1871, during the events of the Paris Commune, al-Jawa’ib provided a 
comprehensive coverage,87 not only through translating English and French news 
reports, but also through a number of editorials written by al-Shidyaq, often 
denouncing the alleged excesses and transgressions of the rebels. A decade later, 
when the events of the ‘Urabi revolt unfolded (1881- 1882) al-Jawa’ib offered an 
equally comprehensive (and sometimes equally counterrevolutionary) coverage of the 
events. At that later point in time, al-Jawa’ib was run by Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq’s 
son and protégé, Salim, though literary critics believe that al-Shidyaq Sr. continued to 
supervise the work of his son.88 During the events of the ‘Urabi revolt, as our analysis 
will show, al-Jawa’ib replicated many motifs of the anti-Commune propaganda and 
deployed them against the ‘Urabi revolt.89 Our examination of the occurrence of the 
terms inqilab and inhilal will therefore start with (but will not be limited to) tracing 
their emergence in al-Jawa’ib’s coverage of the two revolts. 
 
Inqilab: the Upright Order of Things and its Overturning 
“that a man in good clothes should be going to prison, was no more remarkable than that a labourer in 
working clothes should be going to work” (Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities, 3.1.196) 
“Looking at the Jury and the turbulent audience, he might have thought that the usual order of things 
was reversed, and that the felons were trying the honest men. The lowest, cruelest, and worst populace 
of a city, never without its quantity of low, cruel, and bad, were directing the scene.”  (Charles 















In the late 19th century and through the early 20th, the term inqilab recurred as the 
signifier of unexpected change, upheaval, turmoil, etc.90 It repeatedly appeared in 
Salim Faris al-Shidyaq’s (highly unsympathetic) coverage of the ‘Urabi revolt, where 
it signified the overturning of things to the worse.91 Around the same time the 
mouthpiece of the ‘Urabist movement, al-Mufid92 saw English intervention as 
tantamount to inqilab.93 The term would persist as the signifier of upheaval in the 
early 20th century: in Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul’s translation of Gustave LeBon’s The 
Crowd, inqilab was used to translate terms like great upheavals (al-inqilabat al-
‘azimah),94political upheavals,95 and terrible disturbances.96 The turning over of 
things upside down (i.e. their inqilab), presumes that there is a natural or normalized 























upright order look like, and what are the elements that are kept at its bottom and 
threaten it with an “overturning” if it were not kept in place by the government? 
A closer look at the Arabic 19th century description of order and its 
overturning reveals this order to be of a much older pedigree, that of Plato’s. In their 
reports on 1871 and 1882, al-Shidyaq Sr. and Jr. respectively prescribed a hierarchy 
which implicitly invoked the Platonic order. In the hierarchy of the two Shidyaqs, at 
the top there is ahl al-siyasah (the people of government/of sound opinion, thus 
corresponding to Plato’s guardians),97 then al-hay’ah al ‘askariyyah (the military 
establishment, thus corresponding to Plato’s auxiliaries) and finally al-‘ammah (the 
commoners) who when not restrained by the two former classes would run amok, 




















prevent	the	excesses	of	the	commoners:	 عزاو مھل نكی مل اذإف رشلا ىلع نولوبجم ماوعلا نأ ىلع ءانب اذھ لوقأ امنإو











This Platonic understanding of politics was shared by the ‘Urabi press, whose writers 
belonged to a cultural and social milieu familiar with Plato and his philosophy.99 The 
‘Urabist mouthpiece, al-Mufid appeared on 27 Jumada al-Thani 1299 (15/5/1882) 
with a Platonic editorial titled “al-Ummah wa al-Wazi‘,” (The nation/ummah and 
restraint). It starts by proclaiming it to be a “well-known fact” that there are three 
ranks (maratib) of nufus (selves/psyches/souls). These three types correspond closely 
to Plato’s: the first is malakiyyah (royal, kingly, stately, governmental), which enjoys 
the faculty of reason (al-quwwah al-‘aqilah or mental capabilities). The second is 
asadiyyah (lion-like) and enjoys the faculty of passion or anger (al-quwwah al-
ghadabiyyah). The last is the animal-like or beastly (bahimiyyah),100 which is 
characterized by the faculty of desire (al quwwah al-shahawiyyah).101 When the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 												 	
of	the	Khedive	by	the	occupying	army,	al-Shidyaq	jr.	sings	the	praises	of	al-hay’ah	al-siasiyyahover	
that	of	al-hay’ah	al-siasiyyah:	  يدیأ يف تراص مث ةیركسع ةئیھ يدیأ يف تناك نیح رصم يف قرفلا وھ اذھف ةیسایس ةئیھ




























faculty of reason reigns supreme, this leads to rahah (comfort-order) and ‘adl 
(fairness, balance, justice). Following the other two faculties could prove disastrous. 
Passion may cause one’s blood to boil with thawrah (excitement), leading one to exit 
from the world of humans to the realm of beasts.102 Following desires also leads to 
ruin, manifest in sickness in this world and punishment in the hereafter. Therefore, 
according to the editorial, wazi’ (restraint, understood here as corresponding to the 
royal faculty of reason) is necessary, not only at the level of the individual, but also at 
the level of the ummah/nation.  
We see in the late 19th century, therefore, the libidinal element (shahawat in 
al-Shidyaq,103 bahimiyyah in al-Mufid) allocated to the masses, and the rational and 
restraining function allocated to the government. This is not dissimilar from how the 
discourse on the crowd emerged in Europe in the late 19th century, producing the 
crowd as the space of the irrational, the libidinal, and the unconscious.104 This 
similarity is not surprising, given the Western sources on which al-Shidyaq relied 
(and given the Platonic origins of both European and Arab late nineteenth century 
discourses). The libidinal, irrational, and incendiary eruptions that we observe in 
contemporary counterrevolutionary depictions of revolt (and which were most evident 
in 2011 Egypt) do not depart from this Platonic understanding of government and 
psyche, or from the 19th century appropriations of it.  













Tampering with this hierarchy leads not only to the overturning (inqilab) of 
the system but also to its total dissolution (inhilal). In al-Jawa’ib’s reports and 
editorials on the Commune, al-Shidyaq expressed his fear that the army’s siding with 
the rebels and the absence of a government to restrain things would lead to “the total 
dissolution/degeneration of government”  ًلالاحنا ةموكحلا لحنت ذئنیحو ًقلطم ا105  (which in turn 
would lead to the demise/decadence/withering of France: indithar faransa).106 
 
Inhilal:	The	Discourses	of	Looseness	and	Degeneration	
At a time when European counterrevolutionary thinkers were concerning themselves 
with decay, decadence, and degeneration (both as the metaphorical or literal outcome 
of revolt and as a condition borne by the crowds),107 two terms that signify, one way 
or another, the three phenomena, i.e. the terms inhilal and indithar, appeared in al-
Shidyaq’s coverage of the Commune.108 Given al-Shidyaq’s encyclopedic knowledge 
of Western intellectual trends, his career as a linguist and a translator, and his writing 



















synonyms,109 I do not take this concurrence to be accidental. Al-Shidyaq was, almost 
certainly, referencing the emerging European discourse on national, moral, and 
biological degeneration. This conjecture becomes more evident once we take into 
consideration that the outcome of this degeneration-dissolution in al-Shidyaq’s report 
was the spread of fasad: corruption, or rot. Al-Shidyaq here provides a full conceit for 
the national body110 suffering from dissolution/degeneration at the hands of the 
rebels/the revolutionary crowd and for which revolution is a kind of corruption, rot, or 
disease, which can spread throughout the body. This brings to mind LeBon’s 
characterization of the crowd as akin to microbes and agents of decay that hasten the 
dissolution of an already dead corpse (a motif which was central for producing 
revolutionaries and dissidents as disease, and as agents of decay).111 Read this way, 
al-Shidyaq’s passage (which anticipated LeBon’s formulation), can be seen as an 
early introduction (for an Arabic readership) of the concept of the national body, of 
government or the State as that which holds that body together (akin to its immune 



















An alternative reading, however, is possible, which focuses on the moral 
rather than the biological. Indeed, both degeneration/inhilal and corruption/fasad can 
also be moral. In a related context, al-Shidyaq has surely characterized the Paris 
Commune with the spread of fasad al-akhlaq (moral corruption or the corruption of 
morals).113 Read this way, al-Shidyaq is introducing the conception of the 
revolutionary space as a space of moral corruption and license, i.e. as the space that 
produces its inhabitants/subjects as licentious. Yet, even moral licentiousness in the 
dominant ideologies of the 19th century was inseparable from notions of civilizational 
and biological degeneration. Read either way, therefore, al-Jawa’ib’s report can 
indeed be seen as inaugurating an Arabic discourse on revolution and the 
revolutionary space as spaces of moral and especially biological degeneration, and 
thus of the revolutionaries as degenerate.  The subsequent account shows how the 
discourse on degeneration and disease was essential, since the late 19th century, for 
the production of the licentious subject and space, how the collapse from Order into 
disorder, discord, and chaos was also coded as a fall from Civilization and Evolution 




















to degeneration and regression, and how narratives of social and especially sexual 
chaos were inseparable from this discourse on degeneration.  
 
Inhilal	as	National	Degeneration114	
From this point onwards, a discourse on the national body, its health, vitality, and life, 
or otherwise its sickness, death, and degeneration, became part of the Egyptian 
nationalist discourse. Against the national body, healthy or sick, existed the foreign 
body, the colonizers and their local stooges who infected the Egyptian and/or Ottoman 
national body. The thinkers of the first wave of Egyptian nationalism (who were part 
of the ‘Urabi revolt) resorted to disease (and especially venereal diseases,115 notably 































sick man complaining about the symptoms of his economic dependence-qua-
sickness,117 and argued that a sick body part needs to be isolated lest it infect the rest 
of the body.118 The second wave of Egyptian nationalism took this vitalist metaphor 
further, producing a discourse on the intruder/interloper who does not belong to the 
Egyptian-Ottoman national body and who tries to undermine national Egyptian and 
Ottoman interests from within, and for this purpose coined the term dakhil (intruder, 
outsider, interloper) and deployed it against its enemies of foreign descent or those 
accused of dubious foreign loyalties.119 The term itself persisted at least until 1961, 
when the Egyptian singer ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz (the famed Egyptian singer who was 
the quintessential singer of nationalist songs in the Nasserist era) in a song that 
narrates the events of Egypt’s occupation and independence, lamented how “my 
mighty homeland, is governed by a Palace and an embassy, and for every interloper 




























[dakhil] in it there exists an office/administrative role [idarah], alongside inebriated 
armies of occupation.”120 
The post-colonial state preserved this discourse (although the term dakhil 
eventually lost currency). This was especially the case under the Mubarak regime, 
wherein the State, despite its complicity with neocolonialism and in search of a cover 
for this complicity, created a paranoiac discourse about Western influence, in which 
foreigners (including tourists) were depicted as smugglers, Mossad and CIA agents, 
and as agents of disease.121 Recapitulating the trope of the venereal disease, which 
was used to represent the degenerative effect of foreign bodies and foreign influence 
as syphilis122 (and which was employed by the first wave of Egyptian nationalists and 
which has long been a recurrent motif for subversive foreign influence in nationalist 
																																								 																			 	
120   إةرابجلا يناطوأ ياز  
 ةرافسبو رصقب ةموكحم  

























discourses worldwide) and at the height, and the aftermath, of the AIDS pandemic,123 
foreign tourists were depicted as smuggling in and spreading AIDS124 (it was not long 
until some of the extremist Islamist groups began to target unarmed tourists, citing the 
alleged role of these tourists in espionage and in spreading lechery and AIDS, a clear 
response to an incitement by State propaganda-paranoia).125 
Soon enough the same discourse, initially deployed against foreign colonial 




































colonially complicit) State, was turned inwards against internal dissidents. It was used 
against the Islamists in the 1990s, and against the licentious revolutionaries in 2011.  
In the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the Egyptian State was locked in a 
confrontation with Islamist dissidents (some of them armed, others non-armed). 
During this confrontation (and as an excuse for the violent measures the State resorted 
to, which included torture and extra-judicial killings), State propaganda depicted the 
Islamists as foreign bodies through two representational strategies: the first focused 
on their foreignness— the foreignness of their shape and habits to that of the rest of 
the Egyptian society – and the foreignness of the interests they served. The second 
depicted them as disease. Both features were most evident in the propaganda 
pamphlet masquerading as an investigative report titled Irhabi taht al-Tamrin (A 
Terrorist in Training). The foreignness of terrorism was stressed in the afterword in 
which a ministry of interior official is quoted attributing terrorism to a foreign 
conspiracy: “the enemies of Egypt” noted the source, who was identified as the 
second in command at the ministry of interior, “know its [high] value … and found no 
way to stab her in the heart except through her children.”126 The disease-like nature of 
the Islamists was presented throughout the report, but clearly ventriloquized through 
an alleged repentant terrorist named ‘Adil ‘Abd al-Baqi, who enjoyed a moment of 
fame in the Egyptian media after his alleged confessions, and who proclaimed: “we 
are microbes/germs [jarathim], we are earth-worms [didan al-ard],”127 and added two 
pages later that he felt he was living among germs and how by joining Islamist groups 







amrad afkarihim].”128 Adjoining foreignness to disease worked, in the rhetoric and 
propaganda of the Egyptian State, to justify the aggressive treatment of terrorism 
(through police violence, arbitrary arrest, torture, etc.). The Egyptian minister of 
interior at the time, Zaki Badr (notorious for the extreme and violent measures his 
police force used against Islamists and other dissidents) expressed this logic in the 
most explicit of terms: In an interview with the state-run Akhbar al-Yawm. Badr 
proclaimed the Islamists to be akin to a tumor in the Egyptian national body, while 
likening police violence and arbitrary arrests to chemotherapy. Badr also 
acknowledged that this aggressive treatment may harm innocent civilians, but for him 
this was justifiable by extending the metaphor of chemotherapy, which might harm 
some of the healthy body organs but is administrated nevertheless for the wellbeing of 
the body as a whole.129 
In a similar fashion, during the events of 2011, the demonstrators were 
represented in state propaganda as foreign bodies, both in the sense that the way they 
carried their bodies, groomed themselves, and behaved were foreign, and that they 
were contagious bodies that did not belong to the Egyptian body politic and that could 


















as “sanitizing” space. The pro-Mubarak group Ana Asif Ya Rayyis, for example, 
posted the picture of a bottle of Dettol disinfectant, as if to suggest that this is the 
solution to the infectious agents in Tahrir Square.131 Another state propagandist, 
actress Samah Anwar, suggested setting the place on fire altogether, perhaps thinking 
of fire as a cleansing agent. Since the late 20th century therefore, with the discourse on 
AIDS, with Minister Zaki Badr’s justifications for arbitrary detention, with the 
abjection of Islamists and other dissidents as a form of disease, and especially with 
the anti-Tahrir pro-government discourse in 2011, we see the State 
associated/entrusted with the health of the nation. The withering thereof, the 
loosening (or inhilal) of its power, and the setting loose (infilat) of things from under 
its grip were therefore tantamount to disease and degeneration.  
The history of dissent as disease and/or degeneration of the political body 
will become clearer once we discuss the historical association of crowds with 
degeneration, the emergence of the crowd-born(e) subject as a degenerate figure, how 
this discourse was articulated against, among other degenerate figures, the Arab (and 
at a certain moment in history, ‘Urabi as the quintessential ‘Arabi), and the emergence 
in these contexts of the figure of the racial degenerate and the sexual savage. All these 
discourses and figures would come together to produce the licentious space and the 
licentious subject in modern state ideology.  













We have thus far explored how the discourse on the national body has also 
produced the enemies of the State as agents of disease and degeneration, something 
we have traced back to LeBon’s theory on the crowd and to the representations of the 
Paris Commune (and their translation into Arabic). Parallel to this trend was the 
closely related trend of depicting crowds and revolutions as spaces of degeneration. 
Here I am not solely referring to metaphorical moral and civilizational degeneration: 
crowds and revolutions were understood to cause the literal biological degenerations 
of their subjects.132  For LeBon (who had already published a pseudo-study on 
degeneration before venturing to pseudo-study crowds and other social 
phenomena),133 crowds caused the withdrawal of brain functions, which left the body 
under the control of the lower nervous centres, thus turning their members into a 
lower evolutionary form134  (hence LeBon’s famous comparison of crowds and their 
members to the lower evolutionary forms consecrated as such by theories of 
evolution, namely women, children, and Europe’s racial others).135 This logic was 
anticipated in the aftermath of the Paris Commune, when the counterrevolutionary 
writer Francisque Sarcey famously attributed the ‘insanity’ of the Commune to a 
nervous shock to which women were more susceptible (and therefore more prone to 
being vicious or ferocious revolutionaries) due to their weaker evolutionary form that 












evolutionary biological regression, articulated through the degenerate figure of the 
woman (among other degenerate figures in LeBon), is associated with crowds and 
their actions. I will now examine how the understanding of degeneration (articulated 
this time through the figure of the Arab as a racial savage) was produced by European 
colonial and counterrevolutionary observers during the ‘Urabi revolt and how this 
logic was eventually internalized by Egyptian thinkers (even of the nationalist and 
anti-colonial variety). I will then proceed to examine how in the 1990s this logic was 
used to produce the Islamist as a racial and sexual savage, before I move to exploring 
other forms of degeneration and how they informed statist and counterrevolutionary 
ideological representations in Egypt and elsewhere (culminating in the figure of the 
ribald, hysterical, and licentious woman who stands for degeneration and infects the 
revolutionary space with sexual licentiousness). As the bigger part of the subsequent 
account (in this chapter and the rest of the dissertation) deals with crowds and how 
they produce their subjects as degenerate and licentious (and also as perverse subjects 
who lack individuality and cannot be fully separated from the crowd that bears 
them),137 I will refer to this perverse subject which is both born and borne by the 
crowd as the crowd-born(e) subject.  
 
Crowd-born(e)	‘Arabi	
The crowd-born(e) subject is therefore a degenerate subject who regresses to earlier 
evolutionary forms. In the late 19th century Ahmad ‘Urabi (or ‘Arabi, as the British 







Arabs) provided a convenient target. ‘Urabi/’Arabi was thoroughly racialized not only 
because he belonged to the racially other Egyptian crowd, but furthermore because of 
the misspelling of his name. By being ‘Arabi, ‘Urabi becomes the quintessential Arab; 
or conversely, because he was to them the quintessential Arab and the representative 
of an Arab crowd, the foreign media could only think of him as ‘Arabi. ‘Arabi 
through this appellation is a catchall figure and term for the Arab crowd. Furthermore, 
his association with rebellion, the insistence of the foreign media to represent his 
movement (including the army he led) as a licentious crowd or émeute rather than a 
proper army, 138 and the episodes of crowd violence which characterized his revolt 
(again some of which will be revisited in the course of this study), all turn ‘Urabi- as 
‘Arabi- to a/the crowd-born(e) subject. The French Royalist mouthpiece, the Gazette 
de France, though not explicitly using the language of degeneration, presented 
‘Urabi/‘Arabi as the quintessential crowd-born(e), civilizationally regressive and/or 
degenerate, subject. Though supposedly a military man, he stands not for the army 
with all its discipline and order, but for the émeute (rebellion, riot). In the Gazette’s 
caricaturistic report on ‘Urabi, describing the ‘Urabist crowd as presented by the 
Journal des Debats which is quoted in the Gazette, ‘Arabi,  “toujours héroique et 
désinteressé,” is only interested in promoting himself and his entourage undeservedly. 
One officer approaches ‘Arabi and exclaims “Vous ne vous rappelez donc pas que 
c’est moi qui ai tiré la barbe à M. Wilson, il y a trois ans?” and ‘Arabi responds “Ah! 
C’est vrai ... vous avez tiré la barbe à M. Wilson, vous serez commandant.” And 
another “vous m’excluez de l’avancement, mais c’est moi qui suis entré le premier au 
palais d’Abdin au mois de février?” and ‘Arabi responds “Ah! Pardon, je l’avais 






dans mon grade, mais n’est-ce pas moi qui ai déserté mon post quand on m’avait 
chargé de garder les abords du ministère de la guerre, le jour oú vous deviez subir un 
jugement dont vos troupes vous ont hereusement délivré?” and ‘Urabi responds 
“Vous avez raison, et pour ce service c’est bien le moins que je vous fasse général.” 
These imagined dialogues not only present ‘Arabi as someone who promotes his 
officers on a whim, without even corroborating their claims, but furthermore presents 
the acts based on which ‘Arabi is promoting his officers as unruly acts worthy of a 
crowd and their émeute, rather than the acts of a proper army. The first is promoted 
for pulling the beard of the English ambassador, the second for leading the crowd into 
the viceroy’s palace, and the third for deserting his post. What the caricaturistic report 
seems to present is a blaspheming of military discipline.  This blasphemy, or what the 
report terms “comédie scandaleuse” goes on until “Tous les colonels sont devenus 
généraux, tous les lieutenants-colonels colonels, et ainsi de suite.” 
It is therefore an unruly crowd rather than an army that ‘Arabi commands 
and stands for. The unruliness of this crowd is attributed to a civilizational lack; these 
officers, who were promoted for such acts of unruliness, warns the Debats, can 
neither read nor write. The civilizational bias (almost racialized, only recognizing the 
white man’s culture as culture) can be appreciated if we take into consideration that 
among ‘Urabi supporters were the leading Egyptian intellectuals of the time. The 
minister of defense the ‘Urabi movement imposed on the Khedive was none other 
than the leading poet of the time Mahmud Sami al-Barudi. The political wing of the 
movement included some of the leading intellectuals of the time: ‘Abd Allah al-
Nadim, Hassan al-Shamsi, Muhammad ‘Ubayd, and occasionally Muhammad 
‘Abduh, not to mention the Syrio-Egyptian intellectuals who supported the movement 




members of the movement, especially the officers, did not speak English and French 
fluently, but they were educated in their languages and their systems of knowledge.139 
Indigenous languages and bodies of knowledge, however, are dismissed. It is in fact a 
cause of alarm that “L’armée ne doit être commandée que par des hommes dont la 
science se borne a connaitre le Coran, et regarder Araby comme une sorte de 
prophéte.” This civilizational element is highlighted, in the article of the Gazette by 
contrasting those who are being promoted to those whom ‘Urabi has denied 
promotion and who are graduates of schools run by Europeans.  
On the one side, therefore, we see military discipline, the domain of the 
civilized,140 and on the other side the mutiny/rebellion,141 thoroughly racialized as an 
oriental lack of order and discipline. Orientalist political caricature is moreover 
present in the depiction of ‘Arabi throughout the report; in addition to depicting him 
as a nepotistic despot who promotes unworthy officers on a whim, the description also 
highlights his fez, his being a Bey, and depicts him smoking a narghileh. When an 
Englishman asks ‘Arabi to promote a friend who is worthy of promotion (naturally, an 
Englishman will only recommend the worthy), ‘Arabi responds with (almost farcical) 
indignation (or, according to the article, aplomb prodigieux), commenting that he 
could not breach military order. The contradiction between ‘Arabi’s nepotism and 
loose military order, and his indignation at the Englishman’s recommendation, is an 












describes ‘Urabi in another article (in which it follows up on the comparison between 
‘Urabi and then French prime minister Léon Gambetta) as “chef de bandits et 
d’espèce de sauvage.”142‘Arabi, to the West, or at least to the French right wing 
represented by the Gazette and the liberal-centre represented by the Journal des 
Debats, was the convenient crowd-born(e) degenerate, standing for an unruly 
rebellion and carrying all the attributes of the degenerate racial other.143 Whereas the 
royalist mouthpiece (the Gazette de France) depicted ‘Urabi through tropes of 
civilizational regression, the colonialist mouthpiece the Courrier de France used the 
language of biological degeneration, claiming that the description of ‘Urabi in English 
newspaper pointed towards a degenerate physiognomy.144 In both cases, the perverse 
and failed subjectivity of ‘Arabi stood for/was consistent with the situation of the 



























With the defeat of ‘Urabi some of these representations started to be accepted 
by the Arab media. ‘Urabi, in the Arab and Egyptian press of the time, started to look 
more and more like Europe’s ‘Arabi. Most notably in al-Jawa’ib, which was taking a 
pro-British turn towards the end of the 1882 confrontations between the ‘Urabists and 
the British army, ‘Urabi and his comrades appear as excessive, despotic, and irrational 
to the extent of mania, sometimes pyromania.145 Later, the ambitious heir of Khedive 
Tawfiq, ‘Abbas Hilmi II, who sought an alliance with the nationalist movement to 
counter British colonial influence, launched a restoration project which patronized a 
number of the leading intellectuals: this did not only include Mustafa Kamil, the 
founder of al-Liwa’ newspaper and the National Party (and thus in a way the founder 
of the second wave of Egyptian nationalism) but also the court poet Ahmad Shawqi 
(who also harbored Ottomanist and Egyptian nationalist sentiments, who sometimes 
contributed to al-Liwa’, and who was canonized as Amir al-Shu‘ara’- a title which 
translates roughly as ‘the Prince/Commander/Lord of Poets’). This also included the 
Egyptian politician, intellectual, and historian ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi‘i, a longtime 
member of the National Party who became, by virtue of his unprecedented 
multivolume historiography of Egypt and Egyptian national consciousness, the 
mythistorian of Egyptian nationalism. This group of nationalist-loyalist thinkers 
launched a multi-faceted campaign against ‘Urabi and his legacy, sometimes 
inadvertently repeating the colonial claims and unwittingly re-producing their 
civilizational biases which had produced ‘Urabi as civilizationally lagging and 
biologically degenerate.  For example, Shawqi’s attack on ‘Urabi reproduces very 








and uncivilized crowd who were not worthy of high military or political ranks.146 
Shawqi, who at other times expressed a clear anti-colonial sentiment, deemed this 
promotion of the unworthy an “Oriental blindness.”147  In the same fashion, in the 
account of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi‘i ‘Urabi’s weaknesses appear as distinctly 
indigenous/Oriental. His lack of proper Western military training, which al-Rafi‘i 
recognizes as one of his main weaknesses and causes for defeat, is repeatedly related 
to the traditional-religious education ‘Urabi had148 (reminiscent of the discourse of the 
Gazette). To show the shortcomings of ‘Urabi, al-Rafi‘i quotes from the ‘eyewitness’ 
account by Alexander Broadley (a British lawyer and professional and published 
Orientalist, who posed as a ‘Urabi sympathizer), ultimately replicating all the British 
civilizational biases of Broadley. ‘Urabi’s weaknesses, cowardice, and unwarlike 
nature, according to Broadley via al-Rafi‘i, are all results of his peasant 
																																								 																			 	
146   ىَّلحی نأ قیضأ ردصلا اذھو..ي نأولاجلأا نأشلا عجرتس  
لاحم اموی انقلل كی ملف ...اماھسلا لاو صاصرلا ىقل لاو 	
ریفخلا ىلع راخفلا عاض دقل ...ریملأا معن هدنع تعاضو 	
 ریزو ىلإ حلاسلا تحت نمأ...امامھلا لطبلا دیسلا ىمسی 	
 لازی لاو ناك قرشلا يف ىمع...نت ھیلاعم تحرب امفلا 	
 لاجر ىصقلأا اھواش غلبیو ...مھل ىماسی لا ردق لھجلا يف 	
 اھعدف وأ يلاعملا بتر ذخف ...اھعب تئش وأ اھرِشا تئش نإو 	
 اھعضت لا اھلنت نإ كنإف ...اماغطلا بترلا عفرت اشاحو 	
Ahmad	Shawqi,	Sawt	al-‘Izam	
 
147 لانت ھیلاعم تحرب امف ..لازی لاو ناك قرشلا يف ىمع 






background.149 His physiognomy which shows no dignity, his slow and dormant 
movement and his peasant lack of military spirit, as well as his lack of proper military 
training, are all signs and causes of ‘Urabi’s failures as a revolutionary and military 
leader (according to al-Rafi‘i’s rendition of Broadley).150 To make things worse, 
‘Urabi, according to Broadley and al-Rafi‘i, spent the eve of the battle not engaging in 
military preparations but rather in prayers and obscure mystical practices,151 
reminiscent of the Gazette’s taunting of the inept military leaders who only study the 
Qur’an.  Although al-Rafi‘i does not accuse ‘Urabi of degeneration, he is clearly 
reproducing a civilizational discourse that places the native on the side of 
degeneration. ‘Urabi’s shortcomings are clearly those of the indigenous subject, and 
are opposed to the discipline, strength, and spirit of the civilized and warlike Western 
and urban subject. Similarly when al-Liwa’ would beseech its readers (which it 
identified as Easterners/Orientals) to learn the lessons of Western military prowess 
and the value the Westerners (identified as “progressed” nations) place on military 
advancement, they would oppose this Western civilizational lesson to a meekness 
they associate with Arabs in general and ‘Urabi in particular.152 Even in Egyptian 
nationalist media, ‘Urabi had become ‘Arabi. While the figure of ‘Urabi served to 
repudiate the charge of Arab(i) degeneration in the discourse of al-Mufid,153(i.e. in its 










figure of ‘Urabi to promote a discourse on degeneration that reflects back on the 
national crowd and the national self as degenerate.  
With the anti-‘Urabi nationalist discourse, therefore, and especially with al-
Rafi‘i, we begin to see an Arab Egyptian acceptance of the colonial civilizational 
terms that the crowd-born(e) degenerate is Arab, Egyptian, or peasant.154 The 
degeneracy of the native Arab/peasant and the ineptitude of indigenous systems of 
knowledge and education thus construct the realm of the improper, the unruly, and the 
licentious (blamed for the defeat and occupation).  
The crowd-born(e) subject therefore emerges, in the late 19th century in 
Europe and the early 20th century in colonized Egypt, as a degenerate and a lower 
form of evolution. Degeneration in general, and crowd-born(e) degeneration in 
particular, cause the withering of rational faculties (expressed by LeBon in 
neurological terms; the brain gives way to lower nervous centres and outside nervous 
stimuli)155 and therefore a regression to nature. It also causes a regression to lower 
evolutionary forms; in addition to the racial savages, these lower evolutionary forms 
include women and children.  I will now explore how the figure of the racial savage 
played a role  a century after ‘Urabi in producing the Islamist in the ideological 
imagination of the Egyptian State as sexual savage and ultimately a licentious subject. 
I will then move to exploring the themes of the regression to nature, to childhood, and 
to femininity, before I conclude by exploring representations of sexual chaos and how 










Depictions of Islamists in the propaganda of the Egyptian state have often invoked the 
theme of sexual permissiveness. Although this may seem a paradox: that a religious 
organization or a group of religious organizations are considered sexually permissive 
and licentious, I will argue, after exploring the trope and its recurrence, that the figure 
of the sexually permissive Islamist terrorist and Islamist organization are connected to 
the larger themes of this chapter: that spaces that go against the State are produced as 
immoral and licentious, and that the Islamist is produced as a degenerate figure and 
therefore his or her sexual licentiousness is a form of civilizational/racial degeneracy 
and savagery.   
This trend was started by Anwar al-Sadat who made allegations about the 
permissive sexual lives of the members of Islamist organizations in a 1981 
presidential speech.156 It thrived under Mubarak, especially during the confrontation 
with the Islamists in the 1990s: films, television series, and propaganda pamphlets 
depicted the inner lives of Islamist organizations as one of serial (usually 
undocumented by the State) marriages and/or adultery, and thus represented the 
Islamists through a panoply of perversities which mainly focused on polygamy 
(diachronic or synchronic for men, and diachronic for women).157 Opposed to the 
stereotype of the polygamist (therefore over-sexed) Islamist, there was also the 













failed heterosexual.158	 A noteworthy example is a report in which the newspaper 
accuses “the extremists” of running a prostitution ring of which the pimps are bearded 
and the prostitutes wear the niqab. The report is preceded by a preamble about the 
moral degeneracy (inhilal akhlaqi) and physical/carnal permissiveness (al-tasayyub 
al-jasadi) that characterize the Islamists.159 
 This motif of the licentious and sexually permissive Islamist is also 
maintained by the present regime. The charge of running prostitution rings was 
repeated by the regime propagandist Dindirawi al-Hawwari, the editor-in-chief of the 
newspaper al-Yawm al-Sabi‘. In addition to claiming that the Muslim Brothers ran 
prostitution rings (which doubled as hiding places for explosives), al-Hawwari 
charged that most of the global porn industry was run by the Muslim Brothers  (which 
according to al-Hawwari was part of a Brotherhood conspiracy for global mind 



























substituting the Muslim Brothers for Jews).160 Similarly, the Muslim Brothers’ spaces 
of activism were depicted as sexually deviant. As this regime has inaugurated itself 
through the violent and bloody repression of the two sit-ins (in Rabi‘ah al-
‘Adawiyyah and al-Nahdah Squares), which were protesting the 2013 coup d’état, the 
need of the regime’s apologists and propagandists to justify the bloody event led them 
to circulate rumors about the deviant sexual practices that allegedly took place in 
these two sit-ins. For example, one month after the massacres of Rabi‘ah and al-
Nahdah, journalist, regime propagandist, and Sisi apologist Hamdi Rizq alleged that a 
licentious activity which he termed jihad al-nikah161 and whereby men have allegedly 
offered their female family members for the sexual satisfaction of the protesters, was 
widespread  in the sit-ins (thus justifying the massacres after the fact). Nikah al-
Jihad or Jihad al-Nikah is something that began as an online hoax by the 
Islamophobic supporters of the Syrian regime who claimed that an ambiguous form of 


















(never explaining what this form of mating actually was), it is thus an index of a 
global discourse on the licentious and sexually perverse Islamist.162   
This motif may seem paradoxical. Here we have religious groups who are (at 
least perceived to be) fanatic and sexually conservative, but who are consistently 
depicted as sexually permissive and licentious. The production of the Islamist as 
licentious, I would argue, was possible because of two larger ideological trends. The 
first is the association between the politically subversive and the licentious: if they go 
against the State, then they must also go against morality, marriage, the family, etc. 
Second is the understanding of the Islamist as civilizationally and racially/biologically 
degenerate. As proper morality –including proper sexual code- become produced as 
civilizational prerogatives, and as the moral and sexual codes of a certain moment of 
Western civilization become canonized as the universal moral codes, subjects who fail 
(or are imagined to fail) to approximate these codes are produced as simultaneously 
degenerate and licentious.  
The charge of polygamy clearly betrays a civilizational (and perhaps racial) 
disdain for indigenous, Islamic, and/or non-Western matrimonial practices and the 
upholding of bourgeois Western monogamy and the nuclear family as the exclusive 
proper practice. The panoply of Islamic/Islamist perversities also included voyeurism 
and exhibitionism (the insistence of the late Islamist leader ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman to 
receive conjugal visits from his newlywed in his Egyptian prison triggered special 








and exhibitionism)163—to the effect of sometimes producing them as simultaneously 
and paradoxically over-sexed and sex-starved (but in both cases of perverse 
sexuality). Both perversions were understood, under the civilizational episteme of the 
19th century, which still governs modern and modernist ideologies (to various 
extents), as a result of degeneration (a degenerate hereditary predisposition causes 
them) and a further cause thereof (they exhaust the body, they waste the seed and 
block the generation of the race).164  
These representations (and even the paradox of depicting the Islamists as 
religious fanatics and sexually loose, and as simultaneously over-sexed and sex-
deprived) can be explained as simply a part of the larger trend of depicting any space 
and any subject that goes against the State as licentious. In the next chapter, I will 
show how any space that was not under the gaze of the State was suspected of 
orgiastic license, and in Chapter 5 I will show how every rebellion against the State 

























Nevertheless, with the Islamists there is an unmistakable civilizational and racial 
disdain. The licentious representations of the Islamists are anchored in their 
civilizational failures: their failure to approximate modern-Western monogamy, the 
modern-Western nuclear family, modern-Western sartorial codes, modern-Western 
morphologies, and modern-Western sexuality (hence over-sexing and sex-deprivation 
as two failures to approximate the Western mean).  
 
The degeneracy of the Islamists was semantically alluded to by the pro-
regime Ruz al-Yusuf when it started, in the 1990s, to refer to the Muslim Brothers as 
the “disbanded/degenerate group” (al-Jama‘ah al-Munhallah).165 While on the 
surface, the word munhallah means disbanded [by law], one cannot overlook the 
tongue-in-cheek reference to moral inhilal, especially when it comes from Ruz al-
Yusuf. This came amid Ruz al-Yusuf’s campaign against the Islamists whereby it 
accused them, among many things, of moral degeneracy and sexual license and 
perversities. In addition, the lack of restraint, voyeurism, exhibitionism, and other 
perversities ,which we encountered as associated with the Islamists, can be read as 
descriptions of degenerate types. More specifically, the Islamists were represented (at 
least in two of the significant works of propaganda under Mubarak, namely ‘Adil 
















through two perversions which were traditionally understood as degenerate, namely 
masturbation and homosexuality. The figure of the Islamist-masturbator appears early 
on in ‘Adil Imam’s blockbuster film al-Irhabi (the Terrorist), wherein the terrorist, 
aroused by his female neighbor, engages in masturbatory pushups followed by actual 
masturbation. The Islamist as a homosexual appears at the end of ‘Abd al-Baqi’s 
testimony in Shawkat’s Irhabi taht al-Tamrin, as the condensation of Islamist 
perversities and the shocking sobering fact that would finally lead ‘Abd al-Baqi to 
repentance. After his ascent through Islamist organizations, ‘Abd al-Baqi realizes that 
their supreme commander (identified by the initials R.S.) is afflicted with sexual 
deviance (musab bi al-shudhudh al-jinsi).166 It was not, therefore, the killing, the 
looting, and the incitement of terror that turned ‘Abd al-Baqi away from Islamist 
organizations; sexual deviance/homosexuality was the ultimate terror that turned ‘Abd 
al-Baqi away.  
Yet the discourse on the licentious Islamist copied the representations of the 
sexual savage/degenerate most faithfully when it came to adorned men and sexually 
predatory women. Darwinian ideologies (of the biological and social variants) 
believed that the evolution of men leads them to shun adornments and understood the 
beards of savages as adornments.167 The Egyptian propaganda’s fixation on the beard 
of the Islamists can thus be read as echoing this logic. Women, on the other hand, 









seek out her sexual partner, according to the Darwinian ideology.168 Islamist women, 
in state propaganda, were depicted as sexually aggressive, seeking multiple partners, 
moving from one faction to another for the sake of switching partners, and sometimes 





After having zeroed in on the Islamist-qua-sexual savage as a degenerate figure, I 
want to now zoom out again to the larger theme of crowd-borne degeneration (which 
we have introduced earlier through LeBon’s understanding of the withering of brain 
functions) by way of exploring the theme of regressing to nature. Indeed, 
representations of the crowd and especially crowd violence and/or revolution have 
narrated them through the trope of the force(s) of nature. This was most impressively 
performed in Charles Dickens’ memorable description of the storming of the Bastille 
in A Tale of Two Cities whereby the revolutionary crowd was likened to various 


















regression or degeneration from culture to nature, the trope of the angry force of 
nature also recapitulates the now defunct Great Chain of Being. Let us remember that 
breach of the Chain always led to manifestations through the forces of nature. In King 
Lear nature showed its angry face, while in Macbeth it allowed for perversities it 
would not normally allow. Generally, when the trope of the forces of nature is used it 
invokes both the natural and the perverse: it shows the agitation of something that is 
otherwise calm (like water and wind), or the spread of something nature usually 








































contains (like fire). Dickens makes this more obvious when he alternates between the 
natural and the supernatural, between the storm and the rising sea and fire on one side, 
and the apocalypse and the teeth of the dragon on the other.171 The state, therefore, 
does not only hold civilization from regression to nature, it holds nature itself from 
becoming excessive or perverse.  
Among the forces of nature that are used as metaphors for the crowd, fire 
seems to be the most common. It was used by Thomas Carlyle, for example, to 
represent the crowd and labor organizing.172 In many literary, journalistic, and other 
media representations, from the 1800s to the present, fire appears as the trope for the 
crowd and their modus operandi, as well as the metaphor and telos of revolt. Fire as 
the telos of political (seditious/incendiary) activism also recurred in the pro-Mubarak 
propaganda: an absurd television report warned the demonstrators and their families 
that there were ‘anasir ithariyyah (incendiary elements, elements of excitement, 
subversive elements, agents provocateurs) heading to Tahrir Square and holding 




















metonym and fetish173 of the crowd extends to the level of obscuring other parts of the 
picture: who are these incendiary elements (we are not told if they are extremist 
revolutionaries, pro-government thugs, agents of foreign powers, mere arsonists and 
pyromaniacs; we are not even told if they were actual persons or if they were even 
human)? What are their motivations beyond mere arson? Are these burning balls of 
fire torches, Molotov cocktails? Are they going to burn down the demonstrators, their 
tents, or the buildings in the Square? Fire as a sign of uncontrollable destruction and 
of revolutionary insanity, indeed of a physical and metaphysical order of things gone 
awry through the shaking of political power, serves to obscure, eschew, or even deny 
motive, subjective details (producing its bearers not as subjects and persons but as 
mere elements) and even logic (the act of arson here in itself defies logic: if these 
incendiary elements were against the regime, then why were they invested in burning 
down the protest, and if they were pro-government thugs, then why is the State 
television warning against them. In addition, nothing is said about how these elements 
were able to hold ‘burning balls of fire’ in their hands).  These pyromaniac incendiary 
elements who defy logic had their forerunners in the propaganda of the Mubarak 
regime prior to 2011. In 1989, in an editorial denouncing and condemning a worker’s 
strike that was ongoing in the Cairo industrial district, a staunch Mubarak 
propagandist, Ibrahim Si‘dah, who then served as the director general and editor in 
chief of the State-run weekly newspaper Akhbar al-Yawm, alleged that subversive 
elements within this strike threatened to “open the gas containers and set the whole 








the police to put an end to the strike – we see here a distinction between the disorderly 
fire of the opposition and the orderly fire of the state, a common trope which will be 
further explored in this section. Later it turns out, according to Si‘dah, that the 
majority of workers did not support these incendiary tactics, and were committed 
instead to “law and work ethics.” It was only the incendiary/subversive elements, 
some of them communist, others Muslim Brothers, which harbored such threats and 
subversive tactics174 (here the zeroing in on fire blurs or elides the distinction between 
Islamists and Communists, the same way it elided the subjectivity of the incendiary 
elements in 2011). In this report the Carlylean association of workers’ strikes with fire 
is taken to a literal extreme— with the fine distinction that for Carlyle it was the 
workers’ movement itself that was akin to fire, while for Si‘dah it is the subversive 
Islamist and Communist elements, who find a suitable medium for their arson in 
spaces of protest.  
The protest as a suitable space and medium for incendiary and subversive 
elements to commit arson, along with fire as the telos of political protest, appears in a 
2008 film which anticipated, in many ways, the counterrevolutionary propaganda of 

















naïve youth (naïve enough to tolerate an Islamist camp which grew on the outskirts of 
their sit-in) ultimately provides a medium for arson by Islamist extremists (of whom 
the only casualty is a police conscript from peasant background).  The lesson that 
spaces of protest provide a suitable medium for arson and ultimately results in fire 
was taken to heart by the state discourse in the aftermath of the 2011 sit-in, not only 
as evident from the example of the incendiary elements who wanted to burn down the 
protest, but also in how various state and pro-State private media zeroed in on 
moments of conflagration and fixed them as the sole representative and inevitable 
telos of revolt (again a metonym becoming a fetish).  
For a revolt that was sparked through the burning down of police stations and 
which witnessed the burning down of the ruling party headquarters, fire became a 
convenient sign and a convenient delegitimizing mechanism in the hands of its 
detractors. Later, the burning of the science academy (al-majma‘ al-‘ilmi) became, in 
the pro-regime media, a living representation of what would happen to the country if 
the revolution were not promptly put down, calling for the slogan “Egypt is burning” 






















Muslim Brothers kept the same tradition alive. Their mouthpiece, al-Hurriyyah wa al-
‘Adalah, used fire both as a trope for the protests against their government177 and as 
an index of their incendiary tactics and aims.178  
The coupling of fire, literal and metaphorical, in contemporary Egypt with the 
crowd is hardly an innovation but harks back to a century of such deployment. The 
two most significant precedents that set the stage for such use are the Fire of 








































the British fleet’s bombardment of the city, Alexandria caught fire. The British and 
their allies, however, saw no causal link between the bombardment and the fire. 
Instead, fire must have been the work of insidious and insane arsonists within ‘Urabi’s 
ranks. The cultural imposition of these biases on Arabic and Egyptian representations 
was quick to follow. The pro-British historian Salim al-Naqqash (a Syrian/Lebanese 
resident of Alexandria and an important cultural figure of the time) adopted wholesale 
the British version of the story: it was always the natives who were responsible for 
fires.180 Against these incendiary native crowds, we see the British army busy 
extinguishing fires. This in turn serves as a trope for the order/chaos dichotomy. 
Order is always presented as standing on the side of the British army (which explains 
why its shells do not cause the burning of the city), while damage and fire is always 
on the side of the indigenous crowd. In fact even dynamite becomes a tool not for 
setting fire but rather for extinguishing it when in the hands of the British.181 In one of 
the rare incidents where we hear the details about a British shell striking a civilian 
target (in this case, a European hospital, since obviously indigenous losses are not 





blaming	all	damage	on	the	natives,	whom	he	identifies	as	riffraff:	 لاف عفادملا قلاطإ نع تببست يتلا رارضلأا امأ

















worth mentioning) the shell conveniently finds its way to an unoccupied floor and 
rests there without exploding.182 Salim Faris al-Shidyaq, who was by then running his 
father’s publication al-Jawa’ib, offers a more nuanced account but then falls back on 
the same biases. At first, he presents two contradictory stories: that the British bombs 
are the source of the fire, and that also the Alexandrian crowd itself is. At one point he 
tried to square the two stories: the British bombed the Muslim quarter, so the natives 
(al-Ahali) released the prisoners and burnt down the foreigners’ quarter in 
retaliation.183 Eventually al-Shidyaq made a total shift to the other side and stated that 
it was beyond doubt that it was ‘Urabi and his comrades who had burnt the city.184 
Even when blaming the British, however, al-Shidyaq, as we will see, endows British 
shells with a rational faculty, a potential for restraint, which he denies the Alexandrian 
masses. He blames the commander of the British fleet not for bombing the city, but 
for bombing it in a harmful manner (as if there is any other way of bombing): “We 
hoped” writes al-Shidyaq Jr., “that Admiral Seymour had directed his bombs in a way 
that did not cause harm.”185 (Al-Shidyaq, al-Naqqash, and other pro-British 
propagandists of the time seem to be forerunners of the more contemporary discourse 
about “smart bombs”).  
These representations of fire recapitulate very closely the representations of 
the Paris Commune and especially the semaine sanglante in al-Jawa’ib. During 









bombardment by the forces of Versailles as the only means to restore order.186 During 
the burning of Paris at the end of the semaine sanglante, he painted an elaborate 
picture of the communards planning to burn the city (solely out of malicious intent), 
preparing kerosene, creating a network of kerosene filled tunnels to burn the city, 
etc.,187 whereas the Versailles army was shown, after its invasion of the city, to be 
busy attempting to extinguish fires188 (alas, the communards did not give it a chance). 
The depiction of an elaborate Kerosene conspiracy is also obvious in al-Jawa’ib’s 
depiction of the Alexandrian rebels,189 while the British army (in the discourse of al-
Shidyaq Jr. and al-Naqqash) played the same fireman’s role the Versailles army had 
played a decade earlier. The experience of the Commune was present in the mind of 
al-Shidyaq Jr. to the extent that he at one point alleged that the burning of Alexandria 
was the work of “the socialists who burnt the city of Paris” and who joined ‘Urabi’s 
ranks to find another city to burn.190 
We can see therefore how, on the one hand, fire was consistently on the side 
of the rebels, standing for their insanity and the chaos and destruction they spread. In 
the hand of the forces of order, fire, on the other hand, is controllable and can be a 
source of order itself.  In such representations, it seems that ‘Urabi is depicted as 













‘Urabi’s defeat, al-Jawa’ib would allege that ‘Urabi was caught while trying to burn 
down Cairo; fire here can be seen as a trope for ‘Urabi’s insanity and excess, opposed 
to his own narrative of self-restraint whereby he surrendered so that the city would not 
be burnt down.191Al-Jawa’ib would go further to allege that he was inciting the riffraff 
(ri‘a‘ al-nas) to burn the city; once again we see incendiarism, and ‘Urabi’s 
pyromania, as a metonym for the irrational and incendiary crowd and their revolt.192 
Later during the trial of ‘Urabi, al-Jawa’ib would depict the contentment and elation 
‘Urabi and his comrades expressed at the burning of Alexandria, as if they were 
pyromaniacs who merely reveled in the burning of the city. ‘Urabi’s responses to his 
interrogators, especially with regards to the burning of Alexandria, are described as 
“childlike.”193 This link between the incendiary crowd, fire, and childhood is evidence 
of a state of regression from reason. What is linked to them, however, and which al-
Shidyaq (perhaps) did not pay attention to, was the Oriental. 
Given how the figure of ‘Urabi was saturated with the traits of his race as 
depicted in Western sources of the time (on which al-Shidyaq and al-Naqqash relied), 
we can therefore once again read a racial bias in the depictions of ‘Urabi as insane and 
childlike, especially within a colonialist discourse that denies racial others any 







order	to	impede	the	march	of	the	British	forces.	This	logic	is	quickly	qualified	as	flawed:	 قیرحلا اذھ ناكو








rational and precise canon shells and the native irrational and widespread fire is also a 
racialized one.194 The racialization of the ‘Urabist fire corresponds to the gendering of 
the fire of the Commune and therefore affords us one of the many chances for reading 
the mapping of the savage and the feminine onto one another. When Paris caught fire, 
the European conservative media interpreted the fire as a wave of insanity of which 
women predominantly or exclusively partook. For that purpose they invented the 
figure of the incendiary woman, the Pétroleuse.195 The savage fire of Alexandria and 
its childlike Oriental incendiaries did not need to be gendered, as their racialization 
sufficed. In both cases, controllable and precise (gun) power is the civilizational 
privilege of the white man. 
 In addition to playing with uncontrollable fire, the indigenous crowd is 
shown (in al-Naqqash’s196 and in British197 and French reports)198 bludgeoning 


























background) or cutting them to pieces through sharp objects, but seldom using 
firearms.199 Even when they have guns, they tend to use their bayonets rather than 
their bullets. It is as if wielding gun-power is beyond their civilizational means. 
During the events of 1919, when Egyptian resistance groups used gunfire, British 
intelligence would venture that they must have got them through Greek and Armenian 
sources.200 It is as if firearms need to pass from the hands of white Europeans to the 
hands of lesser Europeans, and finally to the hands of the natives. The significance of 
fire as a trope for the crowd and the revolutionaries cannot be overstressed. It operates 
on a civilizational scale not only because it represents a regression from civilization to 
nature, but also because the mastery of fire, represents in itself an index of 
civilization.  
Threshold	of	Fire	
Fire seems to have been a recurrent mythologeme in the narrative of becoming 
human. In Greek mythology Prometheus, the creator of Man, would only make his 
creation complete by stealing fire from Zeus. Beyond ancient Greece, “The Modern 
Prometheus” (also incidentally the subtitle of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein) became 
an integral part of humanism (Prometheus created Man, he represented the search for 

















of fire in the teleology of man becoming Man is preserved in our modern Darwinian 
mythology. Fire is imagined to be the first creation of the primitive man, thus 
establishing a threshold between man as animal and man as human. The incendiaries, 
whether Parisian women or Egyptian rebels, like the primitive man, are at the 
threshold of being/becoming Man; they can create fire but they cannot control it.  It is 
only the white man, removed by millennia of civilizational leaps from the primitive 
man (leaps that women and primitive populations have obviously failed to keep up 
with), who can wield and control (gun)fire. 
This threshold of fire is captured in Adrian Mitchell’s brilliant anti-colonial 
retelling of Robinson Crusoe’s tale.201 A complacent Crusoe announces to Friday, 
after lighting a fire with matches: “White man magic, Friday! Science. S-c-i-e-n-c-e!” 
Later, after giving Friday a lesson on private property, a frustrated Crusoe brandishes 
his gun in Friday’s face. Friday, who witnessed his tribesmen being killed by 
Crusoe’s gun at the beginning of the film did not need explanation, but Crusoe found 
it necessary to proclaim: “Friday, this is mine. I put my strongest spells on guns. They 
will kill black men like Friday but will not hurt white men like Master” (this is 
probably meant as a commentary on the narrative hubris of the scene in which Crusoe 
meets Friday for the first time in Daniel Defoe’s original, in which Crusoe 
demonstrates to Friday his ability to wield firearms and thus wins his submission). 
After they manage to kill the slave traders, Friday examines their dead bodies and 
asks: “Master, thought you said white man could not be killed by gun because of 
science-magic,” and Crusoe responds “I laid that spell myself, Friday, but I can take it 






guidance of Crusoe). The English claims (eventually repeated by al-Shidyaq junior) 
that their precise bombardment could not have caused the conflagration of Alexandria 
(unlike the insane and uncontrollable indigenous fire which must have caused the 
conflagration), and the later amazement by English observers to find Egyptian 
partisans in possession of firearms (who must have attained them through Greek and 
Armenian proxies, according to these observers, as firearms have to move through a 
civilizational grid, from white men to lesser Europeans to savages) seem to belong to 
the same logic of Crusoe: they believed they laid their spell on firearms and that only 
a white man like themselves (or at least a lesser and contingent white, a Greek or 
Armenian) can take it off.  
That the Egyptian crowd was standing at the threshold of fire, discovering it, 
playing with it, but not able to control it, is evident in one of the few available 
accounts on the Cairo Fire of 1952.202 In Jean and Simonne Lacouture’s Egypt in 
Transition, the first fire started when a crowd of nationalist youths confronted a 
drunken British soldier who was drinking outside a cabaret with a dancer. As the 
verbal exchange did not please the frenzied mob, they proceeded to burn the cabaret. 
To the rest of the crowd the fire “came as a revelation.”203 They were clearly at a 
threshold of something they did not experience before. The description of arson in this 
















throughout our discussion of revolt, the crowd, and fire. The frenzied crowd is 
irrational and inept to the extent of burning buildings while their own friends were 
still inside.204 They chanted Allahu Akbar as they engaged in this frenzy, in a curious 








 The civilizational disdain appears most clearly in a paragraph that blames “the mob, 
or the rather poor of Cairo;” a “hungry and idle mass of people” that is “ripe for any 
adventure,” “drunk with violence and with no one to hold them in check” 
“wallow[ing] in a collective crime.”206  This lower class, intoxicated, and irrational 
crowd had to have a racially savage referent. The authors then approvingly cite an 
article that appeared in an Egyptian francophone newspaper of the time, comparing 
the fire to the Native American Potlach. The Potlach is presented as an unexplainable 
frenzy practiced by an irrational people who engage in acts of self-destruction and 
then, once the frenzy is gone, seek medical help.207 
The savage crowd is evident in the narrative and is made even more explicit 
through the comparison with the Native American Potlach. But there is also a clear 
element of depicting the crowd as a growing child, discovering a new game but 









pleasures that are at first overflowing and uncontrollable. After all, the first fire is 
reported to have started in a moment of lust/jealousy by hot-headed youth when 
seeing a British soldier courting a dancer.  The image of (partially) sublimated sexual 
frenzy, of hot-blooded youth, is delivered along with an air of religious extremism208 
characteristic of adolescents and Orientals.209 The report then alternates (sometimes in 
a self-contradictory manner) between representing the fire as spread by the frenzied 
mob and between the allegations that one organization or another was behind it.210 
When the crowd is blamed, however, there are always civilizational overtones. The 
depiction of the crowd as a child who has found a new game, or an adolescent who 
has found new pleasures, and who are not going to stop is evident. Before telling us 
about the spread of fire beyond the first cabaret, Lacouture remarks: “Delirium broke 
out among the throng, who had discovered an exciting new game.”211 An officer who 
chose not to intervene commented saying “Let them play a bit.”212 The Cairene crowd 
discovering fire on January 26th 1952 did not only act like the primitive man 
discovering, yet not fully mastering, fire, but also like the adolescent discovering, yet 
not fully mastering, new pleasures. The threshold of fire, therefore, seems to function 
																																								 																			 	












both phylogenetically and ontogenetically213; the child discovering new pleasures, the 
woman lacking the manly faculties of taming and disciplining fire, and the primitive 
populations, akin to the primitive man who just discovered fire but not yet able to put 

















































of humanity, discovering fire but not yet able to master it (and at oriental religious 
zeal, and Native American self-mutilation rituals). The crowd also stands at an early 
stage of puberty, discovering new powers but not yet sure how to use it. 
The recurrence of fire as a trope and telos of revolt, of the waning of state 
power, and of crowd-action, is not merely because of the visual potency of fire as a 
spectacle.  It is rather because fire represents a certain civilizational threshold that 
humanity has passed, but that it may regress to in the absence of a state that upholds 
the normal order of things. Through the threshold of fire we can see how the 
degeneration/regression attributed to the crowd is not only racial and civilizational, it 
is also a regression to childhood as we saw with the adolescent crowd playing with 
fire in 1952 Cairo.214 One can also bring the threshold of fire to testify on the crowds’ 
regression to femininity (a salient point in crowd discourse). Racial primitives, 
children/adolescents, and especially nature were placed with femininity at the same 
category in the civilizational discourse of the 19th century. When Western newspapers 
invented the female incendiaries, the Pétroleuses, as the metonym for the Paris 
Commune and as responsible for the burning of Paris, they were testifying to this 
gendering of the crowd, of revolt, and of chaos.  
 
Infantilizing	The	Revolutionary	Crowd	
A recurrent theme in the representations of the crowd is their infantilization.215 This 









degenerate and understood childhood to ontogenetically recapitulate an earlier 
phylogenetic phase of evolution and civilizational development. This is already the 
case with the representations of the Cairo Fire and how the crowd at the threshold of 
fire acted like children and/or teenagers. This understanding of the crowd as infantile 
was also coded in LeBon’s theory of the crowd, which posited that crowds acted like 
savages, women, and children. In the 2011 Egyptian  public discourse, this 
infantilization took two forms. First there was the patronizing rhetoric about the ‘pure 
youth’ who despite their good intentions do not know what is best for the country and 
therefore need parental/governmental guidance. Second there was the licentious youth 
who were usually depicted in opposition to the parental (and more specifically 
paternal) authority which they shun, challenge, run away from, or otherwise lack. It is 
the history of this second trend that we will explore, though we will remain mindful of 
the first.  
This trend has three historical trajectories showing less continuity than other 
histories and other phenomena explored in this study. In other words, there are three 
moments which we may deal with as inaugural: the colonial moment with its disdain 
to the national(ist) youth and its infantilization of the indigenous population, Sadat’s 
infantilizing discourse wherein he posited himself as the father of the nation, and the 
production of activists (and/including Islamists and Islamist terrorists) as licentious 
youth under Mubarak in the years leading up to the 2011 uprising.  In this section I 
will offer a brief survey of these three moments and then move to specific examples 
from 2011.  










The first inaugural moment is the moment of colonial disdain: consistent 
with the civilizing mission which European colonialism saw itself as fulfilling, the 
British authorities and British observers viewed the Egyptian people as children, their 
crowds as childish, and their youth activists as incompetent, uncivilized, ill-behaved, 
and vulgar. This was especially the case in 1919 when an anti-colonial uprising swept 
the country, with wide youth participation, which were characterized by a British 
journalist and traveler under the name of J. Jeffries as “a paedocratic regime.”216 This 
paedocracy also entailed a degeneration or regression to nature, as this paedocratic 
crowd “indulged itself” in “silliness,” spat at the British officers, and “hiss[ed] at 
them in their most naturalistic tones” (emphasis added).217   The cultural imposition 
of this infantilizing ideology was met with little success: against the British 
infantilization, Egyptian public discourse showed pride in its national(ist) youth and 



























which brought in a nationalist regime, the 1954 termination of British occupation, and 
the concomitant ascent of the free officer Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir to power (1952) and to 
the presidency (1954), State discourse venerated rather than infantilized the national 
youth.219 Indeed, one of the famous Nasserist mobilizational songs (sung by a group 
of the leading signers of the time, including ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz) was titled [Long] 
Live the Rising Generation (‘Ash al-Jil al-Sa‘id lyrics by Hassan al-Sayyid, music by 
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab) and included a verse which explicitly saluted school 
and university students. 
The infantilization of the crowd, the activist youth, and the nation as a whole 
was brought to full effect by the discourse of Egypt’s third president Muhammad 
Anwar al-Sadat. Al-Sadat’s reactionary project, which included an opening up of the 
country in the face of international capital (commonly known as the opening or the 
open door policy, infitah), an alliance with the US and with US imperialism, a peace 
treaty with Israel, and the deconstruction of Nasir’s (already rudimentary) public 
welfare network, also included a paternal/patriarchal/patronizing attitude towards the 
youth and the rest of the country. Sadat would often refer to himself as “kabir al-
‘a’ilah” (the elder of the family). Clearly, this appellation infantilized the whole 
nation; Sadat used the language of filiation frequently (for example he used to refer to 
Himmat Mustafa, the famous radio presenter who regularly interviewed him, as “my 
daughter Himmat,” and to the army soldiers as “my boys”). Infantilization and 
filiation, however, were used with a special fierceness against political dissidents. For 
example, at a now-famous meeting with the representatives of the student body of 








Cairo University, Sadat, challenged by an Islamist student called ‘Abd al-Mun‘im 
Abu al-Futuh (who would become a presidential candidate in the elections of 2012), 
fired back “You should know your place, for I am the elder of the family” (“ilzam 
makanak, ana kabir al-‘a’ilah”). In another incident he described the Islamist youth 
who opposed him as “awladi al-mugharrar bihim” (my deluded children).220 
This trend continued under Mubarak. In his speech on February 2nd 2011 (in 
other words his penultimate speech as a president before he was deposed) Mubarak 
tried to address the protesters as children (his children, more particularly). Yet the 
rhetoric of Mubarak refrained from the explicitly patronizing language of his 
predecessor (and in lieu of Sadat’s “my children,” he more commonly addressed the 
Egyptian people as al-ikhwah al-muwatinun {brother citizens}, with which he opened 
his penultimate speech before he deployed patronizing tropes). It was in the media, 
however, and especially in popular culture, that the Egyptian dissidents were 
produced as irresponsible children and teenagers.  
In the 1990s, the Islamists were the primary targets of such representation, 























organizations was used to depict them as adolescents rebelling against State, societal, 
and especially parental authority.221 They were also depicted as children who lacked 
any experience or deep understanding of religion.222 In this ideology, parentalism 
meets and provides the cover for governmental discipline and brutality; state violence 
is only akin to parental disciplining, both of which are normalized under a parentalist-
State discourse.223 The women were depicted as virginal yet lustful ingénues who 
were seduced by the system of easy and ephemeral marriages offered by the Islamist 
organizations,224 though at other times they were presented as possessing an 
aggressive and predatory sexuality as mentioned earlier. The men were commonly 
depicted through the figure of the adolescent/pubescent voyeur and masturbator. In 
the 1993 film Disco Disco, the Islamist appears as an adolescent discovering and 
unable to repress sexual pleasures, thus leading him to perversities: peeping on his 
neighbor showering and trying to rape the main female character. This ties to the 
motif of the Islamist-qua-sexual savage; we have already seen ‘Adil Imam’s Terrorist 
engaging in masturbatory fantasies after his failure to sublimate his sexual desires by 
doing pushups. In fact the whole project of Islamist violence was reduced in some 


















Islamist adolescents, which contributed to representations of political violence as 
sexual chaos.225 
In the 2000s, as the confrontation with the Islamists waned, and as the activist 
scene was being dominated by a more diverse crowd of youth who were diversified 
among Islamists, seculars, and others who did not subscribe to the Islamist-secular 
divide, mainstream media and State propaganda started to depict the activists as upper 
class, carefree, licentious youth. This mode of infantilization was presented forcefully 
in the film-cum-counterrevolutionary manual Rami al-I‘tisami,226 (more accessible 
and wider in appeal than other more conventional forms of propaganda). The activist 
crowd is infantilized all throughout the film, not only by virtue of being depicted as 
spoiled children, but furthermore through repeatedly subjecting them to infantilizing 
chastisement by parental authorities.227 Their childish gullibility allowed the Islamists 
to set their own counterpart sit-in and eventually to burn the youth’s sit-in and kill a 
police conscript in the process. In front of the burning sit-in and the dead body of the 
conscript, the Prime Minister talks down to the protesters, chastising them for what 
their naiveté and carelessness had led to (the government’s role in inciting strife 
notwithstanding); he directs his rebuke in particular at the youth: “if you are the new 














(and then he casually refers to the fact that they, i.e. the government, may have made 
their share of mistakes as well). 
In 2011, especially during and in the aftermath of the January-February sit-
in, the infantile/pubescent licentiousness of the youth was depicted as straying away 
from the family, an escape from paternal authority, and a failure/refusal to 
(mis)recognize Mubarak as the father.  Although all youth, men and women, and the 
Egyptian population as a whole, were subjected to this kind of discourse, young 
women were particularly targeted for this sort of chastisement. Female political 
participation was seen as breaking the law of the father not only in the metaphorical 
sense of challenging any presumed male monopoly over public space and politics, or 
in the sense of challenging patriarchy and a State whose claims to power are paternal 
and patriarchal, but also in the literal sense that a young female who attends 
demonstrations and possibly spends the night there must be breaking the predicaments 
of her father, or must lack a proper father/paternal authority to begin with. A most 
telling example came in an inflammatory speech given by Murtada Mansur, a sharp-
tongued regime propagandist and the head of the Zamalik Sporting Club, one of the 
two most important and popular athletic clubs in the country whose football teams 
garner the largest audiences. Lamenting the ill-manners of the demonstrators in 
general, Mansur presents the parentless or ill-bred “girl “as synecdoche for the 
revolutionaries’ licentiousness. Addressing the young female activist (and through 
her, political activists and the whole “revolution”) Mansur exclaims: “girl, don’t you 
have parents to ask you where you are spending the night?” These ribald women 
misrecognize their own inept fathers in Mubarak, according to Mansur: “And to the 




pig!’ If your father had raised you well, he would have taught you not to address 
someone who is as old as your father this way.”228  
 
Effeminate	Crowds	and	Feminine	Chaos	
The figure of the ribald, hysterical, unrestrained, subversive, and licentious woman 
recurs throughout modern counterrevolutionary depictions of revolt, including those 
of the 2011 uprising, her gender often highlighted through contrast with the masculine 
figures of the father and/or the army man. Not unlike its Jordanian forerunner which 
canonized, as explicated by Massad in Colonial Effects, an Arab discourse on the 
effeminate freedom fighter in opposition to and confrontation with the manly army 
man229 (itself a replica of the European discourses on nationalism, romanticism, and 
gender, which Jordanian nationalism mimicked), Egyptian counterrevolution depicted 
the confrontation between the State and its opponents as the opposition/confrontation 
between the masculine and the effeminate. This was already the case with the 
example of the parent-less girl in Mansur’s defamatory notes, in which the licentious 
femininity of the young demonstrator is highlighted through the absent masculine 
figure of the father (with which the president is to be identified or {mis}recognized). 
The figure of the female activist as a licentious body also appeared as a tool within the 
anti-Islamist propaganda of the Mubarak regime. The serial marriages members of 











the Islamist organizations as licentious spaces and the members, especially the 
women, as licentious bodies. This is something we have already introduced in the 
section on the sexual savage: Islamist women were depicted as possessing a predatory 
sexuality that is reminiscent of pre-civilizational savage women (congruent with the 
men’s beards, reminiscent of the adorned and effeminate though virile savage men). 
As these representations will be explored in more detail in the next chapter, I will not 
explore them further here. The figure of the female activist as a licentious body 
available as a fair target for male desire and violation was presented to Egyptian 
mainstream culture more forcefully through the blockbuster film, al-Safarah fi al-
‘Imarah (2005). Indeed, the sensationalization and sexualization of the bodies of 
protesters – especially the women- was better achieved through the medium of film, 
than of conventional propaganda.  This is not only because the fictional nature of film 
frees its makers from some of the realistic constrains journalists and regime 
spokesperson are forced to abide by (indeed these constraints did not stop sexual libel 
by regime propagandists and state officials, as I show throughout this study), but more 
importantly because of the wider circulation of film, and how it adds visual and aural 
effects to the representations of licentiousness, which the conventional propagandist 
provides only in written or (monophonic) spoken form.  In a memorable scene of the 
film, the protagonist (played by the famous Egyptian actor ‘Adil Imam), a womanizer 
and a compulsive procurer of prostitutes, spots an attractive young female activist 
amid a demonstration, leading the chants while being carried on the shoulders of two 
of her male comrades (i.e. literally crowd-borne). The protagonist quickly joins the 
demonstration and the film cuts to a scene showing the protagonist carrying the 
female activist on his shoulders as he grabs and caresses her thighs. Then he makes a 




takes her a while to realize what was unfolding, and as the protagonist attempts to 
convince her to “come home and take a shower” before going back to the 
demonstration, she refuses and insists on rejoining her comrades. As he follows her, 
she gets tear-gassed by the police and her colleagues attempt to rescue her. The 
protagonist walks in, fends off her colleagues, and grabs her body again and carries 
her to the café where he offers her a glass of water.  Although we later learn that the 
licentiousness of the female demonstrator has limits (in the last scene she insists that 
the protagonist would marry her, to which he agrees), the scene of the protagonist 
carrying the female demonstrator and walking away with her (incidentally a shot of 
this scene is what is depicted on the posters advertising the film) affirms the 
conception of the protester’s crowd-born(e) body as a body that is both feminine and 































military police on the night of March 9th, 2011, in what became known as the 
“virginity tests” incident. On that night, the military police, aided by scores of thugs 
(identified by the state media and the ruling military council’s communiqués as 
“honorable citizens,” thus highlighting how the honorable citizen is produced in 
opposition to the licentious subjects of the sit-in), brutally broke a sit-in in Tahrir 
Square and abducted the activists to the nearby museum of antiquities. There, a(n 
unidentified) number of female activists were subjected to ‘virginity tests’ by a male 
army doctor, according to various reports which the army did not deny.  In this 
example, the feminine, licentious, and suspiciously sexual body of the female activists 
stood for the uprising (as well as the licentious space it constituted), whereas the State 
and Order as such were present through the patriarchal ensemble of medicine and the 
military. The same dichotomy between the feminine body (hysterical and depraved), 
and the masculine forces of Order were re-enacted in pro-regime and pro-State 
representations of an incident in which Buthaynah Kamil, a female activist and 
famous journalist/television presenter (and a later presidential candidate), confronted 
a number of army soldiers about the virginity tests incident, warning them that the day 
would come when the transgressor would be held accountable for their transgressions. 
Kamil’s bravery and belief in a better future were turned, through pro-regime 
patriarchal representations, to signs of the feminine gone awry: this incident was 
posted on YouTube by pro-regime subscribers who chastised her for daring to 
challenge the army men and for allegedly attempting (yet failing) to approximate 
masculinity, describing her as sha‘nunah (roughly, hysterical) and her act as safalah 





(roughly, depravity).231 For a number of pro-regime and pro-State viewers and 
observers, the uprising of 2011 was reduced to a confrontation between the 
manly/masculine agent of order (the president, the father, the army man) and the 
feminine agent of chaos and licentiousness (the ribald parentless girl, the promiscuous 
female activist or potential prostitute, the hysterical and ribald female activist 
challenging army soldiers).  
This theme is consistent with the archive of 19th century European 
counterrevolution. In fact an account by Victor Hugo about the outbreak of the June 
uprising of 1848 narrated the onset of the uprising through a confrontation between 
the manly army man and the ribald and licentious women of the revolution in a 
manner that brings to mind our earlier examples from 2011 Egypt. In Victor Hugo’s 
account, the émeute started by two “public whores,” one after another, flashing the 
soldiers and speaking to them in a vulgar manner, before being pierced by army 
bullets. In his thought provoking analysis of the scene, literary scholar Neil Hertz 
points out how the two prostitutes stood for the émeute herself, its gendering in the 
feminine (already coded in the gendering of the term itself), and the obscenity of such 
an event.232 To Hertz’s analysis, I would like to add how the two prostitutes act as a 















vice versa). Similarly phallic intervention was prescribed for the licentious-
revolutionary feminine bodies in 2011 when the female activists were subjected to 
forced virginity tests. Although claiming any direct continuity between the two events 
would be ahistorical, an ideological formation that produced and continues to produce 
the licentious space as feminine and Order as masculine informs the two events.  
But even beyond this confrontation between the army man and the licentious 
female revolutionary, 19th century counterrevolutionary literature persistently 
personified revolutionary excess as female. In his iconic counterrevolutionary treatise, 
A Tale of Two Cities (written almost a decade after the events of 1848), Dickens 
personalizes revolutionary terror and vengefulness in the figure of Madame Therese 
Defarge, and in her entourage of vengeful revolutionary women, especially her 
lieutenant, whom he names The Vengeance, and condenses in them a lineage of 
female monsters from the ancient Greek furies233 to their contemporary and 
metonymical female monster, La Guillotine (which is described as the incarnation of 
all the horrible monsters of history, 234 and is clearly gendered as female throughout 
the text not only through her linguistic gendering but also by repeatedly referring to 
her as the sharp female).235 But Dickens only does so after distinguishing the 
vengefulness and revolutionary ferocity of the women (which he anchors in their 
gendered roles) from that of the men: “The men,” writes Dickens, “were terrible, in 
the bloody-minded anger with which they looked from windows; but, the women, 









poverty yielded, from their children, from their aged and their sick crouching on the 
bare ground famished and naked, they ran out with streaming hair, urging one 
another, and themselves, to madness with the wildest cries and actions” (2.12.172).  
Madame Defarge and her entourage condensed and reified a type that had 
been circulating at least since Carlyle’s French Revolution, that of the blood-thirsty 
revolutionary women who were drawn to the spectacle of the Guillotine, and who 
used to cheer the beheading and count the rolling heads while knitting (sometimes 
called the furies of the Guillotine, harking back to the ancient Greek mythological 
furies, sometimes the tricoteuses, in reference to their knitting). Due to the timeless 
and non-territorial nature of the circulation of Dickens’ novel (a masterpiece in many 
regards, its counterrevolutionary message notwithstanding), Madame Defarge served 
as a vector for the circulation of the type of the vengeful and unrestrained 
revolutionary woman beyond the context of the French Revolution or 19th century 
Europe. Indeed, she continued to haunt the minds of Egyptian counterrevolutionary 
propagandists, who continued to invoke her in the context of warning against 
revolutionary excesses, at least until 2014.236  
The type of the subversive female, already in circulation through figures such 
as that of Madame Defarge and the tricoteuse and through appropriations of classical 
Greek mythological figures (like the furies, as mentioned above, but also the 
Amazons, Medusa, etc), gained even more prevalence during the Paris Commune 
(1871).  The bourgeois bodies of knowledge that coincided with the Commune, as 






the momentum of the circulation of such representations.237 The Pétroleuse thus 
emerged at the end of the insurrection as the condensation of female insanity and 
excess.238 The hysterical, ribald, and licentious women of ‘the Egyptian revolution’ 
were therefore hardly a unique case or a precedent in counterrevolutionary 
representations.  
  
Congruent with my overall argument that the State, in its various ideological-
mythological conceptions, is perceived to hold the upright order of things, I will 
proceed by showing how this upright order of things, in many of its classical and 
modern incarnations, is predicated on purging, holding at bay, restraining, and/or 
containing the feminine, resulting in a conception of revolt and chaos as the breaking 
out and eruption of the otherwise contained and restrained feminine. I will then 
explore how this gendered conception of Order and chaos produced the licentious 
woman as the recurrent metonym to the licentious crowd, to the licentious revolution, 
and to the feminine chaos they engender.    
Mythologies of the State have long associated the State and the rational with 
the masculine, and chaos with the feminine.  This can be traced back to the classical 
Greek distinction between the body as the feminine realm of necessity, and the mind 














politics, the polis, and ultimately the State, while the feminine was to be contained 
within the domestic or exiled to irrational and frenzied events or happenings that took 
place on the outskirts of the polis; e.g. the frenzies, or orgies, of Dionysus and other 
ecstatic gods. In their Dionysian form, these rituals were populated predominantly or 
exclusively by women,240 while in the Cybelean form –which in practice both 
predated and survived its Dionysian counterpart—  it included male priests (galli) 
who castrated themselves as part of the ecstatic ritual.241 During these rituals, the 
feminine (female and castrated) bodies of the initiates were possessed by the god, 
Dionysus, Demeter, or Cybele, depending on whose orgies and which eras we are 
dealing with.242 Their spirits were understood to leave their bodies and unite with their 
god, thus rendering the ritual a literal ecstasy.243 The raving women in the Dionysian 
version of this ritual were given the significant name the maenads, which means the 
mad or raving women.244 The term would be used by Carlyle in reference to the 






















women of the French Revolution245 and will from then on recur in 
counterrevolutionary representations of the Commune.246  
These mad and raving women (especially in their classical Greek incarnation) 
constituted the other of the rational political subject, and the space they occupied247 
and the ritual they performed constituted the limit of the state and its reason, 
sometimes their antithesis. In Euripides’ Bacchae, the Dionysian orgy appears as the 
subversive antithesis of sovereign power; not mediated or mitigated by logic, the 
Dionysian frenzy ultimately results in the tearing down of the body of the King of 






































Thebes, Pentheus (who in a classical tragic act of hubris attempted to outlaw the 
ritual) by the hands of the raving women including his own mother Agave (thus 
serving the unrestrained justice of Dionysus who saw this fate as befitting Pentheus’ 
hubris, and who wanted to punish both Pentheus and Agave for denying the divine 
ancestry of the god, who was born of the union between Zeus and Semele, Agave’s 
sister. The orgy thus, though an irrational and unrestrained force, and although anti-
political to the extent of tearing down the body of the king, is also a force of justice.248 
It is a matter of tragic reckoning rather than abnegation and abjection. Later 
appropriations of the Dionysian ritual would depart from this pattern).  In Virgil’s 
Aeneid the Bacchic frenzy (the Roman version of the Greek Dionysian frenzy) 
appears as an anti-political ploy by the Latin women, at the behest of their Queen 
Amata, to thwart an imminent alliance between the Latins and the Trojans. Possessed 
by the female fury, Alecto, at the behest of the female goddess, Juno, Amata instigates 
the women into a fake Bacchic orgy and uses it as an alibi for hiding Lavinia, 
Amata’s daughter who was to be wed to Aeneas and seal the Latin-Trojan alliance, in 
the woods, out of the polis, away from the male gaze.  
The showdown between the subversive feminine elements that oppose, 
escape, or exceed masculine politics, in classical Greek representations, did not only 
appear in the form of the confrontation between the maenads and sovereign power; it 
appeared as clearly in the myth and tragedy of Antigone. While Creon, in the myth 
and the tragedy of Antigone, stood for the logic and rationale of the State, Antigone 
stood for the higher divine laws and for the affective and emotional bond that exceeds 








hubris, brought both the downfall of Thebes and Creon and Antigone’s own death— 
stood for a certain subversiveness with which the feminine is endowed. In Sophocles’ 
Antigone, which can be read as critiquing rather than affirming this binary, or at least 
as taking the side, if partially, of the feminine and the subversive against the rational, 
sovereign, and masculine, the association between subversive chaos and Antigone, 
and more precisely the association between subversive chaos and Antigone’s 
femininity is clear in the discourse of Creon who sees Antigone’s defiance as 
unmanning him.249 In a memorable soliloquy Creon warns his son, Haemeon:  
Anarchy	
Show me a greater crime in all the earth!	
She, she destroys cities, rips up houses,	
Breaks the ranks of spearmen into headlong rout.	
But the ones who last it out, the great mass of them	
Owe their lives to discipline. Therefore	
We must defend the men who live by law,	
Never let some woman triumph over us.	
Better to fall from power, if we fall must,	
At the hands of a man – never be rated	
Inferior to a woman, never.250 
(emphases added) 
The appliance of both the Dionysian and Antigonean motifs to represent a 
femininity that defies or subverts masculine State logic did not end with the demise of 
the ancient Greek civilization. Like many classical Greek motifs and themes, both the 
Dionysian orgy and Antigone were appropriated and re-invented by Western 
modernity. They both figure in Hegel’s Phenomenology (which as shown in the 









intellectual course for much of the statist and counterrevolutionary thought that 
ensued) as feminine moments that were superseded as part of the march of the Spirit 
and its recognition of itself in the Subject (or in other words the development of the 
masculine rational State and the rise of the subjects it produces as proper and model 
subjects). The various ecstatic rituals we have grouped under the rubric of the 
Dionysian and Cybelean orgies, involved a simultaneous pantheistic and entheistic 
elements: in addition to the ecstasy whereby the spirits of the worshippers unite with 
the divine, the spirit of the god (especially in the Dionysian version) was understood 
to spread through nature and especially through the fruits, wine, and flesh of animals 
that were consumed during these rituals. The orgy, especially for a modern thought 
obsessed with “civilizational progress” understood through a “nature vs. culture” 
schema, is placed in proximity to nature, a discursive space where women (and 
primitives) belonged. Experiencing this feminine nature through the Dionysian rituals 
(or what Hegel termed Bacchic enthusiasm and Bacchic frenzy)251 was, for Hegel, an 
essential moment for the sake of achieving self-consciousness, yet one that still lacked 
the rational element of this consciousness: “Coming down from its pure essential 
nature and becoming an objective force of Nature and the expression of that force, it 
[self-consciousness, or the Spirit on its way to self-consciousness] is an outer 
existence for the ‘other’, for the self by which it is consumed.”252 This moment that 
experiences the divine through devouring the fruits of nature is characterized, 
according to Hegel, by “the feminine principle of nourishment” whereas the other 








principle, the self impelling force of self-conscious existence”253 (which a few 
paragraphs later he tells us is not achieved in the Dionysian orgy due to the lacking 
individual self-consciousness of the worshipped deities Ceres and Bacchus – in other 
words Demeter and Dionysus). This moment seems stuck in its feminine-maternal 
nature, the Spirit, according to Hegel, experiences its essence as “its silently 
nourishing substance” in a “silent maternal yearning.” Not only is the Spirit feminine, 
or stuck in femininity, in this stage, but so are her subjects (not fully the Subject yet): 
it now “roams about as a crowd of frenzied females, the untamed revelry of Nature in 
self-conscious form.”254 
Like the orgy, Antigone, for Hegel, represented a feminine moment to be 
superseded by the Spirit— but this time involved directly in an antithetical 
relationship with masculine rational government, embodied in Creon, his rationale, 
and his laws. To serve this purpose, Hegel ahistorically and in opposition to 
Sophocles’ text reads Antigone as worshipping and standing for the laws of the 
household (so that Antigone can be appropriated as a primordial moment in the 
production of the domestic, whereas in Sophocles’ text Antigone speaks for the laws 
of the gods in their totality, and is accused by Creon of only worshipping the gods of 
death;255 there is no mention of the household or the domestic here).256 While both the 
Antigone and the Creon moments are superseded (after all Creon’s laws are not the 











sublate both Antigone’s domestic and divine appeals as well as Creon’s appeals to a 
State that has not yet got in contact with its rationale/rationality)257 – as evident by the 
tragic end both characters meet as well as the fall of Thebes due to their confrontation, 
we see Antigone as antithetical to even primordial forms of State, and we see her 
being forced (by Hegel’s purposefully distorted reading of the Greek myth) to stand 
for the household, the family, and the domestic, thus reifying them as the feminine 
antithesis to the political.258  
Hegel then notes how State and community, characterized by a manly nature 
and standing for the universal, “creates for itself in what it suppresses and what is at 
the same time essential to it an internal enemy – womankind in general.”259 
Womankind then stands for the family, the particular, and the individual as opposed to 
the universal (i.e. the Spirit in its moment as a universal, before the Spirit becomes 
identified with its human –male- subject as the Hegelian drama unfolds). This realm 
of womankind and of the domestic need to be contained and suppressed for the 
community, the State, and the universal to survive: “The community, however, can 
only maintain itself by suppressing this spirit of individualism.”260 Judith Butler notes 
how, in Hegel’s reading, the “threshold between kinship and the state” which 











even being preserved when ethical order emerges” (emphasis in original).261  Perhaps 
this precarious Aufhebung can be attributed to the containment of the feminine in the 
domestic, while Antigone is not preserved, the femininity that conditioned her 
impossibility was not to become part of the synthesis of the state but always kept as 
its internal other, held at bay through reviving and reinventing the domestic-political, 
and by extension the domestic-public binary. In the early 19th century, on the eve of 
the invention of the European bourgeois domestic (through various appropriations of 
the classical Greek domestic), of the Victorian hearth, the bourgeois nuclear family, 
and of the home as the proper domain and place for femininity and for women, Hegel, 
through a tortuous reading of Greek classics, was theorizing the identification of 
women with the realm of the family and their containment, their “suppression” by the 
rational masculine “community” (in what later became the 19th century realm of the 
domestic, one may add). 
As we have introduced Hegel’s philosophy earlier on as an ideological 
theory and mythology of the State, and as we identified Hegel’s Spirit, at its moment 
of fulfilled self-consciousness, with the modern State, we can see then that for Hegel, 
the State is predicated on superseding the feminine embodied in the Antigonean and 
Dionysian moments. To that effect, Hegel’s appropriation of the two classical Greek 
motifs as the feminine antithesis to various stages of rational (masculine) state power 
was not suspended in a vacuum. Throughout the 19th century, to various extents and 
invoking various registers, both motif of the orgy (or the frenzied women of the orgy, 
the maenads, as we have previously shown) and that of Antigone recurred in 






tropes of political chaos and social mayhem. This antithesis between the State, or the 
order it embodies, and the two feminine moments of Antigone and the orgy were 
preserved in at least two incidents during the encounter between imperial Britain and 
Egypt, providing loci for the mapping of the feminine onto the primitive. In 1882 (in a 
favorable yet patronizing report on the Egyptian nationalist movement) The Times 
compared ‘Urabi, irrational, tenaciously subversive, and heeding divine laws, to 
Antigone; “Many of his expressions as to the eternity and immutability of God’s 
laws” the Times reporter noted,  “reminded me very forcibly of the famous lines of 
Sophocles declaimed by Antigone on the same subject.”262 Standing for an irrational 
rebellion that promises anarchy and uses religious slogans, and thoroughly racialized 
the same way Antigone is thoroughly gendered, ‘Arabi occupied the same position as 
Antigone and stands for the same feminine (and in this case racialized) chaos. A 
similarly racialized and gendered representation of rebellion came most clearly in a 
British intelligence report with regards to a violent resistance operation that took place 
in Upper Egypt in 1919 (during the national uprising that swept the country that year). 
The report highlighted the racialization and classing of the crowd as Egyptian 
peasants, also highlighting the traditional bats, the nabbuts which they held in hand 
and allegedly used to bludgeon their victims to death. It also highlighted the 
gendering of this crowd through focusing on the presence of women. Women seem to 
contribute a special ecstatic and orgiastic quality to the event. The report tells us that 
“Mob screamed with delight, women taking leading part in orgy” (emphasis added). It 








of women, as if the feminine ushers in the orgiastic. Given the importance of Greek 
mythology to the British colonial imaginary (as seen in the Times’ likening of ‘Urabi 
to Antigone) and to the statist and counterrevolutionary imaginary in its totality (as 
evidenced by the appropriation of Antigone and the Dionysian orgy by Hegel and the 
recurrent reference to the maenads in counterrevolutionary literature), it is safe to 
assume that the women who rendered the event an orgy were on some level imagined 
to reincarnate the maenads. Indeed, like the maenads those were “minacle [sic.] 
women.” After describing the revelry, the bloodbath, and the participation of the 
minacle women, the report commented “it seems to have been an indescribable 
orgy.”263  
The two British colonial invocations of the orgy and Antigone, while 
preserving the femininity of both tropes, de-essentialize this femininity and make it 
applicable to the racial other (male or female). This is particularly the case with the 
simile The Times drew between ‘Urabi and Antigone: the Arab man is reminiscent, in 
his superstitious attachment to divine laws to an obstinate and irrational extreme, of 
Antigone and all the notions of subversive and chaotic femininity she conjures. It is 
important here to remember, once more, that for the Western press ‘Urabi was ‘Arabi, 
the quintessential Arab and the failed military/modern man who stands for the Arab 
émeute. The conflation of Antigone and ‘Urabi thus exposes a deeper running 
conflation between the gender othering Antigone stands for and the racial other ‘Arabi 
stands for. Similarly the report on the indescribable orgy turns the women of the orgy 









rhetorical parallel to LeBon’s assertion that crowds, even ones comprising men, have 
“feminine characteristics.” 264   
This de-essentializing of femininity while preserving it as a discursive 
category, and especially this conflation between the feminine and the racial other, 
were essential for the deployment of femininity as a counterrevolutionary trope for 
revolution and chaos. Indeed the degenerate and the hysterical265 appear as the 
gendered and racialized266 categories through which crowd, revolt, and revolution are 
perceived. We have already encountered – through most of this chapter— how crowd 
and revolution were imagined as spaces of degeneration, how for LeBon the crowd 
effects the literal degeneration of its members. The understanding of women as lower 
evolutionary (and therefore degenerate) forms in the Darwinian ideology posits 
femininity as the telos or destination of this degeneration (or as one among many 
thereof), hence LeBon’s gesture towards “feminine characteristics.” Although LeBon 
does not tell us much about these feminine characteristics, and although he does not 
explicitly refer to hysteria, the latter figures prominently as the ultimate feminine 


















impressionability of the crowd,267 is indeed a product of hysteria, or more specifically 
hystero-epilepsy as a body of knowledge, which presumed fits of hysterical epilepsy 
to be precipitated through hysterical contagion. Similarly, Francisque Sarcey, in his 
famous essay where he attributed the revolutionary insanity of the Communards 
(especially the women) to a mental shock, described this insanity as folie contagieuse 
and further compared this contagious folly to medieval waves of hysteria (which in 
turn recapitulated the Dionysian orgy).268 It is no surprise, then, that the hysterical 
woman became the metonym for the hysterical crowd.  
The production of revolution, the revolutionary space, and the revolutionary 
crowd as licentious, since the 19th century, was inseparable from this hystericization. 
It is true that there is a longer history of suspecting spaces which evaded the 
official/political/male/masculine gaze as licentious (as evident in the life of the term 
orgy as well as the literature on the orgy since Greek antiquity).269 The 19th century 
understanding of hysteria, however, added an important element to the production of 
feminine bodies and by extension feminine spaces (including the female émeute) as 
licentious.  By understanding hysteria not as the woman’s uterus but rather her social 
and biological/physiological condition, the sex of the woman was transposed from her 
uterus to the totality of her social and physical existence.270 This is the process Michel 













process whereby the feminine body was analyzed – qualified and disqualified—as 
being thoroughly saturated with sexuality” (emphasis in original).271 Consistent with 
this process of hystericization, the presence of women (or indeed their predominance) 
in a space (e.g. the revolutionary space) became interpreted as the presence of sex. In 
Egypt we saw this both in fiction and in (propagandistic, ideological, though not 
intended as fictional) representations of reality. The licentiousness of the sit-in was 
highlighted, in Rami al-I‘tisami, through various shots of the women walking in 
revealing clothes, working-out in tight sportswear and shorts, and sunbathing. This 
zooming in on women to highlight the licentiousness of the revolutionary space, along 
with its implicit assumption that the presence of women is/ushers the presence of sex, 
was re-enacted in the speech of Tal‘at Zakariyya wherein he accused the 
demonstrators of engaging in intoxication and sexual intercourse. It is noticeable how 
Zakariyya prefaced his orgiastic depiction of the sit-in by stressing the presence of 
women: Zakariyya did not mention that there are men and women—or boys and girls, 
but rather that there are women and men (and I assume it would be safe not to 
entertain the possibility of this being a feminist or chivalrous gesture on the part of 
Zakariyya). Even members of the “revolutionary camp” would be infected with this 
anxiety about feminine presence; when the football fans leagues (commonly known as 
the Ultras) organized a sit-in in April 2012, they made a decision to ban women from 












We observe, therefore, the persistent association between subversive political 
activism by (hysterical) women on one side and sexual activity (read as licentious) on 
the other. This ideological bias was forcefully introduced during the Paris Commune, 
wherein sexual activity was considered evidence of subversive political activism and 
vice versa.273 The survival of this ideological bias to our very day and it cultural 
imposition on Egyptian discourse is evident in the virginity test’s incident (2011): 
political activism led to suspicions of sexual license which (according to the regime’s 
militaristic and masculinist/patriarchal ideologies) warranted a military-medical 
examination of the women’s sex. In later statements by army generals the alleged lack 
of virginity (understood as an intact hymen, in opposition to all indigenous and 
Islamic traditions which never invoked the intactness of the hymen or even had a term 
for the hymen prior to colonial modernity) was used as evidence for the women’s 
political subversiveness, and their subversive incendiarism (the presence of Molotov 
cocktails in their tents) as evidence to their sexual licentiousness and further 
justification for the forced tests.274  The same logic was evident in later allegations by 
a pro-Sisi propagandist that the Muslim Brothers operated whorehouses which 
doubled as hideouts for explosives.275 (And while a reader versed in the Foucauldian 
art of tracing discontinuity may be appalled by this temporal and geographic leap and 















the set of continuities it registers, I contend that it is not the researcher’s fault that 
counterrevolution, since its invention of hysteria and its appropriation of the orgy in 
the 19th century, has lacked any creativity and has since then been repeating itself, or 
that the colonial cultural imposition was successful to the extent that 21st century 
Egyptian counterrevolutionary discourse eerily resembles the anti-Commune 
discourse of 1871. The discontinuity to be marked here, however, is the almost 
complete absence of this form of gendering in Egyptian and Arabic discourse in 1882 
and then its prevalence in modern times as an effect of its colonial cultural 
imposition).  
Opposed to the success of the the cultural imposition of these Western 
discourses, bodies of knowledge, and ideologies through which masculinity and 
femininity – and by extension Order and chaos— were perceived in 2011 Egypt, a 
look at the earlier stages of Egyptian history reveals how this imposition has not 
always been successful.276 Al-Shidyaq’s account of the Paris Commune, though 
reliant on European conservative sources, and although it otherwise played a role as a 
vehicle of colonial cultural imposition, largely avoided the misogyny of the discourse 
he was translating.277 Gendering is not entirely absent from al-Shidyaq’s reports on 
the Commune; at one point, for example, he speaks of a drunken communard who (as 
















but these remain isolated incidents compared to their predominance in the European 
discourse of the time.278 Al-Shidyaq’s coverage, for instance, does not mention the 
Pétroleuses at all. The incendiaries of Paris and their insanity, in al-Shidyaq, are 
gender-neutral.  
During the ‘Urabi revolt, neither the ‘Urabi press nor its Egyptian and Arab 
opponents equated the feminine with the unruliness of the crowd. Even when women 
were used as the face of the crowd, they appeared as heroic rather than unruly.279 
Against this (at least relative) absence of feminization-qua-hystericization at the turn 
of 19th-20th century, a full-fledged appearance of the hysterical woman as the 































dominates Egyptian discourse under Mubarak, as seen in the examples from 2011 
which were previously provided.   
The feminization of the revolutionary space and crowd through their 
gendered metonymy furthermore served to produce the participant men as effeminate 
or feminine. Tahrir Square was in many ways a feminine space, both because of the 
presence of women, but more generally because the space was understood as a space 
of feminine excess (like LeBon’s crowd); even the men in the Square act 
effeminately.280 The confrontation between the State (especially through its manly 
soldiery and police-men) and the demonstrators therefore took on a gendered schema. 
A stark example took place on May 15th 2011; while putting down a demonstration 
commemorating the Palestinian Nakbah near the Israeli embassy in Cairo, an army 
officer exclaimed to a male demonstrator with long hair: “so you think you will 
liberate Palestine wearing your hair like this?!” On the same day, an army officer, 
probably the same one, ordered the demonstrators to crawl down on the ground – a 
sign of humiliation, and then is reported to have told one of them “the [Israeli] flag 
will not go down, but your boxers will” (with a clear suggestion of sexual violation). 
A similarly gendered confrontation was articulated by pro-regime thugs who 
participated in the attack against the demonstrators on February 3rd-4th (which became 















interviewed thugs, identified under the pseudonym ‘Abd al-Qadir, thought the 
pending attack was justifiable because the demonstrators were “a bunch of American 
University [in Cairo] pansies who’d run away at the first gunshot.”281 The 
understanding of pansies as effeminate was made clearer by the interviewed thugs 
when they noticed the reversal of gendered roles at the end of the battle, wherein the 
ruling party member who recruited them “was running around screaming like a little 
girl, but he’s always been a coward” (emphasis added).282  If the gendering was 
implicit in the discourse of the pro-regime thug, it was explicit in the speech of a pro-
regime propagandist on national television. Posing as a repentant demonstrator, the 
unnamed propagandist declared that he and other respectable demonstrators did not 
want the regime to fall, “the opposite of regime (nizam) is chaos (fawda).” As for 
those who chose to remain in Tahrir Square, those who indeed champion chaos, they 
are “nothing but half-men, half-women,283 and people who are sexually deviant 
(homosexuals).”284 Chaos can only be endorsed by, or materialize through, failed 
subjects who embody the sexual chaos of the revolutionary space. The revolutionary 
space was thus understood as a space in which the feminine is in excess and the 

















excess exceeds what is expected of proper femininity, thus producing the women as 
half-women and sexual deviants).285 In the imagination, ideology, and discourse of the 
State and counterrevolution, therefore, the feminization-hystericization of the crowd 
was conducive to, or worked in tandem with, the production of the revolutionary 
space as that of utter sexual chaos. The uncontrollable presence of women (and thus 
of feminine sexuality, understood as the presence of sexuality or sex as such) lead to 
questionable sexual conduct, whereas the feminization of the space, in other words, 
the revolutionary space’s escape from proper masculinity embodied in and sanctioned 
by the State, led to a situation where men acted like women and women like men. It 
was, indeed, an indescribable orgy.  
 
Sexual	Chaos	as	the	Telos	of	Revolution	
Parallel to the Weberian routinization of legitimate physical force into the State (and 
the State monopoly thereof), and integral to Bourdieu’s State monopoly of legitimate 
symbolic violence, there existed, a routinization and monopoly of legitimate sexual 



















a fantasy by Plato, who wished the State to decide who gets to reproduce and cover it 
up as random selection (a fantasy which was turned into science through the 
Darwinian ruse of natural selection and which materialized in Nazi Eugenics). In the 
19th century, this organization of/monopoly over legitimate sexual practice was 
achieved through entrusting the State with sanctioning and/or recognizing marriages 
and divorces (along with the registration of the offspring).287  
This process was also inseparable from the emergence of the ideology of 
property. This ideology understood every transaction, including conjugal transactions, 
in terms of property (which only the State can recognize or arbitrate, according to 
Bourdieu’s reformulation of the Weberian idiom). Ideologies of State and 
counterrevolution thus saw an inevitable link between threats to private property (i.e. 
socialism) and threats to monogamy-understood-as-property (i.e. an indescribable 
orgy). Karl Marx articulated this phenomenon in clear and simple terms: “The 
bourgeois,” writes Marx (and arguably Engels), “sees his wife a mere instrument of 
production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in 
common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion that the lot of being 
common to all will likewise fall to the women.”288  Like Marx’s Bourgeois, the 
British conservative newspaper, the Standard, when hearing that the “the instruments 
of production are to be exploited in common,” – or in other words when faced with 















the socialist contingent within the uprising of the Commune, “came to no other 
conclusion” that a requisition of women would follow. The Standard reporter wrote: 
Nothing would be easier for them than to “requisition” the wealthy parts of the town 
which they occupy. They might help themselves to whatever they pleased, and even 
secure some of the wealthiest inhabitants of the wealthy quarters for the purpose of 
making them pay ransom; they might carry into effect some of the most hideous of 
communistic precepts which have been instilled into their minds. And treat the wives 
and daughters of the well to do bourgeois of the wealthy quarter with as little 
ceremony as their worldly possessions (emphasis added).289 
 
As both the State and society were based, according to the bourgeois ideologies of the 
19th century and beyond, on private property and on the organization of society into 
monogamous nuclear units which produced isolated individual subjects, the spectre 
of the dissolution of private property and of monogamy-qua-property entailed the 
dissolution/degeneration of the whole society; something which was already hinted at 
in al-Shidyaq’s usage of the term inhilal (degeneration/dissolution) in describing the 
effect of the abolishment of private property, and which will resurface in many of the 
examples below.  
Charges of sexual chaos were thus mobilized against revolution and 
socialism. These charges were often coded through the term orgy, suggestive as it is 
of various forms of revelry including the sexual, and harking back to the ancient 
Greek tradition which counterrevolution and colonialism persistently appropriated. 
After all, the orgies of Cybele and Dionysus constituted egalitarian spaces where 









The Commune, thus, was commonly referred to in counterrevolutionary media as an 
orgy—sometimes with explicit sexual connotations, other times with reference to 
revelry, which could be violent or sexual and in which social distinction and the very 
fabric of (capitalist) society is threatened.291 For example, the Standard reporter 
describes the Commune, especially the festive mingling of the “The damsels of the 
environs, whose opinions and habits of life have fully prepared them for the advent of 
Communism” with the “patriots” as a “Republican orgy.”292 More explicit in its 
sexual connotations was the usage of the term by Le Gaulois, which  accused the 
Commune leader Louis Delescluze of turning the “mairie” into a “phalanstère” for the 
Pétroleuses293 who in turn engaged in a nightly “orgie habituelle” that would leave the 































place littered with waste sheets, women’s underwear, undone beds, bottles with only 
dregs left, etc.294  
We see therefore how revolutionary activity in general, and socialism in 
particular, were associated, at least since the Paris Commune, with sexual chaos 
and/or the orgy (which sometimes stood for sexual chaos, other times for revelry, and 
yet others for the ancient Greek ritual and its modern appropriations). It was indeed 
Western counterrevolutionary, and particularly anti-communist, propaganda which 
forcefully introduced (or rather culturally imposed) the trope of sexual chaos (both as 
a metaphor for revolution and as its inevitable telos) to an Egyptian audience. 
To make this point we need to backtrack to 1882 and note the complete 
absence of sexual chaos in the representations of the ‘Urabi revolt,295 as well as its 



























that of al-Liwa’). The trope of sexual chaos appeared, all of a sudden and in full force, 
during the events of 1919, while British observers were blaming Egyptian riots on 
Bolshevik agitation.297 In March 1919, the newspaper Misr published an article titled 
“al-balshafiyyah wa ruh al-ijtima‘.”298 The article asserted that in nascent Soviet 
Russia women were treated as public property, and that any woman who turned 18 
was forced to register with a “public office or market” to offer herself to whomever 
wanted her (and “her parents cannot object” warned the article). This was dangerous 
because, according to the article, it would “lead to the inhilal [degeneration] of al-
hay’ah al-ijtima‘iyyah [roughly society/social organization/ social structure].” This 
practice is furthermore dangerous because it brings us closer to the horizon of 
egalitarianism, equating between highborn and lowborn women. Finally, citing 





























American eugenics,299 the article contends that such practice would lead to the inhitat 
(again one of the words that can mean degeneration/decadence) of human kind. The 
article concludes: “Bolshevism is but a disease with which the Russian Revolution 
was afflicted.” The curious appearance of anti-communist propaganda and the trope 
of sexual chaos, at a time of Egyptian insurgency and against a British suspicion of 
communistic string-pulling, and under the context of British censorship and control 
over the media, suggests that British counterinsurgency propaganda was behind these 
forms of representation.  
A few months later, the pro-British Egyptian Grand Mufti Muhammad 
Bakhit issued a fatwa (religious opinion) denouncing Bolshevism in the harshest 
terms. This fatwa was incited by an Egyptian notable under the name of Sayyid 
Hassan Muhammad, who wrote a letter asking the Grand Mufti for his opinion 
concerning Bolshevism. Muhammad’s incitement was already loaded with 
representations of moral and sexual chaos, as well as with the presumptions of the 
dissolution of society as a result of this chaos. The letter (as appears in the archives of 
the British Foreign Office) reads: 
What is your judgment concerning the ‘Way’ of the Bolsheviks which is spreading and 
doing harm everywhere these days? The chief points in their ‘way’ are: 
Anarchy, corruption, denial of religion, legalising the illegal (antinomianism), freedom from 
any creed at all, trespassing on the property of others and denying individual’s right to hold 
property, holding it to be allowable to every man to seize what he wishes from whomsoever 
he wishes, legalising the shedding of man’s blood, denial of rights of husband and wife and 
of the legitimacy of their children which they claim as property of the State, thus 
demolishing the fence guarding family life, no distinction between Halal and Haram, every 
woman is the common property of each of them without any marriage-contract, any woman 
attempting to defend her honour forfeits her life, unmarried women are often forced to 
prostitution, and married women to be unfaithful to husbands and children: in a word they 









Bakhit tried to legitimate Muhammad’s anti-Communist (orgiastic) presumptions both 
by denouncing communism in the strongest terms and by trying to anchor its orgiastic 
nature in a (false) genealogy that harks back the Magian faith and the teaching of the 
Zoroastrian reformer Mazdak (and thus Islamize anti-Communism as anti-Magian and 
anti-Zoroastrian). This attempt to indigenize/Islamize notwithstanding, the real 
incitement behind the fatwa, as well as the set of biases therein, were without a doubt 
a British colonial agency. A letter written by a British operative and addressed to A. 
W. Keown Boyd (then serving as the Director General of the European Department in 
the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, in other words the representative of the British 
occupation in the ministry) boasted:  
I have been trying to work up some effective propaganda against bolshevism and supplying 
Beaman’s [apparently the name of a British agent] Azhar friends with some of the details 
regarding Bolshevism recorded in the White Papers. This has led to the very satisfactory 
result of the issue of this Fetwa by the Grand Mufti. We are getting it produced in facsimile 
and will send copies all over the Moslem world.301  
	
The fatwa was duly translated to English, reprinted en masse, and widely 
distributed by the British authorities in Egypt and other colonies of the British 
Empire.302 Although this anti-Bolshevik propaganda was initially resisted by an 
Egyptian public sphere receptive to socialism and sympathetic to the enemies of the 
British Empire,303 it indexed (along with the aforementioned newspaper report by 
Misr newspaper) a concerted effort by British imperialism and its clients to instill a 












political dissent of the socialist variety will resurface in Muslim conservative circles 
during the Cold War. In a testimony that became famous within salafi circles (and is 
re-produced on various religious websites and Salafi online forums),304 the Kuwaiti 
sheikh Ahmad al-Qattan alleged that he used to be a communist, and that what turned 
him against communism was how another comrade praised a famous Egyptian 
socialist figure for inviting his guests to sleep with him and his wife on the same bed, 
and instructing his wife to sleep in the middle between him and his guest. The 
unnamed comrade then exclaimed how this was, in his opinion, the epitome of 
communism, thus triggering the repentance of al-Qattan.305 The elaborate 
representations of the socialist orgy as tantamount to the collapse of the whole social 
and gender order is missing, but the socialist orgy as the other of monogamy and the 
wrecker of bourgeois nuclear families is evident.  
Another example, more explicit and comprehensive of what the socialist 
orgy stands for, and more relevant to the specific context of Egypt, comes in a 1996 
short play, titled Ziyarah lil Jannah wa al-Nar (A Visit to Heaven and Hell), and 
written by Mustafa Mahmud, an important figure of Egyptian public culture 


















communist). 306 Although he doomed himself to mediocrity in his last years, Mustafa 
Mahmud is no marginal figure in Egyptian culture. Early in his career he was known 
for his inventive and sometimes controversial novellas. His al-‘Ankabut (the spider) 
toyed with the limits of human neuroscience, the theme of addiction and the idea of 
reincarnation, and achieved high acclaim to the extent that it was made into a 
television series. Later Mahmud endorsed a Sufi version of Islam and wrote a number 
of argumentative and dialectical texts wherein he argued for belief against disbelief 
(perhaps against his earlier atheistic/agnostic self). His simple and convincing style 
and his grasp over modern sciences and spiritual philosophies (both Sufi and 
Brahman) won him great popularity among a younger audience troubled by the 
questions of being, creation, and the existence of a deity. His books Rihlati min al-
shakk ila al-yaqin (my journey from suspicion/agnosticism to belief) and Hiwar ma‘ 
Sadiqi al-Mulhid (a dialogue/discussion with my atheist friend) remain best-sellers to 
this very day. In the 1970s Mahmud started preparing and presenting a weekly 
television program titled al-‘Ilm wa al-Iman (Science and Faith), which was also the 
slogan Sadat picked for his regime (dawlat al-‘Ilm wa al-Iman, lit. The State of 
Science and Faith). The show enjoyed great appeal and continued to broadcast until 


















a well-known philanthropist. A famous mosque he built and which is named after him 
occupies a central location in al-Muhandisin neighborhood of Greater Cairo. The area 
where the mosque falls is known as “the Mustafa Mahmud Square” (coincidently it 
was at the Mustafa Mahmud Square that the regime supporters gathered in 2011 in a 
counterdemonstration against the ongoing uprising, and who eventually marched on 
Tahrir Square to put an end to the uprising, culminating in what became known as 
“the Battle of the Camel.” Murtada Mansur’s previously cited statements about the 
ribald and parentless women of Tahrir Square were given at the Muhammad Mahmud 
Square). The mosque also includes a highly functional and free of charge medical 
centre. A play by Mustafa Mahmud, therefore, is not marginal to Egyptian pop-
culture, not least in the 1990s. The presence of the motif of the socialist orgy in a play 
by Mahmud (serialized on the pages of a popular newspaper), both indexed and 
secured the motif’s presence at the center of Egyptian popular culture in the 1990s. 
Ziyarah lil Jannah wa al-Nar (A Visit to Heaven and Hell), was first 
serialized through the popular al-Ahram newspaper, and then published in book form 
bearing its title and showcasing other writings by Mahmud. While the play attracted 
some controversy through its Sufi motifs, its description of the afterlife, and its 
assignment of people to places in Heaven and Hell (a motif that was not foreign to 
Arabic literature, given how it appeared in the 11th century in Abu al-‘Ala’ al-
Ma‘arri’s Risalat al-Ghufran, which was most likely the inspiration behind 
Mahmud’s text), the core of the play, or at least the Hell section of the play, is anti-
Communist propaganda. Descending through Hell, the main character encounters, in 
addition to Satan, the historic leaders of socialism, who are eventually deemed more 
worthy of the lowest holes of Hell than Satan himself. In a telling dialogue Satan 




space tens of satellites that broadcast, to all television devices, all the ten positions of 
the sexual act.”307 One may be forgiven for being perplexed by how satellite 
television and satellite porn channels, a quintessential capitalist industry, are 
attributed to Communism,308 until one reaches the final scenes and realizes that the 
worthiest of the lowest hole of hell is not Satan, Marx, Lenin, or Stalin, but Russian 
anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, and that the worst sin is not socialism but 
chaos/anarchy.309 If the broadcast of the sexual act (all ten positions of it) is a marker 
of sexual chaos, then sexual chaos here, like the other examples of the socialist orgy, 
serves to provide a trope, a symptom, and a further cause for social chaos. The 
socialist satellite pornographic orgy is only a prelude for to real orgy: the total 
dissolution of society. 
Mustafa Mahmud’s socialist, anarchist, and Satanist orgy exposes another 
running theme in the narration of political and social chaos as sexual. The orgy here is 
a trope (or telos, if we want to read it literally) for the social chaos that will result 
from the abolishing of (all and especially class) hierarchy and social distinction. The 
fear of the collapse of social distinction has always animated the fear of the orgy: 













well as with the Roman suspicion of the orgies of Cybele.311  Modern invocations of 
the orgy did not depart from this same fear.312The Standard’s fear of the Commune 
orgy, al-Shidyaq’s fear of a total moral and social degeneration/the coming undone of 
the social/ inhilal as a result of socialism, and Misr’s fear that socialism leads to 
orgiastic practices that undermine the family and with it the whole social structure can 
be read as belonging to the same trend. Mubarak’s propagandists simply picked this 
already available discursive tool and weaponized it against dissidents (some of whom 
were professed socialists, therefore already belonging to the orgiastic space of 
socialist and sexual chaos.)  
The motif of political activism as sexual chaos was picked up and mobilized 
against political dissidents, before 2011, in Rami al-I‘tisami. In the film, the whole 
sit-in starts as an attempt by Rami to sublimate his unfulfilled sexual desires (Rami 
who lost his phone could no longer get in contact with his habitual lower class 
prostitute, so he started the sit-in in the hope of impressing and seducing another 
woman). Throughout the film, the gathering of youth away from paternal and State 
authority becomes an alibi for sexual or almost sexual license: evident in scenes of 
dance parties, scenes of scantily clad women being stared at by men, scenes in which 
effeminate— read as homosexual— men gather together, scenes in which women 
suggest to their male counterparts that they should spend the night in the sit-in, a 
scene in which Rami attempts to seduce a female colleague in his tent, and yet another 
scene in which he attempts to rape a lower class woman after convincing her to come 
clean his tent for a day’s wage. More importantly, the encounter between classes, the 







is evident in the attempted-rape scene but also evident when the lower class crowd 
seeks to join the sit-in. Rami, who is presented throughout the film as a man with a 
special taste for lower class women, welcomes the merging of classes, to the dismay 
of his jealous female colleague who objects that strict segregation should be observed 
“lest things melt into one another” (an expression conveying chaos and lack of 
distinction in Egyptian dialect). Rami, lustfully eyeing a woman among the lower 
class crowd, responds in a suggestive tone “I wish they melt into one another.” The 
mayhem and class indistinction that form the crowd are understood by Rami, as well 
as by many pro-regime propagandists and counterrevolutionary observers, as sexual 
chaos. 
Depictions of the Tahrir Square sit-in as a space of sexual chaos therefore 
belonged to a longer history of depicting socialism and/or political activism as social, 
moral, and sexual chaos. It was this ideological trend that shaped, or was used as a 
pretext, when the army abducted the women participating in the March 9th 2011 sit-in 
and forced them to undergo virginity tests. It was the same ideological trend which 
shaped the justifications offered by the unnamed army general (probably al-Sisi). 
After exclaiming that these women “were not like your daughter or mine” the 
unnamed general continued: “These were girls who had camped out in tents with male 
protesters in Tahrir Square, and we found in the tents Molotov cocktails and 
(drugs).”313 Indeed subversive activism is tantamount to sexual license and chaos, 
which merits Statist and military examination and regimentation. It was also the same 






sexual relations” were taking place in Tahrir.314  Where other propagandists saw 
sexual chaos, Muhammad Hassan (a preacher with questionable credentials who was 
promoted by the Egyptian state media and who has returned the favor by acting as a 
puppet-propagandist) saw a sexual apocalypse. Giving a speech from the holy site of 
Mount ‘Arafat while (allegedly) performing the Muslim ritual of hajj (roughly 
pilgrimage), in 2012 while Egypt was under the rule of the Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces (SCAF), Hassan saw an opportune moment to deliver religious 
propaganda from hijaz to the ruling SCAF in Egypt.  In the middle of his speech, 
Hassan fired: “those who accuse the army of treason want our country to turn into a 
state of chaos [stressing every syllable of the Arabic word, fawda, especially its last 
syllable]” and then added in a high pitch: “By God, I swear by God on Mount ‘Arafat,  
by God, and then again by God, if they break the army like they broke the police, by 
God no one of us in Egypt will be safe in his own bedroom.” Hassan then moved to 
reminiscing about the events of 2011 “they broke the police and we saw what 
happened: security deterioration/looseness [infilat] in broad daylight, kidnap in broad 
daylight, rape in broad daylight.” All revolutionary scenarios, it seems, lead to rape or 
sexual chaos.315  
In many of the representations of sexual chaos, nevertheless, there is 
something more than simply the translation of socialism into an egalitarian sexual 
chaos which threatens the fabric of society. In addition to this presumption, there is 










subversive and sexual, or that it is simultaneously politically and morally subversive. 
In fact the suspicion of what transpires, is hatched, is plotted, or is produced, beyond 
the gaze of the State, runs through many of the examples of disorder and chaos which 
were presented throughout this chapter. It is as if the gaze of the State is normalizing, 
and what evades, escapes, challenges, or eschews it becomes perverse, degenerate, 
and licentious. In the next chapter I will use the trope (and topos) of the orgy (taking 
up and revising Ernst Curtius’ notion of the literary topos) to examine this suspicion 






The Dance of Dionysus: The Topos of the Orgy in Egyptian Pro-State 
Discourse 
 
stories of our women leaving home to frisk	
in mock ecstasies among the thickets on the mountain, 	
dancing, in honor of the latest divinity, 	
a certain Dionysus, whoever he may be! 	
In their midst stand bowls brimming with wine. 	
And then, one by one, the women wander off	
to hidden nooks where they serve the lusts of men. 	
Priestesses of Bacchus they claim they are,	
but it’s really Aphrodite they adore. (Pentheus, in Euripides’ Bacchae) 
There were drums, toots, dancing, and drugs, girls, and boys, and full sexual relations 
(Tal‘at Zakariyya describing the scene in Tahrir.) 
 
The	Orgy	as	a	Topos		
In the previous chapter we explored how, within the ideological 
representations/mythologies of the State, political dissent and social chaos are 
commonly narrated as sexual chaos—when Tal‘at Zakariyya characterized the events 
in Tahrir Square as “drums, dance, toots … and full-fledged sexual relations” he was 
merely summing up a discourse and an ideological set of representational practices 
that emerged from politicians, army men, regime propagandists, and even religious 




certain polysemic valence, a signifier with a range of significations ranging from the 
ancient Greek ecstatic ritual associated with Dionysus and other gods, to its modern 
meaning as a state of mayhem or revelry of a violent and/or sexual nature) operated 
within these representations of sexual chaos. In this chapter I will show how, in both 
counterrevolutionary archives of Egypt and Europe, the orgy (inseparable from its 
classical Greek referent) operated as not only a metaphor, or a trope, for political, 
social, and sexual chaos, but beyond that as a topos which shaped and conditioned 
representations of crowds and revolutions.  This enquiry will shed more light on the 
normalizing gaze of the State which suspects anything that escapes or evades it to be 
licentious, subversive, chaotic, sexual, and orgiastic (an understanding coded within 
the very polysemic nature of the term orgy as well as its history since Greek 
antiquity). It will also show how this gaze has a specific Western history anchored in 
specifically Western modes of power, whereas what escapes this gaze and becomes 
thus orgiastic has always been referred to the Oriental (thus contributing to the mutual 
mapping of the licentious and the Oriental, or the licentious and Europe’s racial other 
more broadly).  
Though I am clearly arguing for a history of recurrence, the history I am 
about to explore is not in any way a history of continuity. I have already shown how 
the figure of the frenzied woman (even when referred to as a maenad), did not always 
reference the same phenomena: whereas in Greek mythology the maenads referenced 
literal ecstasy (and not hysteria, which in this period was tied to the uterus not the 
soul) in modern times the frenzied woman/maenad came to reference a group of 
bodies of knowledge through which femininity is constituted—most notably hysteria. 
I have also gestured towards how the orgy’s association with the natural and the 




were absent from the ancient Greek understanding of the orgy. In this chapter I will 
also show how, though the orgy had always been associated with the Oriental, the 
significance of this Oriental irreversibly changed through the paradigms of Social 
Darwinism and through epistemologies/metaphysics of the modern which produce the 
Oriental as that which escapes signification.   
For this purpose, before proceeding with my analysis, I need to revisit, 
unpack, trouble, and redefine the literary concept of the topos, a concept already 
imbricated in a European ideology that fabricates a continuity between ancient Greece 
and post-Enlightenment Europe and thus contributes to the same European 
exceptionalism that constituted the 19th century colonialist discourse. For the purpose 
of this chapter – and this study more generally, I use the term topos to refer to a 
number of motifs or themes that recur side by side to create an argument or a 
metaphor. Here I am making an arbitrary distinction between topos and motif, only 
reserving the former term for the arguments or metaphors that are constructed through 
various motifs. Linguistically the two terms (topos and motif) can be treated as 
synonymous.316 In literary studies, on the other hand, the term topos (which in ancient 
Greek meant a place) originally referred to verbal and argumentative conventions, but 
was later extended (through the concept of koinoi topoi, or commonplace) to “include 
standard metaphors and ‘topics’.”317 This usage was taken up and further elaborated 










the topos as “established schemes of thought, extended metaphors, standardized 
passages of description, and the like.”318 
It is Ernst Curtius’ conception of the topos that I want to simultaneously take 
up and take issue with. In this conception, the topos becomes “a unifying element,” 
congruent with Curtius’ agenda of inventing a continuity of Western literature that 
extends from antiquity, to the medieval ages, to modern times. In his review of Ernst 
Curtius’ Europaische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter, Classics scholar L.R Lind 
noted that for Ernst, “European literature” (whether Classic, Medieval, Renaissance, 
or modern) constitutes a “historical whole” which defies its division into eras or 
periods.319 This myth of continuity (which is central to the mythistory of Europe as an 
eternal entity that hails from or inherits Greek antiquity) is central to Curtius’ 
conception of the topos.  Lind notes that, for Curtius, “much of Renaissance and later 
European literature cannot be fully understood without a knowledge of that 
literature’s relation to Medieval Latin rhetoric in the use of commonplaces, 
metaphors, turns of phrase, or, to employ the term Curtius prefers, topoi, many of 
which go back to the Greeks, although many also are Medieval in origin” (emphasis 
in original).320 On the one hand, what I am arguing is not very different from Lind’s 
rendition of Curtius’ argument: understanding the modern recurrence of the orgy 
cannot be fully achieved without understanding of the set of “commonplaces, 
metaphors, turns of phrase, or…[as] Curtius prefers, topoi [which] go back to the 









of tracing the topoi back to their Greek origins to a wholistic nature of Western 
culture, but rather to the continuous appropriations which invent/fabricate Europe as a 
wholistic geographic and cultural trans-historic entity. These appropriations, 
inventions, and fabrications are indeed ideological, and hence I suggest understanding 
the topos as an ideological device through which Europe has 
imagined/represented/invented itself. Here I propose a new shade of meaning to 
Althusser’s notion that “ideology has no history”321 – at once modifying, or 
unfaithfully rendering, Curtius’ concept of topos and Althusser’s concept of an 
ideology with no history. While for Althusser, an ideology with no history means that 
ideology is not the exclusive feature of a certain stage of capitalism but rather an 
integral part of how relations of production are re-produced and therefore an integral 
part of the class struggle at any point in time, the shade of meaning I want to 
introduce (which is not entirely alien to Althusser's conception of ideology) is that 
ideologies deny their histories/historicity and present themselves as eternal and trans-
historical (otherwise they would be acknowledging their own essence as ideology, 
something only Marxist ideology dares to venture, according to Althusser). The 
concept of topos in Curtius’ formulation can thus be approached as an ideological 
device that sustains the ideology of Europe (in other words the ideology that produces 
Europe as an entity, a task inseparable from Orientalism, which was both predicated 
on and integral to the conception of the Occident, or Europe, as a wholistic unit. Later 
in this chapter I will show how modern appropriations of the orgy have worked as 
part of appropriating and re-inventing ancient Greek Orientalism as modern 
Orientalism). This device works not only through arguments of a wholistic continuity 






and reinvention of ‘tradition’. Colonialist and counterrevolutionary forces of 19th 
century Europe saw themselves as the rightful heirs, via the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment, to the Greek civilization and therefore (consciously and 
unconsciously) re-produced classical Greek motifs, or topoi, including the orgy. 
Throughout this chapter I will show how the topos of the orgy operated as an 
ideological device and was culturally imposed on Egypt as an ideological effect. The 
appropriation of the topos of the orgy by post-Enlightenment Europe as well as its 
implicit imposition on Egyptian culture, was a feature of a voyeuristic State which 
suspects all that it cannot see and paradoxically produces what it does not know as 
licentious.  
Indeed, the resurgence of the orgy can be explained, if partially, through the 
classical Greek orgy’s resonance with a number of modern or resurgent phenomena. 
These phenomena included modern patriarchy and the gendering of spaces (itself 
based, if partially, on a resurgence of the ancient Greek gendering of spaces) evident 
in the recurrence of the figure of the maenads even as their referent shifted from 
ecstasy to hysteria. They also included modern Orientalism. Finally and most 
importantly for the purpose of this chapter, the classical Greek orgy resonated with 
the voyeuristic State, its suspicion of what evades it, and its projection of sexual 
suspicions and fantasies onto this orgiastic space.  
 
The	Orgiastic	Paradox:	It	seems	to	have	been	and	indescribable	Orgy		
A curious paradox appeared in Zakariyya’s statements about the licentiousness of the 
Tahrir Square sit-in. Throughout his interview, Zakariyya expressed his anxiety about 




interpellating we that produces a community embodied within the State and others the 
dissidents and their orgiastic space) could not ascertain the nature of the events that 
took place within the sit-in (let alone ascertain who was there: “Muslim Brothers or 
otherwise, only God knows”).322 Despite (or because) of this assertion of ignorance, 
Zakariyya seemed certain not only of the licentious nature of the event but also of the 
specific details of the licentious behavior that took place (it is noteworthy that 
Zakariyya did not simply claim that Tahrir Square had become a hotbed of sexual 
relations, but he went further to characterize these sexual relations as full or full-
fledged – kamilah.) The same paradox of knowing yet not knowing, or knowing by 
virtue of not knowing, is present in the 1919 British report that characterized the 
violent event in Upper Egypt as an indescribable orgy. In the 1919 report, the event is 
only describable as indescribable, as if its very indescribability produces the 
condition of its describability (the paradox is compounded by how the term orgy 
refers to something that is indescribable, as I am about to show, creating an infinite 
loop of something that is describable as indescribable and indescribable as 
indescribable). 
 Although this paradox acquires a new significance with the modern State 
and its ability to monitor, survey, and surveill its subjects, the paradox already existed 
in classical Greek representations of the orgy. The soliloquy of Pentheus quoted in the 
epigraph of this chapter betrays a similar paradox. Even though Pentheus, until his 
death at the hands of the maenads, is ignorant of what the orgy is or what kind of 
rituals it comprises, he insists throughout the play (and especially in the quoted 







remarks seem as if they were an echo of Pentheus’ words: in both cases, the ritual that 
takes place away from the gaze of the State must be of a licentious and sexual nature, 
and the participants in this ritual (especially the women, who are the exclusive 
participants in Pentheus’ case, but who need to be highlighted and mentioned before 
the men in Zakariyya’s case) are undoubtedly using this ritual as a cover-up for 
licentious and sexual behavior. This paradox characterized the ancient Greek 
understanding of the orgy, governed the transformation of the term from a signifier of 
a religious rite to a signifier of licentious and sexual behavior, and is therefore 
generative of the polysemy that characterizes the term.  
The first definition of the term orgy in The Oxford English Dictionary is:  
Secret rites or ceremonies practised in the worship of various gods of Greek and 
Roman mythology; esp. those practices connected with the festivals in honour of 
Dionysus or Bacchus, or the festival itself, which was celebrated with extravagant 
dancing, singing, drinking, etc.323 
It is important, therefore, for the definition of the orgies that they were secret, hidden 
from the gaze of the public, of the men, and of the State; hence literature on the 





















because/despite of this mysterious nature of the ritual that it was suspected of being 
revelry (of animal and/or human sacrifice, of feasting/cannibalism, of intoxication, 
and, most importantly, of illicit sex). It is from this suspicion that the term orgy came 
to signify not only secret religious practices but also revelries and licentiousness325 
(something we have already seen in the logic of Pentheus).  This has led to the second 
dictionary definition of the orgy as “An occasion of feasting or revelry, esp. one 
characterized by excessive drinking and indiscriminate sexual activity. Now freq.: 
spec. an occasion of group sexual activity”326(a meaning invoked in Zakariyya’s 
speech), and to the third definition as “In extended use: an occasion of excessive 
indulgence in any activity, attitude, condition, etc.; an excessive or extravagant 
display of something”327 (a meaning invoked in the 1919 report). Indeed the classical 
Greek fear of the orgy did not only manifest itself through sexual suspicions. 
Representations of the orgy included allegations of animal and human sacrifice 
(sometimes the sacrifice of infants, signifying a fear of a femininity that could become 
infanticidal if not properly contained/regimented in the domestic. We see an element 
of this theme in the Bacchae. Pentheus, though not an infant, is ultimately torn to 
pieces by his own mother who, struck by Dionysian madness, mistook him for a wild 
animal).  The brutality of the maenads was often emphasized through  tearing up their 
sacrifice with their bare hands, which is something the 1919 report faithfully re-
enacted, depicting how “brutes” who included “minacle women” tore down the limbs 










included the consumption of the flesh and blood of their sacrificial animal or 
human—again something that was faithfully re-enacted in the 1919 report that 
claimed that the “brutes” drank the blood gushing from the torn limbs of the British 
officer. The orgiastic paradox therefore produced the orgies not only as sexual 
revelries but also as violent revelries, revelries of blood and cannibalism, something 
that persisted in modern appropriations of the orgy.  
In the rest of this chapter I will proceed to show how this orgiastic paradox 
operated in Egyptian pro-State representations of spaces which eluded the State gaze 
(be they spaces of protest, Heavy Metal parties and alleged cults of Satanism, or 
crowds and secret organizations), and how narratives of sexual chaos and ultimately 
of licentious spaces of a sexual nature are produced under the context of this paradox. 
Although I have already introduced the orgy as a counterrevolutionary trope in the 
previous Chapter, I am yet to dissect the logic of its operation (i.e. what I have so far 
termed the orgiastic paradox) beyond a mere sensationalist tool to discredit the 
enemies of the regime. It also bears noting that not all the examples of orgiastic 
representations provided in the previous chapter faithfully re-enacted the topos of the 
orgy or exhibited the orgiastic paradox. The socialist-Bolshevik orgy was not an affair 
hidden from the gaze of the State and the public. On the contrary, it was sponsored by 
the Soviet State and made public (through public state-run whore houses according to 
Misr newspaper or through Marxist-Leninist-Bakuninist satellite channels according 
to Mustafa Mahmud). Yet the orgy of socialism is an orgy of a collapse of distinction 
(let us not forget that the real menace in Mahmud’s play was anarchism and the 
collapse of Order, and the real villain Bakunin, and that Misr’s fear of the Socialist 
orgy was not only moral, it was also a fear of the collapse of social distinction to the 




to the total collapse of the social order or al-hay’ah al-ijtima‘iyyah). This collapse of 
distinction was already part of what constituted the fear of the orgy for ancient Greece 
as well as for 19th century counterrevolutionary observers who appropriated the topos. 
This collapse of distinction, furthermore, poses a challenge to the gaze of the State, 
which would no longer be able to distinguish the individual members of this orgy.  
My subsequent analysis will thus cover two themes: first I will deal with the 
orgy as something that evades the gaze of the State, providing examples that followed 
faithfully the topos of the orgy as set by the Greek tradition, while paying a special 
attention to the history of appropriations and cultural impositions that made this topos 
available to the Egyptian State. I will end my discussion of this theme by exploring 
the Western specificity and the Orientalist nature of this topos and of the state-gaze on 
which it is predicated. I will then move to discussing the orgy as a collapse of 
distinction, showing how the crowd as such, even if not insurrectionary or rioting, and 
even when convening in public and under the gaze of the State, is constituted along 
certain appropriations of the topos of the orgy. I will conclude the discussion of this 
theme by discussing the Orient as that which escapes signification, and thus as the 
discursive equivalent to the orgy and the crowd.  
 
The	Satanist	Orgy 
It should not come as a surprise that the accounts of the Egyptian Satanists which we 
are about to explore would re-enact faithfully many of the Dionysian motifs. The 







Indeed, scholars of mythology, of medieval lore, and of Gender Studies have 
commonly perceived the medieval European cults of witchcraft and the Satanic rituals 
they were accused of observing to be the direct heir of the Dionysian ritual, 
substituting the hysterical witches for the frenzied maenads.329 Just like the women of 
the orgy, the witches were thought of as holding frenzied, irrational, and suspiciously 
sexual rituals, out in nature, away from the public, social, and masculine gaze. The 
Devil, whom the witches worshipped, and with whom they formed bonds and had 
sexual intercourse, also inherited the figure of Dionysus330 in many ways, most 







































specifically by inheriting his goat-like figure.331 The same way the maenads sacrificed 
animals, and sometimes humans (babies according to some accounts)332 to Dionysus, 
the witches sacrificed unbaptized babies to the Devil.333 Similarly, other blood rituals 
associated with medieval witchcraft and Satan worship (spilling, smearing, and 
drinking) can be seen as replicating the consumption of blood in the orgies. It matters 
little, as far as this study is concerned, whether the enemies of the Church had 
excavated a pagan ritual and used it to escape and challenge church authority, or if the 
Church on the other hand excavated the ritual to discredit its own enemies and 
paganism simultaneously (or if the recurrence pertains to a deeper buried connection 
between ideology and the unconscious, which neither Althusser nor I could venture to 
explain, as pointed out in the Introduction). 
In a similar fashion, modern representations of Satanism have thus 
resuscitated the Dionysian motif(s) (by way of witchcraft). In the 1980s conservative 
media in Europe and North America (both in the US and Canada) excavated the 























referred to as the Satanic panic).334 This was contaminant with the rise of Reaganism 
and Thatcherism and the intensification of the use of conservative and Christian 
rhetoric at the height of the Cold War and in reaction to the sexual revolution and the 
AIDS pandemic (among other things). This could be either read as the right-wing 
conservative ideology creating its own foil, or adversary, as targets and fulcra for its 
discourse and finding in its Christian archive a useful discursive tool. It could be also 
read as youth rebelling against the hold of conservative power and thus having a 
recourse in the Satanic ritual. Either way, Egypt and Lebanon (both particularly open 
to the effect of global media and its cultural imposition) had their own versions of the 
Satanic scare, as an aftershock to the 1980s Western Satanic scare, in the 1990s.  
In the Fall of 1996 and through 1997 Ruz al-Yusuf, a popular Egyptian 
magazine that has long acted as the sensationalist mouthpiece of the State and the 
regime, and which was at the same time spearheading a number of regime-sponsored 
campaigns including the one against Islamists335 and the one against non-conventional 
matrimonies,336 fabricated/uncovered a Satanist scandal that would dominate 
















In 1996, Ruz al-Yusuf claimed that there were clubs for devil worship337 
throughout Egypt and that Heavy Metal concerts were nothing but a cover-up for 
satanic rituals (a claim that would be picked up by other media, and eventually by the 
police, which by early 1997 began to arrest alleged Satanists).338 This came about a 
year after Ruz al-Yusuf rehearsed the orgy through heavily reporting on a scandal in 
which a married couple filmed group sex parties in their home, and in which the orgy 
qua group sex figured strongly as the other of monogamy and the wrecker of the 
monogamous family.339 While these earlier rehearsals of the orgy were merely 
sensationalist depictions of group sex (and conservative appeals to strengthen the 
family, weakened as it is by the orgy), the Satanist orgy in Ruz al-Yusuf revisited all 
the incarnations of the orgy, from the Dionysian ritual to sex parties. It also exhibited 
the same anxiety concerning spaces that evade the public gaze of the State and 
society, though this time these spaces were not socialist or politically active, but 
rather the carouse spaces populated by upper class youth closed off, through class 





















In its coverage of the scandal, Ruz al-Yusuf replicated the Dionysian themes 
that characterized the orgy and the cults and rituals of witchcraft, sometimes directly 
quoting Western media or “the internet.”  That the Dionysian motifs came to Egypt by 
way of Western media and more importantly by way of the conservative discourse 
that characterized the capitalist/Western bloc in the 1980s speaks to the cultural 
imposition, adoption, and adaptation inherent in the application of the topos of the 
orgy. In the subsequent subsections I identify three Dionysian motifs and trace their 
recurrence in Ruz al-Yusuf’s coverage of the Satanists’ scandal. These motifs are the 
blood ritual (including animal sacrifice and the consumption of blood), the frenzied 
dance (or dance and frenzy, which also include depictions of ecstasy and 
intoxication), and licentious sexual behavior (including real or simulated group-sex).   
 
1- An Orgy of Blood 
 
Like the ancient Greek representations of the orgy and its medieval and 1980s 
Western appropriations, blood-rituals comprised an integral and recurrent feature of 
the larger Satanic/orgiastic ritual. This was evident starting from the first report on 
Egyptian Satanists. In his ‘report’ which set off the scandal, ‘Abd Allah Kamal (a Ruz 
al-Yusuf reporter who in 2005 became its editor in chief, soon after he joined the 
political committee of the ruling party in 2003, and who doubled as a staunch 
Mubarak propagandist and later as a Sisi apologist) identified the slaughter of cats and 
mice “to the beats of black music” as among the most prominent Satanic rites; this 
was highlighted in the flash points constituting a sub-heading in his report,341 and then 







re-stressed in the main text.342 At first, the blood ritual on the pages of Ruz al-Yusuf 
only involved mutilating the bodies of animals and using the blood to write “bizarre 
statements” on walls.343 Soon, however, Ruz al-Yusuf would move to describing more 
intense blood rituals. An alleged letter from a mother of a Satanist claimed that her 
son and his friends sat in a circle, and while chanting “bizarre songs” they would 
slaughter a dog or a cat and then drink its blood, and that, at one point, the mother 
walked in on them and saw their bodies smeared with animal blood.344  Another report 
alleged that, amidst the frenzied dance, the participants would pass around a glass full 
of blood and would drink from it and smear their bodies with it. Another account 
(coming in the form of a confession-letter-to-the-editor from a former member of a 
satanic cult) suggested that to be initiated into the cult, a member was presented with 
a full glass of blood to drink.345 This report is significantly titled “shurb al-damm wa 
hurriyyat al-ra’i” (Drinking blood and the freedom of opinion). In addition to 
presenting a ritual that is outlandish and shocking to the sensibilities of the larger 
audience, the spilling and consumption of blood (both in the Dionysian orgy and the 
Satanic ritual, and most clearly in the 1919 indescribable orgy) can be seen as a sign 
of a certain kind of excess achieved when the participants reach a certain frenzy. 
Depictions of ecstasy and frenzy are therefore not unrelated to depictions of blood 
rituals.  










Much like the blood ritual, various depictions of dance, frenzy, and ecstasy recurred 
as a Satanic and orgiastic ritual (from the raving maenads, to the hysterical witches’ 
dances in the wilderness as Satan possesses them, to modern Satanists who danced in 
Heavy Metal parties). In Ruz al-Yusuf’s reports on the Satanists, dance recurrently 
appeared as a frenzied, intoxicated, hysterical, and sexual phenomenon.  
Reporting on a video of one of the parties (most probably procured through 
the police, which was by then investigating the case and pressing charges), Ruz al-
Yusuf’s Maysa’ Nuh presents an image of utter frenzy: the dancers “were dancing to 
Black Metal music, and shaking their heads, frantically/violently from back to front 
and from front to back, jumping, dancing in circles, hands on shoulders.” Then Nuh 
moves from frenzy to intoxication: “While dancing, they were taking drugs, including 
marijuana and hashish, the level of excitement/frenzy (darajat al infi‘al) rising with 
the loud/rowdy music until some of them fell unconscious.” Other dancers, according 
to the report, “took off their tops and started dancing in a hysterical346 manner.”347 
Many other reports equally highlighted intoxication (through both alcohol and drugs) 



















frenzy and ecstasy, the description here brings forth two phenomena that inherited the 
Dionysian orgy, namely hysteria349 and convulsion.350 Hysteria (using the Arabic 
transliteration of the Greek term) also appeared many times in the coverage.351 The 
convulsing Satanist, falling unconscious after a fit of hysterical/epileptic dance also 
recurs through the coverage.352 
The dance is also described in sexual terms, or as leading to sexual relations. 
In one of its earliest reports on the Satanists, Ruz al-Yusuf mentioned (with no 








































context) something it terms “hot/het bangs” (from the description, they clearly mean 
head banging) as a form of frenzied dance. Then, again without providing any 
context, the article moves to describing what it terms “slam dance” (which allegedly 
the “aficionados of this music game engage in.” It is not clear if by “this music game” 
they mean heavy metal, head banging, or Satanism). According to the article, slam 
dance is: “a dance in which bodies bump into one another, and is engaged in when 
these people reach a state of ecstasy under the effect of music, and when things get 
messy.”353  Another article described the “obscene positions” of some of the 
intoxicated girls on the dance floor in another Satanist party354 (which brings forth the 
image of the maenads – the mania of the maenads here is only understood as sexual, 
which is not different from Pentheus’ interpretation of the orgy). The nexus of ecstasy 
and sex within which the frenzied dance of the Satanists exists is clear in the choice of 
the word nashwah (ecstasy) to describe the state under which “slam dance” takes 
place.355  The same article provided clearer sexual suggestions when it described the 
merging of the bodies of the dancers when they “slam danced”; and left no room for 




















Satanic sexual dances, however, can sometimes go further and simulate group sex. In 
one of her “investigative reports,” Maysa’ Nuh described a woman “standing between 
two men, [one] from the front and [one] from the back, like a sandwich, [bodies] 
embracing and hands intertwining.”357 
3- Weird Sex and Sexual Chaos 
In addition to frenzied and sexual dance (which sometimes simulates group sex), the 
charge of illicit sexual intercourse358 and group sex during the Satanic parties/rituals 
was also ever-present. In fact it was one of the official charges on which the alleged 
Satanists faced arrest and interrogation.359 In addition, non-normative sexual practices 
were always at the root of Ruz al-Yusuf’s representations of Satanic cults and creeds, 
whether in Egypt or elsewhere. Egyptian Satanists were accused of engaging in 
“weird sex” (al-jins al-gharib)360 and in the rape of the living361 and the dead.362  The 






















non-normative sexual chaos. Among these apocryphal origins is the Yazidi religion—
which is largely conceived to comprise devil worship. In Ruz al-Yusuf’s reports, the 
Yazidis in line with Ruz al-Yusuf’s editorial policy, are charged with various forms of 
sexual license. According to the article, a Yazidi adulteress is forgiven if her partner 
in adultery is Yazidi. Furthermore, when a Yazidi couple are faced with parental 
resistance, the man could allegedly kidnap the woman to “one of the villages” where 
they could get married “with no mahr or sadaq [the alimony paid by the husband to 
the wife in order to officiate the marriage]” (which is significant given how Ruz al-
Yusuf at the time was obsessed with the threat of non-normative marriages).363  
Another important source for Satanism, according to the same article, is “an American 
man named Anton Szandor [LaVey]” who founded “a ‘church’ for Satan,” in which 
animals are sacrificed “and the basest forms of sex [ahatt anwa’ al-jins] are 
performed”364 (one is left to wonder what these most lowly and base forms of sex are 
and whether they are among the ten positions of the sexual act which constituted 
Mustafa Mahmud’s Satanist-Marxist orgy).   
Representations of sexual chaos in the context of the Satanic orgy were not 
limited to allegations of sexual intercourse. Sexual chaos was also narrated in terms of 
sexual indistinction (much like the ancient Greek representations of the orgies of 
Dionysus and Cybele and the 19th century counterrevolutionary representations of 
revolutions as orgies in which the distinction between the sexes is blurred, and in 










feminized). In the Satanic orgies of 1996, not only were the sexes mingling (and 
merging) freely, but it was furthermore sometimes difficult to tell the men and the 
women apart. Men with long hair and wearing makeup served as a target for such 
representations,365 in the same manner as the orgies of Dionysus featured the 
effeminate god with long curls, (and also in the same manner the Tahrir orgy a decade 
and a half later would feature men with effeminate long hair and dubious loyalties).  
What we see in Ruz al-Yusuf’s reports on the Satanists, therefore, is the 
coming together (or the cultural imposition or importation) of the various Dionysian 
motifs. We are no longer dealing exclusively with the orgiastic paradox of knowing 
yet/by virtue of not knowing. This paradox is indeed present (and the gap between the 
known and the unknown is filled and/or elided through the fantasies/investigative 
reports of Ruz al-Yusuf’s journalists as well as the police investigations-fabrications 
they relied on). In addition to this paradox, we also see other motifs that constituted 
the Dionysian topos – many of them coming via the modern appropriations of the 
Satanic ritual, which in turn inherited the orgy: ecstatic dance and intoxication, blood 
rituals, and of course group-sex (or the simulation thereof). While it inherited the 
motif of sexual chaos as the index and/or telos of escaping the normative gaze of the 
State, the society, and the parents, the scandal of the Satanists synthesized this motif 














apologists (many of whom were the same people who fabricated/uncovered the 
Satanists’ scandal)366 who would use it later against protesters and ‘revolutionaries’.  
To illustrate how Ruz al-Yusuf’s coverage/fabrication of the scandal of the 
Satanists placed at the centre of Egyptian public discourse a topos that was later 
weaponized against political dissidents, we can compare two scenes, one from Ruz al-
Yusuf’s coverage of the Satanist parties (based on the alleged confessions of a 
repentant Satanist procured by the police), and one from 2011 Tahrir Square (through 
the alleged confessions of a repentant ‘revolutionary’ made on public television). The 
2011 scene seems as if it were a faithful reenactment (mutatis mutanids) of its 1997 
Satanist forerunner.  In both versions, the scenes are supposed to be narrated by a 
repentant eyewitness; a disillusioned Satanist in the first and a disillusioned activist in 
the second (the confessional of the repentant as witness can be seen here as revealing 
an anxiety concerning what averts the gaze of the voyeuristic State, an attempt to 
penetrate the orgy-qua-mystery). In the first, however, the confessions of the 
disillusioned activist are relayed by Ruz al-Yusuf’s journalist Wa’il al-Ibrashi, while in 
the second the disillusioned activist is given air-time on state-run television to speak 


















disillusioned Satanist), entering the licentious space of the Satanist party, and greeted 
by an organizer. The organizer then asked the later-disillusioned Satanist if he had had 
any drugs. When the disillusioned Satanist declared he did not have any, the organizer 
responded by reassuring him that he could procure drugs for him.368 The absurdity of 
the organizer asking for drugs while he himself is the source (or connected to the 
source) is left unresolved; the purpose is not to provide a coherent story but to offer a 
caricature of licentiousness. It is the repeated and exaggerated mention of narcotics 
that is at stake, not the plot. In the Tahrir Square version, the disillusioned activist, 
named Muhammad ‘Adil, relates that upon entering Tahrir Square he was greeted by 
an Islamist organizer, who was identified as a representative of “The Commander of 
the Islamist group” (Amir al-Jama‘ah). The Islamist then asked ‘Adil whether he had 
had hashish on him. As ‘Adil declared that he had had no hashish on him, the Islamist 
assured him that he could obtain some from the Amir. Once again the 
absurdity/caricature/farce of the person asking for drugs being the procurer is left 
unresolved. It may be that Muhammad ‘Adil used to read Ruz al-Yusuf in the 1990s 
and was repeating, consciously or unconsciously, what he had read there. It may 
furthermore be, if we adopt a more cynical attitude, that the same person or apparatus 
that fabricated the Satanist confessions in 1996-97 were also responsible for 
fabricating testimonies like ‘Adil’s in 2011. It is more (or equally) likely, however, 
that there was a(n ideological) topos that weighed heavily on the discourse; one that 
produced/es any space that tried to evade societal/state/parental gaze as an orgy and 








its inhabitants as orgiastic licentious subjects, and made these subjects speak the same 
lines, be they Satanists or Islamists.  
 
On	the	Curious	Kinship	between	Satanists	and	Islamists		
It is curious that the Islamist, in our last example, replaces the Satanist; of course 
another unresolved absurdity in ‘Adil’s account is that the Islamist is the procurer of 
drugs, that the supreme source of hashish is indeed the Amir, the Commander of the 
Islamist Group. Perhaps ‘Adil took to heart the alliance between the licentious subject 
and the Islamist, or perhaps he was also retelling, in addition to the Satanist scene, the 
scene of the licentious alliance observed in Rami al-I‘tisami, while blurring the lines 
between the Islamist camp and the licentious youth’s camp.  
But the interchangeability of the Islamist and the Satanist is not restricted to 
this re-enactment. Throughout its coverage of the Satanic scandal, Ruz al-Yusuf 
presented the Islamists and the Satanists as two faces of the same coin, the two poles 
of extremism. A recurrent theme in Ruz al-Yusuf’s reports was that while Islamist 
extremism/terrorism represented the extremism of the poor, Satanism represented the 
extremism of the rich.369 When the police started arresting the Satanists, the magazine 
provided extensive coverage under the main heading “Satanism, the Other Face of 
Extremism.”370Among the articles lined up under this heading is a report by Wa’il al-










the Islamists; the ministry of interior, according to al-Ibrashi “was forced” to arrest 
“in haste” the members of the “deviant jama‘ah” (clearly the language of police 
circulars).371 The defendants, according to the report (citing, though claiming to 
paraphrase rather than quote, interrogations held by the Office of State Security 
Investigations), tried, in the course of the police interrogations, to “justify their 
joining of the jama‘ah”372 (indimamihim lil-jama‘ah, again a phrase commonly used 
with Islamist organizations).373 The kinship between the Islamist and the Satanist was 
taken further by ‘Abd Allah Kamal; playing off the stereotype of the clueless 
extremist youth swinging between the two poles of extremism, Kamal presents the 
story of the same person who once joined an Islamist organization and then a Satanist 
cult.374 Another story presented by Kamal is of a Satanist who hailed from a Muslim 
Brothers family.375 The Satanists, therefore, do not only come from dysfunctional 
families but also from Islamist ones.376 
This kinship between the Islamist and the Satanist re-enacts the alliance 



















set of ideological representations and/or propaganda (sometimes masquerading as 
investigative reports) in which the Islamists were produced as licentious subjects and 
the Islamist organizations (especially if underground) as orgiastic. The usage of the 
topos of the orgy against the Islamist thus constitutes an important step towards its 
usage against political dissidents (of the Islamist and secular varieties) in and post-
2011. If the coverage of the Satanic scandal placed the topos of the orgy at the centre 
of Egyptian public discourse, the propaganda against Islamist organizations (peaking 
around the same time, on the pages and screens of the same media outlets) 
weaponized the topos against the enemies of the regime.  
 
The	Islamist	Mystery	and	the	Orgy	of	Underground	Organizations	
The representations of the Islamists, especially in 1990s Egypt, were prolific and 
merit a study on their own. This section, therefore, will not attempt to exhaust all 
representations of Islamists; it will rather explore (some of) the representations that 
follow the topos of the orgy. For the purpose of this section, I am basing my analysis 
mainly on a number of propaganda pieces masquerading as serious journalism. The 
first of these propaganda pieces—and the most important for the purpose of this 
section, is the book titled Irhabi Taht al-Tamrin (A Terrorist in Training) which I 
introduced in the previous chapter. The book consists of a collection of articles 
previously published in the state-run Akhbar al-Hawadith. The author is Akhbar al-
Hawadith journalist Sabir Shawkat, who claims to have infiltrated Islamist 
organizations (by simply growing a beard and wearing a tunic or a jilbab), and had the 
newspaper’s photographer following him, which apparently raised little suspicion. 
The larger part of the book is a series of interviews with and articles about the 




In addition to this book, I will be using as my second main source the 
magazine Ruz al-Yusuf, which enjoyed wide circulation at the time and which at one 
point spearheaded the campaign against Islamist organizations, as it was actively 
reporting on the Satanic scandal simultaneously. It is also important to note here that 
Ruz al-Yusuf often bases its investigative reports on police reports. Sometimes it 
openly cites police reports, interrogations, and alleged confessions, while at other 
times it is clear from the language and context that it is either citing police reports or 
that its journarlists are engaged in interrogating prisoners themselves. This blurring of 
the line between police investigations and journalistic reports makes it difficult to 
establish whether what we are dealing with is State-sponsored propaganda and 
fabrication, forced confessions, or mere facts. The same dilemma arises when reading 
‘Abd al-Baqi’s confessions: was he a repentant terrorist, a police spy, or someone 
looking for fame and stardom? And, must we believe Shawkat when he claims that he 
was able to infiltrate Islamist organizations simply by growing his beard a little? 
Instead of trying to separate fact from fiction, my purpose here is to trace the logic 
that produces a story and allows its circulation, regardless of whether the story itself is 
factual or not.  
Though not always a rave (the somber dress code and solemn religiosity of 
Islamists offered some, though not total, deterrent against such representations), the 
construction of the Islamist threat followed very closely the topos of the orgy; these 
groups, by virtue of being underground, of withdrawing from society, of hiding 









gaze, and were hence perceived as subversive. This extended even to groups that did 
not advocate armed struggle against the state. As with other cases of hidden, orgiastic, 
and licentious spaces, the subversiveness of Islamist organizations readily lent itself to 
representations of sexual licentiousness.  
In various pro-regime accounts, Islamist groups were dangerous (even the 
ones who did not take up arms) because they operated an autonomous system of 
economic and social exchange.  Before and beyond armed struggle, the threat of these 
groups is manifest in their opaque social system, including an opaque economy that 
resists integration within the larger national economy (hence the predominance of the 
figure of the street vendor as the quintessential Islamist378) and an opaque system of 
sexual pairing (marriage contracts that are officiated by the group or their leader but 
not officially registered,379 thus evading the power of the state to regulate and 
recognize legitimate sexual practice, and without seeking to have birth certificates 
issued for the offspring, thus evading the power of the state to count its subjects380).   























In his bizarre investigative report (or propaganda pamphlet), Irhabi Taht al-
Tamrin, Sabir Shawkat proclaims the undocumented marriages to be the hardest thing 
on him “ashadd al-umur qaswatan ‘ala nafsi”381 (harder, therefore, than the murder, 
the looting, and the armed confrontations with the police). Evading the power of the 
State to regulate and recognize sexual practice, these arrangements have led to serial 
marriages, not only for the men, but, (the horror!), for the women.382  The situation, 
therefore, was not only that of a community of women (like the socialist orgy) but 
rather one of female polyandry. The police could not prosecute these polygamous 
women, according to Shawkat, because of these groups’ eschewing having official 
papers (a symptom of their evasion of the state and societal gaze). It seems that the 
women’s serial marriages and polyandry were what was at stake for Shawkat. 
Explaining why he chose to write a book outing the mysteries of the Islamist 
organizations, Shawkat proclaimed that hiding the facts would be of no use “when the 
Merciful God asks us: what did you do when you knew of the wife who ran away 
from her husband, and then married another man, then another, and yet another, 
without [observing] al-‘iddah al-shar‘iyyah [the waiting period a woman should 
observe between husbands according to Islamic law] ... [all this taking place] under 
















the curtain/veil (“sitar”) of the rightful religion?”383 Only after dwelling on these 
sexual abominations did Shawkat move to mentioning the killing and looting in which 
some of these groups were involved, but kept always returning to their non-normative 
sexual practices and their dangerous and licentious women. We are therefore in a 
territory that combines the fear of the orgy-qua-mystery, the sexual narration of that 
mystery as something that troubles monogamy and allows for polyandry, and the 
anxiety about the ability of polyandry to shake the foundations of society.   
Sexual chaos is represented not only as one of the features of the Islamist 
mystery, or as a trope through which it is narrated, but furthermore as the telos of the 
hidden activities within this mystery. Unregulated underground economic activities, 
in Shawkat’s account, ultimately led to underground unregulated sexual practices. 
This is obvious in a story about a certain group that worked in smuggling goods 
(because, according to Shawkat’s representation of their beliefs, they believed paying 
custom duty lacked religious sanction)- under the leadership of a certain shaykh 
Jum‘ah, identified as part of the cadre of al-Jihad within al-Jama‘ah al-Islamiyyah.384 
Another member of the group, identified as ‘Abd al-Nasir, convinced his wife to help 
him with his smuggling, only to find out that she had disappeared.  Then, one 
Ramadan night, after the tarawih prayers, ‘Abd al-Nasir heard rumors that his wife 








house, to find “the veiled sister” in her nightgown, lying next to the “pious shaykh,” 
with bottles of alcohol surrounding them.385 
In addition to representing promiscuity as the outcome (or telos) of clandestine 
activities, the story (especially in this last scene) reveals an anxiety about predatory 
female desire and what it could do behind the veil (the metaphorical veil of the 
underground organization, the mystery, and the literal veil female members of 
Islamist organizations wear when in public). Predatory and unashamed feminine 
desire was further emphasized when Shawkat narrated the ensuing police 
investigations. Questioned by the police about her promiscuity and polyandry, the 
woman unashamedly responds:  “I fell in love with him, sir.”386 It furthermore turns 
out that the woman had married shaykh Jum‘ah through a customary (‘urfi) contract, 
adding polyandry to promiscuity. The promiscuous woman whose desire is unleashed 
underneath the mystery of underground networks and from behind the mystery of the 
veil continued to reappear in Shawkat’s account. In one of ‘Abd al-Baqi’s 
confessions, an Islamist woman was said to have drugged him in order to have her 
way with him. After realizing what had happened while unconscious, ‘Abd al-Baqi 
was furious, not only due to religious reasons, but furthermore due to the violation of 
monogamy: “I had known no women other than my wife, the mother of my children, 
to whom I have granted all my manly passions, and who is, as far as I am concerned, 
the best woman.”387 Though still not a rave, the Islamist organization is now looking 
more and more like the Dionysian ritual. In the eyes of state propagandists, the piety 








perverse sexual desires; they pretend to worship the new god but it is Aphrodite they 
worship, just like the Bacchantes of Thebes were in the eyes of Pentheus.388 
Furthermore, what they engage in looks more like a socialist orgy to the point that 
sexual chaos is presented as the other of monogamy and therefore a threat to the 
bourgeois nuclear family.  
These orgiastic representations of Islamist organizations did not abstain from 
including depictions of group sex. In one example an Amir declares his wife to be an 
apostate and therefore “[sexually] violable” (mustabahah) by all the members of the 
group. The report does not then tell us if “all the members of the group” would 
“violate” her one-by-one or all at once, but it tells us that the verdict was enforced.389 
A more salacious description of the Islamist orgy comes from Ruz al-Yusuf. Citing 
police reports on an Alexandria based Islamist organization,390Ruz al-Yusuf uncovers 
that this group does not only steal and pillage, they are also engaged in another kind 
of licentious activity that the reporter finds more shocking: namely “zina” (adultery) 
and liwat (lit. sodomy, or, more commonly, male to male sexual practice). The 
religious shaykh of this group (not to be confused with its Amir, apparently this group 
separates profane power from sacred power) is described (by the article, quoting the 












(lustful) liwati (sodomite, male-lover, homosexual391), munharif (deviant) harami 
(thief), farran (baker[??]) and hatik al-a‘rad (violator of [other people’s] honor, 
rapist). He is never at ease (la yahda’ lahu bal) unless he is flanked by two women on 
either side. His lewd practices included kidnapping and raping “unarmed soldiers,” 
and violating/debauching (ya‘tadi ‘ala) the group’s Amir. After the death of the 
shaykh, the sexual intrigues of the Amir himself moved in turn to the two sons of the 
late shaykh (it is unclear here whether the two sons substituted for their father, or 
were paying for their father’s violations). This “disease,” according to the article and 
the alleged confessions it is based on, is widespread throughout the organization: the 
men have sexual intercourse amongst themselves while the wives of the Amir watch. 
These wives, in turn, are forced to “engage in debauchery” (mumarasat al-fahsha’) 
while the Amir watches.392 The Islamist orgy, in these representations, begins to look 
less like the Dionysian orgy and more like a porn film (perhaps even resembling one 
of the fantasized Satanist-Marxist satellite TV orgies featuring the sexual act “in all its 
ten positions,” which Mustafa Mahmud had pointed out). 
The representations of Islamist organizations, therefore, followed the topos 



















mystery, the orgy qua feminine space (or space for feminine chaos to be unleashed), 
the orgy as the other of monogamy, which threatens to shake the foundations of the 
family and society as such, and the orgy as group sex. This worked along with Ruz al-
Yusuf’s reports on the Satanists (which came out around the same time these reports 
were circulated, and through the same outlets) to produce and impose the topos of the 
orgy as a convenient rhetorical strategy at the hands of the State. This weaponized 
topos came in handy, as far as the regime and its propagandists were concerned, at the 
moment of revolt: It was left to Tal‘at Zakariyya, and other regime propagandists to 
pick up this weaponized topos from the 1990s and re-aim it at Tahrir Square in 2011.  
 
The	Mystery	of	the	Niqab	and	the	Orgy	behind	the	Veil	
Consistent with the orgy as a mystery that unfolds beyond the official gaze, the motif 
of the Islamist orgy always revealed an anxiety about something that was occurring 
behind a curtain or a veil. This was sometimes used metaphorically; like when 
Shawkat lists the (mostly sexual) abominations the Islamists commit behind the veil 
or curtain (“sitar”) of Islam.393 At other points it was used literally – the veil, the 
niqab or hijab that covers parts of or the whole bodies of the female Islamists, and 
which triggers the anxiety and fear of pro-state observers. Similarly, Islamist men 
were depicted as hiding, behind the beard, under the jilbab, and in the guise of 
religiosity and piety. Sometimes they go as far as hiding by undergoing plastic 







threatening and licentious orgy, but also each of these bodies is a microcosmic orgy in 
itself.  
There is, therefore, a fear of masks, a metamfiezomaiophobia that works 
hand in hand with the fear of the orgy. This was and continues to be the case with the 
Dionysian orgy. In fact, the orgy and the mask have a common history, and the fear of 
one is connected to the fear of the other. The participants in the Dionysian ritual were 
believed to have worn masks (perhaps to further emphasize their lack of distinction, 
or to separate between their daily persona and their orgiastic one). Dionysus himself 
appears at the beginning of the Bacchae wearing a smiling mask.395 There is 
something uncanny about the smile on the mask, worn by the wrathful god about to 
tear his enemies to pieces. Perhaps coulrophobia, which was later perpetrated by the 
Hollywood horror genre of murderous clowns and then later by conservative anxiety 
about V masks (with the serene smile of Guy Fawkes), started with the smile of 
Dionysus. 
 This same fear that there was something behind the mask that one could not 
clearly read, and that this thing lurking behind the mask could be seditious and 
destructive, was always evident in the rhetoric about the “Islamic” mask (the beard 
and the niqab, especially the latter). When in power, the Muslim Brothers exhibited 
the same metamfiezomaiophobia.  In one of its reports on the disguised chaos the 
anarchists and other activists were about to unleash, the Muslim Brothers’ mouthpiece 











would commit acts of violence and sabotage in order to lay the blame on 
Islamists.396On the eve of an organized protest against their rule, the Muslim 
Brothers’ mouthpiece, al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adalah, mongered fear against the 
seditious and insidious (anarchist-socialist) plot taking place under cover. Especially 
fearful for al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adalah was the “Black Bloc,”397 supposedly an 
anarchist group whose members hid their faces with balaclavas. The real terror as far 
as al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adalah was concerned, however, was the V mask.    
Like Dionysus at the beginning of the Bacchae, the anarchist terrorist V 
(from V for Vendetta) promises to unleash destruction from behind the serene smile of 
the Guy Fawkes mask he wears. Worn by anarchists and other activists in various 
places in the world (including in Egypt, predominantly since the events of 2011), the 
propagandists of the Muslim Brothers found the mask ominous.  The mask provided a 
cover, according to al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adalah, to the incendiary elements who 
would wreak havoc and terror.398 In fact the first thing al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adalah 
mentioned about the V mask was the smile of Guy Fawkes; it described the mask as 
featuring “a smiling man who looks like a clown.”The coulrophobia that started with 
the smile on the Dionysian mask was therefore carried on to the V mask and ended up 
















Catholic fundamentalist smiling like a clown, while the anarchist terrorist behind the 
mask threatens (like Dionysus at the beginning of the Bacchae, and the clown in 
horror films) to unleash chaos and destruction.  
Al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adalah’s fear of masks also reenacted other episodes of 
the orgy in Egypt; the activists’ obsession with V masks is compared by the ikhwan 
mouthpiece to the obsession of upper-class kids with black outfits during the Satanic 
craze. Furthermore, when providing a pseudo-genealogy of the V mask, al-Hurriyyah 
wa al-‘Adalah described the creed of Guy Fawkes (which it confused with anarchist 
ideology399) as madhhab shaytani: a diabolical/satanic creed. While some of these 
specific examples may be coincidental, it remains that the fear of what was hidden 
behind the mask, the curtain, or the veil was present even in the discourse of an 
Islamist party that was previously and continued to be the target of this very 
discourse. It is clear that what hides itself behind a curtain, a face-veil, or a smiling 
mask, must be chaotic and terrorizing.  
The anxiety concerning the body behind the veil (and, to a lesser extent, the 
body behind the mask) betrays, in many of the above examples (though not in al-
Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adalah) an anxiety about a licentious, feminine or feminized, body 
behind the veil/mask. The feminization/femininity of the body behind the veil is self-
evident, yet even the disguise of the male Islamists, at least on one occasion, was 
presented as effeminate. A report by Ruz al-Yusuf on terrorist disguises points out 
how male Islamists would sometimes solicit the help of barbers and makeup artists, 







themselves and hide from the authorities.400 The language used suggests an 
effeminacy of the camouflage, especially when substituting the term hallaq (barber) 
with the term coiffeur (transliterated in Arabic), which in Egypt is usually used to 
refer to women’s hair stylists (and in some cases the hair stylists catering to the – 
effeminate?- male members of the upper class).  The suggestion of effeminacy is 
further enforced by the fact that the common Arabic term for plastic surgeons is 
jarrahi tajmil (lit. beautification surgeons)- as if the terrorists, through makeup and 
beauty surgery, are “coyly primping,” just like Pentheus was said to be under the 
effect of Dionysus. Feminization is not merely a circumstantial symptom of language, 
though. In a cartoon that ran alongside the article, a terrorist behind the niqab enters a 
“surgery and beauty [sic.] clinic” as a masculine figure (identified by hairy legs and 
lack of body curves) and exits as a feminine figure (identified by an ample bosom and 
buttocks).401 
These representational patterns and strategies always expose the sexual 
fantasies surrounding the female body behind the niqab. In the two examples of the 
licentious female Islamists we encountered in Shawkat’s work– the woman who 
seduces/rapes ‘Abd al-Baqi and the polygamous woman who cheats on her husband 
with shaykh Jum‘ah— Shawkat’s narration highlights the niqab and the woman’s 
emergence from behind the niqab; there is almost a state of shock in seeing women 











emerge in revealing nightgowns, a curious fixation on the part of Shawkat). Whereas 
the journalist speaks in specific examples, the repentant terrorist speaks in 
generalizations. In his official confessional, ‘Abd al-Baqi summarized the discourse 
on the licentious behind the niqab when he warned the larger public of 
“prostitution/whoredom behind the niqab” (“da‘arah taht al-niqab”).403 
This theme of a licentious mystery that hides behind the niqab was repeated 
in many ways (even beyond anti-Islamist propaganda) on the pages of the 
sensationalist Ruz al-Yusuf. When commenting on a prostitution scandal in which 
members of Islamist groups were implicated, 404Ruz Al-Yusuf’s reporter exclaims that 
“the niqab has become a sitar [curtain] that hides forbidden and illegitimate [haram] 
pregnancy, as the extremists have turned from violence to sex.”405 The niqab therefore 
acts as a physical cover for the orgy: covering its switch between its two phases of 





























violence and sexual excess.  In the title of another article, it is the hijab, rather than 
the niqab, that covers (and simultaneously marks) a sexual and licentious space/body: 
“I‘tirafat Zawjah Muhajjabah: 3 a‘wam fi al-haram” (the confessions of a veiled wife: 
three years in sin). The article, however, has nothing to do either with the hijab or 
with sin. It is about a woman who discovers, years after her husband’s passing, that 
her husband had divorced her in absentia shortly after the marriage but never 
informed her (which in reality and outside the sensationalism of the story would 
render the divorce void in Islamic jurisprudence). The veil and sin were added for the 
sake of sensationalism.  
This anxiety about the veil is clearly a colonial cultural imposition in which 
the modernist/secular Western is internalized: here I am not making an argument for 
the authenticity of the veil or unveiling as a secular/modern/Western(ized) 
phenomenon (such claims lie beyond the purview of my study), but rather referring to 
how unveiling (both in a metaphorical and literal sense) was integral to the European 
colonial project. In his powerful account on French colonization and Algerian 
resistance, Fanon recounts how the drive of French colonizers and the French State to 
colonize Algeria with their gaze as much as with their troops fueled a project of 
unveiling: the literal unveiling of Algerian women in this context is but an index of 
the larger project of the colonizer to unveil the country he colonized (hence the 
significant title of Fanon’s essay,  l’Algérie se dévoile, or “Algeria Unveiled”).406 The 
colonizer, intent on producing the colonized country as an object of his knowledge 
and a target of his gaze was faced with hidden spaces, epitomized by the face-veil: 






the hidden.”407 Fanon contextualizes the emergent double of fascination and anxiety, 
or fascination and horror, within a distinctly European patriarchy/misogyny that is 
inseparable from colonialism, and which aims at possessing the body of the colonized 
woman as much as that of the colonized country: “In a confused way, the European 
experiences his relation with the Algerian woman at a highly complex level. There is 
in it the will to bring this woman within his reach, to make her a possible object of 
possession.”408 (This fascination with the body behind the veil and this obsession with 
possessing it persist in modern global popular culture and are evident in the genre of 
veil pornography, which is something this study is not prepared to discuss). Through 
this fascination-horror the woman behind the veil is produced (by the French 
colonizers in Fanon’s explication, and much like ‘Abd al-Baqi’s whore behind the 
veil), as “hypocritical, perverse, and even a veritable nymphomaniac.”409 
The discourse on the veil and on the Islamist orgy thus internalizes the 
colonial gaze410 and replicates the 19th century Orientalist fascination with and fear of 
the sensual Orient, the Arab/Turkish seductress, and the Harem, especially the latter, 















until space was reorganized along colonial lines).411 It also replicates the modern 
(particularly French) Orientalist fear of the veil as a security threat. According to the 
Mubarak propagandists of the 1990s, as well as to the veil-phobic sectors of the West, 
the niqab may hide weapons, explosive belts, or sensual bodies behind it; objects of 
fear and fascination that need to be brought under the scrutiny of the public gaze.  
More generally, the association between the Islamist organizations and the 
orgy reveals a civilizational anxiety that underlies the official public gaze. The 
Islamists and their organizations are depicted as belonging to a lagging phase of 
civilization and evolution, which Egypt should have surpassed, and which the 
regulatory power of the state, the upholder of the civilizational and evolutionary 
order, as explained in the previous chapter, is bound to stem. Because they exist in 
orgies that by default escape the state’s gaze, the Islamists’ abomination continues to 
exist, despite the civilizing and evolutionary imperative of the state. It is telling that 
when Zakariyya was listing the various abominations that were being committed in 
Tahrir Square by virtue of our lack of knowledge of what was unfolding in Tahrir 
Square, he listed the “Muslim Brothers, and others; only God knows!” The Islamist 
therefore is an abomination that only emerges once the state averts its gaze. It is even 
more telling how the Islamists, and especially the licentious depictions thereof, are 
modeled on the representations of the sexual savage. In the previous chapter, we 
mentioned how the beards of the Islamist men, the predatory sexuality of Islamist 









realm of sexual savagery, according to a Darwinian ideology. This chapter has 
provided even more evidence to support this argument.   
This account of course is complicated by the figures of Westernized 
licentious elites participating in the orgies of Tahrir Square and in Satanic cults, thus 
belonging to a sphere of an orgiastic Western culture that defies the indigenous and 
national gaze. The very notion, however, of a State gaze that is entitled to penetrate 
the social sphere, and the notion of the spaces that defy this gaze as an orgiastic threat, 




The modern appropriations of the topos of the orgy are predicated on the public 
(liberal) gaze. What the State and society see and recognize becomes normalized. 
What lies beyond, what evades this gaze, is orgiastic.412 This is symptomatic of an 
ideology that is afraid of what is hidden; an ideology which prescribes the coming out 
of what is hidden for it to be normalized and accepted.413 This liberal ideology of 
coming out is, in many ways, the direct heir of the Christian Confessional.414 Modern 
















confessional, be they psychiatric, medical, or penal institutions.415 The predominance 
of the genre of repentant confessionals in producing the discourse on (and in some 
cases, the cure to) the orgy, whether in the case of the repentant Islamists, repentant 
Satanists, or repentant revolutionaries,416 is a testament to how the Christian 
Confessional has pervaded Egyptian discourse.   
The logic of the Confessional is obvious when Shawkat justifies giving an 
account of what is hidden. Shawkat frames his account/confessional as an account to 
be given in front of “the Merciful God,” and justifies this outing by stating that silence 
would not please Him.417 The very notion of giving an account before God, and of 
remedying sins by confessing them, is foreign to Islam and belongs to Christianity as 
well as its modern-secular appropriations. The logic of the Confessional (and its non-
Islamic and distinctly Christian dimension) is even more evident in ‘Abd al-Baqi’s 
account. Supposedly a pious Muslim whose innocence was corrupted by the seduction 
of looting and bloodshed by Islamist organizations, and of illicit sexual relations by 
Islamist women, ‘Abd al-Baqi’s show of repentance is to give a public account of 
them. This is a clear violation of the Islamic predicament that one should not 
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This confessional streak aside, my point is not to say that Islamic history is 
void of orgiastic representations. Taking a glance at the cannons of early 
Arabic/Islamic literature (like for example the 4th Hijri/10th Gregorian Century, 
eloquent and salacious collection of anecdotes and rumors connected to famous lines 
of poetry, entitled al-Aghani by Abu al-Faraj al-Asfahani419 or Alf Laylah wa 
Laylah,420 to name two notable examples) would reveal how too common the motif of 
orgiastic revelries was. These representations, however, were never coupled with a 
fear of what was hidden, or with the predicament of having to reveal what lies behind 
the veil.421 A famous story that involves an orgy in early Islamic history reveals a 
topos that runs in complete opposition to the topos of the orgy as explicated 
throughout this study. In this story,422 ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, while serving as Caliph, 
walks in on an orgy (an orgy of drinking in some versions of the story, and of 


























drinking and possible sex in others).423 ‘Umar, the firm and resolute strongman of the 
Caliphate, wanted to punish the participants whom he had caught in flagrante delicto. 
Instead of submitting to punishment, however, the participants challenged ‘Umar for 
his violation of three Qur’anic predicaments in his seeking to punish them: not to spy 
on others, not to break into homes without the permission of the owners, and to only 
enter houses through the front door. In both versions of the story, ‘Umar obliges and 
departs from the scene. While at first this story may seem to suggest that the topos of 
the orgy is also present in Arab-Islamic lore before the colonial age, on closer 
examination, the story serves the exact opposite purpose: that what is hidden should 
remain hidden, sexual and moral anxieties notwithstanding. This is consistent with the 
Islamic imperative of not giving account of one’s sins, and not to wield charges of 
adultery unless the act is public enough that four witnesses could authenticate having 
seen the act of coitus itself (falling short of four people’s authentication, the wielder 
of such charges is subject to punishment for libel, regardless of whether the act itself 
took place or not). In the modern appropriations of the topos of the orgy,424 what is 
opaque to power, what evades its gaze, is a matter of suspicion and concern. For an 
Islamic mode of power, however, as the story of ‘Umar and the orgy tells us, what is 
















The topos of the orgy in 20th and 21st century Egypt, therefore, exhibits the 
symptoms of an anxiety about what is hidden that belongs to a history of Christianity, 
Western institutions, and Western liberalism, rather than to any indigenous 
tradition.425 It is telling that, during the wave of protests against President Muhammad 
Mursi, supporters of the latter would resort to the same logic: that the President’s 
opponents (labeled as secular and immoral) were taking refuge in protest tents in 
order to engage in drug abuse and illicit sex. Even the Islamists were calling for the 
revealing of, and were making claims about, what was hidden; something that would 
subject them under strict adherence to Shari‘ah to 80 lashes, an adherence they claim 
to promote. One of Mursi’s supporters went as far as claiming that vaginal cleansers 
and unused condoms were found at the site of the protest, using these paraphernalia to 
paint an image of licentiousness for the sit-in.426 This forensic logic, of excavating 
evidence (false evidence in this case) instead of waiting for the act to be public in 
order for it to be punishable reveals the extent to which anxiety about what was 
























within a proper forensic logic, an unused condom does not prove anything. In an 
Islamic system of governance adhering to Shari‘ah jurisprudence, however, even a 
used condom (with DNA traces of both partners) would not suffice to merit 
punishment for an act that was meant to be hidden. 
In addition to its distinctly Western and Christian history, this gaze has also 
been a colonial gaze that fueled colonialism’s project: invading the colony with the 
colonial gaze preceded and went hand in hand with military colonization, often 
providing it with pretext and/or achievements (it is no coincidence that the French 
occupation of Egypt 1798-1801 produced a Description de L’Égypte). We have 
already introduced in our above discussion on the veil how Fanon analyzed French 
colonialism in terms of the invading French gaze that produced the female body under 
the veil (and with it other spaces to which the colonizer did not have access) as a 
target for the colonizing gaze and an object of possession.  The colonizing gaze was 
also integral to the colonization of Egypt: in his study of the epistemologies of 
colonization Timothy Mitchell shows how both modernity and colonialism were 
predicated on an epistemology and a metaphysics that attempt to order and make 
sense of the world (as if it were an exhibition).427 The colonization of Egypt, thus, 
proceeded through a process of reorganization of spaces to make them legible to the 
nascent State (although Mitchell’s book is more concerned with organization and less 
with the gaze, I propose, for the purpose of this dissertation, to focus on the implicit 
gaze in Mitchell’s analysis). Mitchell summarizes this process in his introductory 
note:  
[M]odel villages were intended to organise and make legible the life of ordinary 






families visible to the ‘observation of the police’. The new, open streets of modern 
Cairo and other Egyptian towns embodied a similar principle of visibility and 
observation, the principle of the exhibition.428 
Like the French colonial gaze which obsessed over and expressed anxiety about what 
is hidden, the gaze that colonized Egypt (which was simultaneously British, French, 
and Egyptian) experienced frustrations with social spaces and marital formations 
which escaped its purview – and which this gaze produced through Orientalist 
fascination and horror as the Harem¸ In response, the colonizing gaze proceeded to 
destroy these social formations429 and to devise plans to open up these spaces, 
including an unfulfilled plan to develop  “model village” which opens up all spaces 
and bodies for this gaze.430 
We can therefore begin to see how using the logic of the orgy by state 
propagandists entailed the adoption of a gaze that is distinctly Western: a gaze that 
has a distinctly Christian genealogy related to the Confessional, and is one of the 
many things modern liberalism and the modern state inherit from Christianity. The 
anxiety about the spaces this gaze fails to access was enacted at the onset of modern 
colonialism through anxiety about the Harem, which in a way replaced the orgy as the 
place (and topos) of mystery and license. This Western-colonial anxiety about oriental 
mysteries was re-enacted, in the late 20th century, against the Islamists, produced as 














the abnegated other. In the 21st century, a similar anxiety would be animated against 
the political dissidents in Tahrir Square  (and although this anxiety was not always 
marshaled with the orientalist overtones that accompanied the colonial anxiety with 
regards the ‘Harem’ or the modern State’s anxiety with regards the Islamists, we 
cannot overlook the Orientalist history of this anxiety). This history, furthermore, 
goes even further back than the moment in which the Harem replaced the orgy. It 
even goes back farther than modern Orientalism. The orgy, even in its original Greek 
manifestation, always belonged to the other, to the Orient.  
 
The	Oriental	Orgy	
Whether in Greek antiquity or in its modern renditions, the orgy has always been an 
Orientalist trope.  Dionysus himself (at least according to one of his many stories of 
origin) hails from Oriental ancestry. While his ancestry from the father’s side is 
clearly Olympian, his mother, Semele, is the daughter of the Phoenician Cadmus who 
comes from Sidon (the present day South Lebanese town of Saida.)431 Ancestry of the 
god aside, the Dionysian religion and the ecstasy of the Dionysian orgies were 
believed to belong to the East, not to Greece.432 Even in Greek mythology, Dionysus 














most common version is that he was initiated into Cybele’s orgies by Cybele 
herself433 in Phrygia after wandering through Egypt and Syria,434 but another version, 
presented in Nonnus’ Dionysiaca, sends the wandering god to India instead).  
Dionysus then returns to Greece as “the god of orgiastic delirium who came from the 
Orient.”435In The Bacchae, we see Dionysus returning to Thebes with an army of 
Asian maenads (or bacchantes). Towards the end of the play, the fall of Thebes seems 
to be an Oriental conspiracy by the Oriental god and his Asian female followers: 
while the Theban maenads were struck by intoxicating madness to the effect of 
tearing asunder the body of Penthreus while oblivious to the fact, the Asian maenads 
kept their sobriety and commented in a clear-headed cold-hearted manner, almost 
with schadenfreude – or epicaricacy, as we are in Greek territory- on the tragic 
events.436 
When the orgy resurfaced in the 19th century counterrevolutionary discourse, 
the counterrevolutionary observers were horrified at the Phrygian cap that signified 
the orgies of Cybele and the castration of priests. Part of the horror, furthermore, was 



















that even the Asiatic section of Greece was unable to conserve its own liberty.”437 The 
orgy therefore is one of the tropes that modern Orientalism inherits and appropriates 
from the classical Greek perspective on the Orient.438 What is new here, under the 
Darwinian ideology of our modern times, is that the orgy became a sign not only of 
the Oriental other, but furthermore of degeneration and civilizational/evolutionary 











































association with nature, which we commented on in chapter 1, becomes a marker of a 
regression from the evolutionary path from nature to culture.  
This is evident in how the orgy became anthropologized. Starting the 19th 
century, the topos of the orgy became part of the construction of the primitive and the 
savage space as a space that defies order, a space of sexual chaos and savagery, but 
also a cathartic space that escapes the repression of civilization.440 Commenting on 
how anthropology produces the figure of the sexual savage, and thus produces the 
sexual savage’s space as a space of sexual chaos and catharsis which lends itself to 
modern gay appropriations, Neville Hoad notes how in the work of anthropologist 
Tobias Schneebaum: “the deeper into the jungle you go, the more things start to look 
like a sex club … [with] disturbingly sexualized description of cannibalism.”441 Hoad 
(via Schneebaum) is clearly describing the Dionysian topos: to see these 
anthropological fantasies we need to go to the jungle (i.e. into nature, like the 



























maenads who went to the woods and the mountains), we also go deep (i.e. beyond the 
civilized gaze of the modern State). Once we are in this orgiastic space, beyond 
civilization and its gaze, things “start to look like a sex club” (i.e. an orgy in its 
modern meaning as a sexual party) in which sexual behavior is disturbingly mixed 
with cannibalism (like the Dionysian ritual and its Satanic descendants). Here Hoad’s 
analysis of how the orgiastic space is produced through anthropological fantasies as a 
cathartic space and as a space that belongs to a lagging phase of civilizational 
development clearly echoes Fanon’s note that “The civilized man retains an irrational 
nostalgia for the extraordinary times of sexual licentiousness, orgies, unpunished 
rapes, and unrepressed incest.”442  Indeed, in Black Skin White Masks Fanon notes this 
association between the black and/or non-white qua savage on the one side and the 
orgy (along with black magic and other primitive rituals) on the other, while exposing 
the psychic effect of the cultural imposition of this association on the non-white. In 
his impassioned commentary on the anthropological text La Vie Sexuelle en Afrique 
Noire Fanon exclaims:  
I am walking on hot coals. Sheets of water threaten my soul on fire. These rites 
make me think twice. Black magic! Orgies,443 Sabbaths,444 pagan ceremonies gris-
gris. Coitus is an occasion to invoke the family gods. It is a sacred act, pure and 
absolute, bringing invisible forces into action … From every direction I am 














The new significations the Oriental orgy acquired can also be traced in the 
Orientalist production of the Harem (also a cathartic space, arguably one that was 
more coveted by Occidentals than the savage cathartic spaces of black Africa), which 
did not only represent the Oriental other, it represented decadence and degeneration 
that are to be understood literally, as lagging phases in social and biological 
development. We just saw how this was also the case with the mysteries of Islamist 
organizations, standing for a degenerate version of the self which civilization (and the 
State that upholds it) should have surpassed. 
The orgy therefore does not depart from the themes of degeneration and 
regression that constitute the metaphysics of chaos as imagined by the mythologies of 
the State (and laid out in the previous chapter). It represents, at least in its modern 
manifestation/appropriations a regression to the feminine, to nature, and to the 
evolutionary inferior racial other. It represents, furthermore, the degeneration of the 
subject, the dissolution of the individual into a collective; the maenads (and other 
participants if any) join in a collective in which distinction is abolished, and in which 
the spirits collectively unite with the divine, and intruders like Pentheus (or Mr. Pope, 
the English officer in the 1919 indescribable orgy) literally lose bodily integrity and 
experience the dissolution not only of their individualities but furthermore their 
physical bodies. This dissolution, from the individual into the collective, was also 
read along civilizational lines starting in the late 19th century. In the coming sections, 
I will further explore what the orgy entailed in terms of the dissolution of 
individuality, how it became a trope (sometimes topos) for the crowd as such, and 
how other orgiastic/mysterious/underground organizations became the surrogate of 






Our analysis so far has touched upon but not yet fully explored the similarity between 
the orgy and the crowd. Both the orgy and the crowd represent the threat of the 
dissolution of individuality.446 Throughout the previous analysis we have encountered 
many examples of this loss (or fear of loss) in the context of the orgy. We observed 
the loss of individuality most clearly in the fate of Pentheus; first he was struck by 
Dionysian madness that resulted in him losing his individual consciousness, and later 
he lost his bodily integrity through being torn to pieces by the maenads. A similar 
fear– of losing one’s individuality, one’s consciousness, one’s very bodily integrity– 































We have also encountered at least one clear example in which the crowd is 
described as an orgy; indeed, the fear of the crowd coincided with the fear of the orgy, 
namely, in the 1919 report on the indescribable orgy. The insurrectionary crowd is 
represented in this report as an amorphous collective, the ambiguity of which is 
highlighted by the unintelligible voices it emits (the luluing, or ululation of the 
women). Just like Pentheus, British individuals who encountered this crowd-orgy 
were doomed to lose not only their individual consciousness but also their very bodily 
integrity (like the aforementioned officer). The 1919 indescribable orgy is part of a 
long tradition of associating crowds with orgies, whether implicitly or explicitly. This 
tradition has manifested not only in counterrevolutionary propaganda (like, for 
example, Carlyle’s invocation of the orgy through the figure of the maenads) but also 
in poetry about the metropolitan crowd (such as Baudelaire’s Les Foules in which the 
crowds are described as an ineffable orgie) or even in philosophic treatises like 
Hegel’s Phenomenology (in which Bacchic frenzy appears as a pre-individual stage of 
consciousness, the same stage which crowds regress to in 19th century thought).447 
In the previous sections we have explored how insidious and subversive 
activities (carried by the insurrectionary crowd, by secret organizations, or by 
irresponsible youth) constituted an orgy. In this section, I am proposing something 
slightly different. In addition to the mystery and the out of body revelry that render 
crowd action an orgy, the crowd is also an orgy to the effect that it is a collective 
whereby individuality disappears. Observers imbued with the liberal ideology of 
individuality fear the crowd for two interrelated reasons: they fear the collective of 






themselves are going to be subsumed by this collective body (either by losing their 
minds and becoming themselves part of the crowd, or by being assaulted, killed, or 
torn asunder by the crowd).  
To make this argument, I will first show how the crowds have appeared as a 
threat (or sometimes antithesis) to individuals and individuality. I will illustrate this 
theme through a reading of volume 5 of Salim al-Naqqash’s Misr lil Misriyyin, which 
deals with the events of Alexandria during the British invasion of 1882 almost 
exclusively from the point of view of its European residents, and that is 
unapologetically sympathetic to the occupiers, and which I treat as an example of late 
19th century Egyptian discourse on the crowd and an index of European, especially 
British, influences on this discourse. I will then show how this same fear runs through 
(or was informed by) British representations: I will first take a look at foreign 
(predominantly British) reports on 1882 to explore the encounter between the crowd 
and the individual, paying special attention to the set of privileges that endow certain 
people with individuality while insisting to treat others as an uncountable collective. 
Although these biases take an explicit racial turn when applied to Egypt, they were 
also at work in depicting crowds in the metropole. Through a number of primary and 
secondary sources on the crowd, I will show how the fear of the dissolution of 
individuality also runs through19th century European representations of the European 
crowd. My examples will consciously mix representations of revolutionary crowds 
with representations of pacific crowds, in order to show how it is not only the revelry 
of the revolutionary crowd that is orgiastic, but rather that any collective body, even if 
peaceful, is an orgy according to a late 19th century European understanding of 
crowds and orgies. This is the reason why throughout my analysis I use the term 




feared, but also any collective in which individual distinction is lost. This fear of the 
loss of distinction is not unrelated to the orgy-qua-sexual chaos/group sex.  I will 
show how, in various examples (from 19th century European literature as well as from 
late 19th century Egypt), that the threat of the crowd to individuality is sometimes 
narrated through a sexual trope. I will then revisit the orgy as a mystery, arguing that 
the crowd, by virtue of its lack of individual distinction, defies the public-official gaze 
which perceives it as an orgy-qua-mystery. This analysis of the crowd in terms of the 
orgy-as-mystery will also aim to throw light on the special kinship between the crowd 
and the secret organization (which also aims to defy the public-official gaze and 
which is sometimes depicted as an anti-individualist collective). I will finally revisit 
the orgy as an Oriental mystery, showing how 19th century European thought posited 
both the Orient and the orgy as mysteries that defy signification. This analysis will 
pave the way for the next chapter in which I discuss how Egyptian representations of 
the crowd have internalized some European racial biases of the 19th century, but also 




In Salim al-Naqqash’s Misr lil Misriyyin, the Egyptian crowd always appears as a 
collective, threatening, unintelligible mayhem that lacks individual consciousness, or 










mostly foreigners or “Christians” according to al-Naqqash. These Western-Christian-
individuals are surrounded and besieged by the indigenous collective. In one report, 
quoting a foreign consul, al-Naqqash shows us this siege through the eyes of the 
Western individuals contemplating how to deal with this collective that besieges them 
(though in reality it was the British fleet that was besieging the Alexandrian shore). In 
the subsequent examples from al-Naqqash’s representations and other reports on the 
events, two themes are evident, both of which interrelated, and both of which are 
relevant to this chapter and the next. First there is the theme of the collective versus 
the individual, which privileges the latter and disenfranchises the former to the extent 
of normalizing the violence by the latter against the former. While individuals have 
motives, personal stories, personal tragedies, and loved ones to protect or grieve, the 
collective lacks any specific attribute to merit identification or sympathy – they are 
not even countable, as the subsequent examples, from al-Naqqash and other reports, 
will show. Individuals have legitimate fears, worthy of articulation, explanation, and 
sympathy by the narrators/authors. These narrations allow for the transformation of 
these fears from intangible emotions to legitimate security tools.449 Crowds on the 
other side have passions that are scarcely explained, let alone justified. They are not 
entitled to the same fear that individuals are allowed, even as a foreign army was 
besieging, bombarding, and invading their lands, and even as they were facing 

















(usually unarmed or armed with sticks and rocks) the gunfire of the scared 
individuals. The second evident theme is the racialization of this opposition- it is 
already obvious how the above biases fit neatly with colonialist biases against 
indigenous populations, and the account we are dealing with is first and foremost one 
of an encounter between a colonizing force (armies and settlers) and an indigenous 
population. European Christians exist as individuals, while indigenous populations 
exist as crowds. The justification and normalization of violence is thus racialized. 
From the beginning of and throughout al-Naqqash’s volume 5 (the volume 
dedicated to the events of 1882 especially in Alexandria) the events are narrated 
through the point of view of the foreigners (sometimes identified by al-Naqqash as 
ajanib, lit. foreigners, and sometimes as Christians). Unsure when this indigenous 
mass would decide to swoop in or what kind of damage it would decide to inflict, the 
foreigners contemplated how they would fortify themselves and how they would fend 
off this mass (by means of boiling water, pressurized water, rocks, dynamite, and fire-
arms, the contemplation was about the technicalities of the weaponry while the harm 
it would cause was left out as irrelevant).450 In another example, a boisterous lower 
class crowd gathered, and they walked around creating a ruckus; the more they 
continued to walk, the more people joined them. This particular crowd turned out to 
be harmless, but later the same day (and on the same page) another indigenous crowd 
appeared and tried to break into a locked door to kill everyone inside a house (we are 
not told whose house it was, but from the context we can infer that it was owned by 







The indigenous crowd is always referred to generically as ri‘a‘ (riffraff), asafil 
(the base and lowly), or, when using a language that is less derogatory, al-wataniyyin 
(the locals, the indigenous) and al-Muslimin. In the following paragraph in which al-
Naqqash describes the scene in Alexandria on the eve of the invasion, outlining the 
foreigners’ fear of “al-ahali” (lit. the residents, the locals), the inexplicable hatred and 
lust for vengeance of the natives are recounted from the point of view of the 
foreigners: 
سحأو بناجلأا ةظحلاملاب ةبقارملاو ونأ ةلفس موقلا نم يلاھلأا عیمجو لاجر ةیداھجلا مھرثكأوأ اوحبصأ ةاسق 
يف مھتافرصت نوظلغی ةلماعم سانلا نودبتسیو مھرومأب اراثئتسا  عیفرلا نونھتمی ارابكتساو ابجع عاوشلا يف نوشمی
قل وأ اورفن نونسحتسی لاام اوأرا ذإو عیضولا نومدختسیو مھب نودیری مھنأو رعشث اوخمشو اومظاعت مھب دتعی لا نم او
 اماصخأو مھل ءادعأ مھومھوت نمم اماقتنا مھرودص تانونكم زاربإو ةعیقولا ىلإ ھب نوعرذتی ثداح لقأ نوعقوتیو ارش
نییبورولأا بناجلأا مھب ينعن. 452  
This paragraph does not stop at laying out the vengefulness, hatred, and evil 
harbored by the natives; it also tells us how their conception of the foreigners as their 
enemies was a mere illusion. The indigenous crowds, thus, act upon illusions rather 
than motives- or in other words, their motives are turned into illusions by colonialist 
discourse. The dismissal of the motives of the indigenous rebels is also evident in al-
Naqqash’s description of the ‘Urabist contemplation to block the Suez Canal. From a 
practical and a strategic viewpoint, a local army blocking an international waterway in 
the face of an invading army is a rational act that may impede the invasion (and could 
have changed the course of the events had ‘Urabi had the courage to do it). For al-
Naqqash, however, such a decision cannot be motivated by any sentiment other than 






 رش نم ةعرتلا ھب ىقو ھنإف ةبقاعلا دیمح ناك اكلسم يبارع ءازإ رملأا يف كلس دق سبسل يد ویسوملا ناكو
اماقتناو ایفشت ةعرتلا مدرب يبارع رملأ كاذ لاولو زیلكنلال تقملا ةدشو مھیلإ زایحنلااب رھاظت نأب نییبارعلا. 453 
In the above phrase, ‘Urabi’s unexplainable contempt is highlighted through the use 
of the terms tashafiyyan (roughly gloatingly, or with schadenfreude) and intiqaman 
(vengefully). Had Ferdinand de Lesseps not been resourceful enough to trick ‘Urabi 
by pretending to side with him, according to al-Naqqash, ‘Urabi would have blocked 
the Suez Canal “gloatingly and vengefully” or “with schadenfreude and vengeance.” 
The two terms are extraneous and superfluous; they add nothing to the narrative, yet 
they are important to foreclose any rational motives on the part of ‘Urabi. It is not that 
‘Urabi would have blocked the Canal, (God forbid!) for strategic purposes, for the 
purpose of hampering foreign invasion, or for the fulfillment of a nationalistic or 
patriotic ethos, but for base gloating/schadenfreude and vengeance, in other words for 
blind hatred. ‘Urabi’s blind hate is compounded by his naivety, and both are 
contrasted to Ferdinand de Lesseps’ foresight and resourcefulness for pretending to 
side with the ‘Urabists in order to thwart their intentions to block the Suez Canal.  
Consistent with its lack of motive and rationale, the indigenous crowd seldom 
speaks in proper words in al-Naqqash’s account. Instead, it emits noise. Various 
descriptions of the noise the crowd emits index the ambiguous and unexplainable 
threat the crowd carries, or, when imminent threat is absent, the nuisance it constitutes 
to individual observers. In one example a passerby relates how, as soon as he got out 






“screaming of women and the gathering of people.”454 Unintelligible noise clearly 
indexes in this account the simultaneous gendering and classing of the crowd. In 
another example the ululation of the women becomes indexical of the irrational 
euphoria of the crowd (irrational because the crowd seemed to be celebrating what 
they thought was an Egyptian victory, only for it to turn out that Egyptian fortresses 
had just been overwhelmed by the British).455 Unintelligible noise, rather than words, 
language, discernible speech, or other types of sounds that do not constitute the same 
threat and nuisance, is thus a sign of a collective, non-discernible and threatening 
body whose very existence is a threat, an affront, or in the best cases a nuisance 
(much like the noise it emits). In addition to reinforcing the depiction of the crowd as 
a non-discernible collective, the crowd-as-noise affirms the privileging of the 
Christian and English individual over the indigenous crowd: the indigenous crowd is 
reduced to a nuisance, a sound without a human subject uttering it, one without proper 
meaning, subtext, or motivation. On the other side, the Western individual holds the 
privilege of being annoyed by this sound, and hence his prerogative and right to 
silence it.  
These representational strategies serve to render violence against the 
indigenous crowd harmless (there are no individuals to be harmed, only an ambiguous 
collective) and justifiable (one is not blamed when attempting to neutralize a threat, or 
																																								 																			 	











shutting off noise). Because this mass obscures its individual members (to the extent 
that they seldom have names, social positions, or a distinct comprehensible voice), 
shooting at this mass is normalized; it is not a shooting at individual persons who may 
be grieved. While fear and alarm are not the prerogative of the locals (who are not 
even thought of as individuals), the foreigners are justified in stockpiling arms in self-
defense (or more literally, to quell evil: “li daf‘ al-sharr”) and to fire at the unarmed 
crowd if necessary.456 These representations thus produce on one side, the individual 
(Western-Christian, who is implicitly a member of the upper or merchant class), and, 
opposed to this individual, on the other side, are the collective, riffraff, indigenous, 
and Muslim crowd. The former is endowed with the privilege of feeling threatened, 
and with the faculties of self-defense and the contemplation thereof. The latter is both 
uncountable and ungrievable, if we can borrow Judith Butler’s lexicon.457 Members 
of the Egyptian crowd become only countable as dead bodies, but even then it is not 
important (or worth the effort) to give an accurate body count; al-Naqqash reports 
nonchalantly that Egyptian casualties might have been 350 or 2000, immediately after 
he provides a detailed account of the fallen British soldiers and the number of 
casualties and injuries suffered aboard every British battleship.458 
Opposed to this collective, uncountable, and unintelligible mass that 














members of the invading forces are given names, professions and social status, 
families,459 and are enumerated as individuals.460 Rather than street-dwellers or 
originating in the wilderness, they inhabit homes,461 churches,462 banks,463 and 
hospitals464 (all surrounded and threatened by the indigenous crowd, the invading 
British bombardment notwithstanding). 
Al-Naqqash’s text reproduces very closely the biases of European discourse 































his account. His representational schema follows closely that of official and 
journalistic British reports on the events of 1882.465 
The same imagery that al-Naqqash presents is evident in the British Foreign 
Office’s “Correspondences Respecting the Riots at Alexandria on the 11th June, 
1882.”466 These correspondences included memoranda sent by the British consulate in 
Alexandria to the Foreign Office, letters from foreign residents of Alexandria filing 
for compensation,467 as well as the testimonies given in front of the “Commission of 
Inquiry into the Events of June 11, 1882.” The correspondences start with the account 
given by Mr. Cockson, the British Consul in Alexandria, of how he was “pursued by 
howling Arabs.”468 From there on, the same themes al-Naqqash uses are repeated; the 
indigenous crowd (described as Arabs) spreads, increases in number, overflows, 
threateningly brandish their nabbuts (but rarely firearms, the threshold of fire still 
























the examples, they do so without showing any signs of rationality or of any form of 
individual consciousness; scarcely, if ever, does the account offer any explanation as 
to why they were doing so (except, of course, for base inexplicable and blind hatred 
towards the foreigners). As with al-Naqqash, the crowd howls and screams but rarely 
speaks. There are very few examples of this crowd actually saying something, but 
even when they do, their speech was always rendered in translation into one variation 
or another of “let’s kill the Christians.” In one of these examples, what is reported to 
be said is in fact “mawitou [sic.]” which means “kill him,” but the translation renders 
it “kill the Christians.”469 In another example, a member of the crowd was purported 
to have yelled “Ya Muslimin issidouni nimowitou en-Nasára.”470 This is clearly faux 
Arabic (and sounds more like an incorrect rendering of something said in classical 
Arabic and not in the colloquial of the period) but the gist is still about Muslims 
killing Christians. When it speaks, the crowd only declares its intent to kill Christians, 
and it does so not in proper words, not in an intelligible, but rather in faux, Arabic. In 
yet another example a member of the crowd was reported to have yelled at the 
Europeans “ha, ya, nozara,” an unintelligible rendering of Arabic.471 Fluent in faux 
Arabic, the European eyewitness understood this as a threat (perhaps if asked what 
“ha ya nozara” meant, European witnesses would readily answer “kill the Christians.” 
Perhaps all faux Arabic phrases translate to “kill the Christians”).  The threatening 
collective nature of the crowd, its lack of distinction, is therefore symptomatized in its 
lack of a distinct intelligible voice. This unintelligible voice must be threatening, and 








The amorphousness of the mass that constitutes the crowd is not only evident 
in the crowd’s lack of language. Like with al-Naqqash, the British report on the 
Alexandria events also depicts the Egyptian crowd as uncountable. The numbers of 
members of smaller crowds are often given in estimates, while with larger crowds the 
description merely emphasizes how they surround their helpless European victims. 
Although in some cases this narrative of European victimhood is troubled by reports 
of Europeans throwing rocks and “roofing stones” back at the Egyptians, and 
sometimes shooting at them, this is usually posited as in self-defense.472On the first 
page of the report we encounter how“[t]he Europeans fled to their houses, and from 
there began a very lively fire on the Arabs with revolvers.”473 The shooting therefore 
is posited as defensive in nature; only after they fled did they shoot at the Arabs, and 
the European fire in that regards is lively rather than deadly (which one would 
generally expect of gunfire).474 In the hands of the Europeans, fire is lively, while in 
the hands of the savages who stand at the threshold of fire, fire can only become 
arson, leading to the burning of the city. The report then goes on to tell us “the 
Europeans with their revolvers killed a certain number of Arabs, but nothing in 
proportion to the Europeans killed.”475 Even when certain, the number is not definite, 
or not worth enumerating. My suggestion here is not to read this sentence as claiming 
the number of the Egyptian casualties to be small (after all the estimates of death tolls 
during these events all point to higher Egyptian casualties) but that any number of 










uncountability of the Arabs (as a crowd as well as dead bodies in this example) only 
serves to further emphasize that the value of their lives is “nothing in proportion to the 
Europeans.”  
Opposed to these uncountable Arabs, an exact account of Europeans, living or 
dead, is given. The opposition between the uncountable Egyptian crowd and the 
countable European individuals is evident in a report on an attack against a hotel. A 
foreign eyewitness, after describing Egyptian crowds as consisting of “quantities of 
Arabs,” a “great number of Arabs,” and “about half-a-dozen boys and three or four 
men,”476 moves to provide a detailed account of every European killed and the place 
where they were killed. As opposed to the “three or four” Arabs, the number of 
Europeans killed was definitely five. It was not enough to report that they were killed 
near the hotel at around the same time (this would have perhaps turned them into a 
crowd). Instead, we are told that three were killed “close to the spot and two more 
further off.” The details of the manner and time of death are also important: “They 
were not all killed on the spot; I saw one man move for long afterwards.”477  Once 
again this can be read as a keen attempt not to turn the killed Europeans into a crowd 
that dies simultaneously, but as individuals dying at distinct times, and as grievable 
subjects whose time and manner of death are worthy of recounting in as much detail 
as possible (if we learn anything from Agamben it is that there is also subjectivity in 










The race of the crowd is highlighted by how it howls and speaks in a faux Arabic that 
could only be interpreted as a threat. Sometimes the race of the crowd is emphasized 
further: in one of the British reports, an eyewitness noted: “our carriage was entirely 
surrounded by Barbarens [sic.], Saïdis, and negroes;”479 this, of course, in addition to 
all the reports highlighting the Arab and Muslim nature of the crowd (whether in the 
British reports or in al-Naqqash’s book). This insistence on the race of the crowd, and 
to oppose the racially savage crowd to civilized Western individuals, ties to a Western 
theory of subjectivity that views individuality as a (Western) civilizational 
achievement and therefore the prerogative and privilege of the civilized white man. 
All other populations, according to this system of representation, exist as collectives 
that lack proper individuality. This trend (still evident in contemporary cinematic 
representations480) has shaped 19th and early 20th century theories of subjectivity from 

























is how native informants were brought in to testify to the exclusive Western nature of 
individuality and racialized nature of the crowd. The eyewitness who reportedly 
identified the members of the crowd as barbareens (i.e. Nubians), Saïdis (i.e. peasant 
upper Egyptians), and negroes, was in fact the Egyptian-born Mohamed Aly, who was 
identified by the report as a “janissary” at the Italian Consulate. It is not clear if by 
janissary the report was referring to Aly’s origins (in that case his insistence on 
highlighting the race of the crowd can be seen as an attempt to distance his own race 
and class from those constituting the Egyptian crowd) or was merely being Orientalist 
in characterizing a native who worked as an armed guard (in that case his insistence 
on highlighting the race of the crowd can be seen as an act of identification with the 
Europeans he worked for and an attempt to distance himself, on a civilizational if not 
a racial scale, from the indigenous crowd). The racial characterization of the crowd 
was therefore ventriloquized/internalized by Mohammad Aly, the native informant, 
appearing in front of the British “Commission of Inquiry.” The same ventriloquism is 
also evident in the discourse of al-Naqqash. As early as page 5 of the volume on the 
























Alexandria events, al-Naqqash identifies the members of the crowd as Muslims, 
Saidis, Sudanese, and Bedouins. In keeping with European classist depictions of the 
crowd, al-Naqqash also adds a clear classist element to describe the crowd as the 
lowly and the riffraff, and identified some of them as porters and donkey-drivers: 
امف رعش يف ةنیدملا لاإ ریھامجو نیملسملا نم ةلفس موقلا مھعاعرو نیب يدیعص ينادوسو يودبو 
مھنمو ةرماحلا نولامحلاو مھلاثمأو نومجھی ىدارف اجاوزأو تاعامجو اجاوفأو ىلع نم هوقل يف مھقیرط نم 
بناجلأا اریبك ناك وأ اریغص لاھك ىتفوأ .483 
This is not to argue, however, that it is only the Arab, savage, or non-European 
crowd that is characterized by a lack of individuality. In fact, in the next section, I 
propose that the description of the Alexandrian crowd, especially in relation to the 
loss of individuality, copies the description of the metropolitan crowds in 19th century 
European literature. While this may seem paradoxical (and while racist discourse 
should not always be expected to be consistent), one could read the racialist 
descriptions of the 1882 crowds as stating that, when residing within proper Western 
spaces, like homes (i.e. the domestic, opposed not only to the crowd but also to other 
arrangements of habitation which were being erased by the advent of colonialism), 
banks, and shops (owned by a foreigner merchant class and their local clients), are 
produced as proper individuals. One may add here churches as per al-Naqqash, 
though we should be careful not to make al-Naqqash’s mistake of reducing the 
‘Christians’ to the ‘foreigners’ and thus erasing indigenous Christians and native 
churches, Coptic and otherwise.  
When dwelling outside of these proper Western spaces, dwellers become a 






racialization of these spaces is heightened and the picture is drawn in exclusive terms 
of the Arab crowd inhabiting the streets versus Western homes and individuals. 
Whereas when dealing with crowds in Europe, racial themes are less evident (though 
not entirely absent),485 loss of individuality, the presence of an ambiguous threatening 
collective, and of a howling crowd are all commonplace. The imagery in al-Naqqash 
and in the British reports on the events of 1882 is in many ways informed by their 
European predecessors, dealing with metropolitan European crowds (especially in 
London and Paris). In the next section I take a closer look at some of these 
metropolitan accounts, in order to better understand the 19th century European 
conception of the crowd.   
 
“Dissolution	of	Sensoria”	
For many 19th century European, especially English, writers, the crowd represented a 
challenge to individuality that inspired both terror and fascination. In his study of the 
representations of the crowd in 19th century English literature, Victorian literature 
scholar John Plotz reads a “dissolution of sensoria” that takes place upon William 


















Wordsworth’s encounter with the crowd. 486 In the same vein, Saree Makdisi (also 
reading Wordsworth) characterizes the uncertainty at the encounter with the crowd as 
a “crisis of subjectivity.”487 The crowd, therefore, even in the metropolis, and even 
before it turns into a rioting mob, poses a challenge to one’s consciousness, one’s 































fear (and fascination) of losing one’s senses, of having one’s individual subjectivity 
lost to/in the crowd, is perhaps what Baudelaire was also referring to when he 
described the crowd as an “ineffable orgie.” Baudelaire then explains this “ineffable 
orgie” as: “cette sainte prostitution de l’âme qui se donne tout entière, poésie et 
charité, à l’imprévu qui se montre, à l’inconnu qui passe.” The sexual connotations 
aside, Baudelaire is describing a loss of oneself to unknown members of the crowd.488 
(In the hands of LeBon, this loss of individual consciousness was deprived of its 
poetry and turned into pseudo-science.) 
This dissolution of sensoria and all the terror (and, to an extent, the 
fascination) at the encounter with the crowd are evident, in perhaps more concrete 
terms, in Dickens’ description of the Parisian crowd in A Tale of Two Cities. In his 
famous description of the onset of the revolution and the storming of the Bastille, the 
dissolution of sensoria can be read in Dickens’ eschewing of grammatical structuring 
and his use of sentence fragments, as if language itself dissolves at the encounter with 
this ‘living sea’ that is the revolutionary crowd.489 Towards the end of the scene, a 
Bastille governor finds himself “encompass[ed]” by a “howling universe of 
passion,”490 (just like the howling crowd in Alexandria, even though this crowd 
speaks the officer’s language) and this howling crowd would take that “grim old 
officer” captive, would take him through the streets, subject him to a “long-gathering 









posthumously.491 The same threat which the European residents experienced and al-
Naqqash reported, namely that a howling universe is surrounding them and is about to 
put an end to their life, existence, and bodily integrity, was faced by the Bastille 
officer (and by extension the individual) confronting the Parisian crowd. The fear is 
then realized. Not only does the officer fall dead, but also the crowd makes a point of 
ripping his body apart even though he was already dead. This encounter between the 
individual and an unintelligible yet threatening crowd is repeated throughout the Tale, 
even when the crowd is peaceful. The echoes of the footsteps of the London crowd 
become an omen to the French Revolution and to how the Revolution would 
transform the family-lives of these characters.492 The echoes of the footsteps perhaps 
represent the anonymity of the crowd: they are not distinguishable from one another, 
it is not certain from whence they came and where they were headed, hence their 
threatening nature. The Parisian crowd dancing the revolutionary dance, the 
Carmagnole, around Lucie Manette (the female protagonist and the representative of 
Victorian493 femininity in the novel), induces a fit of terror.494 The crowd is therefore 
unintelligible; it is experienced as a howling universe, footstep-echoes, and dances. 
The reports on the Alexandria crowd, and al-Naqqash’s translation/appropriation, 
clearly follow a theme in English fiction. They were sometimes narrated through the 














the individual into a collective, the imminent disintegration/ripping asunder of 
individuals who confront or fall prey to it, and its very unintelligibility.  
 
The	Orgy	and	the	Sexual	Narration	of	the	Disintegration	of	the	Individual	
At the beginning of this chapter we have discussed how the topos of the orgy 
resonated with the recurrent trope of sexual chaos. As we switched from the orgiastic 
paradox which produces the hidden as (sexually) licentious to the orgy as a trope for 
the dissolution of individuality, we have shown many representations of this 
dissolution, yet the sexual narration of this dissolution has so far been missing from 
our analysis. Indeed, just as sexual threat (and promise) is imminent in the orgy-qua-
mystery or the orgiastic paradox, the dissolution of individuality within the crowd-
qua-orgy was also recurrently narrated as a sexual threat; the violation of the 
individual integrity of the body narrated as the sexual violation of the body. 495 The 
sexual connotations are hard to miss in Baudelaire. The orgy to which Baudelaire 
likens the crowd is most likely the Dionysian orgy: the crowd-orgy in Baudelaire is 
characterized by “ecstatic mysteries/mysterious ecstasies” (mystérieuses ivresse) and 
by a “universal communion.” Yet the crowd-orgy is also sexual, only known to “he 
who easily weds the crowd” (Celui-là qui épouse facilement la foule). The crowd-















individuality, yet maintaining the sexual metaphor; the loss of self in the crowd-orgy 
is a “sacred prostitution of the soul, that gives itself in all entirety, poetry and charity 
... to the stranger/unknown who passes by” (sainte prostitution de l'âme qui se donne 
tout entière, poésie et charité, ... à l'inconnu qui passe.). Of course Baudelaire’s is a 
narrative of fascination rather than terror. The sexual fear of the crowd-orgy, on the 
other hand, is evident in the Carmagnole scene from A Tale of Two Cities. Lucie’s 
terror at the Carmagnole is delivered with an air of sexual chaos: “Men and women 
danced together, women danced together, men danced together, as hazard had brought 
them together” (3.5.216). The men are dancing like women and the men and women 
are dancing promiscuously without separation (or even proper pairing) as in an orgy 
(which led Dickens scholars to believe this scene is influenced by Carlyle’s 
invocation of the maenads,496 though to my knowledge none of them tried to explore 
the significance of the orgy). Clearly what the fictional Lucie Manette, like many of 
the non-fictional bourgeois and individual observers of the crowd, finds threatening is 
the collective ambiguity and mayhem of the crowd. But in addition, it seems there is a 
certain fear of her own undoing as a bourgeois individual subject by that crowd. First, 
this dancing crowd-orgy stands between her and her husband’s cell in La Force 
prison; the crowd-orgy therefore is breaking the domestic unit in which Lucie’s 
individuality is enclosed (consistent with the breaking of her family by revolutionary 
justice, which put her husband in prison based on his aristocratic descent). But in 
addition to the breaking of the family, one could read Lucie’s fear of the sexual chaos 
of the crowd-orgy as a fear that she will be sexually violated by the crowd. If the men 
and women of the crowd-orgy are dancing “as hazard had brought them together” 






molested?) by this haphazard crowd. This fear of sexual violation by the crowd-orgy 
is evident in the title of the chapter: “The Wood-sawyer.” The title already represents 
sexual threat: wood as a (Freudian) phallic symbol, the working class cutting virility 
of the wood-sawyer, and even the suggestion of castration in cutting wood. The 
wood-sawyer, however, only appears twice in the chapter; he appears amongst the 
crowd dancing the Carmagnole but also appears earlier molesting Lucie and her 
daughter (also named Lucie) with questions (to which Little Lucie is never sure if she 
should answer) as they try to stand peacefully in front of La Force prison to 
momentarily unite their household (as if interfering with his wood and saw, his 
working class virility and ability to castrate, into the bourgeois domestic, but also 
threatening bourgeois and aristocratic bodies as he compares his saw to the 
Guillotine).497 The wood-sawyer therefore is the stranger among the crowd, always a 
threat to the domestic, always a potential sexual threat to little girls and their mothers; 
he is the index of how the crowd’s threat to individual subjectivity is also a sexual 
threat.498  
Egyptian thinkers have understood the crowd as a sexual threat since the late 
19th century (i.e. since the emergence of a discourse on the crowd). A lengthy didactic 
dialogue by the Egyptian intellectual and the ‘Urabi revolt orator ‘Abd Allah al-
Nadim, appearing in 1892, clearly depicts crowds in which individual distinctions 
blur as a sexual threat to respectable women. In this dialogue a woman warns another 
against going out to where certain Sufi rituals (al-hadrah) are supposed to be taking 









of Sufi practices repulsed him,499 but the dialogue is more concerned with the 
obscenity of the Sufi crowd than its sacrilege. A woman who goes to these events, 
according to the dialogue, would expose herself to lewd men who dance like women, 
who sport curls like women, men who distribute flowers to flirt with the ladies, who 
distribute candy to the children to flirt with the mothers, those who would verbally 
and physically harass the women, and those who are drunk and may be moved by 
their drunkenness to touch the women.500 The dancing crowd around women, the men 
dancing like women, the strangers molesting children and their mothers, and the 
strangers in the crowd as potential sexual threat to respectable women are all 
reminiscent of the Carmagnole scene and therefore of orgiastic representations of the 








ecstasy/convulsion	is	mocked	by	al-Nadim’s	description	of	the	fake	worshipper:	 مجربیو لیریو فتفتی





















It is important here to note not only the similarities but also the differences 
with the orgy. Like with the Dionysian orgy and with Pentheus’ fear thereof; the 
hadrah is presented as a space where the men are feminized and the women are 
sexually threatened. Like Dionysus, who was a threat to women because of his curls 
and effeminate attitude according to Pentheus, the men of the hadrah are dangerous to 
the women. The lewd men of the hadrah are more like Dionysus than the maenads, at 
least as far as seduction goes- though their effeminacy can be seen as reminiscent of 
the castrated priests of Cybele.  Unlike the orgy, however, the hadrah is not a 
women’s ritual: the fear is not of the women who participate, but that the women who 
go to watch may be assaulted by the participants. Although the presence of women 
highlights the licentiousness of the space (mainly by providing this licentiousness 
with a target to harass and assault), the licentiousness of the space is not imputed to 
women or their presence. Still there is a certain effeminacy to the practice and its 
participants, one that creates an atmosphere of gendered and sexual chaos reminiscent 
of the orgy.   This is most evident in the ensuing lines: 
 ادو ضعب اوسوبیو ضعب ىلع اوّلیمی امل لاو نیف هوملعتا اد صقرلا يتخی ةفراع انأ يزاوغ امھ لاإ
ةرتایت لاا شیلوقتام دعقی ادو موقی ادو لوخلا يز ھطسو عصقی ادو اد ارو نم فلی502  
















The men’s behavior in the hadrah is suggestive both of effeminacy and of a 
sexual laxness; men kiss one another and go/turn around each other, standing behind 
one another, etc.; they are dancing like professional female dancers, ghawazi, but also 
like professional male dancers, “khawal” (a term that in the 20th century will come to 
mean an effeminate man, a penetratee, or a– usually passive— homosexual and would 
become a popular epithet not unlike the English “faggot”).   
At the end of the dialogue, the opinion of a sheikh is sought, and the sheikh 
denounces the hadrah in a manner reminiscent of Pentheus’ denunciation of the orgy 
(mutatis mutandis). The sheikh objects that the true dhikr (roughly, praising God) 
belongs in the mosques and not out where people dance to be seen (especially by 
women). While true worshippers may shut their eyes and cry for the fear of God, 
according to the sheikh, those fake worshippers dance while eyeing the women. The 
sheikh then moves to describing how these fake worshippers engage in fake or drug-
induced ecstasies only to get the attention of the women or to trick people into giving 
them their money.503 Just like the maenads in Pentheus’ discourse, these men engaged 
in “mock ecstasies” as an alibi for their lewd behavior. Remarkable here is the role of 
al-Nadim in indigenizing modernist anxieties (which parallel the Western colonial and 
Victorian anxieties described throughout this chapter) by anchoring them in notions of 














Al-Nadim’s dialogue, therefore, is initially not about the crowd as such; it is 
about the space where certain heterodox practices, which already had their affinities 
with the orgy, including ecstasies or the simulation thereof, are performed, and which 
al-Nadim viewed with suspicion. By the end of the dialogue, however, al-Nadim’s 
warning against these types of spaces extends to all sorts of publics; the take away 
advice is for women to avoid crowds in general, better yet not to go out at all. The 
catastrophe, according to the sheikh in al-Nadim’s dialogue, is the woman who 
coquettishly walks in the streets (timshi tit‘ajib) so that the men would see her.505 This 
understanding that the crowd is no place for a lady would be repeated in 2011 in the 
regime apologists’ justification of violence against women demonstrators by 
wondering why they were there in the first place. It would also be repeated by the 
Muslim Brothers’ warning that female activists who participate in the Tahrir Square 
demonstrations protesting President Mursi’s rule in 2013 would lay themselves open 
to various forms of sexual assault by the Tahrir crowd. There is a difference, however, 
between al-Nadim’s understanding of the crowd as a place that constitutes a threat to 
women, and the 2011 counterrevolutionary understanding that feminine presence is 
what constitutes a threat of the crowd.  
Here the orgy, or the motif of sexual chaos, does not narrate the dissolution of 
political order, political dissent, or the evasion of the State’s gaze the same way we 
saw in earlier examples. Instead, sexual violation in these examples narrates the 
dissolution of bodily integrity into the collective (the crowd, the hadrah). In the 










Carmagnole scene Lucie fears the Parisians not because they no longer have a 
government to deter them from violating her and her daughter (to do so they would 
need to denounce her to the Committee of Public Safety and march her to the 
Guillotine- also it is important to note that in the Tale Dickens attributed rape not to 
the revolutionary crowd but rather to the brutal aristocracy. Although Lucie’s fears 
can indeed be read as sexual, Dickens does not vindicate those fears, nor does he 
situate this fear within the context of a lack of government or the evasion of the state 
gaze), but rather because they form a threatening collective, a crowd, and dance 
around her. Similarly the false Sufis who would expose bourgeois women to lewdness 
and to sexual harassment were not secretly plotting an insurrection. They were 
threatening, however, because the rules of the collective space did not allow for 
respecting the individuality and integrity of the bodies of women.  
And yet in both cases there is an evasion of the State’s gaze, even if it is 
articulated differently from the examples we encountered earlier.  By forming a 
crowd, by engaging in ecstatic celebratory dance or esoteric ecstatic religious rituals, 
or simply by being a collective, the Carmagnole dancers and the (fake) Sufi 
worshippers constitute a space that is opaque to the gaze, scrutiny, and surveillance of 










The crowd, therefore, shares many of the attributes of the orgy. Like the orgy, the 
crowd represents a state of lack of distinction in which the individuality dissolves. 
This lack of distinction and dissolution of individuality are sometimes narrated in 
terms of the same sexual chaos that is attributed to the orgy, and it incites the same 
sexual fears. Yet the orgy and the crowd are different in one important way: the orgy, 
as discussed across this study, is a mystery, something that is hidden from the official 
and public gaze and is therefore suspect. The crowd, on the other hand (even when 
described as a mystery by fascinated or terrified poets like Baudelaire and 
Wordsworth), is public by default. In this section I argue that the crowd, though 
public, defies the public-official gaze in ways similar to the orgy. 
Instead of the Dionysian mystery that occurs away from the city-(and) state, 
the crowd is an orgy that happens within the field of vision of the public gaze (except 
of course when the crowd decides to stress its own autonomy and constructs its own 
sit-in, as the case was with the Tahrir Square orgy). But even the crowd as public orgy 
is not discernible to the public eye. The conglomeration and condensation of bodies in 
one space (which triggers the fear of the loss of individual boundaries and the 
sexualization of this loss) to the extent of blurring the boundaries between these 
bodies creates a certain opaqueness in the face of the public’s and the State’s gaze, a 
certain anonymity (as if everyone is wearing the mask, just like for Wordsworth every 
face in the crowd is a mystery). Individuals who wish to hide can walk safely within 
the opaque space constituted by the density of bodies.506The crowd therefore is an 






potentially or suspiciously sexual), but also because, by virtue of this loss, the crowd 
becomes a mystery, even if a public one. 
This orgiastic-mysterious nature of the crowd produces a special affinity, nay 
complicity, with the secret or militant organization (itself orgiastic-mysterious, as we 
saw with the mystery of Islamist organizations). The first operates underground and 
strives to evade the gaze of the state, the second evades the gaze of the state through 
its human density, sometimes acting as the very underground within which the secret 
organization operates and/or hides its members. In Irhabi taht al-Tamrin, for example, 
the crowd (generically referred to as al-ziham) seems to be the secret organization’s 
surrogate, or accomplice, in hiding militants from the public gaze. In one incident 
‘Adil ‘Abd al-Baqi reports on how a terrorist, wanted by the police, was simply 
“hiding/submerged within the crowd” (mundassan wasat al-ziham).507In another, he 
reports that members of the Shawqiyyin organization who were wanted and pursued  
by the police everywhere were simply hiding in the crowd in broad daylight.508 This 
affinity between the crowd and the militant organization, their complicity in hiding 
their respective and each other’s’ members, should not come as a surprise; “The 
former may be likened to water, the latter to the fish who inhabit it” to use the words 







508Shawkat,	Irhabi	taht	al-Tamrin,	150:	" ءاحنأ عیمج يف مھنع ثحبی نملأاو نیرشتنم نوبراھلا نویقوشلا ةوخلإا ناك




and crowd mobilization).509 The crowd as a convenient medium for the members of 
the secret organization to stay underground was acknowledged, in a different context, 
in a film interview by members of the 1970s US militant group whose very name is 
suggestive of the evasion of state gaze: The Weather Underground Organization (set 
against footage of a moving crowd).510 The career of ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim himself 
can serve here as an empirical anecdote to supplement such representations of the 
crowd as a space of hiding. Nadim himself was an orator responsible for managing 
the Alexandrian crowds in the service of the ‘Urabi revolt. After the defeat of the 
revolt, he spent years hiding within the crowd.511 
In some representations, the affinity between the crowd and the secret 
organization goes beyond the hiding of militants within the crowd, to the secret 
organization adopting a modus operandi reminiscent of the crowd and the anonymity 
it affords. Charles Dickens has famously caricaturized the Jacobin club (which was, 
basically, the crowd-organization) as a jacquerie512 within which everyone is named 
Jacques. Anonymity, the collapse of individual distinction, becomes a symptom of 
revolutionary chaos and of the rule of the crowd. But even before the Revolution 
imposed a regime that supersedes the individual, the synonimity/anonymity of the 














evading the gaze of the aristocratic state;513 perhaps Dickens understood, avant-la-
lettre, the Althusserian mode of power through which the state needs to assign a 
unique name and a unique social position for its subjects to hail them. For the state to 
be able to hail its subjects, they must be first interpellated as individuals.514 When 
subjects are hidden, unidentifiable, anonymous, or interchangeable, then a cog, or 
dispositif,515 in the machinery of interpellation is not working. Unlike the policeman 
who shouts “hey you” in Althusser’s example, the police spy stands confused in front 
of the jacquerie, not able to identify who exactly of its members is Jacques, and like 





































authorities, police forces, and spies were not able to identify the members of al-
Shawqiyyin just because they donned masks of anonymity (like the masks that 
rendered every face in the London crowd a mystery to Wordsworth) by simply hiding 
in the crowd.  
This Dickensian caricature of the jacquerie is repeated in the Egyptian 
regime’s propaganda against Islamist organizations. In a way, the Islamist 
organization is always a jacquerie in which all the members hide under something that 
masks their identity and renders them all the same: this is the beard and the jilbab for 
the men, and especially the niqab for the women. Ruz al-Yusuf’s caricatures depicting 
Islamist women show what we can term ‘a jacquerie of the niqab’ in which all the 
members are interchangeable and the same. 516 The Dickensian jacquerie is repeated 
very closely in Shawkat’s Irhabi taht al-Tamrin. In one of the absurd moments in the 
text, Shawkat tells his readers of an Islamist organization that did away with proper 
names and instead bestowed on all its members the name ‘Abd Allah.517  Since ‘Abd 
















distinction or recognition: any Muslim is in essence ‘Abd Allah518 (or any Muslim 
male ‘Abd Allah, any Muslim female Amat Allah). 
Both the crowd and the secret organization/ Jama‘ah are therefore mysteries 
that lend themselves to orgiastic representations. They are both hidden spaces, and 
therefore one is the surrogate of the other. This affinity sometimes goes as far as 
depicting the secret organization as a space in which the individual is lost to the 
collective, just like the crowd (and the orgy, for the matter); the jacquerie in Dickens, 
the jacquerie of the niqab in Ruz al Yusuf, and the jacquerie of ‘Ibad Allah (pl. of 
‘Abd Allah) in Shawkat. The affinity between the Islamic secret organization and the 
crowd is also semantic.  The Islamic organization, especially in regime caricature, is 
often referred to as al-Jama‘ah. The term originally meant the group or the collective 
(and in a certain Sunni Islamic discourse referred to the collective will of the Muslim 
ummah), but would be used at the beginning of the 20th century to denote the crowd in 
its LeBonian manifestation (and was used in this manner by Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul in 
his translation of LeBon’s The Crowd, which we will further discuss in the next 
section). Al-Jama‘ah, therefore, like the crowd, is a space where individual members 
merge to form a collective. The crowd and the jama‘ah are both depicted as mysteries 
that obscure their individual members, sometimes to the extent of effecting a total loss 
of individuality. The jama‘ah (after its transformation from its early 20th century 
meaning of something normative to something abnegated), the crowd, and the orgy 
therefore have something inherent in common: the dissolution of individuality into a 







mystery, license, and chaos can be seen as outcomes of this dissolution into the 
collective.  
In the next chapter I will move from the crowd-as-orgy to the crowd as such, 
exploring how the crowd emerges in Egyptian discourse as an improper and licentious 
space amidst a colonizing process that redefines space along Western-bourgeois-
colonial lines (the same colonial process that transformed al-jama‘ah from the 
embodiment of the normative will of the ummah to the abnegated crowd and later to 
an Islamist caricature).  But before moving from the crowd-as-orgy to the crowd as 
such (and to pave the way to understanding the colonial process that defines and 
redefines space), I want to bring the crowd back, through a different lens, to the orgy-
as-mystery, and as an oriental mystery more specifically.  
 
The	Crowd,	the	Oriental	Mystery,	and	the	World-as-Exhibition	
The new lens I want to introduce here is Timothy Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt. The 
colonizing process, which Mitchell reads as inherent to the modes of modern 
disciplinary power,519 rests on an epistemology that abstracts a plan from the real, yet 
one that only conceives of the real through a plan or representation. Mitchell terms 
this epistemology, this almost paradoxical movement of abstracting a representation 
from the real yet only conceiving the real through its representation, the “metaphysics 
of modernity.” This epistemology and these metaphysics manifested themselves 







rendered into a representation easily navigated through an actual printed plan.520 But 
the Great Exhibition is itself an index of the larger epistemology that sees the world as 
an exhibition; a space organized through a plan and made available for legibility by 
the gazing subject.521 Voyagers to the Orient, who were simultaneously (and 
somehow paradoxically) expecting to see the thing beyond the exhibit yet expecting it 
to be organized according to the principles of the world-as-exhibition were then 
perplexed by a reality, or a thing, unmediated by a plan. They found no representation 
that would render the real real or abstract meaning thereof, and to them this rendered 
the thing void of meaning522 (perhaps an “indescribable orgy,” one may add?). From 
then on, the colonization of the Orient, and of Egypt specifically, proceeded through 
imposing a plan, an order, and therefore meaning, on this plan-less Oriental thing that 
defies order and escapes meaning.523 In the next chapter I will move to how this 
ordering of space created some spaces as orderly while others (which to an extent 
escaped the planning and organization, especially the division of spaces to proper 
public and domestic spaces) as licentious.  
What I want to add to Mitchell’s analysis here is that the crowd, as a 
disorganized and undisciplined collective, corresponds to the order-less and therefore 
meaningless thing in Mitchell’s analysis. In fact, although Mitchell’s analysis is not 
concerned with the crowd as such, there are various hints and gestures throughout the 
text to the crowd as the other of the modes and institutions of discipline that inscribe 









Exhibition was thought of as domesticating the crowd: the insidious crowds of 1848 
were turned, by the power of the Exhibition, into disciplined and orderly spectators in 
1851.524The Exhibition is not the only disciplinary institution that orders the crowd 
into something else. Military discipline (which was conceived as the other and 
antidote to the crowds by LeBon,525 and which in Mitchell’s analysis appears as 
providing one of the models of discipline that were taken beyond the army to other 
institutions and to social organization at large) also appears as the other of the crowd. 
Compared to modern militarism, older forms of warfare “seem[ed] like the foolish 
clashing of mere crowds”526 (emphasis added). The Ottoman generals, Mitchell tells 
us, took note of how outdated troops that have not learned modern military discipline 
“when in the presence of the enemy, do not remain drawn up in a line, but stand 
confusedly and promiscuously like a crowd in a place of diversion” (emphases 
added).527 But the opposition between the crowd and the modes of discipline that 
produce an ordered and meaningful world-as-exhibition do not only lie in the example 
of the 1851 Great Exhibition or the semantic opposition of mere crowds to modern 
militaries. There is a deeper opposition that is inherent in the very nature of the world-
as-exhibition epistemology. The world-as-exhibition separates, according to Mitchell, 
not only representation from reality, but furthermore the spectator, the gazing subject, 
from the representation (and hence from the real thing being observed).528 Not only 










produce “the modern individual, constructed as an isolated, disciplined, receptive, and 
industrious political subject.”529 This is the individual we have posited as the other of 
the crowd throughout this section, the individual that risks total disintegration in the 
crowd-orgy.   
We can think of the crowd therefore as the other, or one of the others, of the 
world-as-exhibition; the crowd is a disorderly space that defies representation (hence 
only describable as an indescribable orgy) and therefore a space of the loss of 
meaning. The “dissolution of sensoria” Plotz noted, or the “crisis of subjectivity” 
noted by Makdisi, can therefore be understood as this loss of any means to render the 
thing intelligible. It can also be understood in terms of the collapse of the series of 
separations the epistemology of the world as exhibition is predicated on. As a space 
that defies order, representation, and meaning, the series of separations between the 
thing and its representation, and representation and the gazing subject, is no longer 
possible, leading to the dissolution of the faculties of comprehension of the subject, a 
dissolution of sensoria, along with the dissolution of the subject as such. We keep 
coming back to the fate of Pentheus, as the outcome of his experiencing the crowd; 
now, the “metaphysics of modernity” endow it with more epistemological and 
symbolic significance.  
The crowd, then, can be seen as a space beyond representation and 
signification, beyond what is known in Lacanian psychoanalysis as the symbolic 
order. Throughout this chapter, the crowd has appeared ululating, howling, and 
threatening in faux Arabic, but seldom speaking in a proper language. While the 






the howling and luluing descriptions come mainly from British reports, there is still 
merit in applying this lens to Egypt. First, the colonial reports on the crowd were part 
of the Egyptian cultural world (through translations like the one offered by al-
Naqqash for example but also through the ensuing transformation of the Egyptian 
polity and society by the authors of these colonial reports). Second, it is important to 
recall from chapter 1 how the term bahimiyyah stood for the undisciplined, 
uncivilized, and libidinal element, which late 19th century thinkers associated with the 
crowd, and that this terms also refers to a dissolution of signification and to the 
absence of the faculty of speech. I am not suggesting, of course, that Lacan’s analysis 
neatly fits late 19th century representations or that the authors of the colonial reports 
and the late 19th century Arab authors using the term bahimiyyah were all avant-la-
lettre Lacanians. What I am suggesting, instead, is that in the late 19th century, 
through representations of the crowd as something beyond signification, a howling 
mass, an indescribable orgy, and through using a term like bahimiyyah which 
combines together the notions of ambiguity, lack of speech, and the libidinal 
uncivilized element (also the Freudian id in early translations of Freud), a Lacanian 
world was made possible. The value of bringing the Lacanian lens here is that it 
brings to a new light the femininity and childishness of the crowd.  
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, acquiring the faculty of speech, entering the 
symbolic, is initiated through the father’s prohibition, and therefore through the 
complex process of identifying with and fearing the father. The symbolic order 
therefore is paternal and masculine, and the phallus becomes the universal signifier. A 
withdrawal from signification is therefore a regression from the law of the father, and 
a loss of the phallus. Femininity of the crowd can be then understood as a regression 




with the maternal530 (thus simultaneously the infantile and the feminine). This space, 
which lacks meaning and signification, threatens to effect a similar regression from 
the symbolic on its observers; Plotz’s dissolution of sensoria can therefore be thought 
of as the dissolution of the symbolic order and the regression to the pre-oedipal 
maternal and infantilized spaces.531  The fear of the orgy and the crowd (and the 
crowd-as-orgy) can therefore be understood as a fear of dissolution into the maternal, 









































forms of the orgy included the killing and devouring of a human child, but also in the 
fate of Pentheus, torn to pieces by the hands of his own mother). It can also be 
understood as a fear of castration (literalized by the practice of castrating Cybele’s 
male priests in her orgies). The fate of Pentheus, in addition to standing for the fear of 
being devoured by the mother, can be read as a fear of castration (displaced onto the 
dismembering of the body), but also as a fear of the regression to a fragmented body. 
Again, this is not to suggest that the orgy has always carried Lacanian significations, 
sometimes avant-la-lettre. It is to argue that the orgy and the crowd, especially the 











































crowd as orgy, acquire new significations in a Lacanian (and Freudian/Oedipal) world 
in which the symbolic order is masculine. 
This fall from signification is also a fall from the modern,533 from what 
Timothy Mitchell terms the “metaphysics of modernity.” (Hence, superimposing a 
Lacanian analysis on Mitchell’s work may help reveal the intersection of race and 
gender, and how the crowd falls at this intersection between the primitive and the 
feminine, a point elaborated by feminist scholars and to which I will pay close 
attention in the next chapter).534 Experiencing the real thing without representation, 
without a plan to impose meaning, was the experience of the Orient. There is 
therefore something in common between crowds and orgies on the one side and the 
Orient on the other, something deeply Oriental about the crowd and the orgy. Once 
again, the metaphysics of modernity, the epistemology of the world-as-exhibition, 
endows oriental mysteries with a novel significance. Oriental mysteries no longer 
signify a suspiciously exotic and sensual Orient, but furthermore they come to signify 
this Oriental lack of ordering and meaning, now that we are beyond the bounds of the 
Western and modern world-as-exhibition. It is not surprising then that the first 
accounts on the encounter between the British colonial forces and Egypt (which also 
came to constitute one of the earliest Egyptian accounts on the crowd) feature 
Western individuals threatened by collective, disorderly, and threatening crowds, 











It was not only the crowd in Alexandria, however, that was experienced as an 
Oriental threat that defies legibility by Western epistemologies; we have already seen 
how even the metropolitan crowd (especially in Paris) was an Oriental mystery, a 
howling universe reminiscent of the howling Arabs surrounding Western individuals. 
In the next chapter I will take a closer look at this affinity: representations of the 
crowd in Egypt were shaped by colonialism and therefore rehearsed Europe’s biases 
against its own crowds. However, at the outset, the descriptions of the crowd in 
Europe were also shaped by colonialism and placed the crowds in the same discursive 





Chapter 3: Colonial Revolving Doors 
 
Through most of the 19th century, and especially with the turn of the 19th/20th century 
and the British occupation of Egypt, a new conception of space and of the 
organization thereof was introduced to/imposed on Egypt. This discursive/ideological 
organization of space led to an imposition of what in the dominant European 
bourgeois ideologies were considered proper spaces: State institutions, the domestic, 
spaces of official work, to name a few; a veritable cultural imposition befitting 
Fanon’s conceptualization of the term. This organization of space, however, was 
already predicated on subsuming Europe’s racial others (and frequently more 
specifically the Muslim, the Arab, and the Turk) into what it perceived as improper 
and licentious. This chapter traces this movement of the discourse on the crowd (as an 
exemplary licentious space) between the colony and the metropole. This chapter, as 
well as the next, though more concerned (as far as its archive and empirical data go) 
with space and less with subjective traumas, explores the Fanonian trauma by way of 
space.  
But before proceeding with my analysis, I first need to explain: why the 
crowd? Why is the crowd useful as a term and a discursive category? Why is it being 
used as an exemplar of licentious spaces? And why am I choosing to read certain 
Arabic texts under the rubric of the discourse on the crowd, even as many of them had 
no specific or uniform term to denote the phenomenon Europe called the crowd? 
Establishing how the crowd as a term and a discursive and analytic category is useful 
for studying licentious spaces in Egypt will further help us construct the argument of 




Egyptian counterpart.  
 
Why	the	Crowd?	
Why the crowd and not the mob? For the purposes of this study, it is the crowd 
because this is the term that was deployed in the English sources, obviously, including 
the English translation of Gustave LeBon’s Psychologie des Foules, although in a 
number of secondary texts the terms crowd and mob readily collapse into one another. 
In LeBon’s book, the aggregate of people that are under scrutiny are not necessarily 
engaging in riots, destruction, and other kinds of behavior that would fall under the 
general definition of a mob.535 What LeBon presumed to study was the state of mind 
of people who aggregated in a collective, even before they engaged in riots, 
destruction, and mob-like activity; as far as LeBon was concerned, any aggregate of 
people had the tendency to riot, and any crowd potentially a mob.536 This 






















the classical works of English literature (including ones that would later become 
relevant to colonial and postcolonial Egypt as I will show throughout this chapter). 
This is the case, for example, in Wordsworth’s Prelude, where the crowd always 
carries a threat of chaos.537 The mob/riot potentiality, imminent within the crowd, is 
even more evident in Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities; the echoes of the 
footsteps of the London crowd, going about their own business, are enough reason for 
Lucie Manette, the representative of the bourgeois domestic and of Victorian 
femininity, to “shudder” 538; which also goes to show the opposition between the 
crowd and the proper spaces of domesticity.539 In an ensuing dialogue between Lucie 
Manette and Sydney Carton (who enjoyed a special kinship with the crowd as will be 
shown later in this chapter), the echo of the footsteps of the London crowd is decided 
to be an omen for a more ferocious crowd that is about to walk into their lives (i.e. the 
crowd of the French Revolution).540 This ferocious potentiality of the crowd is 
realized when the French Revolution takes place, and the Parisian crowd walks 
uninvited into the lives of the bourgeois characters of the novel. It is perhaps this 



















in Psychologie des Foules, hence the preferred use of the crowd as a translation over 
the mob. 
It is this unruly potentiality in the crowd that makes the crowd the primary 
object of analysis for this chapter. These potentialities can also be read on symbolic 
and epistemic levels; the unruliness of the crowd is evident not only in its wont to riot, 
but in its evasion of the State’s power to regiment spaces; it defies individuation as we 
saw in chapter 2, it threatens the domestic as we see in the example of A Tale of Two 
Cities (in a way, the tale of the uninvited march of the Parisian crowd into the lives of 
the members of Lucie Manette’s household), and it is inimical to work and to other 
proper forms of publics as we will see throughout this chapter and the next. The space 
the crowd occupies, comprises, and constitutes541 is thus an exemplary licentious 
space to the effect that it is neither the domestic nor the proper public, but rather a 
space that threatens both and defies the very dividing line between the domestic and 
the public. 
The	crowd	in	Arabic	
The question of why the crowd becomes more complex and contentious once we are 
dealing with Arabic discourse. Many of the late 19th century texts I choose to read as 
texts on the crowd did not have a term for this phenomenon. Instead, they commonly 
resorted to terms like al-‘awam (commoners), al-safalah/siflah (the lowly or base 
people), and al-ri‘a‘ (riffraff). Why, then, choose to read these texts as treatises on the 







First, I choose to read these texts as constituent parts of the discourse on the 
crowd because they share with their European counterparts the understanding of the 
crowd as the lower class/ lowly crowd (until LeBon revised the notion and posited 
that all crowds acted like their lowliest elements, regardless of their actual class or 
educational constitution). Second, I have already shown how in the writings of 
someone like al-Naqqash, we have the same notions of the loss of individuality into a 
howling and threatening collective that characterize the European discourse on the 
crowd, even in the absence of an Arabic term for the phenomenon. In other examples, 
however, we need pay attention to the similarities and differences between Arabic 
discourse and European discourse as well as the discursive formations that 
contributed to them. Al-Shidyaq, for example, did not adopt the discourse on the 
crowd in toto but engaged many of the discursive formations and bodies of 
knowledge that shaped the European discourse on the crowd (including, as I am about 
to show, discourses on criminality and criminology, as well as the pre-Nordau 
discourse on degeneration). It is important here to remember, however, that what is at 
stake for this chapter is not the crowd per se but licentious space more generally. 
While the crowd is treated throughout this study as constituting the quintessential 
licentious space, my analysis here will take the liberty to move from the crowd to 
other licentious spaces as they appear in discourse. 
Colonization	in	Real	Time:	Crowd	Discourse	in	Arabic	in	the	late	19th	Century		
Two authors who reproduced Western discourse on the crowd in Arabic as it was 
emerging in the West (and before the translation of A Tale of Two Cities or Le Bon’s 
writing of The Crowd) were Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq (especially in his reports on the 





crowd show how the emergence of a discourse on the crowd in Egypt, even if 
colonially defined, was almost coterminous with its emergence in Europe (a few days 
after the fact in the case of al-Shidyaq and two years after the fact in the case of al-
Naqqash). In the previous chapter we have introduced how al-Naqqash, throughout 
volume 5 of Misr lil Misriyyin, adopted, translated into Arabic, and introduced to an 
Egyptian audience, British (mis/pre)conceptions of the crowd in a way that mixed 
racial biases against the indigenous crowd with the individual-liberal fear of 
ambiguous collectives. In al-Naqqash’s representations as well as in British reports at 
the time, the proper Western spaces in which proper modern individuals were 
embodied (banks, churches, hospitals, and households) were opposed to the licentious 
and largely indigenous spaces of the crowd.542 Nothing more need be said about al-
Naqqash here but it is useful to remember the significance of Misr lil Misriyyin. It was 
one of the early incidences of the emergence of a discourse on the Egyptian crowd 
(that is, if we bracket the appearance of the masses in the historiography of al-Jabarti 
as belonging to a different discourse, and their appearance in Ottoman and Egyptian 
governmental documents prior to 1882 as not generative of an Egyptian discourse on 
the crowd, given how these documents were in Ottoman Turkish rather than Arabic, 
and were never intended for wide circulation). Furthermore, Misr lil Misriyyin seems 
to have constituted a significant landmark of the Egyptian cultural landscape, 












An earlier, and much more complex, encounter between an Egyptian 
readership and the phenomenon of the crowd took place through the reports of al-
Jawa’ib, the newspaper run by Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, on the Paris Commune. To 
better understand the emergence of an Arabic discourse on the crowd, its engagement 
with the emergent discourses in the West, and the complex workings of colonialism in 
transforming Arabic discourse (sometimes through local agency, as the case was with 
al-Shidyaq), a closer look at al-Jawa’ib’s reports on the Commune is necessary.  
 
The	Commune	in	Arabic:	the	Case	of	al-Jawa’ib		
Unlike al-Naqqash and his English sources, al-Shidyaq’s reports do not present a clear 
depiction of a collective wherein individualities are dissolved. This may tempt one to 
say that the theories and the set of representations that constituted the discourse on the 
crowd were still in formation in 1871 and that al-Naqqash, writing in 1882 (and later 
LeBon, writing in 1895), was deploying it after it had formed. While such reading is 
not entirely inaccurate, we must remember that the depiction of the crowd as a 
collective that subsumes and supersedes the individual was already present prior to 
1871; whether in Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities (1859) or even in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology (1807) (not to mention the early Greek foreshadowings thereof). The 
crowd as a dissolving collective, therefore, was already available as a rhetorical 
device. Al-Shidyaq, however, did not deploy it. 
Why then, in the absence of the motif of the crowd as a collective wherein 
individuals dissolve, do I treat al-Shidyaq’s reports on the Commune as partaking of 






the discourse on the crowd? Is it not enough to leave it at what it was in chapter 1; a 
discourse on the physics and metaphysics of chaos, on the disruption of the natural 
order of things, on the overturning (inqilab) of an upright (Platonic) hierarchy that 
otherwise functions to preserve order (rahah) both in its political and metaphysical 
senses? 
There are two reasons why I treat al-Shidyaq’s reports on the Commune as 
partaking of the discourse on the crowd. First, even in the Platonic origins of the 
ideology of an upright natural-political order, there is a fear of the crowd. The 
Platonic anxiety about overturning the political-natural hierarchical order is a fear that 
the mob will become the rulers. The Republic in a way is a polemic against Athenian 
direct democracy, in other words, mob rule.544 To use the words of J.S. McClelland, 
“Everything Plato has to say about democracy applies to the crowd, and everything 
Plato has to say about the crowd applies to democracy.”545 Although this is still not 
the crowd of the 19th century, the crowd that cancels individuality, that shapes urban 
landscapes, and that is a mass mediated phenomenon produced in discourse, Plato’s 
mob can be seen as a discursive formation that foreshadowed and was later used in 
the bodies of knowledge that produced the crowd in the 19th century. In fact, a close 
reading of the reports of al-Shidyaq on the Commune helps us to trace the mapping of 
Plato’s philosophy onto the 19th century emergent discourse on the crowd.  
The second reason I am treating al-Shidyaq’s reports as relating to the crowd 
is that these reports engaged with emergent bodies of knowledge and theories that, 








ways shaped the discourse on the crowd. These include theories of criminality, the 
nature of crime, crime psychology, and degeneration.546 
 
Remnants	of	Plato		
Platonic ideology is not unrelated to the 19th century discourse on the crowd. The very 
notion that crowds occupy a space of license can be traced to the Platonic hierarchy 
wherein the commoners, characterized by base and basic desires, need to be restrained 
through the higher faculties of the guardians and the auxiliaries.547 This Platonic 
concept re-emerged in Western theory on the crowd, especially in the aftermath of the 
Commune. This was especially the case with the writings of Hyppolite Taine, who 
viewed the crowds, and the revolutionary crowd more specifically, as a space where 
people escape from societal repression, which otherwise keeps them civilized.548 The 
same notions also re-emerged in al-Shidyaq’s writings on the Commune; al-Shidyaq, 
as shown in chapter 1, was not only fearful of how the rebels (al-‘usah) could 
overturn the upright order of things, but also how the commoners (al-‘awam) were 
prone to evil and to following their base desires. Allowing commoners to follow their 
desires (especially the desire to redistribute wealth) could lead, according to al-
Shidyaq, to the total dissolution (inhilal) of government.549 Al-Shidyaq’s writings 













repressing the commoners, their desires, and their proneness to evil. All this may be 
read into Plato’s original hierarchy  (and al-Shidyaq’s writings can hence be read as 
exemplary of the mapping of Platonic thought onto the 19th century discourse on the 
crowd and rebellion), but one thing al-Shidyaq adds is a fierce anti-socialist rhetoric. 
Many a time during the insurrection of the Commune, al-Shidyaq explicitly 
denounced the doctrine of musharakah  550 (lit. sharing; here al-Shidyaq used the term 
to mean socialism. Later al-Shidyaq would coin the term ishtirakiyyah from the same 
root. Ishtirakiyyah remains the Arabic standard word for socialism until our very 
day),551 which he characterized as al-fikr al-dhamim (roughly: the thought worthy of 
disparagement).552 Indeed, al-Shidyaq’s fear of the unleashing of the commoners was 
																																								 																			 	
550	For	example	in	his	editorial	dated	8	Muharram	1299,	29/3/1871,	al-Shidyaq	proclaims	“ ينإ	... دشأ نم
مھكلامأو مھلاومأ يف ءاینغلأا ةكراشم ىلع مھؤطاوت ةاتعلا ءلاؤھ ىلع نیركنملا”	(roughly:	“I	am	…	one	who	denounces	
most	the	collaborative	intent	of	these	extremists/transgressors	to	share	{using	the	term	musharakah}	
the	wealth	and	property	of	the	rich.”).	On	his	next	editorial	(12	Muharram	1288,	2/4/1871),	al-
Shidyaq	moves	from	denouncing	socialism	to	giving	counterinsurgency,	anti-socialist,	advice:	 " نأ يدنعو
 رھق ىلع اسنرف ةموكح دعاست لودلا عیمج نأ يضتقت ةسایسلا نأ ةفاخم مھكلامأ يف ءاینغلأا ةكراشم ينعأ بھذملا اذھ باحصأ



























a fear of socialism: it is the redistribution of wealth by the commoners in the case of 
revolutionary success that would lead to the total inhilal of government (as shown in 
chapter 1). Although the fear of the dissolution of individual distinction, which we 
encountered with al-Naqqash and Dickens, is still not evident in al-Shidyaq, there is 
clearly the fear of the collapse of social distinction, that the commoners (the 
crowd/the lower classes/the socialists) will do away with class distinction (thus 
turning everyone into members of the crowd/the lower classes/the commoners). This 
same fear was echoed again in the reports of al-Jawa’ib on the ‘Urabi revolt, in which 
‘Urabi was accused of attempting to confiscate and redistribute the wealth and 
property of the rich.553 
What al-Shidyaq was presenting to an Arabic readership, therefore, was a 
counterrevolutionary/anti-socialist message, with recourse to a Platonic/neo-Platonic 
ideology, which served to simultaneously support and cover the anti-socialist 
component.554 Platonic ideology on its own, however, was not enough: a mystifying 
upright order of things was not enough to sustain the status quo at a time when 
various bodies of knowledge, including bourgeois sciences, were emerging. These 
sciences themselves, however, sublated Platonic ideology and continued to serve the 
same counterrevolutionary role. Many of these sciences and bodies of knowledge 
coincided with the Commune, and thus provided abundant discursive material for 












knowledge and counterrevolutionary ideology can be mapped on the pages of al-
Jawa’ib. This was most notably the case with theories of crime and how they 
informed and were supported by the depiction of political activism as a crime and the 
revolutionary as essentially evil. 
 
The	Commune	and	the	Quintessence	of	Crime	
The emergence of the communard as a purely evil subject is anchored in, or 
references, a number of theories about the quintessence of crime, that emerged around 
or coincided with the Commune. The first is the theory of the criminal crowd, 
developed by Gabriel Tarde in response to the Commune, and later revised by 
LeBon.555 The second is the theory of the born criminal and the criminal-degenerate 
type, developed by Cesar Lombroso (a theory which he famously applied to the 


























Consistent with these theories, al-Shidyaq located crime within the very nature of the 
communards and thus produced them as inherently criminal and evil, not only by 
suggesting that commoners were created evil, but also by using terms like lafif min al 
fujjar wa al ashrar557(roughly: a bunch of wanton evildoers), shayatin al 
ins558(human devils/the Satans of humankind), and al-ashrar, bal al shayatin (villains, 
nay devils/demons).559 We see al-Shidyaq bringing two disparate elements here: 
classical Islamic terminology along with the 19th century discourse on the inherent 
evil nature of the criminal. The term shayatin al ins, for example, comes directly from 
the Qur’an. In its original Qur’anic invocation, it denotes how certain human beings 
can deceive or tempt their fellow humans to commit sins the same way devils do. Al-
Shidyaq, however, did not use the term in the context of the dissemination of 
revolutionary propaganda— which would have been consistent with its meaning in its 
original Qur'anic context. On the contrary, he used it in the context of claiming that 
the crimes of the communards were never matched by any other humans. The human-
devil is thus translocated from a discourse on temptation (which allows for both good 
and evil to coexist within human nature, or allows for the corruption of good human 
nature through satanic and human temptation) to a discourse on the inherent evil 
nature of criminals and political activists. While belonging to the Qur’anic lexicon, 
the term shayatin al-ins in al-Shidyaq works in a manner consistent with, perhaps 
even as a reference to, a 19th century Western debate on crime, criminology, and the 











evil nature of the criminal (and the political activist/anarchist as a political criminal) – 
the same debate that coincided with, crystallized around, and gained momentum after 
the Commune and as a result of it. 
 
Eschewing	Motives:	The	Commune	and	Hysterical	Contagion	
By producing them as pure evil and by referring their rebellion to their evil nature, al-
Shidyaq foreclosed any possibility of conscious motivations (save the evil motivations 
to plunder and burn). Here al-Shidyaq was once again plugging into one of the major 
debates in Western social thought of the time, perhaps the debate around which the 
whole discipline of criminology evolved, namely the question of the crime without a 
motive. The question of motive posed a paradox to 19th century legal theory: if there 
were an explainable motive, it would mean that the criminal had had a reason to 
commit the crime, which puts the crime’s punishability into question. On the other 
hand, if the crime had no motive at all, then there would be no reason to be examined, 
no account to be given, no rational subject to be held accountable and punished for the 
crime, and once again the machinery of justice and punishment would be in a fix. In a 
way, the whole question of criminology, of seeking crime in the nature of the 
criminal, was born out of, or at least tethered to, this paradox.560 With the Commune, 
nevertheless, the search for motive was a little bit more complicated, or perhaps 













motives of the insurrectionary crowd or legitimize socialism as a valid rational and 
political motive.  The Standard reporter captured this logic in his triumphant 
denunciation of the Commune: “There has not been a political idea from the 
beginning to the end of this insurrection. It was a purely Socialist movement.”561 The 
same logic was observed with how the fire of Paris was attributed to the communards 
and deprived of any symbolic or strategic purpose, thus contributing to the referral of 
mass action to insanity and the reduction of the crowd to their lowest impulses and 
basest desires (as shown in Chapter 1). 
The reports by al-Shidyaq are symptomatic of the same paradox between the 
existence of motive and lack thereof. From the very beginning, al-Shidyaq gives the 
communards a very clear motive: they want to redistribute the wealth of the rich 
amongst themselves.562 This motive, however, is continually obfuscated through al-
Shidyaq’s insistence on the pure evilness of the communards (and again this 
obfuscation of motives reaches its peak with the depiction of the incendiaries, not 
only did they burn Paris down out of pure evil and insanity, but then they moved to 
other cities to set them afire).563 Al-Shidyaq’s obfuscation of motives, including the 
very motives suggested in his own earlier reports, is evident at his bafflement at the 
news that shaghab (riot) might spread to England: “ نم زیلكنلإا ةآر يذلا ام يرعش تیل ایف
مھبغش نم ىشخی راص ىتح ةیروھمجلا ةموكحلا حلاص. ”564 After wondering what good the 











expresses his fear that the fitnah of Paris would spread, but it would spread in the 
form of a fasad (corruption, rot). In Chapter 1, we have explored how fasad, and the 
passages in which al-Shidyaq warns against the spread of the fasad of revolution, 
make an association between sickness/rot on the one side and revolt/the revolutionary 
crowd on the other. Related to this trope of sickness is the spread of revolutionary 
ideas as contagion. As revolution, the crowd, and especially the revolutionary crowd 
are deprived of motive or rationality, the spread of ideas through rational intercourse 
is precluded; the only way for these ideas to spread is through (hysterical) 
contagion.565 This understanding of the spread of revolutionary ideas among the 
crowd in the form of contagion, which would be later taken up by Taine and later 
LeBon (and would be sublated by Freud into a theory of identification and bondage in 
Group Psychology), constituted one of the salient features of the anti-Commune 
propaganda. In his famous polemic against the Commune, Francisque Sarcey referred 
























through his depiction of the spread of revolutionary ideas despite their lack of logic, 
and through his usage of terms like fasad and ‘adwa567 (lit. contagion).  
Crowd	Inebriation		
To the motifs of irrationality/insanity and the hysterical spread of revolutionary ideas 
through contagion, al-Shidyaq added the trope of drunkenness. The irrationality and 
the base lusts that motivate the revolutionary crowd are explicitly likened by al-
Shidyaq to intoxication, and the gunfire of the government to the sobering cure: 
“ ىلع عفادملا نارین بصت نأ دعب لاإ ھنم نوقیفی لاف مھركسأ دق بلسلاو بھنلا بح نأ رھاظلاف
مھسوؤر.”568(Also noticeable here is how the gunfire of the forces of order is not a 
cause of damage but rather the cure, consistent with our argument on the threshold of 
fire in Chapter 1).  
We have come full circle, therefore, to the now familiar trope of the 
licentious crowd. The insanity of the crowd and their lowly lusts (for stealing and 
pillage in the previous quote) are captured in the metaphor of intoxication. This 
metaphor is made possible through the motif of the drunken crowd in 19th century 
literature. This motif sometimes worked metaphorically, as in the previous quote: 
regardless of whether the members of the crowd were in fact sober or drunk, their 
behavior, as a group, is one of intoxication and inebriation. The same motif 
sometimes worked literally: the crowd consists of drunkards, and revolutionary chaos 
allows for drunkards to take their bacchanals (or orgies) to the streets. This is most 
evident in the following passage, in which al-Shidyaq referenced the Standard’s 







أر ھنأ سیراب يف میقملا دردناتسلا بتاك ىكحى  دنع نیفئاط اوناكو نیسمخلا وحن ةعامج ةلیل تاذ
مھو لیتسابلا ىراكس   ةطینرب ھبشت ةطینرب ھسأر ىلع ناك نم مھنموءاسنلا ينغی ناك نم مھنمو ھقھقی رخآو
صقری رخآو569  
In this quote a number of familiar themes are invoked; first we are dealing 
with a large number of people, about fifty, who are roaming the Bastille. We know 
therefore, from the beginning, that we are dealing with a large moving collective: a 
crowd. They are drunk, thus invoking the motif of the drunken masses. Some of them 
wore a cap similar to the one worn by women; it is not a wild guess to assume this 
was the Phrygian cap. In addition to this cap’s oblique references to castration, the 
orgy, and the goddess Cybele, the very statement that some of the members of the 
crowd were wearing caps that “resemble women’s caps” serves to gender the crowd 
in ways we have been familiar with through Chapters 1 and 2. It is important however 
to remember that al-Shidyaq only gendered the Commune sparingly, as explained in 
Chapter 1; revolutionary chaos, insanity, and evil were gender neutral in most of al-
Shidyaq’s depictions, but the gendering appears, if unwittingly, when translating from 
the Standard. The licentious representations (which one could also read as effeminate) 
continue: they were singing, giggling, and dancing (one may be left to wonder here 
whether they also engaged in “full-fledged sexual relations” like Zakariyya’s Tahrir, 
and as the Standard and other counterrevolutionary outlets repeatedly suggested).  
Colonial	Turns	
Whereas I am not suggesting here any comprehensive continuity between al-






of continuities and discontinuities), the above account shows how the Commune and 
the debates that surrounded or coincided with it shaped some of the discursive tools, 
strategies, and bodies of knowledge that later came to shape the 20th and 21st 
centuries’ counterrevolutionary discourse. The writings of al-Shidyaq, were part of 
this cultural milieu, and therefore acted as an agent of transforming Arabic discourse 
along Western, bourgeois, counterrevolutionary, and colonial lines, rendering it 
receptive to the themes of the licentious crowd. 
It is important, however, not to reduce al-Shidyaq’s intellectual career to a mere 
echo of these theories. Chronologically, his writings predated Taine, Tarde, and 
Lombroso (let alone LeBon). In addition, while he was referencing the debates that 
were later consolidated into theory by these theorists, his ability to code these debates 
in Islamic terminology suggests that what he was doing was beyond providing a mere 
echo. It is also important, on the other hand, not to credit al-Shidyaq with arriving at 
these theories before European theorists, but to locate his writings within the network 
of bourgeois and colonial knowledge that emerged in 19th century North-Western 
Europe and its colonies and found a moment of articulation and support in the 
Commune and its defeat. Indeed, al-Shidyaq was a product of the relations of 
knowledge, production, and circulation that produced these discourses and ideologies 
(or, to put it in cliché terms, he was a man of his time). One may note here how 
financial relations privileged the circulation of counterrevolutionary notions: more 
specifically, they privileged the circulation of newspapers like the Standard and the 
Gaulois with their fierce anti-Commune rhetoric (as opposed, for example, to 
newspapers like La Sociale and Le Père Duchesne, which were not backed by 
sufficient capital to reach Istanbul and the Arabic reading world). Part of this 




relations nor their author, but merely a subject of the ideologies and power relations 
of the time, and his writings their effect. Al-Shidyaq’s partaking of these discourses 
was nevertheless unique in two opposing ways. The rich engagement al-Shidyaq 
showed towards Western theories and intellectual trends, along with a creative 
invocation of the Islamic lexicon reveals a certain (limited) agency over discourse (in 
the Foucauldian sense wherein one may be able to manipulate power relations but not 
exit the matrix that comprises them).  And while there are incidents where al-
Shidyaq’s writings aimed to reverse colonial notions and colonial hierarchies,570 al-
Shidyaq’s agency was, as I am about to show, largely colonial.  
Let us first examine the colonial transformation of discourse in the hands of 
al-Shidyaq. Despite al-Shidyaq’s usage of classical Arabic terms with Islamic 
resonance, he used them in ways that transformed their meaning along colonial lines. 
In that sense, his terms sublate the original Arabic terms in ways congruent with 
European colonial modernity. Al-Shidyaq was clearly turning terms from the Islamic 
and classical Arabic lexicon into signifiers of European bourgeois discursive 
formations: terms like ‘awam and shayatin al-ins are dislocated from their earlier 
significations and contexts (or from the language games to which they belonged, if we 
are to borrow a Wittgensteinian term) and are transformed into signifiers of the 
revolutionary classes and elements as they feature in European bourgeois and 
counterrevolutionary fears. The transformation of discourse and its political 
application along colonial lines is further evident in al-Shidyaq’s use of the term 
fitnah. The term, which can be translated, depending on the context, as sedition, strife, 






Many verses of the Qur’an and reported utterances by the Prophet warn against fitnah, 
be it political and social strife, or personal temptation by earthly pleasures, by the 
devil, or by other human beings. Despite its rich range of referents, the term fitnah 
does not encompass the wide variety of understandings of political strife and violence 
present in classical Islamic jurisprudence and historiography; while battles of what 
became known in Western historiography as the first Islamic Civil War have been 
characterized in Sunni Islamic historiography as al-fitnah al-kubra, the revolt of al-
Husayn and the various shi‘a and khawarij571 revolts, as well as the Abbasid takeover 
of power from the Umayyads, were not commonly characterized as fitnah. In the mid-
19th century another author responsible for transforming Arabic and Islamic terms 
along colonial lines, Rifa‘ah Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi (the student of the prominent Azhari 
collaborator with the French occupation forces, Hasan al-‘Attar )572 used the term 
fitnah to signify any form of political revolt,573 thus fixing political revolt as seditious, 
malicious, and anti-Islamic, while erasing other Arabic/Islamic terms that could refer 
to revolt with more ambiguity or richer valence. Perhaps al-Tahtawi, who was a mere 
mu’adhdhin (someone who performs the call to prayer) before he rose to fame 
through his inferiority-complex-infused writings on Paris, had been ignorant of the 












the belle-lettrist Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq.574 Regardless, however, of their intentions, 
fixing political revolt as fitnah at the hands of al-Tahtawi and al-Shidyaq served not 
only counterrevolutionary purposes, but also colonialist and imperialist ones, as even 
anti-colonial revolts came to be denounced as fitnah (contrary to the Islamic religious 
discourse from which the term fitnah is borrowed, and whereby rising against an 
invader would be a religious duty). In the reports of al-Jawa’ib during the Commune, 
the term fitnah was used not only in reference to the events in Paris (which may have 
appeared to an observer with no stakes in what had been going on as a mere fitnah) 
but also in reference to the simultaneous uprising in Algeria.575Al-Shidyaq therefore 
instrumentalized the term fitnah, along with its religious overtones, for a colonial 
project, thus exposing the interconnectedness of the colonial discursive transformation 
with the imperial political agenda. Al-Shidyaq does not stop at denouncing the anti-
colonial uprising as fitnah, but goes on to give reason after reason for the Algerians 
not to rebel against colonial authorities, and to advise the people of Algeria to “fight 
the French through pleas not weapons.”576 The rationale al-Shidyaq provides for such 





















those who see in the Commune a chance to rebel against colonial yoke will be made 
to pay the price later. Behind the parity with which al-Shidyaq coats his language, we 
can see here a sense of inferiority, an a priori acceptance of defeat, let alone a stench 
of collaborationism.  
Al-Shidyaq therefore combines a discourse on fitnah (bastardized from its 
Islamic origins) with a discourse on docility-as-rationality. The uprising against the 
French is both fitnah and an irrational act that defies sober calculations. The same 
rationale will later be used by his son, Salim Faris al-Shidyaq, through the same outlet 
(and most probably under the tutelage of Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq himself) along with 
a number of pro-colonial Alexandria- and Beirut-based newspapers, to denounce the 
‘Urabi revolt. For example, an article titled “Junun ‘Urabi” (‘Urabi’s insanity) was 
published by the Alexandria based al-I‘tidal577 and republished by a number of 
newspapers including al-Jawa’ib.578 The only signs of ‘Urabi’s insanity presented by 
this article, nevertheless, are his disobedience to the rulers (the viceroy of Egypt and 
the Ottoman Sultan) and his alleged delusions that he could defeat the British army. 
Once again we see rationality being cast alongside political authority and especially 
colonial power, and irrationality, to the extent of insanity, on the side of the 
insurrectionary crowd (as the case was with the communards) and on the side of those 
who think they can defeat the colonizers (as the case was with the Algerians, worthy 












his advice to the Algerians, this article combines a discourse on docility-as-rationality 
with Islamic coding. The Islamic appeal is made through the appeal to the figure of 
the ‘Commander if the faithful’ (i.e. The caliph, in other words the Ottoman Sultan 
‘Abd al- Hamid), ‘Urabi’s disobedience to whom is tantamount to a transgression 
against Islam. Yet the sole act of disobedience perpetrated by ‘Urabi, as per the 
article, was his insistence on fortifying Alexandrian shores against the invading army, 
when the Khedive and the Sultan had commanded otherwise. The conception of 
docility the article is promoting, despite its Islamic garb, is novel. In any school of 
Islamic jurisprudence, as well as in the thought of ‘Urabi and his comrades, taking up 
means to defend the city against an occupying army is a religious duty, and failing to 
do so is to fall short on one of the commandments of Islam.579 Al-I‘tidal and al-
Jawa’ib along with partaking of a discourse on docility qua sanity, were engaging in 
an effort to transform Islamic discourse in the service of colonial powers, and thus 
code resistance to the occupation as disobedience to the caliph, while erasing the 
militant tradition of Islam that would make resistance a duty.  
This transformation was not only taking place on epistemic levels, it was also 
taking place at the very practical level of mobilizing this discourse to dissuade the 
public from resisting colonialism, turning resistance into an irrational act, an act of 
insanity, that, according to the transformed discourse, is depicted as rebellious against 
the Caliphate and against Islam itself. Al-Shidyaq Sr. and Jr. were therefore 
facilitating in their writings and their deployment of European discourses on the 









colonization of Arab/Muslim lands. Al-Shidyaq Jr.’s celebratory note after the British 
occupation of Cairo leaves little doubt as to where his sympathies lay:  
 ّرملا هذھ ةدراولا تافارغلتلا عیمج ّیرصملا ةلأسملا نأب انرشبت ... ة متأو لاح نسحأ ىلع تھتنا دق ة
 ّدع يف اولشف يبارع ركاسع عیمج نإف ؛لاونم عیمج اوكرت نأ دعب تتشم لك اوتتشتو اومزھناو ... عقاوم ة
م لب تاماكحتسلااو لحاوسلا عیمج اوطبضی نأ زیلكنلاا ركاسعل رسیتف ... لاتقلا نادیم يف مھرئاخذو مھعفاد
. مھتنینأمطو مھتئیھ ىلع ةرھاقلا اضیأ اوأوبت580  
 
These sympathies were in no way innocent. They come at a time when Ahmad Faris 
al-Shidyaq was believed to have been on British payroll,581 a fact he cared little to 
deny. When confronted by a French Count about the allegations of his being a British 


























Shidyaq had already rendered services to British imperialism by using his newspaper 
to pacify Indian Muslims under British colonial rule. Muhammad ‘Abduh (who was 
al-Shidyaq’s contemporary, and who would later play his share in serving British 
imperialism) went as far as accusing al-Shidyaq of serving English interests for 
twenty years.583 According to ‘Abduh, al-Shidyaq mainly served British interests by 
masking them as the interests of the Ottoman sultanate/caliphate;584 this is in a way 
what we see him doing in his reports on the ‘Urabi revolt, coding imperialism in 
Islamic terms, and coding the surrender to British imperial expansion in terms of 
obedience to the Caliph. In fact al-Jawa’ib’s masking of British interests as Ottoman 
served the fatal blow to the ‘Urabi revolt. Perhaps the last service al-Jawa’ib rendered 
to the British in that context was publishing the Ottoman decree declaring ‘Urabi a 
rebel, which weakened ‘Urabi’s morale and swayed his public support.585 In that 
regard, al-Jawa’ib was complicit in the military and institutional colonization of 
Egypt, as much as it was responsible for the colonization of Arabic discourse.  
 
Projecting	the	Metropole:	‘Urabi	and	the	Commune	through	Colonial	Channels		
















Now we can posit that the role of al-Jawa’ib was, beyond any doubt, to function as a 
colonial pathway. Al-Jawa’ib sought successfully to transform extant Arabic 
discourses along colonial lines and to instrumentalize this transformed discourse to 
facilitate military colonization. Through this colonial pathway (and others), European 
bourgeois bodies of knowledge and counterrevolutionary discourses (which happened 
to coincide and crystallize around the Paris Commune) infiltrated Arabic discourses 
and were directed against Arab insurrectionary and anti-colonial actors. More 
specifically, through this channel, the Commune was mapped onto the ‘Urabi revolt; 
it is no coincidence that the above analysis started with the former and ended with the 
latter. In fact, the discourse devised against the Commune was used, mutatis 
mutandis, by al-Jawa'ib and other media outlets, against the ‘Urabi revolt. The libel 
of socialism, (understandably) a staple of the anti-Commune discourse, was used in 
the same manner against ‘Urabi.586 The same goes for the allegations of incendiarism, 
as already shown in Chapter 1. The same presumption that the fire of order is precise 
and the fire of the crowd is contagious, chaotic, and destructive marked both events. 
In its coverage of the ‘Urabi revolt, al-Jawa’ib drew a picture of a kerosene 
conspiracy very similar to the one that was drawn (by European newspapers and 
copied by al-Jawa’ib) for the fire of the Commune, down to using the same term, zayt 
al-hajar (petroleum, lit. rock oil or fossil oil), for the incendiary material allegedly 
used by the conspirators.587 In both cases arson is attributed to crowd-born(e) insanity: 
we see ‘Urabi rousing the riffraff to start the fire, and we see him and one of his 







defense that the city caught fire because of British bombardment dismissed as childish 
insanity (as presented in Chapter 1).  
While using the same representations of insanity that were used against the 
Communards, al-Shidyaq (Jr.) was unable to use the same representations of pure 
evil. Perhaps this is due to the fact that al-Shidyaq, even while playing a pro-colonial 
role, could not depict to a predominantly Arab-Muslim readership their compatriots 
who were engaged in an anti-colonial struggle against a foreign and non-Muslim 
empire as pure evil. Instead of mapping the communards’ pure evil onto the ‘Urabists, 
al-Jawa’ib brought in actual communards to serve this mapping; it alleged that the 
burning of Alexandria was the work of former communards and simultaneously 
blamed ‘Urabi for “sullying his ranks with the socialists who burnt Paris” and the 
former communards for using the ‘Urabi regime as a tool for realizing their 
“diabolical intentions.”588 After enumerating the transgressions of ‘Urabi (including 
the burning of Alexandria), al-Shidyaq concluded: “and as if all this were not enough, 
he sullied his ranks with the French socialists who burnt the city of Paris in 1871 and 
were thus expelled, for those evil-doers/bandits [ashqiya’],589 after being banished 
from all the corners of the earth, found no outlet for their diabolic intents other than 
the ‘Urabi government.”590 These ‘Urabist communards literalized the mapping of the 
Parisian insurrectionary crowd, of the Paris Commune, onto the ‘Urabi revolt, and the 












Al-Jawa’ib was not the only Arabic newspaper that drew explicit similarities 
between the Commune and the ‘Urabi revolt. Another newspaper that followed its 
lead was the Egyptian al-Watan. A staunch supporter of ‘Urabi during his rise, al-
Watan maintained the same staunchness in denouncing ‘Urabi during his downfall. In 
addition to using the socialist libel (with its possible oblique reference to the 
Commune) against ‘Urabi,591al-Watan made a number of explicit associations 
between ‘Urabi and the communards; its denunciation opened with an explicit 
reference to Parisian revolutionary terror (an image that could have come from 
representations of the Commune or the Reign of Terror).592 As if to apologize for their 
earlier support for ‘Urabi, they accused him of intimidating everyone into supporting 
him “just like the revolutionaries of Paris” who prosecuted and persecuted their 
adversaries and “slaughtered” anyone who showed any kind of disagreement with 
them (even by merely refusing to wear their uniforms, emblems, and Phrygian caps):  
 مھبرشم مومس نم برشی مل نم وأ تازازح ھنم مھرودص يف ناك نم لك ىلع ضبقلا نوقلی اوناكو
 سبلی ملو مھیزب أیزتی مل نم نوحبذی اوناك نیذلا سیراب ةروث لھأ لثمك مھلثم ناكف مھبھذم عابتاب رھاظتی ملو
یملاعلا بر اوقتی ملو نیدلاو لقعلا اوذبنف مھتملاع ھسأر ىلع عضی ملو مھتمس.ن593  
One page later, al-Watan moved to a yet more direct reference to the Paris Commune.  
















Ibrahim Pasha and the Lions of Qasr al-Nil bridge is comparable, according to al-
Watan, to how the communards took down the statue of Napoleon (most probably in 
reference to the Vendôme Column) “and other monuments that are considered historic 
masterpieces.” It is as if “‘Urabi and his transgressive/tyrannical (taghi) party have 
not learnt from history except emulating the mongers of grave discords (ahl al-fitan 
al-wakhimah) and their disparaged acts.”594 The decision to take down the statues was 
attributed by al-Watan not only to revolutionary emulation but also to religious 
fanaticism: people who posed as (religious) scholars, according to al-Watan, had 
advised ‘Urabi that he would not to win if he did not take down the statues. This was 
one of many incidents in which revolutionary terror and Islamic fanaticism were 
associated with one another. 
The ‘Urabist transgressions, according to al-Watan, came not only from a 
place of revolutionary emulation and Islamic fanaticism, but also from a place of 
primitive savagery: what they did was not even surpassed by the most savage of 
Barbarians (awhash al-umam al-mutabarbirah).595 Perhaps this betrays how both 
revolution and religious fanaticism, or revolution and Islam, were understood to 
belong together in a stage of savage primitivity. We are back to the Social Darwinism 
of the metaphysics of chaos, of the crowd and the political disorder they create as 
regression, degeneration even, from the path of civilization and evolution. By 
associating the ‘Urabi revolt with savage primitivity al-Watan was following the lead 
of European observers who thought of the crowds and their rule in terms of regression 
and degeneration, and who found in the ‘Urabi, or ‘Arabi, revolt a suitable savage and 







comparing the ‘Urabi revolt to the Commune, al-Jawa’ib and al-Watan were 
following the same trend evident in European newspapers (especially the Gazette de 
France and the Standard). A closer look at these newspapers does not only reveal the 
European biases echoed by al-Jawa’ib and al-Watan, but more importantly reveals 
the circularity of mobility between the colony and the metropole, of the discourse that 
produces the crowd.  
 
1882:	Paris	in	the	Orient	and	the	Commune	au	Caire	
Under the set of cultural impositions described above, the events of Egypt in 1881-
1882 were juxtaposed, by European observers and their Arab clients, to earlier 
insurrectionary moments in the European metropolises, especially Paris. Egypt at that 
point in time fell at the intersection of a number of colonial fantasies/imaginaries: a 
target for Orientalist fantasies and colonial policies (including an impending military 
occupation), and an African Ottoman domain (perhaps the position Egypt occupied in 
the Western imaginary was exemplified by the description of the Egyptian crowd in 
British reports as consisting of Arabs, Upper Egyptians or “Saidis”, Berbers i.e. 
Nubians, and negroes, which we encountered in the previous chapter). The Egypt  of 
1881-1882 was therefore a space that represented to Europe an intersection of its 
others, and therefore a convenient space to which the savagery of its own crowds 
could be projected. This projection also allowed European and pro-European observes 
to understand the events through a Western frame of reference; if the Orient, 
especially at times of insurrection, is anarchic and escapes meaning, then it can only 




was evident, for example, in how the Standard used terms like anarchy596 and 
incendiarism,597 in its coverage of the events; both these terms belonged to the anti-
Commune lexicon and could be read as an indirect reference to the Commune. Less 
oblique was the Standard’s reference to the French Revolution: many a time the 
situation was explicitly described as a “Reign of Terror.”598 In addition the Standard 
English newspaper often used the French term émeute in reference to the events in 
Cairo and Alexandria, perhaps to suggest that there is something particularly French, 
resonating with recent episodes of French history, in the revolt.599 The reference to the 
Commune, nonetheless, was made more explicitly and abundantly by the French 
Royalist mouthpiece, the Gazette de France.  
Describing the ‘Urabist ascent to power, the Gazette referred to the situation 


























comparison of Ahmad ‘Urabi (or Arabi) to Léon Gambetta601 and of the events in 
Egypt to the revolutionary moment preceding the Commune (as seen in Chapter 1). 
After comparing the ‘Urabi government to Gambetta’s, the Gazette concluded in an 
equally dramatic tone – which logically and chronologically anticipates the Commune 
au Caire:  “C’est exactement la reproduction de la dictature de 1870.”602 In both 
articles, in addition to comparing the Commune, the revolutionary upheaval and 
democratic-republican buildup that preceded it, and any hint of democracy or 
republicanism to the ‘Urabi revolt, the Gazette builds ‘Arabi as a racialized, 
quintessentially Arab/savage figure (as shown in Chapter 1) and compares him to 
Gambetta (dubbed as Bey, to further highlight his similarity to Arabi) and to the 
Commune leader Louis Delescluze (dubbed by the Gazette as Pacha).   
This mapping of Europe’s revolutionary crowd onto Egypt’s and the cultural 
imposition of Europe’s counterrevolutionary conceptions of crowd and revolution on 
Egypt continued beyond the Commune and the ‘Urabi revolt. Before we return to the 
Commune and ‘Urabi in order to examine the other side of the colonial revolving 
door, we need to examine how Egyptians came to understand their own crowds 
through European counterrevolutionary terms, indeed how European 
counterrevolution became an Egyptian ideology.  
















Examples from the writings of al-Shidyaq and al-Naqqash and anti-‘Urabi 
newspaper reports by al-Watan have already given us an idea of how this cultural 
imposition started, yet an important episode which our analysis cannot ignore is the 
early 20th centrury. By the beginning of the 20th century a discourse on the crowd 
began to emerge among Egyptians (this is the time, after all, when both A Tale of Two 
Cities and The Crowd were translated), but even then, and even until our very day no 
term survives as the sole signifier and the accepted translation for the crowd. In his 
translation of LeBon’s text, Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul used the term jama‘ah/jama‘at 
(which I treat as an effort of colonial transformation, transforming jama‘ah from an 
exalted to a repudiated term). This term did not survive and was replaced by a 
plethora of terms, including al-jamahir (commonly translated as the public or the 
masses) and al-malayin (literally the millions), two terms that were classically 
invoked to exalt rather than abnegate the masses. This faltering between terms, and 
between traditions that abnegate the crowd and traditions that valorize them, can be 
seen to represent the limitedness of the success of the imposition of the Western 
division of space and with it the Western discourse on the crowd and the other 
licentious spaces, a sign of contention between the dominance of a colonial discourse 
(along with a colonial definition and organization of space) and the failure thereof. 
Beginning with the 1882 British occupation of Egypt and through the following few 
decades, Britain was engaged in a process of transforming Egyptian bureaucracy, 
Egyptian institutions, and the Egyptian cultural and social landscape. This also meant 
that the set of biases, which produced the crowd as abnegated, racially other, and 
savage, and privileged the individual, the family, and other modern/Christian 
institutions over the crowd, were introduced to the Egyptian political and cultural 




which the English abnegation of the crowd and the indigenous population was 
introduced to Egyptian readership). A colonial redistribution of space, or of the 
representation thereof, indeed of space in ideology, was in effect. This study will not 
be able to trace the changes of laws pertaining to public space, or the novel urban 
planning policies introduced by the English (or by the technical vanguard of 
colonization a few decades before the occupation).603 Instead, I will address the 
ideological aspect of this transformation/reorganization that can be traced in the 
Egyptian afterlife of the two texts that I have so far dealt with as paradigmatic 19th 
century European texts on the crowd – namely LeBon’s The Crowd and Dickens’ A 
Tale of Two Cities. The former was translated in 1909 by Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul, and 
the latter in 1912 by Muhammad al-Siba‘i (who also translated Carlyle’s The French 
Revolution). Both the translation of The Crowd and that of A Tale of Two Cities, as 
well as the careers of their respective translators, were enmeshed in the colonial 
relations that brought these texts, and their underlying ideological biases, to Egypt in 




Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul was himself a colonial official. He was one of the judges 
who presided over the notorious Dinshway tribunal which, in 1906, issued harsh 
sentences, including five executions by hanging, for Egyptian peasants accused of 






proof) to look at the harsh sentences issued by the tribunal for the peasants as 
anchored in the new redistribution of space that privileges the urban and the urbanite 
and repudiates the rural and peasant,604 and thus as part of an effort to erase non-
modern, non-urban, improper indigenous spaces. This is congruent with the elitist 
ideology of LeBon, but also with the racialist and racist biases underlying LeBon’s 
text and at work in its Arabic translation.  
Zaghlul’s translation of The Crowd was titled Ruh al-Ijtima‘. To denote the 
crowd, he used the Arabic term jama‘ah and its plural, jama‘at. The use of the 
term jama‘ah is indexical of a transformation of local discourses to accommodate 
colonial concepts. Previously al-Jama‘ah was a normative concept, representing the 
consensus of the Muslim ummah. All of a sudden al-Jama‘ah became something to 
look down upon. It became LeBon’s crowd, worthy of denunciation and contempt. 
This transformation indexes not only a change in meaning nor a turning away from 
Islamic concepts to a European elitism, but furthermore the adoption of the same 
Social Darwinist notions that were used to colonize Egypt; let us not forget how 
LeBon referred the crowds to the discursive civilizational category of Europe’s racial 
others, including the Arabs- a point I addressed repeatedly and will revisit throughout 
this chapter.  Zaghlul’s usage of the term jama‘ah to translate the crowd thus affirms 
LeBon’s civilizational mapping, as if to signal to his Arabic readership that their 
earlier sense of community and polity (the jama‘ah on which the legitimacy of the 
caliphate is predicated) is none other than the abnegated crowd. This and other 








adversaries,605were thus part of the ideological campaign to transform along colonial 
lines the conception of space, and with it the conception of the self, in 
modern/colonial Egypt.606 
The Egyptian afterlife of Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities is not much 
different. A Tale of Two Cities, which I have so far been using as emblematic of 
Victorian literature on the crowd, was the first of Dickens’ novels to be translated into 
Arabic. Since then it has enjoyed a central privileged position in Egyptian public 
culture.607 In addition to being a widely read, debated, and referenced text in Egypt, it 
also served as an integral part of the Egyptian official public school curriculum (itself 
modeled on the British school system), and film versions of the novel were frequently 
broadcast by Egyptian state television. It was also reportedly on Jamal ‘Abd al-
Nasir’s list of favorite books608and the reason why he was reluctant to use 























If the Tale showed some ambiguity towards the crowd and their cause (up 
until they resorted to terror, a nuance Nasir seems to have understood well), al-
Siba‘i’s preface to the Arabic translation would efface this ambiguity and highlight 
the anti-crowd, counterrevolutionary message of the novel. The French Revolution, in 
al-Siba‘i’s description, becomes:  
 لضعاو اھررش راطو اھرش لحفتساو اھقتف عستاو اھبطخ لجو اھرمأ مظع يتلا ةروثلا اھؤاد
اھؤاودزعو610  
The Revolution, therefore, is a breach, a cause of evil, an uncontrollable 
spark, and a sickness with no medicine. Later on the same page, al-Siba‘i describes 
the events of the Revolution as ahwal (roughly, horrors/terrors, in Zaghlul’s 
translation of LeBon, ahwal’s singular, hawl, is used as a translation for “the Terror”) 
and faza’i‘(roughly atrocities, here used also to denote terror. The reign of terror is 
referred to as ‘ahd al faza’i‘- also translatable as the era of atrocities). The members 
of the Revolutionary Convention are described as ةكنح لاو مھل ریبدت لا رارغأ لاجر611  
(roughly: novice men/ingénues with no resourcefulness or experience), a description 
that invokes, in addition to the infantile/pubescent (they are men, but they are novice 
men/ingénues) nature of the Terror/crowd-rule, the hierarchical order of things and its 
overturning, its inqilab, in revolutionary times and when crowds rule; ingénues who 
themselves need guidance now have a say in government under revolutionary 








as ابولق سانلا ظلغأ رییبسبورو نوتنادو حافسلا تارام612  (Marat the cutthroat and Danton and 
Robespierre, the most coarse/cruel of heart among men). Then, when moving to the 
depiction of the Reign of Terror (which allegedly turned France into one big 
massacre, according to al-Siba‘i), Robespierre is described as a bloodthirsty 
monster613 always howling for more blood even as the gore of his victims is still 
dripping from his mouth: 
و رھش ةدم يف حبذ دقلف ىمظع ةحبذم اسنرف تحبصأ ھیفو "عئاظفلا دھع" ىمسملا وھ اذھو فصن
1400 لغ مھؤامد فشت ملو ریسأ لیىلتقلا عیجنب بضخم ھمفو يرلا بلطی يوعی ناكف رییبسبور.614  
We can therefore begin to see the role The Crowd and the Tale helped introduce the 
Carlylean/LeBonian trend of abnegating the crowd into an Egyptian cultural sphere 
(concomitant with the role they played in their original European milieu). More 
importantly, we see how the two translations and the careers of the translators served 
the cultural imposition of colonial notions and biases (especially given the 
asymmetric conditions of power under which these translations were produced and 
released). Of course the reception and afterlife of these two texts in Egypt are a much 



















provide that kind of history, but to flag two texts, which were already emblematic of 
and influential on the discourse on the crowd in Europe, as texts that played a role in 
shaping Egyptian conceptions of the crowd (and which continue to do so, if we take 
into account the continued invocation of the Tale post 2011615— Dickens had more 
luck, and indeed much more talent, than LeBon, but one can also say that the novel as 
genre remains much more popular than sociological treatises). These translations, the 
translations of the two foundational treatises on the crowd but also the larger effort of 
translating the discourse on the crowd and on the organization of space, operated 
under conditions of asymmetric power relations. They were introduced at a time of 
British military and administrative dominance, at a time when various indigenous 
institutions were replaced by institutions modeled on their British and French 
counterparts (and in many cases run by foreigners), and when the whole Egyptian 
landscape was being transformed along colonial lines. These translations, therefore, 
can be viewed as representing the cultural and ideological dimension of the 
colonization project. This would have been true even had the translators (al-Siba‘i and 
Zaghlul) been unaware of the colonial process they were participating in. The truth, 
however, is that neither of them had any qualms about the colonial role they played 
and of which they were conscious, nor with the asymmetric power relations and 
inferiority complexes they were promoting. While Zaghlul, the colonial functionary 
and Dinshwai judge, assented to Egyptian inferiority in his preface to his translation 
of Edmond Demolins’ Á Quoi Tient La Superiorité des Anglo Saxons,616 al-Siba‘i 
prefaced his translation of the Tale with a statement of acquiescence in that inferiority 







preface al-Siba‘i proclaims his efforts in translation– along with the efforts of his 
publisher, as  
 نم لمأ لك عاطقنا نمو ىرقلا كلذ سبیو ةبرتلا هذھ بدج نم امغر اھثب نع رتفن نل لضف روذب
 اعنای انیدیأ سرغ ةیؤربیسم  حورلا الله خفنی موی نوكیس ھنأ اننیقی كلذ نم انبسح لب .هرامث انل بئرشتو هراون انل
 ىقلت ادلب رصم سانلا ھیمسی يذلا ربقلا اذھ لوحیو ةملأا هذھ ةمر يف يف تاتابن لا نولقعیو ءایحأ اسانأ ھیف
ف اذإ ىتح نومطحیو نوعنصی باصنأ لب نوتومیو نومنی مھنأ وھ نولعفی ام لك سانأ روصع بعشلاب الله ل
 ءادنأ اھقوف تطقسو ةمحرو رب ةبرت اھلوح تیدنو روعشو ساسحإ سمش ةنوفدملا انروذبل تقرشأ كلذ تیملا
رفأ تلاطو لوصأ اھل تكزف ةقرو ءایحأ بیرلأا نیقی و كلذب اننیقی انبسحف .ةرمث تعنیأو ةرضن اھل تفرو ع
نادجو بیبللا ةقثو نایع617 . 
The proclamation is tragic because it starts with declaring the Egyptian 
(intellectual) soil barren, and any hope for its restoration lost. Despite this predestined 
tragic fate, al-Siba‘i avows to keep attempting to plant his intellectual seeds– and he 
contradicts his earlier tragic statement by prophesying a future in which God would 
breathe life into “this corpse of a nation.” These statements may be contradictory in 
meaning but are consistent in their commitment to the colonial project.  The 
desolation he observes is an acknowledgment of inferiority (Egyptians who live and 
die as mere “plants”), and the hope is a statement of a colonizing-civilizing mission, 
meriting its characterization by literary critic Shaden Tageldin as “essentially 
colonialist.”618 Tageldin remarks: “Thus his [al-Siba‘i’s] determination to introduce, 
through Dickens and other masters of English literature, ‘seeds of superiority’ into 








pedagogy.”619 According to Tageldin, this statement meant that al-Siba‘i not only saw 
the situation of Egypt as that of an “indigenous stasis” but furthermore that the only 
way to “breathe life” into Egypt is through British cultural imperialism.620 The theme 
of degeneration once more appears. Indeed, the translator’s preface ascribes 
degeneration to this Egypt, its cultural soil barren, its people dead. There is an 
unmistakable coincidence here between degenerate Egypt and the the degenerate 
crowd, a coincidence that reveals how the crowd (or the licentious spaces more 
broadly) and Egypt (or the Orient/colony more broadly) were together produced as 
degenerate spaces, in need of reclamation by the colonial State. 
These two 19th century paradigmatic texts on the crowds, therefore came to 
influence the Egyptian cultural landscape through colonial channels, and their afterlife 
in Egypt remained entangled with that very colonialism. Both translations, implicitly 
and explicitly, abnegated and repudiated Egypt and its culture, imposing a 
British/Western superiority, as if to relegate Egypt to the same category of the crowd 
they abnegate (after all, both translators were members of an elite that viewed itself in 
the image– or imago- of their colonizer, and looked down on the indigenous crowd in 











This abnegation of Egypt and its indigenous population-qua-crowd, along with their 
production as the discursive equivalents of the European abnegated crowd, was not 
solely achieved by intellectuals who acted as agents of colonization and who suffered 
from colonial inferiority complexes. It was already coded in Europe’s understanding 
of its own crowd. The cultural imposition and colonial trauma I am discussing 
throughout this study are therefore not only predicated on how the European 
understandings of the crowd were imposed on Egypt through colonial relations, or to 
a specific moment of self-doubt and/or self-abnegation by defeated Egyptian 
intellectuals, but are deeper running. They pertain to the fact that this ideological 
understanding of the crowd always already modeled the European crowd on Europe’s 
racial other. We can now turn to the other side of the revolving door, in other words to 
how Egypt, the Orient, and/or the colony was mapped into Europe’s conception of its 
own crowd.   
When the Gazette de France compared ‘Urabi to (or made ‘Arabi of) the 
Commune, Delescluze, Gambetta, and the Republic, it was not only forcing the figure 
of ‘Arabi to stand for or be modeled on its internal enemies (read as failures).  It was 
also Oreintalizing the Commune, revolution, democracy, and the Republic. What we 
observe in these comparisons, in describing Gambetta as Bey and Delescluze as 
Pacha, is not only the use of communards and opportunist republicans as a lens 
through which ‘Urabi and his comrades should be understood and defamed. In 
addition, we see how the Commune, the Republic, and Democracy, Gambetta, and 
Delescluze, are Orientalized/Arabized through the figure of ‘Arabi and the Arab 
rebellion he leads. The discourse of the Gazette can therefore be seen as emblematic 
of the larger colonial discourse which did not only understand the events in the Orient 




also subsumed the Orient, the colony, and racial savagery into Europe’s own crowd 
and their rebellion –  a part of a larger process in which Europe (and later North 
America) projected its unruly element onto its others, especially its Muslim other,622 
which both predated623 and outlasted624 the 19th century.  This mutual mapping is 
evident in the titles of two essays of the Gazette: “Arabi-Gambetta – Gambetta-Bey” 
and “La Commune au Caire.” This is especially the case with the former; it is as if the 
title performs the circular motion between the colony and the metropole entailed by 
this mutual mapping: ‘Arabi, the Arab, representing Arab rebellion and Arab 
unruliness, and then Gambetta (the democrat, the Opportunist Republican, associated 
by the Gazette with a revolutionary legacy he was never part of), then Gambetta 































European subject and the savage. At its beginning, the article proclaims “Araby-Bey 
est un Araby-Gambetta qui porte le fez.” Is this supposed to be a denunciation of 
‘Urabi or Gambetta? Perhaps both. While the former is clearer, there is a suggestion 
here that Gambetta lends himself to Orientalist tropes, creating in the mind of the 
reader the image of Gambetta as a Bey in a fez. This becomes even clearer when the 
Gazette responds to al-Mufid’s assertion that ‘Urabi is a better leader than Gambetta. 
The Gazette was willing to concede that ‘Arabi might be better than Gambetta, its 
main concern was that Gambetta was comparable to ‘Arabi (whom the former treats 
as a chief of bandits and of a savage species, but other republicans treat as a soldier of 
liberty and a man of the Commune) and ends up being placed underneath him.625  The 
structure of the article itself keeps the circularity of the title: it keeps going back and 
forth from denouncing ‘Urabi to denouncing Gambetta, as if each is a worthy slur for 
the other, and as if the ‘Urabi revolt were a chance to settle scores with both. The 
same loop of reference is observed between the ‘Urabi revolt and the Paris Commune 
in the article titled “La Commune au Caire.” The Gazette proclaims: “Le Caire a sa 

















(ellipsis in original). Once again, it is not only that ‘Arabi’s bad and Oriental 
subjectivity is reminiscent of Louis Delescluze but also that the latter lends himself to 
Oriental tropes and appropriations. The figure of ‘Arabi, therefore, does not 
Orientalize Delescluze’s ex nihilo. Rather it affirms the already Oriental nature of the 
bad subjectivity of “Delescluze .... Pacha.” Thus, it is not only that the ‘Urabi revolt 
should only be understood through the lens of the Commune and the French 
Revolution, but also that the Commune and, to a lesser extent, the French Revolution, 
were to be understood as the savagery and terror of the Orient and the colonies 
settling in or coming to haunt the metropole. 
Through a panoply of racial others, among which the Muslim and the Arab 
stand prominently, counterrevolutionary representations of the Commune and the 
French Revolution consistently utilized tropes of racial savagery. Implicitly and 
explicitly, the racial other (Arab, Muslim, Turk, Native American, African, and 
Berber) was the maligning frame, the bad subject, within which revolution and 
revolutionaries were conceived. This is already the case with the previously cited 
discourse on revolution and degeneration: the racial other belonged to a lagging stage 
of evolution akin to that of degeneration, in the colonial thought of the 19th century. 
Therefore, even the ‘degenerate type’ is a species that is kin to the racial savage; the 
criminal, and by extension the revolutionary, or, in Lombroso’s characterization, the 
anarchist, regresses to the racial savage, consistent with the crime/rebellion that 
affronts the State, the upholder of civilization.  
As the Commune was being defeated, the Standard articulated the logic that, 
through rising against the State, and through committing acts of political violence 




Western civilization (coded as Christendom) and placed themselves in the same 
category with racial/non-Christian savages: 
The crime, which those who commit it call tyrannicide, is a political crime; and a far 
less atrocious crime than those of the Parisian traitors. It is murder; but murder 
which in the eyes of heathen nations partook of the nature of war or of justice, and 
which even Christian men, when once they allow themselves to forsake the moral 
code of Christendom and shake off the yoke of public sentiment and moral instinct, 
may easily persuade themselves and others ... to consider it justifiable. (emphases 
added)626 
The insurrection, or any sympathy with its perpetrators, is thus seen as forsaking “the 
moral code of Christendom,” and thus the communards, though originally Christian, 
do not only walk out of the Christian religion, but also of the bounds of Western 
Christian civilization (Christendom) and its “moral code.” This on its own may invite 
us to think of the longtime enemy of Christendom, Islam (or in the context of the 19th 
century, the Turks). The passage does not only ambiguously cast the communards out 
of the moral code of Christendom (which would have been explicable in terms of the 
anti-clerical zeal of the communards and the atheistic materialism of Communism) 
but more specifically associates them with “heathen nations” (and again one could 
think of Indians, Africans, Native Americans, and/or Turks/Arabs/Muslims).  
The racial savagery of the Commune, according to the Standard’s reporter, 
was contagious, anyone who remotely sympathized with them or granted them asylum 
would “pass for barbarian.” An earlier passage of the same article reads as follows: 
Must we not pass for barbarians, insensible alike to artistic treasures and to moral 
distinction, if we accord to the incendiaries of Paris the same privileges we gave to 
the martyrs of Italian unity and the soldiers of Hungarian independence? The 
victorious and vengeful tyrants of each successive dynasty, Legitimist, Elective, 
Republican, have in turn reviled us as the enemies of civilisation and of order for 
according a welcome to their hunted foes; shall we not deserve that epithet at the 
hands of impartial history if we shelter from the retribution they have deserved these 
worse than pirates- these wretches, who are, without exaggeration or metaphor, 






the accumulated glories of civilisation and art – which have destroyed the Tuileries 
and the ministerial offices, and which aimed at destroying the Louvre and the 
Sorbonne? (emphasis in original) 
More layers of the racial and civilizational conceit start to unravel in this passage: part 
of what casts the communards and those who sympathize with them outside Western 
civilization/the moral code of Christendom, is how they (allegedly) destroyed 
buildings that symbolized state power and Western civilization simultaneously 
(through uncivilized, untamed, and imprecise fire as shown in Chapter 1). These acts 
place the communards in a precarious category outside statehood and state protection, 
the category of pirates and hostis humani generis.  
But even in comparing the communards to pirates and hostis humani generis, 
the Standard’s reporter is projecting onto them a space that is not only outside the 
bounds of the state but also a space that is racially other and ambiguously Muslim:  
the figure of the pirate in the English imaginary – and by extension, one may add, that 
of the hostis humani generis, was already racialized not only through it falling outside 
of Europe, and out of state-bounded civilization, but also through England’s 
experience with the “Barbary Pirates.”627  The reference to pirates and hostis humani 
generis can therefore be read as a lingering echo of a 14th-15th century terror that is 
Oriental, Ottoman, Muslim, and Berber – one may even note how the term Barbary is 
derived from Barbar (Berber) the same way Araby/Arabi is derived from Arab.   
This is not to say, of course, that the experience of the Barbary pirates 
necessarily defined Europe’s counterrevolutionary discourse, or that 15th century 
European history can sufficiently explain its 19th century history. It is to say, however, 






others that played a role in Europe’s own understanding of itself (as Christendom was 
becoming Europe, let alone the obvious role it played as Christendom’s other), and 
that were at the disposal of European thinkers and propagandists to characterize their 
internal others and produce their own bad subjects (just like the concept of 
Christendom, even after it was supplanted by Europe, was at the disposal of the 
Standard’s reporter as a marker of identity). “Islam is at the heart of liberalism, at the 
heart of Europe; it was there at the moment of the birth of liberalism and the birth of 
Europe,”628 says the opening passage of Joseph Massad’s Islam in Liberalism. Islam 
was, indeed, there in the 14th-15th century (through the experience with the Barbary 
pirates, with the Ottomans, let alone with Muslim Spain), and remained there, as 
Europe’s external other against which Europe’s self is defined and to which its 
internal others are projected, in the 19th century.  
This relationship between Islam and Europe (and Islam and Europe’s 
dominant ideologies, including liberalism, and the liberal-conservatism that shaped 
the 19th century European discourse and to which many of the authors we are reading 
subscribed, especially Dickens and LeBon) can be observed in the trajectory of the 
term “terror” which came to characterize the rule of the crowd, the Reign of Terror 
(and to a lesser extent the Commune, compared by its detractors to the Reign of 
Terror especially as it instated a Committee of Public Safety modeled on its Jacobin 
forerunner). It is easy to read the racialist and Orientalist significance of the term 
backwards, and to project the “Muslim terrorist” of Hollywood and US 
counterinsurgency back in time to the Reign of Terror, but even a chronological 
reading of the history of the term would reveal how the Muslim stood at the centre of 






term was standardized, before US counterinsurgency and before the Reign of Terror, 
was Muslim terrour. Through the 17th century the term “the present terrour of the 
world” referred to the Ottoman “empire” after the English Historian Richard Knolles 
coined the term and used it in the memorable opening passage of his Generall 
Historie of the Turkes: “the glorious empire of the Turkes, the present terrour of the 
world.” This term rapidly came to currency, according to cultural historian Anders 
Ingram, “by the mid-seventeenth century this phrase was in common usage. In 
particular, its use to describe the Ottoman Turks became ubiquitous to the point of 
cliché.”629 
The Reign of Terror, therefore, both succeeds and precedes Muslim terror. 
We cannot claim with certainty, however, whether the Jacobins who used the term 
terror or the later historians and observers who characterized the revolutionary 
government as a reign of terror had Ottoman terror in mind (once again, neither 17th 
century nor 20th and 21st century Western histories can sufficiently explain an 18th-























notions of good governance developed themselves against the stereotypes and 
misconceptions of Oriental and Ottoman despotism630 (something we observed earlier 
with how the Gazette de France depicted both dictatorship and democracy, which 
appeared in the discourse of the Gazette as two conflated categories of bad 
governance, both equally befitting the descriptions of the Commune and the Republic, 
were readily projected onto the figure of ‘Arabi as an Oriental despot). Both the 
Revolutionary government of 1793 (commonly referred to as the Reign of Terror) and 
its detractors distanced themselves from, juxtaposed their respective mode of 
government against, and accused the other party of emulating Oriental despotism, 
until, that is, the Revolutionary government, faced by the intolerance and animosity of 
the old European regimes, made common cause with the Ottomans as the enemy of 
their enemy, and chose to side with the Ottoman sultanate during its war with 
Austria.631 If the Revolutionary government was ambiguous towards the Orient and its 
despotism, some of its detractors were clear about the Muslim nature of the Terror. 
Comte de Volney (who later became the Orientalist advisor to Napoleon)632 saw in 
the ideology of Robespierre “une doctrine renouvelée d’Omar.” For Comte de 












ou je te tue; ce qui est littéralement la profession de foi d’un mohamétan.”633 One can 
thus add Robespierre to the West’s litany of (real and imaginary) Muslim terrorists.  
Heavy representational baggage, therefore, governed the appearance of 
Islam, the Orient, and the Ottoman in European discourse in the 19th century (as much 
as today) – not all of which related to the colonial experience. This representational 
baggage sustained the continuous projection of the crowds, their defiance of meaning 
and signification, their rebellion, revolt, and crimes, and their government, in short 
their terror (not only the terror of Jacobin government and of crowd violence, but also 
the terror of the loss of meaning and dissolution of individuality) onto the Orient – 
among other racially other territories. The crowds, their revolts, and their government 
belong to this predominantly (though not exclusively) Oriental space of racial 
othering: they exist “outside the moral code of Christendom,” they are like (Barbary) 
pirates and hostis humani generis, their rule is comparable to Muslim terror and 
Oriental despotism, and are effectively Mohamétan. 
In the 19th century, after the modern State became the upholder of 
civilization and evolution as such, these representations served to cast the crowd 
(which falls outside the State’s regimentation of space and definition of space) and 
revolt/revolution (which challenges this very state) as simultaneously degenerate and 
Oriental (two categories that overlapped once the evolutionary episteme of the 19th 
century took over). In that sense, we can read the role played by the pirates in the 
Standard report as that of a proxy; likening the communards (who rise against the 








state-bound civilization. The pirate metaphor, in turn, through the memory of the 
Barbary pirates, takes the communards to the degenerate and racially other territory of 
Berbers – and through them to Islam and Africa, simultaneously, to the Oriental and 
the racial savage, to the Orient and the colony.  
A similar role was played by the metaphor of the desert, to which revolution 
and the crowd (as such, before even becoming a revolutionary crowd) were 
commonly likened. The desert, like piracy, exists outside of Europe, and stands in 
antithetical relationship to Europe’s civilization. Furthermore, it is a racially other, 
sometimes Oriental, territory, roamed by degenerate Bedouins, Berber, Arabs, and 
Muslims. I will now turn to the usage of the desert (and sometimes more specifically 
the Sahara) in representations of crowd and revolution.  
 
The	Sahara	of	Paris	
Commenting on how the representations of the crowd in 19th century European 
literature combined fascination with terror, John Plotz notes:  
to be among such crowds is like being among non-Christians, perhaps even closer 
to being in a desert. One might usefully compare such texts to Baudelaire’s prose 
poem “Les Foules” (c.1860), which ends by comparing the “intoxicating mysteries” 
of the crowd to those felt by “founders of colonies, the pastors of people, missionary 
priests exiled to the ends of the earth.634 (emphases added.)  
The experience of the crowd, even before the crowd takes up arms and becomes a 
Paris Commune or a Reign of Terror, is akin to “non-Christian” territories, or, to 
being among “heathen nations,” to exiting “the moral codes of Christendom.” Plotz 







curious given the otherwise vigilant and erudite nature of his account. Particularly 
intriguing in this passage is the unexplained reference to the desert. It is not clear 
whether the Brandeis professor was consciously making an argument that the image 
of the desert recurs, with racial overtones pointing in the direction of Jews (who were 
lost in the desert for four decades) and Arabs (who are its constant inhabitants) alike, 
in representing the crowd, or simply using the desert as an exotic metaphor. The 
desert as the racialized metaphor for the crowd is recurrent, however, and can be 
observed in LeBon. The very opening sentence of The Crowd proclaims the 
foundation of an “Arabian [sic] Empire” and “the fall of the Roman Empire” to be 
“great upheavals” comparable to “the age of the crowd.”635  In this representation, we 
have on the one side Rome, standing for Civilization and the West, and on the other 
side the Arabs and upheaval636 (and one may add the Barbarians that destroyed 
Roman civilization). Arabs (and therefore by extension upheaval and the crowds) are 
then referred back to the desert; after detailing the primitiveness of the crowds, LeBon 
points out how the lack of reason behind their action is the same lack of reason that 
enabled an Arab civilization to emerge: “improbable too that a few bands of Arabs, 
















world, and establish an empire greater than that of Alexander.”637 To the dichotomy 
between Rome, civilization, and the West on the one side, and Arabs, crowds, and 
upheaval on the other, LeBon adds the desert to the side of the latter. 
The desert as the (Arab) antithesis to civilization and the prelude to 
colonization was important to 19th century colonialist ideologies:  19th century 
colonialism was often coded as a mission to reclaim the wasteland, thus juxtaposing 
the Western civilized topography to its Saharan other. Similarly in the discourse on 
the crowd we have the desert, the antithesis of civilization, a topography foreign to the 
West, desolate, chaotic, and racially other, as a space comparable to one occupied by 
the crowd, or as a space to which they belong.  Even before LeBon, the trope of the 
desert appeared in Thomas Carlyle’s The French Revolution. Trying to account for 
the “half-frantic” nature of the revolutionary ardor against the internal and external 
enemies of the revolution, Carlyle writes:   
Let the Reader conceive well these two cardinal movements; and what side-currents 
and endless vortexes might depend on these. He shall judge too, whether, in such 
sudden wreckage of all old Authorities, such a pair of cardinal movements, half-
frantic in themselves, could be of soft nature? As in dry Sahara, when the winds 
waken, and lift and winnow the immensity of sand! The air itself (Travellers say) is a 
dim sand-air; and dim looming through it, the wonderfullest uncertain colonnades of 
Sand-Pillars rush whirling from this side and from that, like so many mad Spinning-
Dervishes, of a hundred feet in stature; and dance their huge Desert-waltz there!—638 
(emphases added). 
 
Opposed to order (read civilization) therefore there is the desert-waltz, the immensity 











acknowledge that in these movements “there is order, or the beginning of order,” – the 
same developmentalist civilizational schema we observe with LeBon and others.  
Revolution, which challenges the state, the upholder of (Western) civilization, takes 
France out of civilization (where there is order) into a primitive stage where there is 
“the beginning of order.” It diverges from the civilizational march of France into the 
less calculated “desert-waltz,” reduces its civilization (including its architecture)639 
into desert-sand. It ultimately takes France out of Europe and into the Sahara.  
The geographic and discursive locations of the Sahara are particularly 
significant for our study. Literally meaning the desert(s) in Arabic, the term Sahara 
indexes racial and linguistic otherness while signifying the desert. Its geographic 
position in North Africa (along with its discursive position as an Arab desert) brings 
together two categories that I have so far treated as the same: the Orient and Africa- 
and by extension the Orient and the colony. Although the Orient, Africa, and the 
colony were not necessarily the same for 19th century Europe, the set of biases that 
produced each often intersected. With the Sahara we have a space that is Oriental (an 
Ottoman domain with an Arab name and a predominantly Arab-Muslim population), 
that is part of Africa, and that is a target to British and French colonization— also 
incidentally a space to which Egypt belongs, both geographically and discursively. It 
is telling therefore, that Carlyle depicted revolutionary France as a space that 
combines the Orient, Africa, the colony, and the desert. Carlyle’s student, Charles 
Dickens, followed suit in A Tale of Two Cities (in which he cited Carlyle as “the most 
trustworthy witness” )640; through a set of racially charged images, tropes, and 







Africa, and to Native America (a colony but also an Orient in the European 
imagination). Dickens here was important not only because of his relevance for an 
Egyptian readership. LeBon, Comte de Volney, and even Carlyle were Orientalists by 
profession (which in itself is telling, that the authors we encountered as exemplary of 
the West’s counterrevolutionary discourse happened to also be Orientalists, a 
testament to the role of Orientalism in shaping Europe’s counterrevolutionary 
discourse and defining its sense of self). It would be expected of them to compare 
what they saw in Europe to the Orient they studied and wrote professionally about. 
Dickens, however, despite harboring Orientalist biases, was not an Orientalist by 
training or profession (except in the capacity that everyone at his time had 
internalized Orientalist ideologies) and did not write about Arab, Muslim, or Ottoman 
domains. Through Dickens, therefore, I will show how a paradigmatic European text 
on the crowd and revolution (i.e. A Tale of Two Cities), that is not written by a 
professional Orientalist, was still haunted by the racial other, the colony, and the 
Orient (and this will help us better appreciate how the abnegation of the Egyptian 
indigenous culture in al-Siba‘i’s preface mirrored, if inadvertently, an abnegation of 
the non-European in the original text). With Dickens, however, we will find the 
Muslim/Arab to be less prominent, and other racial others (mainly African and Native 
American savages) more so.  
 
A	Ferocity	Worthy	of	Abyssinia	and	Ashantee	
Although A Tale of Two Cities takes place between the two metropoles of the time, 
London and Paris, the text is rife with imagery from the colonies and the Orient. The 




and serves as a warning for the English ruling classes, is constantly referred to as the 
savagery of the racial other. Let us for example examine this brief scene, taking place 
at the margins of the September Massacre: “The grindstone had a double handle, and, 
turning at it madly were two men, whose faces, as their long hair flapped back when 
the whirlings [plural in original] of the grindstone brought their faces up, were more 
horrible and cruel than the visages of the wildest savages in their most barbarous 
disguise,” (3.2.203, emphases added). Given the context in which Dickens was 
writing (England’s recent involvement in colonial wars in North America, and the 
persistence of the figure of the Native American as a threat and as a trope for the 
depiction of revolutionary threats)641 the scene of the wildest savages prepared for 
battle in their “most barbarous disguise” (war paint) as “their long hair flapped back” 
is not likely to be racially innocent; it is the savage of the Americas with his “long 
hair flapped back” and “most barbarous disguise” on his face that is being invoked.642 
Like Native American warriors, these revolutionary savages smeared their faces with 
“[f]alse eyebrows and false moustaches” and like them they were “glaring with 
beastly excitement.” Comparing the revolutionary savages to the Native Savages is a 
step towards rendering them legitimate targets for murder (or genocide) by the 
civilized “beholders”: after describing their “frenzied eyes,” Dickens concludes: “eyes 
which any unbrutalized beholder would have given twenty years of his life, to petrify 
with a well-directed gun.” Dickens’ fantasy of sacrificing two decades of his life to 











the Classical Western genre.  It seems that Dickens, who harbored genocidal fantasies 
against Indians,643 needed to turn the revolutionaries into native savages in order to 
cast them as fair targets of genocide.644 If this may seem like an over-reading on our 
part, Dickens’ description of the scene at Temple Bar, as we will see, leaves little 
room for speculation. 
Early in the Tale the ultimate terror is projected onto the colonies; when 
describing the view from inside Tellson’s Bank, the scene of severed heads on pikes 
in Temple Bar, gazing back at whoever is looking out of Tellson’s windows, is 


































In a novel dealing with the motif of decapitation and the Guillotine, one that 
ends with the decapitation of one of its main characters, this reference, early on in the 
novel, (the seventh of the 45 chapters constituting the novel, and the first chapter of 
the second book, or “Book the Second”) serves to foreshadow the decapitation that 
would take place later. The severed heads at Temple Bar would be reflected again in 
the decapitation of the (already dead) Bastille officer,646 the “gory heads on pikes” 
after the storming of the Bastille,647 the head of Faullon (Faulon) de Doué displayed 
on a pike with grass stuffed into his mouth,648 the uncanny sight of red caps on 
pikes,649 and of course the heads severed by the Guillotine. The first of many 
decapitations to come, the scene at Temple Bar foreshadows these later decapitations 
and display of heads, yet to refer to the “brutality and ferocity” of all these 
beheadings, all the turmoil that would take place in France, to the “brutality and 
ferocity” of Africa and the colonies.  






















Furthermore, the scene can be understood as part of the criticism/warning 
Dickens directs against the English upper class of financiers and bankers, embodied in 
the fictional Tellson’s Bank (which overlooks Temple Bar).650 Part of the message of 
the Tale was that the English ruling class had to mend its ways or else it would meet 
the fate of its French counterpart,651 that the brutality of the French Revolution was 
comparable to the brutality of the ancien régime, and that the English ruling class, if it 
did not check itself, may be comparable to the ancien régime and the French 
Revolution in brutality.652 This brutality and ferocity they all share or run the risk of 
sharing, does not belong to England or France or Europe, but to Abyssinia and 
Ashantee. 653 Though the novel is about the French Reign of Terror (invoked at some 
points as a warning to the English upper classes), the ultimate terror belongs not to 


























A Tale of Two Cities, therefore, like many other counterrevolutionary texts of 
the time (including Carlyle’s The French Revolution and the reports by the Standard, 
and LeBon's The Crowd), was haunted by the racial other. Europe’s recent experience 
in the colonies, the experience of the masses of people beyond its control, and 
especially the experience of anti-colonial rebellion, determined how Europe, its 
bourgeoisie, and its counterrevolutionary intellectuals understood their own 
crowds.654 This was especially the case with A Tale of Two Cities, haunted by the 
recent memories of the Ashanti war the Native American wars, as well as the more 
recent memory of the Indian uprising.655 With these recent memories of colonial 
encounters and a mastery over vivid imagery, Dickens elucidated a trend that ran in 
the counterrevolutionary literature of the time: that the rule of the crowd, the upheaval 
they cause, are tantamount to the rise of Europe’s racial other. This is consistent with, 
perhaps predicated upon, the general European colonial understanding of individuality 
as a Western achievement.  
If in the colonial imagination of the 19th century, Oriental and other savage 
populations exist as collectives (or crowds for the matter) while Westerners exist as 
individuals or as members of institutions that produce individuals (a status that is only 
preserved through State power and the gaze of the State), then forming a crowd in the 
West Orientalizes the West, or takes it on a path of degeneration towards savagery. 
The crowd, therefore, is always already savage, sometimes always already Arab 










section I will examine various instances in which crowd-born(e) subjects and other 
figures that stood metonymically656 for the crowd were racialized (frequently as 
Muslim, Oriental, and/or Arab), starting by revisiting the figure of the crowd-born(e) 
‘Arab(i).   
 
Europe’s	‘Arabis	and	Carton	the	Jackal	
‘Arabi, the degenerate Oriental despot who blasphemes military discipline was not 
merely a racial slur used to defame Ahmad ‘Urabi. ‘Arabi was furthermore a screen 
for the degeneracy Europe saw at home.657 ‘Arabi’s degeneracy, despotism, and lack 
of discipline also served, in the discourse of the Gazette, to Orientalize and defame 
the Commune, the republic, the left, and the opportunist republicans (all phenomena 
associated with the crowd in one way or another). Through their fez, their narghileh, 
their Oriental despotism, their Oriental aristocratic titles (Bey, Pacha), which seem 
less noble that the titles of European nobility for some reason, and their crowd-born(e) 
degeneracy, Delescluze (and with him the communards) and Gambetta (and with him 
the republic) were thus produced as ‘Arab(i)s. In fact, Ahmad ‘Urabi, Léon Gambetta, 
and Louis Delescluze were not the West’s only crowd-born(e) ‘Arabis. In various 

















were likened, explicitly or implicitly, to Arabs, Muslims, Turks or other Orientals. To 
show how the crowd-born(e) ‘Arabi predated Ahmad ‘Urabi (a point which will help 
us illustrate how the crowd was always already racialized), I will turn one more time 
to our established example, A Tale of Two Cities, and to the (almost) crowd-born(e) 
figure of Sydney Carton, who is racialized as ambiguously Arab and/or Oriental. Even 
when the figure who stands for the crowd, is not Arab, even when this figure is 
European, there persists a need to project that figure onto the Orient and produce him 
as ambiguously a racial other.  
Sydney Carton, who mirrors the vices and degeneracies of the London and 
Paris crowds,658 though an English man, can be read in many ways as a racialized 
figure.  In chapter 5 of Book 2 of the Tale, which is dedicated to the exposition of 
Carton’s character, we learn that one of his quirks was the habit of dampening a cloth 
and tying it around his head before setting to work659 (perhaps to prevent the 
excessive amounts of liquor he consumes from causing him a headache). This quirk 






















{mis}recognition be lost, Dickens later refers to it as a turban).661  This turban serves 
to transform Sydney Carton’s morphology from an almost handsome one, to one that 
Dickens describes as “hideous to behold.”662 Before Sydney Carton puts on the 
turban, and only a few lines before his turbaned looks are described as hideous, 
Carton compares himself to his lookalike, Charles Darnay, whom he identifies as “a 
rather handsome fellow”: “I thought he was a rather handsome fellow, and I thought I 
should have been much the same sort of fellow, if I had had any luck.” Wearing the 
turban following the uttering of these words marks Sydney Carton’s descent, or 
degeneration, from the good (European) ego and imago epitomized in the rather 
handsome Charles Darnay, to the bad (Arab) ego and imago he embodies, and which 
put him in proximity to the crowd.  
Just as Gambetta and Delescluze needed to turn into ‘Arabis to reflect the 
degeneracy of democracy and crowd-rule, Sydney Carton needed to morph into a(n) 
‘Arabi to reflect the degeneracy of the crowd. In the light of this reading, all the vices, 
degradations, and degeneracies Carton embodies (which again mirror the vices, 
degradations and degeneracies of the crowd) need to be read as racial. 





















Throughout the novel, Sydney Carton is haunted by his impending death.663 
This aura of death puts him in the same position of the degenerate; like the 
degenerate, Sydney Carton is “like someone who might have died all along.”664 Even 
the language Carton uses to describe himself is reminiscent of the language of 
degeneration. When confessing his love to Lucie Manette, Carton describes himself in 
terms of “degradation,” and “sink[ing] lower and be[ing] worse.”665  He is, according 
to his own description “self-flung away, wasted, drunken, poor creature of misuse.”666 
This degradation and degeneration serve to place Carton in the same 
category as the sexual degenerate. Although we are told very little about his sexual 
life, the language used here resonates with the 19th century understandings of sexual 
degeneracy and the sexual savage.667 The way he describes himself (“self-flung away, 
wasted … poor creature of misuse,” let alone “the life I lead, Miss Manette, is not 
conducive to health. What is to be expected of, or by, such profligates”)668 echoes the 


















description of the sexual degenerate who engages in same sex practice (at a time when 
homosexuality was being invented).670 
In fact Carton can be read, in many ways, as homosexual/failed-heterosexual. 
One of the main subplots of the novel is Carton’s heterosexual failure, his unrequited 
love for Lucie whom he loses to his look-alike Charles Darnay. In addition, his 
(probably homosocial/homoerotic) life of vagabondage and vice is presented as the 








































of sexual degeneration, the very understanding of these perversities as degeneracies, 
subsume the figure of the racial other (sometimes the African, sometimes the Native 
American, and sometimes the Arab/Turk) as sexual savages.672 
Sydney Carton’s degeneration is not only sexual; he is also a class-
degenerate. He fails to adhere to proper work ethics (a failure that places him not only 
in the same category as the Parisian crowd, which is described in the novel as idle, but 
also among  primitive populations, thought of as lazy or as unable to schedule their 
work properly by the civilizational-colonial episteme of the time. Like them, Carton is 
unable to schedule or organize work, working too much or too little, thus 
simultaneously lazy and overworked). His failure to abide by proper work ethics 
results in his subjugation to and exploitation by his friend and boss, Mr. Stryver (thus 
mirroring the subjugation of the colonized by the colonizer, and the exploitation of the 
working class by the capitalists, which in both cases is blamed on the idleness of the 




























subjugated and the exploited in modern dominant ideologies). His class failures are 
narrated through a zoological trope; just like the jackal hunts for the sake of the lion, 
Sydney Carton works for the sake of Mr. Stryver. Throughout Chapter 5 of Book II, 
Stryver is referred to as the lion and Carton the jackal. The jackal would resurface in 
1871 through the discourse surrounding the Paris Commune: both the revolutionaries 
and the counterrevolutionaries would use the metaphor of the jackal to depict the 
savagery of the other side (and especially that of the women).673 The metaphor of the 
jackal therefore carried a significance that went beyond A Tale of Two Cities, and 
therefore merits our attention.  
 This metaphor carries curious Darwinistic overtones.674 The jackal occupied 
a bizarre position in the evolutionary thought of the time, one that resembled (and 
perhaps anticipated) degeneration: like the degenerate, the jackal was supposed to 
perish but somehow did not; it was, in the words of Charles Darwin ‘‘an animal not 
destined by nature to exist” and thus one that lives “carrying with it the provision for 
death.”675 Sydney Carton’s class degeneration, therefore, is also biological/zoological, 



















This proximity is achieved, via the jackal, not only through the category of 
degeneration, but also through the racialization of the jackal in European and 
Orientalist imaginations. The jackal belongs to racially other discursive and 
geographic spaces. It is an animal not native to Europe. The very name of the animal 
comes from Persian etymology. In addition, an England obsessed with Egyptology 
would not have missed the association between the jackal and Anubis, the god of the 
underworld in Egyptian mythology (which was perhaps more than a cursory – 
conscious or unconscious- reference by Dickens as Sydney Carton is metaphorically 
dead and gets metaphorically resurrected towards the end of the novel). This possible 
association between Sydney Carton and Anubis brings Carton closer to ‘Arabi. This is 
not only because ‘Arabi and Anubis were both Egyptian figures. The association more 
importantly, is achieved by way of Antigone. Sydney Carton (who was destined to 
death from the start) was associated with the Oriental underworld and Oriental gods 
of death, the same way ‘Arabi was associated, via Antigone (who like Carton was 
destined to death from the start), to the Chthonic gods of death (whom Antigone 
worshipped exclusively, according to Creon’s accusations).676 It is curious here how 
death (in a way the equivalent of degeneration) provides a common ground for the 
Arab, the crowd-born(e), the feminine (more specifically the feminine that fails to be 

















contained in the domestic), and the animal (more specifically the animal which fails to 
keep up with Darwinian evolution).677 The jackal, through the Oriental Anubis, 
combines racial degeneration with death, the telos of the degenerate and of Sydney 
Carton (and foreshadows the latter’s resurrection)—along with all the white man’s 
others (including the Arab, the woman, and the animal).  
Even beyond the contexts of Dickens and Victorian England, the jackal 
recurs in Western imagination as Arab, from Kafka’s “Jackals and Arabs” to Carlos 
the Jackal;678 in both cases the proximity to Arabs turns one into a jackal: in the 
former it is a Mizrahi Jew and therefore effectively an Arab, and in the latter a South 
American member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In fact, 
it seems that even before Carlos and even before Kafka, Orientalists have associated 
jackals with Arabs. In a quote which, according to Timothy Mitchell, represents what 
the Orientalist was expecting to see when visiting the Orient, a traveler to Egypt 
commented: “There they are; the same Arabs, camels, deserts, tombs and jackals that 
we journeyed with, rode on, traversed, dived into, and cursed respectively.”679 The 
jackal then seems to be a staple of the Orient, something one expects to experience on 
a visit to Egypt without experiencing any sense of novelty. It seems to be as Egyptian 
as the tombs, as Arab as the deserts and camels, and as Oriental as the Arabs. But, just 
like in Darwinian evolution the jackal was marked as expendable or living beyond his 












seems an expendable element of the Orient, a nuisance even. All the other Oriental 
elements offer a utilitarian value, but the jackal represents the Orient when it ceases to 
offer any value. The jackal, however, is not simply redundant, it is worthy of cursing; 
it represents therefore the abject, perhaps vicious, annoying, and/or terrifying, Arab 
element. It was only a matter of time, then, before an Arab or pro-Arab terrorist (the 
difference is irrelevant) would be christened a jackal. It just happened that this Arab 
terrorist was Latin American (perhaps a descendant of the erstwhile Arab rulers of 
Spain?). Carlos the Jackal, however, was not only a surrogate Arab,680 but also 
someone who comes from the deserts (of Jordan and South Yemen where the PFLP-
External Operations trained) to unleash the terror and destruction of the desert/Orient 
onto the European city (and, of all European cities, Paris).681 Carton the Jackal may 
therefore be read as anticipating Carlos the Jackal: both were not Arab but showed 






























degeneration, and a turban for the former, Palestinian solidarity and terror in the case 
of the latter). Similarly, both were associated with the desert as the antithesis of the 
civilized city: the Sahara, which Paris is reduced to under revolutionary chaos in the 
case of the former (a metaphor Dickens must have been familiar with, as he cited “the 
philosophy of Mr. Carlyle's wonderful book [The French Revolution]” in his preface), 
and the PFLP-EO training camps in the latter. To the same effect, both are associated 
with revolutionary terror (which happens to threaten to sweep over Paris in both 
cases). Most importantly, both are associated with popular revolutionary movements 
that are only understandable to the Western bourgeoisie and its mainstream media and 
intellectuals through a racialized lens.  
Through his turban, through his sexual degeneracy, and through the figure of 
the jackal, Sydney Carton is racialized as Arab- or more broadly as an Oriental and a 
savage. Through the example of Sydney Carton (or Carton the Jackal) we thus see 
how the Arab/Oriental functioned as Europe’s bad imago, and how this bad imago 
functioned in producing bad crowd-born(e) subjectivity (thus working both at the 
collective level, the crowd, and at the individual level, though this individuality is 
always precarious and perverse). An English character and an English figure needed 
an Arab/Oriental imago to be produced as the bad subject and to stand (through this 
bad subjectivity) for the crowd. This example is particularly telling as it shows how 
this production of the crowd-born(e) bad subject as Arab predated Britain’s encounter 
with Ahmad ‘Urabi, and predated the Commune and the discourses on degeneration 
which were associated with it. It is also testament to the widespread ideological 
valence and resonance of the association between crowds and Arabs/Orientals: it 
comes in a text which enjoyed great popularity in Europe and beyond, and which was 




establish the widespread nature of this ideological trend, I will now turn to the 
feminine figures who stood for the crowd and examine their racialization.  
 
The	Women	who	Stand	for	the	Crowd	and	their	Racialization	
So far the figures that we have examined as metonyms for the crowd are male figures; 
yet all these figures are feminized.682 ‘Arabi’s irrationality (which culminated in 
pyromania, as we saw in Chapter 1) inherits the irrationality of the Pétroleuse and for 
her gendered insanity substitutes racial insanity. His zeal and his appeal to divine law 
are comparable, according to the Times, to Antigone (arguably the West’s 
quintessential resurrected female revolutionary). Similarly Sydney Carton is 
feminized through his masculine failures, including his failure to abide by the work 
ethic, and his failure to lead a proper heterosexual life (also manifest through him 
losing the woman he loves). These figures, therefore, stand at the intersection of race 
and gender, where the racial other is also the gendered other.  
The same could be said about the female metonymies of the crowd; female 
figures that stood for the insurrectionary crowd in the 19th century have been 
consistently, though sometimes ambiguously, racialized. Let us take a look, for 
example, at one of the most famous revolutionary women in the history of English 
literature, one who popularized the type of the tricoteuse, namely A Tale of Two 
Cities’ villain Madame Therese Defarge. Throughout the Tale Madame Defarge with 











and anyone remotely connected with it, stands for Jacobin Terror and for the 
Revolutionary crowd.  It is telling, of course that Dickens chose to personify 
revolutionary zeal, terror, and vengeance through a female figure (yet a lower 
class/menu peuple female, one has to remember. Middle class femininity on the other 
hand is personified and glorified in the gentle and caring figure of Lucie –whose very 
name means “Light” – Manette). Yet, Madame Defarge is not presented without her 
own share of hinted racialization. Her rich dark hair (in contrast to the golden curls of 
Lucie Manette), her large earrings, and her heavily ringed hands bring forth the figure 
of a gypsy.683 Her name, moreover, brings to mind the Spanish Saint Teresa de Avila, 
whose grandfather was an Arab Jewish marrano condemned by the Inquisition. In 
addition, she is not properly Parisian; though born in Marquis Evrémonde’s fiefdom 
in the Parisian countryside, the murder of her siblings by the Evrémondes led her to 
flee to the seashore where she was raised by fishermen.684 Growing by the seashore 
seems to have contributed to her Amazonian qualities: in the climactic moment where 
she was heading to kill Lucie and her child, Dickens describes her as “walking with 
the confident tread of such a character, and with the supple freedom of a woman who 
had habitually walked in her girlhood, bare-foot and bare-legged, on the brown sea-
sand.”685 We are left to wonder, in what coastal territory did Madame Defarge acquire 














European territories only precariously European, especially at a time when 
Frenchness was being invented)? Corsica? Spain? Italy? (territories that were 
ambiguously Oriental up to the 20th century and may still be in certain contexts)? Is 
she anachronistically transposed onto French Algeria? Or maybe the reference to “the 
supple freedom of a woman who had habitually walked in her girlhood, bare-foot and 
bare-legged, on the brown sea-sand” is not to be understood as a background story of 
Madame Defarge but as a metaphor: her “supple freedom” and her untamed and 
unrestrained bestial nature are similar to those of Oriental and Mediterranean girls 
who “walk bare-foot and bare-legged” on the “brown sea-sand.” Through her rich 
dark hair, her gypsy earrings, and her Mediterranean-Amazonian qualities, Madame 
Defarge, like the crowd she belongs to, leads, and metonymically represents, has the 
nature of a racial other, and is, in a way, the representative of the racial other, the 
Oriental, the savages, in Europe.   
Madame Defarge was not the only female figure combining racial savagery 
to femininity and thus embodying the revolution and the crowd that partakes of it. 
Revolutionary women, particularly the women of the Commune, were often 
represented through a kaleidoscope of racial others. In addition to the racial 
undertones that remind us of the maenads (already explored in the previous chapter), 















classical Greek Orientalism), and, most importantly for the purpose of this study, the 
Muslims/Arabs/Turks. 
While depictions of racial otherness have bestowed on these women a certain 
primitive savagery, sometimes a warrior (Amazonian) femininity that ran contrary to 
the Victorian vogue of the time, the invocation of the Muslim/Arab/Turk added an 
element of Oriental sensuality, a shadow of the Harem, to the representations of these 
women; to that effect counterrevolutionary propaganda against revolutionary women 
did at least on one occasion uncover/fabricate a sensual background story for a female 
revolutionary that included an alleged four-year residency in a Harem.688  This study 
has rehearsed many times the association counterrevolutionary ideologies draw 
between sexual activity (especially women’s) and political subversiveness, something 
that was particularly evident in the case of the Commune.689 In addition to the 
insinuation of an exoticism, sensuality, and sexual activity, the Harem represented the 
other of Europe’s domestic,690 of the family and the mode of Christian bourgeois 
monogamy that sustained it. The reference to the Harem therefore placed the female 
revolutionaries along with their subversive sexual and political behavior outside “the 
moral code of Christendom.”   
Orientalization as the condition for the perverse sensuality, licentiousness, 










testimony on how the female revolutionaries who were shot dead were treated. The 
testimony states: 
Quant aux femmes fusillées, on les traitait à peu près comme les malheureuses 
Arabes des tribus insurgées: après les avoir tuées, on les dépouillait, agonisantes 
encore, d’une partie de leurs vêtements, et quelquefois l’insulte allait plus loin, 
comme au bas du faubourg Montmartre et sur la place Vendôme, où des femmes 
furent laissées nues et souillées sur les trottoires.691 
 
In her book on the representations of the women of the Commune, Gay Gullickson 
presents this passage as an example of the humiliation the female revolutionaries 
suffered. In Gullickson’s translation, the passage appears as follows: 
As for the women who were shot, they treated them almost like the poor Arabs of an 
insurgent tribe: after they had killed them, they stripped them, while they were still in their 
death throes, of part of their clothing. Sometimes they went further... [S]ome women were 
left naked and defiled on the sidewalks.692 
It is telling that Gullickson, who is studying representations and tropes, did not stop at 
the “poor Arabs of an insurgent tribe” analogy, as if only the humiliation of white 
female bodies is troubling, but not the humiliation of Arab bodies – in the case of 
which the report would be adding insult to injury, comparing the killed women to 
abject Arabs. It is also telling how in her translation, Gullickson misses the gendering 
of the poor Arabs “les malheureuses Arabes”693 even though her study is mainly 
preoccupied with gender, as if her feminism could only accommodate Western 
women, while Arab women are elided through an ellipsis of translation. 
This account and Gullickson’s subsequent commentary are not only 









mean to be treated like les malheureuses Arabes des tribus insurgées? It is equally 
telling that the original account would present such an analogy (which on its own does 
not make any sense) without any further explanation, and that Gullickson presents it 
without any attempt to explain, analyze, or problematize the statement and its 
underlying biases.  
Perhaps what is elided (and self-evident for both the author of the original 
report and Gullickson to the extent that no explanation is needed), is the persistent 
stereotype of the maltreatment of Arab women (the same stereotype that helped fuel 
US colonial wars in the 21st century). The women in this example were shot, 
undressed, thrown on the sidewalks, and yet this does not begin to describe what the 
wretched Arab women go through; this treatment is only “almost like,” à peu près 
comme, what happens to Arab women.694 Once again, the lack of reflection in the 
original account and the lack of commentary in Gullickson suggest that both authors 
accept that the place for the maltreatment of women is the Arabian desert, that this 
treatment is worthy695 of tribal Arabs, or Arab tribal women, but certainly not Parisian 
revolutionaries (the opposition between civilization and the desert is also evident here, 
the former being the place for the mistreatment of women, the latter a place for 
respecting them).  
While objecting to the treatment of female revolutionaries and their dead 
bodies by the forces of order, both reports ultimately partake of the same racial bias 
that was mobilized by counterrevolutionary forces against revolutionary women. They 








do not only become Arab, they become tribal Arabs. That the Arabs in the analogy are 
tribal Arabs suggests that they represent not only racial othering (and not only the 
Arabian desert as the other to civilization), but also a nomadic lifestyle inimical to 
sedentary urban life and,696 more importantly, to the domestic.697  Women who 
wander off the domestic (and join the insurgency) therefore become nomads (a state-
of-being that is not fit for a lady), but not any nomads: they become malheureuses 
Arabes des tribus insurgées. In this wandering off the domestic, one could also note a 
class element that is missing from the original but that appears in Gullickson’s 
translation: by being insurgents, the women become not only tribal and Arab, but also 
poor (after all they walk out of the domestic order of the bourgeoisie and to the streets 
and the insurgencies of the working and other lumpen classes)—that is, of course, if 
we choose to read the term poor in Gullickson’s translation as referring to material 
poverty, not to general misfortune. 
One thing remains missing, however, for the analogy to make sense: the 
perverse tribal Arab desire that disrobes women in “their death throes,” and the 
perverse and abject sexuality of the dead, naked, and defiled female body,698 a 


















conceit, the present absence if we are to borrow from Derrida, is the voyeuristic and 
necrophiliac699 Arab/Muslim (whom we already encountered in Chapters 1 and 2 
when dealing with representations of Islamist terrorism).  In other words, the 
Versailles forces did so to the bodies of women as if they (the Versaillais) were 
Arab/Muslim, as if these women were Arab/Muslim, or as if they were doing so to 
please an Arab/Muslim onlooker, or as if the Versailles forces were themselves Tribal 
Arabs treating their women in the manner they deserve to be treated. Here we are 
clearly dealing with abjection; female bodies (though not female subjects, just the 
body, neither subject nor object)700 that are left, naked, defiled (perhaps even raped) 
postmortem. Yet to be abject, and to stand in their abjection for the revolutionary 
crowd (itself racialized and Orientalized), these female bodies had to be 
subjected/abjected to Arab/Muslim (voyeuristic-necrophiliac) perversity.  
That the Versailles forces are akin to Arab tribes, that they treat the female 
revolutionaries the way Arab treat their women, is only one interpretation of the 























Arab abjection is never identified. Nor are we told who are those tribal Arabs 
insurging against. An alternative reading would posit Versailles as akin to the 
authority the insurgent Arab tribes are rising against, and the treatment of the female 
revolutionaries as akin to the treatment this authority is ought to subject the women of 
the insurgent tribes to. The insurgent Arab tribes may belong to the Orientalist 
stereotype of perpetually warring Arab tribes, in that case Versailles’s brutality would 
still be similar to Arab brutality. In a similar vein, these Arab tribes may be imagined 
as insurgent against the Ottoman authority, and thus Versailles brutality would be 
compared to Turkish brutality.701 The insurgent Arab tribes, nevertheless, may have 
been the insurgent Arab tribes of Algeria, and the brutality and abject humiliation they 
received, in life and posthumously, is perpetrated by the colonial authorities. Read 
this way, the passage becomes not a critique of the colonial practices in Algeria, but 
rather a cautionary note that the brutality and abjection, which only the Arabs of 
Algeria are worthy of, and which should be exclusively reserved for them, was being 
domestically misdirected.702 Through all these alternative readings, the Arab/Oriental 
is produced as the place of abjection and brutality, the legitimate or expected target of 
practices that brutalize and abject the body, and thus produce the brutalized and 
abjected bodies of the female revolutionaries as Arab and/or Oriental.    
What we have here is not simply the mutual mapping of femininity and 












feminist scholars and so far taken up by this study. In addition to civilizational 
anxieties that placed the primitive and the feminine together, something slightly 
different is taking place in these representations: for the feminine to be abject and 
licentious, it needed to be projected out of the domestic, far onto the colony and the 
Orient. When contained in the domestic (and here I am consciously invoking the 
double-meaning of the term), the feminine can be seen as respectable, proper, and 
civilized.703 The mapping of the feminine and the primitive/savage onto one another 
happens when the woman strays out of the domestic; and here there seems to be a 
slippery slope, coded within the very double meaning of the term domestic: when she 
walks out of the household,704 she is bound to walk far beyond the tame bounds of 
civilization, Europe, or Christendom. Or in more general terms, it is not that 
femininity as such is like Europe’s others (the savages, the Native Americans, the 
Amazons, and the Arabs) but it is that femininity when untamed, unruly, is 























Female bodies rendered abject (abject as revolting and abject as not properly 
subject) through voyeuristic Muslim perversity (under conditions of revolutionary 
chaos) resurface prominently in the counterrevolutionary discourse on the Commune, 
namely in Maxime Du Camp’s polemic Les Convulsions de Paris (a title that already 
gestured towards the body, its abjection, and its gendering as feminine given the 
gendered history of the notion of convulsion, which belongs to a panoply of notions 
that inherited the Dionysian orgy and produced 19th century hysteria). In the course of 
his anti-Commune propaganda, Du Camp engages in a tangential attack against the 
socialist painter Gustave Courbet, who was briefly affiliated with the Commune. 
Courbet’s painting, L’Origine du Monde, notorious for its depiction of female genitals 
and still inviting controversy when publicly exhibited at present, falls under Du 
Camp’s moralizing fire: 
Pour plaire à un musulman qui payait ses fantaisies au poids de l’or . . . Courbet . . . 
fit un portrait de femme difficile á décrire. Dans le cabinet de toilette du personnage 
étranger, on voyait un petit tableau caché sous un voile vert. Lorsque l’on ecartait le 
voile, on demeurait stupefait d’apercevoir une femme de grandeur naturelle, vue de 
face, émue et convulsée, remarquablement peinte, reproduite con amore, ainsi que 
disent les Italiens, et donnant le dernier mot du réalisme. Mais, par uninconcevable 
oubli, l’artisan qui avait copie son modèle d’aprés nature, avait negligé de 
representer les pieds, les jambes, les cuisses, le ventre, les hanches, la poitrine, les 
mains, les bras, les epaules, le cou et la tête. L'homme qui, pour quelques écus, peut 
dégrader son métier jusqu’à l'abjection, est capable de tout.705 
 
Once more we are clearly dealing with abjection, with an artist who “degrades his 
trade to abjection” for money (“pour quelques écus”) to use Du Camp’s words. The 
abject nature of the painting is not only evident in its depiction of female genitalia (a 
site and sight of horror and disgust in 19th century Western ideologies as well as in 
contemporary misogynistic Western epistemai), but also in the realist nature of the 






any conception of the painting as subject. Neither is it object; even the licentious 
female body, according to Du Camp’s description, is cut, leaving only, and centering, 
the abject vagina. This mixture of sexual/feminine abjection and realist immediacy 
threatens the collapse of the whole symbolic order (in a manner that anticipates 
Lacanian psychoanalysis). According to Janet Beizer's analysis: “What constitutes for 
Du Camp the abject heart of this painting is … not merely the female sex—which is 
all that remains on the canvas/page after he so coyly slashes the other body parts—but 
the positioning of female sexuality at the very core of symbolic systems, be they 
uncovered in aesthetic or political representations.”706 The abject body in L’Origine 
du Monde, with “the female sex” at its centre, which is identified both by Courbet and 
Du Camp as “convulsing,” (an identification that is “completely supplementary to the 
body painted in L’Origine, which shows not a trace of a convulsion; but it supplies, 
through a curious chiasmus, the convulsed body announced by the title of Les 
Convulsions de Paris and withheld by its text,”707- and here I would add metonymy to 
Beizer’s chiasmus. Although the nude partial body in the painting does not belong to 
the revolutionary crowd, i.e. is not a synecdoche of the crowd, it stands in relation to 
the crowd, convulsing like it does, and being painted by a member of the 
revolutionary crowd) stands for abject horror, licentiousness and depravity, and 
collapse of order under revolutionary chaos.  
Yet for the female body to come to play this role of abject representation, it 
had to be produced as abject through perverse Muslim desire. This abject body had to 
be produced under the tutelage of “un musulman qui payait ses fantaisies au poids de 







restraint, he pays for his fantasies—which perhaps correspond to the Oriental 
fantasies harbored by the cultural milieu to which Du Camp belonged, and, as a true 
Oriental, this perverse Muslim pays not in money, not in silver (or argents),, but in 
gold, de l’or; one could even read an unconscious etymological association between 
or and orient.708 
What seems as offensive as the nudity (if not more) in Du Camp’s account is 
that it was painted to please an Ottoman diplomat, a Muslim voyeur, and that it was 
hanging in the home of a foreigner, personage étranger- a kind of miscegenation the 
normal order of things would have prevented, but perhaps revolutionary chaos 
allowed for. Consistent with the Muslim/Oriental sensuality and perversity that 
produced the female body as abject, (and equally troublesome for Du Camp, it 
seems), the painting existed behind a green veil, invoking the modernist and 
colonialist anxiety about what lies beneath the veil, what escapes the gaze, be it a 
sensual female body or an indescribable orgy (one here is not to miss the significance 
of green as the color associated with Islam; the colonial anxiety/frustration about the 
Oriental feminine and sensual body hidden behind the veil of Islam is evident).  
We may here push Maxime Du Camp’s analogy further and venture that, if 
revolutionary chaos is akin to the rendering of (French) female bodies licentious 
through socialist and Muslim agencies, then order, embodied by the state, is imagined 
to prevent this trilateral miscegenation. In this light Du Camp is not different from the 
contemporary European Right, which calls for banning or restricting Muslim 










bodies of European women (which in the French context readily invokes white 
Marianne, a respectable white female figure that, if not defended by good French 
nationalists, might be veiled or otherwise violated or defiled by Muslim perverts). Nor 
is the “Muslim who paid for his fantasies/whims their weight in gold” or the present 
absent Arab tribal pervert in the previous example different from the alleged Muslim 
rapists of Cologne who appeared in the media accounts surrounding a surge of sexual 
assaults and other incidents of mob related violence in Germany on New Year’s Eve 
in 2016: media reports focused on one incident in Cologne and brought out alleged 
testimonies claiming that the perpetrators were dark skinned, looked Arab, or spoke in 
Arabic.709 If we were to subject these testimonies to forensic logic, a number of 
questions would arise: how is the dark skin of the perpetrators different from the skin 
of sun-tanned or darker Europeans, let alone other darker races? How does an Arab 
look like? And do the witnesses understand the Arabic language to be able to claim 
the mob spoke in Arabic? The logic of the reports, however, should be examined 



























readily racialized, readily dark-skinned and ambiguously Arab, if we accept the 
argument made throughout this chapter and the last. Similarly, just like any crowd, the 
mob of Cologne howls in foreign languages (the sine qua non of rioting mobs, even 
the French crowd around the Bastille guard, as we may remember, were howling, 
despite having a shared language with the guard). Just like the crowd in Alexandria 
screamed (faux) Arabic phrases which the English observers did not comprehend but 
interpreted as a threat, the crowd of Cologne spoke in a language the eyewitnesses did 
not understand but readily interpreted as Arabic and as a sexual threat (it seems that 
howling faux Arabic is the official language of crowds, whether in Alexandria of 
1882 or Cologne in 2016, and that this peculiar monosyllabic language has evolved 
from kill the Christians to rape the women). The sexual violence enacted forces a 
racialized metonymy between the women and the crowd- the women become literally 
if forcefully crowd-borne. The Cologne incident, therefore, is the latest of a series of 
historical incidents wherein the crowd is racialized as Arab and its metonymy 
becomes female bodies subjected to perverse Arab/Muslim abjection.  
There is indeed evidence that the incident was fabricated or exaggerated, at 
least as far as depicting the aggressors as predominantly or exclusively Arab.710 Yet 
even if this were not the case, what is at stake, as far as our analysis is concerned, is 
not the real but rather how the real is represented through ideology (in the 
Althusserian sense of the word as “the system of the ideas or representations which 
dominate the mind of … a social group”).711 In other words, what interests us is their 
Althusserian illusion/allusion relationship to what they purport to describe. What is 







incidents of violence to rape, and to reduce the crowd to Arab gang rapists, is to 
narrate chaos through a trope that is simultaneously sexualized, gendered, and 
racialized. The only difference, thus, between the accounts on the Cologne incident 
and the accounts on the Paris Commune is that the Orient that produced the rapists of 
Cologne is an Orient of restriction and repression to the point of sexual frustration, 
according to contemporary Orientalism, whereas the Orient that produced the 
“Muslim man who paid for his whims in gold” and the present absent necrophiliac 
voyeur during the downfall of the Commune, was an Orient of permissiveness and 
license to the extent of perversity.712 Yet both Orients produce a racialized and 
culturalized inability to restrain oneself— whether this is manifest in paying French 
socialists to render nude French bodies in drawing, or in Arab immigrants sexually 
harassing women in public (perhaps also with the complicity of European socialists). 
In both cases, the Muslim pervert, unable to practice self-restraint, defiles the bodies 
of European women.713 The crowd that emerges at the withering of the State (in 
situations of insurrection) or the slightest sign thereof (through opening its borders to 


















crowd are referred to racially other (and in all the previous examples, Muslim) 
territories.714  
My purpose here is not to posit gendered abjection as always already 

















































definitely points in that direction), nor to absolve 
mainstream/statist/counterrevolutionary Western culture of the 19th century and 
beyond of its sexism. Nor am I claiming that mainstream Western culture is only 
sexist when it is racist. My purpose, rather, is to show how the racialization of 
feminine bodies that stand for the crowd plays an essential role in their abjection, and 
subsequently in the counterrevolutionary, rightwing, mainstream, and Orientalist 
mobilizations of these abject bodies to (mis)represent the crowd. The examples I 
provided are not enough to preclude the possibility of non-racialized abject feminine 
bodies standing in for the crowd and serving a counterrevolutionary purpose; and yet 
the archive for this study shows a consistent racialization that serves as the sine qua 
non of the abject feminine or feminized bodies that stand in for the crowd. This 
archive, conversely, allows for the existence of respectable female figures when these 
figures are contained in Europe’s domestic (usually in both meanings of the term): 
blonde Lucie Manette and white Marianne are cases in point.715 Modeled on 
respectable bourgeois women and undetached from Victorian ideals of proper 
femininity, these figures are distanced from the licentiousness of the crowd (Lucie 
Manette through her fear of the crowd, Marianne through iconographic distancing) as 
well as from the licentiousness of the female body; they are transcendental mothers 
(who cast doubt on Julia Kristeva’s association between abjection and repudiation of 
the maternal onto the other). Lucie [light, her very name suggests transcending the 
corporeal and its licentiousness/abjection] Manette is depicted as asexual while 











femininity through divinity, but furthermore transcends human sex through her 
virginity vow— a rare occurrence in Greek mythology. Respectable domestic females 
are threatened to be turned licentious and abject, however (and to become crowd-
born(e) in the process), through the encounter with the racial other –especially the 
Muslim/Arab; we see this at present with the French invocation of Marianne in anti-
immigrant rhetoric in France and we see it most evidently in the Cologne accounts.  
We have, therefore, a body of knowledge that consistently refers the unruly 
and the abject to Arabness/Islam. This was true in 19th century counterrevolutionary 
representations as much as it is true in today’s mainstream (pop) culture. Even the 
motif of the hysterical woman or the licentious feminine body standing in for the 
crowd and their transgressions, is often a racial motif, or is a gendered motif that is 
readily racialized for its counterrevolutionary purpose to be served. Perhaps 





























This Orientalist counterrevolution, with all its anti-Arab biases, was inherited by 
Egyptian thinkers (most evidently al-Naqqash and Zaghlul) and was passed on to 
contemporary regime propagandists. Understanding the Egyptian conception and 
representation of the licentious space, therefore, especially in its counterrevolutionary 
renditions, cannot be attained without understanding the colonialist and Orientalist 
roots of their cultural imposition. Under relations of colonial (military, institutional, 
and cultural) dominance, Zaghlul was inviting his audience to read the Jama‘ah 
(which before that represented their sense of community and their normative social-
political institution) as the abnegated crowd. He was also inviting them, along with 
LeBon, to look at the rise of their (cultural if not necessarily biological) ancestors, the 
Arabs, as an upheaval, opposed to the civilization represented by the Roman Empire. 
Adding insult to injury, upheaval was translated in this context as inqilab, as if to 
teach the readers their place at the bottom of the natural order of things. They were 
invited by al-Naqqash to see their compatriots as an ambiguous, non-individual, 
uncivilized, threatening, and expendable crowd, and to only see the world from a 
white European (sometimes Christian, a term al-Naqqash exclusively reserved for 
Europeans) vantage point. Finally, if read in a certain way, they were invited (by 
Dickens and al-Siba’i, for example)717 to recognize themselves, or other racial others 
belonging to their same position in the colonial order of things, as the subjects of 
abnegation, contempt, horror, violence, and possibly genocide. These texts 







Western while inviting them to identify themselves as the abnegated other, effecting a 
trauma, a psychic split that is Fanonian par excellence. 
This is not to say that Egyptian counterrevolutionary propaganda or the 
Egyptian representations of and discourses on the crowd and the licentious space were 
always a faithful or conscious repetition of the colonial rhetoric. Of course one can 
pinpoint instances of colonial mimicry, but one can also observe modifications, 
sometimes to the extent of reversing what is Oriental and what is Occidental. In 2011, 
for example, while regime propagandists were using the logic and the motifs that are 
the cultural imposition of the dominant Orientalist, colonialist and 
counterrevolutionary Western ideology, they were paradoxically accusing the 
‘revolutionaries’ of being agents of the West. Like its Jordanian forerunner,718 
Egyptian counterrevolution depicted proper masculinity as national and male 
effeminacy as foreign. The irony, of course, is that it was Western notions of 
masculinity that were upheld as properly masculine and national, sometimes at the 
expense of earlier indigenous notions and performances of masculinity. A brief 
overview of this theme reveals the (conscious or unconscious) mapping of the 
indigenous (read as unruly) onto femininity (also read as unruly and licentious, 
especially when taking the form of male effeminacy) by Egyptian 
counterrevolutionary actors (corresponding to the mapping of licentious and abject 
femininity onto Europe’s racial other, as described above).  
The long hair of male political activists was used by various 
counterrevolutionary observers as a mark of the ‘revolution’s’ unruliness and foreign 






Egyptian army officer reportedly challenged a male demonstrator with long hair in 
front of the Israeli embassy. A slippery slope from long hair, to effeminacy, to 
national failure appears in this taunting remark: because the male demonstrator wears 
his hair long he is effeminate, and because he is effeminate he cannot play a role in 
national liberation. Similarly, the administrators of the facebook group Ana Asif ya 
Rayyis posted pictures of male demonstrators with long hair to cast aspersions on their 
grooming, hygiene, and masculinity. The same slippery slope from long hair to failed 
national allegiance was observed when the administrators of the group abducted one 
of these male activists and handed him to the Bureau of Intelligence, on account of his 
alleged foreign allegiances.  
Their nationalist appeal notwithstanding, the disdain these 
counterrevolutionary actors showed towards long hair belongs not to any indigenous 
tradition but rather to Victorian and conservative Western cultural imposition, as per 
the Fanonian formulation, in other words the rabid transformation of cultural notions 
along colonial lines. The coding of short hair as masculine and proper and of long hair 
as feminine and/or unruly belongs to Victorian and modern Western notions of 
propriety, (which resonated with the post-enlightenment appropriations of the 


















proper runs against various indigenous traditions of men wearing their hair long: not 
only did Bedouins in many parts of the Arab world traditionally wear their hair long 
(and some still do until our very day), 720 but it is also widely accepted that the 
Prophet of Islam had long hair which he occasionally braided. While Egyptian 
conservatives (at least the ones who do not identify as secular) occasionally claim 
they are following the Sunnah of the Prophet, their aversion to long hair on men 
(which is technically part of Sunnah) suggests it is the Sunnah of Victorian England 
and modern America rather than that of the Prophet of Islam that they follow. The 
colonial-Victorian origins of the counterrevolutionaries’ bias against men’s long hair 
notwithstanding, it was this long hair that also moved them to accuse their victim of 
being an agent of Western powers.721 
Nevertheless, what is at stake is not one example here or there (no matter 
how prevalent and how conducive to acts of violence, like the case was with the 
example  of long hair) whereby a colonial bias was indigenized or appropriated by the 


























postcolonial (and colonially complicit) State and directed against its dissidents. As far 
as our analysis is concerned, such examples are but an index, or a symptom, of a 
larger colonial trauma, the trauma of having to see oneself through the eyes of the 
colonizer, always in contrast to the ideal image set by the colonizer, or, to use Fanon’s 
formulation, the trauma of an “image of one’s body [that is] solely negating … an 
image in the third person.”722 In the next chapter I will show how, even as many of 
the colonial biases were partly transformed, partly reversed, the deep epistemological 
and ideological biases persisted, and with them a colonial trauma and neurosis in 
which the image of the self had always been negating, abnegated, put in a 
hierarchized contrast to whiteness (or to a Eurocentric modernity and propriety), 








The Self in the Third Person: The Spatial Articulations and Symptoms of 
the Fanonian Trauma  
 
After having established the revolving door nature of the colonial mapping of space, 
which subsumes the racial savage, the Arab, the Muslim, in other words, various 
versions of the constructed Egyptian self, into Europe’s unruly spaces and subjects 
and simultaneously imposes these thoroughly, if implicitly, racialized notions onto 
Egypt (and other colonies), I will now turn to the reception of and the response to 
these colonial notions. In other words, after establishing the etiology of the Fanonian 
trauma as far as conceptions of space are concerned, I will turn to the symptoms and 
coping mechanisms. 
 The symptoms and coping mechanisms that characterize the Egyptian 
experience of the Fanonian trauma will be sought in, among other things, writings by 
Egyptian nationalists and other intellectuals, translations of paradigmatic European 
texts, news reports, propaganda songs, presidential speeches, as well as visual and 
cinematic representations. As the case is with the rest of the study, the focus of this 
chapter is on the two defining moments of the late 19th/early 20th century and the late 
20th/early 21st century. This chapter, however, will be mindful of two major shifts in 
Egyptian state ideology that affected the representations of the crowd, of spaces of 
political activism, and ultimately of proper and licentious spaces: the first is the 
Nasserist shift, a time when the crowd was no longer rendered licentious, and from 
which I will draw a number of examples. The second is Sadat’s reversion (not to say 
reaction) to the licentious crowd, which did not only make a comeback, in full force, 




president. Both these shifts are necessary to understand the post-2011 moment 
(especially the discourse surrounding the 2013 coup d’état). 
The history of these developments is a history of inconsistencies, of 
continuities and discontinuities, of colonial mimicries and anti-colonial subversions. 
As we will see, these trends do not completely supplant one another; more often than 
not, they coexist in the same period and can be even traced in the writings of the same 
author (as I will show with al-Shidyaq and to a lesser extent with al-Nadim). One 
salient feature of this uneasy coexistence, however, (with few notable exceptions) is 
the failure to completely and radically subvert Western notions and their underlying 
assumptions even as they are being reversed.723 
The history we are about to embark on, therefore, is part of the history of the 
Egyptian articulation of the self in response to the colonial cultural imposition (a 
response that sometimes mimics, sometimes opposes, but for the most part ultimately 
reproduces the underlying biases of, these cultural impositions). Throughout most of 
these responses, the set of assumptions, civilizational grids, and bodies of knowledge 
embedded in a white gaze continue to haunt, condition, and shape these responses. “In 
the Weltanschauung of a colonized people,” according to Fanon, “there is an impurity 
















Fanon, interferes with the very ontology of the black man (and by extension the 
person of color, mutatis mutandis, I would add), which is then positioned in a 
hierarchized  contrast to the ontology of the white man. Under these asymmetric 
psychic power relations (themselves conditioned by the asymmetry in military 
preponderance, economic relations, and ideological production) the person of color 
could therefore hardly escape the internalization of the white gaze and its ontological 
effects, always experiencing him or herself in reference/opposition to the white man: 
“The image of one’s body is solely negating. It’s an image in the third person.”725  
The examples surveyed in this chapter rarely digress from this Fanonian articulation 
of the colonial trauma. Even when attempting to achieve a certain parity with the 
West, writers needed to achieve this parity through the approximation of Western 
norms, projecting licentiousness to other racial others (most notably Africans and 
Native Americans, and sometimes other Arabs). However, my analysis departs from 
Fanon’s in one important respect. Fanon attributes the white gaze and the ontological 
rupturing to a specific geographical experience, that of the Metropole, while the 
Antilles and the Antilleans remain relatively shielded from the white gaze as long as 
they are not subjected to a racial and cultural interaction with a white person.   Per 
contra, I claim that, in Egypt, this ontological trauma takes place in perpetuum,  
regardless of the actual physical presence of white Western foreigners. I believe that 
this ontological trauma dispatches itself through three mechanisms that overlap and 
complement one another: the first one is through the education provided by colonial 
institutions built by Muhammad ‘Ali, further assimilated to the colonial model by the 






by the postcolonial state; the second one is through institutional memories of defeat in 
relation to British colonial rule – and later through institutional sets and memories of 
defeat and perceptions of inferiority vis-à-vis the superiority of Western powers and 
foreign capital (a perception which was at times augmented by the media to justify the 
regime’s complicity with Western powers), and  finally through the media, the 
process of globalization, the political and cultural invasiveness of the Hollywoodian 
entertainment industry serving as the ideological state apparatuses of US imperialism. 
As such the Egyptian, since birth, is forced to simultaneously identify with the white 
man and see himself or herself as other through the white gaze. Unlike the Antilleans 
in Fanon’s analysis who identify with the white man with no ontological interruption 
as long as they stay in the Antilles, and only suffer the ontological rupture effected by 
the traumatizing experience with the white gaze once they set foot in the Metropole as 
their blackness is thereupon fixed, objectified, and reified; for a contemporary Arab 
both processes unfold simultaneously.  What I describe here may seem contradictory: 
on the one side, the subject is being forced to identify with the white man through the 
three mechanisms mentioned above, while being consistently reminded that he is not 
white (and, in the case of women, that she is not a he). Indeed, this contradiction 
exists, and is at the centre of the colonial trauma. Since the birth of the colonial 
subject, he or she is never himself. “The young Antillean,” according to Fanon, “is a 
French child required to live every moment of his life with his white compatriots.”726 
The young Arab, on the other hand, and perhaps the young member of any colonized 
population in the age of globalization/US imperialism, is a white child required to live 






As far as this study is concerned, a distinction needs to be made between 
three different stages: before British occupation, after British occupation, and the 
triumphant moment of US imperialism through globalization. In the first of these 
stages, despite the circulation (sometimes to the effect of dominance) of Western, 
modernist, and colonial notions, and despite their approximation by various authors, 
we do not encounter a complete internalization of colonial notions, nor a clear and 
unequivocal articulation of an inferiority complex (with the exception of a few 
authors who can be pinpointed as the cultural and political clients of imperialism, like 
the examples of al-Shidyaq, who despite his articulation of an inferiority complex vis-
à-vis Great Britain, needed to imbue his language and analysis with a sense of parity). 
Or, if we want to put it in theoretical terms, the network of power relations, 
ideologies, or cultural impositions that characterize the colonial encounter were not 
sufficient to make a child see himself or herself through the white gaze. This 
condition was reflected in the proliferation of accounts that attacked Western 
foreigners and their norms, casting doubts and aspersions on their civilizational 
claims; even al-Shidyaq, who otherwise served as an agent of imperialism, produced 
such accounts, as I will show in this chapter.  Although this ideological trend or 
orientation would not entirely disappear and is still observable to our very day, it 
would gradually be supplanted by other trends that show less parity and more 
acquiescence. 
The second stage, the stage that followed the British occupation, is marked 
by the progressive (not in any linear civilizational form) adoption of British and 
European notions of civilization. The occupation’s civilizing mission was adopted by 
Egyptian nationalists, who internalized the British civilizational disdain towards 




Western occupier.	(We have already seen how this was the case with both Ahmad 
Fathi Zaghlul and Muhammad al-Siba‘i. This chapter will showcase the 
implementation of this process of cultural reproduction in some of the representations 
of space and more particularly those of licentious space). The rupture between the 
first and the second stage marks the work of ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim, producing ‘Urabist 
propaganda with a sense of parity with the West in the first stage and producing 
Social Darwinist essays on civilizing the Egyptians in order for them to regain727 their 
independence in the second. The Nasserist era could also be read as part (though one 
that is unique and peculiar in its deployment of anti-colonial rhetoric) of this stage, at 
least with regards to its recuperation of the crowd-qua-national mass. Through notions 
borrowed from Western socialism, Western romanticism, and Western militarism, 
Nasir’s discourse turned the licentious crowd into the respectable mass. 
Epistemologically, the rhetoric of this stage was conditioned by colonial institutions 
and colonial education, their nationalization by Nasir’s regime may have served to 
reverse their deployment but not to subvert their epistemologies.  
The final stage is that of US imperialism, in which hardly anyone can escape 
the Hollywood mediated imago of the white man as the ideal image, and a plethora of 
Europe’s racial others (including the Arab, coming to the forefront after Reagan’s 
debacle in Lebanon, and slowly, though never completely, replacing the declining 
Soviet other) as the bad imago. In the context of Egypt, this coincided with, and 
directly followed, Sadat’s infitah (opening, open-door) policy. This policy made 
Egypt receptive to US cultural imposition in many ways: it opened the Egyptian 







Western genre, which, invite their audience to identify with the ideal and idealized 
image of the genocidal white man, thus leaving Egyptian  spectators at a dilemma of 
whether to identify with the Native Americans, who possess a dark skin similar to the 
Egyptians’ own, and who are subjected to the same US war machine that targeted the 
Arabs, or to heed their interpellation by the ideological apparatus of film and identify 
with the cowboy).  
   In addition, to justify defecting to the Western-capitalist camp, Sadat’s 
propaganda needed to depict the US triumph in the Cold War as inevitable, and 
therefore produced its own mythology of American supremacy at the expense of the 
Soviet model (something this study will not be able to further explore due to the 
confines of space and method). Alongside the Sadatist discourse on US supremacy, a 
virulent form of anti-Arabness characterized the speech of Sadat, his propagandists, 
and his cultural milieu (to justify Egypt’s new alliance with Zionism and US 
imperialism, and to blame Egypt’s earlier military defeats on “the Arabs”). While the 
scope and method of this study will not allow us to discuss the details of Sadat’s anti-
Arabness, it is important to note it as one of the factors that conditioned the Egyptian 
writers’ self-abnegation, or abnegation of the Arab self, in the post-Sadat period.   
Writings in this stage, in addition to their self-abnegation, were characterized 
not only by admiration of the West, but also by a desire for things Western; Western 
recognition, Western democracy, Western commodities, Western bodies, and, at 
moments in which the charge of Oriental licentiousness was turned back on the West, 
Western licentiousness.  On the one hand, this opening up to US films, television 
series, and print publications, this promotion of US ideals, imagoes, and lifestyle, at 




Western others728 led to the advance of the white imago as an ideal image and the 
non-white imago as the bad image.  On the other hand, against a moral fabric that still 
sustained Islamic and other indigenous moral notions, yet supplanted them with 19th 
and early 20th century European, British, and particularly Victorian notions now 
passed as indigenous, and at a time when the West’s civilizational claims were no 
longer made in terms of moral restraint but rather of liberation, US cultural 
productions provided ample material for depictions of a licentious West, which were 
taken up and re-produced, sometimes with a sense of moral horror, by Egyptian 
authors. But, as we will see through a litany of articles from Ruz al-Yusuf, these 
depictions of licentious West were always marked by an abnegation of the Arab self 
and an admiration/desire of the very licentious West that was being denounced. 
While these stages are important to note, my analysis below will be mainly 
organized thematically rather than chronologically. Any periodization remains rough 
and schematic, and themes occasionally exist across stages. In the subsequent 
sections, I will first show how the colonial gaze persisted even in Arab and Egyptian 
accounts that aimed to reverse the set of biases implicit within this gaze. I will then 
show how various attempts to denounce the West as licentious ultimately assign 
blame to the West’s dissident components and countercultures (which the West 
already produces as mirror images of its racial others). I will then interrupt the 
apparent continuity of this account through examining the discourse of the Nasserist 











and underlying epistemologies, succeeded in offering a richer engagement with these 
notions, especially inasmuch as it imagined/imaged the national crowd and the role of 
the military vis-à-vis this crowd.  My account will conclude through tracing this 
crowd-military relationship in and beyond Nasir’s era (ending with a brief discussion 
of the forms this relationship took during the prelude to and the aftermath of the 2013 
military coup d’état).  This account will also show how even when the colonialist 
and/or counterrevolutionary notions of the licentious indigenous crowd were avoided, 
the institutions which redeem the crowds or act as antidote for their licentiousness 
remained colonial institutions, modeled on their Western colonial counterparts and 
culturally and institutionally imposed on Egypt through the process of colonialism 
(these are, namely, the army as I show in this chapter and the next, and the family as I 
show in the next chapter).  
 
Unfinished	Anti-Colonial	Reversals	
The anti-colonial rhetoric, as early as the ‘Urabi revolt, crafted responses to the 
colonial allegations of the unruliness of the Egyptian crowd, yet ones which expressed 
explicit and implicit civilizational anxieties that internalized, to varying extents, the 
civilizational biases of colonialism. In the face of a discourse on the unruliness of the 
Egyptians, as a people and as a crowd/mob, early Egyptian nationalists emphasized 
the civil and civilized nature of their supporters who constituted the indigenous 
crowd. A series of essays in al-Mufid emphasized the orderly, respectable, and heroic 




agitation, and eventually mass displacement.729 Similarly ‘Urabi, in his retelling of 
various key incidents of the revolt, insisted on the orderly and civil nature of his 
supporters. Various confrontations with the Khedive are prefaced by explaining how 
the crowd/soldiers showed utmost respect, even if this led to depictions of docility– 
sometimes evident in chanting the Khedival salute.  This was especially the case in 
his depiction of the ‘Abdin Palace incident, wherein ‘Urabi recollects details of the 
military formations the demonstrators (who were mainly army soldiers) took and their 
orderly march to the Palace730 (downplaying the civilian contingent)—as if countering 
reports like the one from the Gazette, in which the army is represented as an unruly 
crowd, and the demonstration as an émeute. ‘Urabi, the leader of those men, showed 
even more discipline and restraint, to the extent of stepping down and sheathing his 
sword, while the men behind him refused to do so “as their patriotic blood was boiling 
in the furnaces of their hearts, and rage was evident on their faces.”731 While these 
and other examples stressing the orderliness of the national crowd served to counter 
the contrary colonial allegations, they show an implicit agreement with the view that 
crowds, generally, are unruly, but ours are not. The ‘Urabi press occasionally 
preserved this dichotomy/distancing between order/government/troops/military-
government on the one side and crowds on the other. Whereas in al-Naqqash’s 
historiography, the appearance of Egyptian soldiers was always a sign of threat and an 












situation is under control. To that effect the ‘Urabi mouthpiece assures its readers that 
the Egyptian army is patrolling all neighborhoods, particularly those where Europeans 
and Syrians reside.732Al-Ta’if even went further and, while stressing that the situation 
was under control and that ‘Urabi supporters were orderly and civil, issued a warrant 
that anyone caught causing strife or sedition would be shot in accordance with martial 
law.733 
As these writings belonged to the pre-British occupation stage, the stage 
when colonial interpellation and cultural imposition had not taken full hold, the 
colonial effect on the ‘Urabist press was not articulated in the form of an abnegation 
of the self or an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West. Colonial notions, however, 
appear in the acceptance of the dominant European ideological perception of space, 
crowds, Order, and revolt-qua-chaos. As it went to extremes to prove the orderliness 
of the ‘Urabi movement, the ‘Urabi press ended up producing the same dichotomy 
between governmental and military order on one side and crowd-born(e) 
revolutionary chaos on the other, except that it cast itself on the side of the former. 
This reached the extent of wholesale identification with the forces of the 
counterrevolution; on the eve of the Alexandria confrontations, al-Ta’if ran a report 
about French politics, in which it declared its admiration for Adolf Thiers (the first 
president of the Third Republic, who crushed the Commune and massacred the 
communards), and praised him for having been able to unify the nation using 







measures Thiers resorted to for crushing the revolution).734 Little did the ‘Urabists 
know that a few months later they would be likened to the adversaries of Thiers, as 
various forms of manifest firmness would be used against them. Once again, while the 
article betrays an admiration for the French Republic and counterrevolution (both 
imbedded in a set of epistemologies that are inseparable from the colonial, not the 
least due to their mapping of the licentious onto the Oriental and savage as shown in 
the previous chapter), and while this admiration of things French is a clear symptom 
of the colonial trauma that was inaugurated through the French occupation of Egypt 
(1798- 1801), the article does not show any signs of abnegating the self. Its implicit 
hostility towards the communards (who were imagined by the counterrevolution as 
Oriental, savage, and Arab) was not translated as a hostility towards the 
Arab/Oriental/Muslim self on which these communards were modeled, owing – 
among other things—to the fact that the ‘Urabists were not yet materially in the 
position of the communards (and would not be until the bombing of Alexandria 
started in June 1882).  
Once the Egyptian nationalists were materially and objectively put in the 
position of the Communards through British military occupation, the articulation of 
the colonial trauma differed and betrayed less self worth. A decade after the ‘Urabi 
revolt, al-Nadim (who had been in charge of ‘Urabist propaganda and was the editor 
in chief of al-Ta’if) reiterated his insistence on the orderliness of the national crowd, 
but this time with more emphasis on English-defined civilization and civilizational 
worth. In 1893, on the eve of the escalation between Egypt’s viceroy the Khedive 






British, al-Nadim wrote an article whereby he called on Egyptians to demand their 
rights through tazahurat adabiyyah.735 The term tazahurat (sing. tazahurah) literally 
means an appearance, manifestation, or pretense. In modern Arabic, especially when 
used in the plural, it refers to political manifestations/demonstrations. From the 
context of the article, al-Nadim was most probably using the term tazahurat in the 
latter sense; he invokes the example of workers in England who went on strike and 
who “impressed the world with their deeds that witnessed no riot or flaw.”736 The 
term adabiyyah clearly refers to civilizational worth: adab (in addition to its modern 
usage to refer to literature, a translation that has been thoroughly criticized by adab 
scholars) means good behavior, discipline, and civilization.737 Adab as civilization is 
important in this context: throughout this article and others, al-Nadim had been 
stressing that if the purpose of the British occupation of Egypt had been to civilize the 
Egyptian, then the occupation had achieved its goals and it was time for it to leave. 
According to this logic, the Egyptians could get the British to leave by displaying 
their civilizational worth (here one could even drop the specific meaning of tazahurat 
as demonstrations and translate al-Nadim’s article as an appeal to the Egyptians to 
manifest themselves in a civilized manner). Not unrelated to this logic is the 
















demonstrations that are disciplined, featuring no “riots or flaws,” and that are thus 
able to “impress the world,” just like that of English workers. While al-Nadim’s 
ultimate purpose seems to be the exposure of British hypocrisy, claiming to civilize 
the country while occupying it for its own ulterior reasons, he ends up reproducing the 
colonial understanding of civilization-as-discipline and more particularly as colonial 
discipline; in this article as well as in previous ones he goes as far as crediting the 
English with teaching Egyptians important civilizational lessons, and with providing a 
margin of freedom that allows for civilizational growth.738 Even as he questions the 
West’s civilizational mission, al-Nadim subscribes to the logic that the people can 
demand their rights only once they have reached a certain civilizational stage, and 
accepts the colonial stage as the exclusive benchmark of civilization. He only 
disagrees with the claims of colonial discourse concerning the civilizational stage 
Egyptians were said to have reached at the time, but not with the logic of colonialism 
and its episteme of civilization.  
This logic represents a step backwards from the discourse of the ‘Urabi 
revolt (and thus from al-Nadim’s earlier position as the orchestrator of ‘Urabist 
rhetoric),739 which insisted on the civilizational worth of Egyptians and other 
Ottomans in the face of a lack of civilizational worth on the part of the West, 














British imperialism. The defeat was also manifest in the acceptance (though tactical 
and aimed at exposing British hypocrisy) of the British definition of civilization as the 
frame of reference to which even nationalist authors appealed, and ultimately 
accepting the British (or more broadly Western/foreign) as the judge of whether 
Egyptians had achieved civilization or not. This was a salient feature of Egyptian 
public discourse that outlasted British colonization—the acceptance of the foreign, 
predominantly Western, gaze as the judge of Egyptians’ civilization and civility, and 
the constant need to submit civilizational credentials to the West (which was 
sustained, of course, by political and economic dependency relations with the West, 
especially under Sadat’s open door policy and its continuation under Mubarak’s, 
Mursi’s, and al-Sisi’s regimes, and whereby Egypt as a political and economic entity 
needed to prove itself to the colonial centers it aimed to serve).  
After the uprising of 2011, in one of the rare moments of Egyptian state and 
capitalist sponsored propaganda flirted with, rather than abnegated, the crowd, quotes 
by foreign leaders and foreign news agencies about the civility and civilizational 
worth of Egyptian demonstrators (some real, some apocryphal) quickly became 
popular on Egyptian television channels, in Egyptian social media, and on billboards. 
Giant billboards through the highways entering and exiting Cairo International 
Airport reproduced these quotes with images of their (alleged) authors. As they turned 
the ‘revolution’ into an object of the foreign/white gaze, and despite the lip service 
they paid to the ‘revolution’, these billboards served the counterrevolutionary purpose 
of turning the 2011 uprising into an act for a foreign audience and legible through a 
white civilizational gaze. This is a clear symptom of what Fanon terms “a collapse of 
the ego,” when the colonized “stops behaving as an actional person. His actions are 




enhance his status and give him self-esteem at the ethical level”740 (emphasis in 
original). 
Another closely related trend, which successfully subverted the colonial 
gaze, though failed to problematize colonial civilizational assumptions themselves, 
was to hurl the charge of licentiousness back toward the West (including the Greeks 
and the Maltese, who, despite not being perceived as white or fully Western/European 
by Europe at the time, were conceived by Egyptians as part of the West – defined in 
opposition to the Ottoman Sultanate- and part of the Western colonial effort – given 
the way many of the Greeks and Maltese residents of Alexandria took the side of the 
British during the 1882 invasion). This sometimes took the form of blaming unruly 
behavior on Western residents of Egypt,741 which was taken up and expanded by al-










a	Greek	assailed	an	indigenous	Egyptian	(min	al-wataniyyin)	the	newspaper	exclaims:	 شحوتلا اذھل اسعتف








لاسلا انیلع نورھشتو لطابلا نوقحتو قحلا نولطبت انبولق اھیلع اوعبطتو انسوفن يف اھوثبت نأ نودیرت يتلا نویبرغلا اھیأ مكتیندم هذھأ ح
انومجرتو يرانلا حلاسلا فئاذق انیلع نوقلطتو ضیبلأا	]اذكھ	[ مظعأ يف انم مكاح ربكأ نوحرجتو انتوق رھظم نولتقتو ةراجحلاب
 اذإ مث انروغثةنیز اھانذختا اصع انیدیأ يفو ةنیدملا هذھ نساحم ىلع جرفتملا جورخ انجرخ		  تیبابن اھومتلعج انسفنأ نع اھب شھنل لا




times the invading army and its stooges (including Khedive Tawfiq, the viceroy 
during the ‘Urabi revolt and the British invasion) were the ones depicted as spreading 
chaos.743 Other times yet, this discourse took a more global outlook, comparing the 
civility of Egyptians and other Ottomans to the savagery and cruelty of Europeans 
(for Egyptian authors at the time the savagery of Europe was particularly evident in its 
treatment of its Jewish population, and the Russian pogroms were commonly cited as 
evidence of Europe’s savagery—notwithstanding the othering of the Russians by 
Europe itself).744 
This account of Western savagery, opposed to Eastern/Muslim/Ottoman 
civilization and civility, can be easily seen in al-Jawa’ib’s reports on the Commune. 
By using a damning language to describe the Commune, its savagery, and the horrors 
of its socialism, al-Shidyaq may be seen as sending the charge of savagery back to 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 												 	
The	anti-colonial	reversals,	however,	subscribe	to	a	clearly	classist	logic:	
	
حلا ببسلاو نع قازترلاا لئاسو مھب ترصق نیذلا مھتلفسو موقلا عاعر نم ةیردنكسلإا يف ةیردنكسلإا يف ءلازنلا بلغأ نأ وھ يقیق




















Europe;745 the savage crowd, according to this reading of al-Shidyaq, belongs not to 
the Orient, not to the colonies, not to Native America or Africa, but to Europe proper, 
and to Paris, the so-called capital of the nineteenth century, out of all European cities. 
Early in his coverage of the Commune, al-Shidyaq points out (with an unmistakable 
mix of awe and vindication) the ‘ajab (wonder/irony/bemusement) in how the nation 
that “last year was a model in civilization and knowledge” was a year later suffering 
from turmoil.746 The implicit schadenfreude (not completely implicit if we take into 
consideration that ‘ajab comes from the same root as a’jaba, to like, though the term 
‘ajab usually denotes awe and amazement rather than enjoyment) in this statement is 
made more explicit in the next page; these events, according to al-Shidyaq, were a 
sign that God wanted to punish the French for their imperial hubris: 
 نایغطلا نم اقباس هوبكترا ام ىلع سیسنرفلا بدؤی نأ دارأ امنإ لجو زع يرابلا نأ ىلع لدی اذھف
 اوحبصأف كلامملا عیمج ریبدت لواحتو لودلا رئاس رومأ يف لخادتت ةیروطاربملإا مھتلود تناك ذإ ربجتلاو
























Al-Shidyaq takes the Commune as an occasion to deny France’s claim to 
everything it was supposed to pioneer, from civic ethics to democracy. In at least two 
of his editorials on the Commune, he set out to give the French a lesson in civic 
ethics, after lamenting how they fought among themselves and tore their homeland 
apart.748 In one of these editorials al-Shidyaq warned (his audience? the French?) that 
if the insurrection of the Commune continued, people would start to think of the 
French as “a chaotic people (unas fawda) that neither learn the lessons of their past 
nor plan for their future, and who are therefore only suited to be governed by 
force.”749 The French, thus, in the discourse of al-Shidyaq, became disorderly native 
savages who lacked a sense of history (they neither learn from their past nor plan for 
their future).  Tyranny, therefore, was part of their culture—or so people would think, 
al-Shidyaq was careful to distance himself from the claims he made. In a similar 
manner, in a later editorial he exclaimed, in a remarkable expression of anti-colonial 
schadenfreude: “everyone now thinks that the Parisians can only be governed through 
coercion and suppression.”750 Here we clearly see the stereotype of Oriental 
despotism along with the charge of civilizational savagery being turned back against 
France, as a step towards turning these charges back against the West.  
This charge of (French) savagery is generalized to the rest of the West 
through Europe’s (alleged) complicity with the communards, made explicit through 
the readiness of some European countries to grant asylum to former communards. Al-
Shidyaq mocks this decision, noting that European governments only exhibited a 








wondering what kind of civilization allowed one to host saboteurs (mufsidin) who 
spread ruin (kharab), exclaiming that if this was what civilization looked like, then 
perhaps savagery was better: شحوتلاب لاھأف اندمت ىمسی اذھ نكی نإف.751 Al-Shidyaq here 
seems to echo closely the Standard’s article about the communards being hostis 
humani generis and those who shelter them passing for heathen nations (which was 
perhaps among al-Shidyaq's sources, given the frequency with which he used to cite 
the Standard). Unlike the Standard’s reporter, however, who saw civilization in 
Christendom and savagery outside of it, al-Shidyaq here was questioning the 
civilizational claim of Europe/Christendom as a whole. For the Standard, the referent 
for savagery is heathen nations, while for al-Shidyaq, the referent is Europe. 
Revolutionary ruin and chaos are therefore forms of barbarism, yet a 
distinctly Western barbarism. To further establish this point, al-Shidyaq places chaos 
within a distinctly French grammar.  Frustrated with the confusion and contradiction 
of news reports relating to the insurrection, al-Shidyaq locates this confusion within a 
French lack of bayan (eloquence/clarity/signification); after quoting one of the reports 
on the Commune, al-Shidyaq protests “this statement was in the passive voice in the 
original, for they are bereft of eloquence (bayan) and do not know the conditions 
under which the passive voice can replace the active.”752 Al-Shidyaq’s frustration 
with the French lack of bayan/eloquence continued and was generalized to Western, 
including British, media: after a lengthy paragraph about how the news was confusing 
and news sources unreliable, al-Shidyaq’s frustration reached its peak:  
																																								 																			 	
751Al-Jawa’ib,	9	Rabi‘	al-Awwal	1288,	28/5/1871,	1.		





يرعش تیل مث  امو ھتعامجو ةللیدروب ىلإ وأ ھئاكرشو رتور ىلإ سیرابو ياسرف نم رابخلأا هذھ لسری نم
 ّتك نأ فیكو رابخلأا فحص ھب اولأم يذلا رتاھتلا اذھو طیلختلاو شیوشتلا اذھب دارملا ام مھنم نومھفی فحصلا هذھ با
لذ ىلع مھنومولی لا فیكف مھومھفی مل اذإو تاممعملاو يجاحلأا نم ھنوقلی ملاكلا يف لصولا نوعاری لا جنرفلإا نأب انملس ك
 نونغیو مولعم ھل لعاف ىلإ لعفلا نودنسی لا مل نكلو ریخأتلاو میدقتلا لاو قیسنتلا لاو [؟قابطلا لاو عیرقتلا لاو] فطعلا لاو
.لیوأتلا نع سانلا753  
At the end of this paragraph, al-Shidyaq once again places this confusion 
within a French grammar; he grants that the ifrinj/ifranj (lit. the Franks, a term that in 
modern Arabic may refers to Western foreigners in general, or more particularly to 
the French) are not well versed in rhetoric and that he should not expect them to write 
with eloquence “but why don’t they just refer the verb to a defined subject and spare 
people the speculation.” These are most probably references to the use of the French 
impersonal pronoun on, whereby the specific subject of the sentence remains 
obscured even though the sentence is phrased in the active voice.754 Once again this is 
a reversal of the charge of savagery. If for the colonizer the colonized speaks in 
gibberish or lacks the proper faculties of speech and signification (as we saw in the 
many examples where crowds howl in faux-Arabic), for al-Shidyaq it is the French—
and through them the rest of the Europeans- who lack the faculty of bayan, of proper 



















In another example Christianity itself falls under al-Shidyaq’s attack. If the 
Standard had placed the communards and their sympathizers outside “the moral code 
of Christendom,” al-Shidyaq, presaging Nietzsche’s linking Christianity and socialism 
in his 1887 Genealogy of Morals, placed socialism itself in 1871 within the moral 
code of Christendom and the teachings of the Bible. Socialism, which he repeatedly 
denounced, is attributed to Christianity and more specifically to the New Testament – 
Chapters 4 and 5 of the Acts of the Apostles, especially the verse stating “but they 
shared everything they owned.”755Al-Shidyaq prefaces this fake genealogy of 
socialism with the caveat “Though I am not one to mock sects and religions...” This of 
course, is only to be read ironically; a significant part of al-Shidyaq’s oeuvre is 
dedicated to mocking sects and religions (not only Christianity and Judaism, but also 
the way Islam, to which he converted, was practiced). What this preface is telling us, 
in al-Shidyaq’s tongue-in-cheek style, is that what was to follow was an attack on 
socialism and Christianity, just like his regular attacks on religion which were 
referenced through their negation. After attributing socialism to Christianity, al-
Shidyaq placed his polemic against Socialism within his larger attack on European 
civilization (or the lack thereof) by telling a (seemingly unrelated) story about a 
woman in London who was arrested for stealing, but was pardoned because she 
pleaded that it was her husband who ordered her to do so, and that the Holy Book 
commanded her to obey her husband.756 Al-Shidyaq’s re-production of Europe’s 
attacks on Islam and re-directing them to a Christian Europe was obvious in this 










were religiously dogmatic, and that women had to blindly obey their husbands, but in 
London, and under the precepts of Christianity. Read this way, the story about the 
woman thief ceases to be unrelated to the polemic against socialism and the 
Commune, and appears as part of his expansive criticism of Western civilization and 
its Christian component. Al-Shidyaq found in the alleged savagery of the 
communards a chance to settle scores with Christianity (from which he had converted 
to Islam), the Maronite Church (which tortured his brother to death), the Protestant 
missionaries (who rejected his translation of the Bible), and the Christian component 
of Western civilization. 
With al-Shidyaq, therefore, we see two opposite trends coexisting. We see, 
on the one hand, the acceptance and internalization of many of the Western notions, 
biases, in short, epistemai, and a wholesale adoption of a distinctly Western-bourgeois 
counterrevolutionary ideology that abhors socialism and abnegates the crowd. On the 
other hand, we see a reversal that is at times meticulous, in which the savage is not the 
Oriental, the Muslim, the Turk, or the Arab, but rather the Westerner, the European, 
and particularly the French. Despite this reversal, however, the end result of al-
Shidyaq’s intellectual effort was to facilitate French and especially British 
imperialism.  
In the example of al-Shidyaq we see not only the depiction of the licentious 
crowd as a Western phenomenon, but furthermore a discourse on the licentious West 
in toto. In addition to the licentious crowd that stands for Europe’s savagery, we see 
this licentiousness placed within French grammar, within Christianity, within 
European civilization, or, to use the words of the Standard's reporter, within “the 
moral code of Christendom.” A similar trend (perhaps influenced by al-Shidyaq) soon 




Western civilizational hierarchy notwithstanding, and Mustafa Kamil and his 
entourage writing in al-Liwa’) not only depicted the unruly crowd as a Western 
phenomenon but furthermore labeled various forms of licentiousness and public 
immorality as Western exports. Prostitution, gambling, alcoholism, narcotics, and 
wasteful expenditure were attributed by al-Nadim to foreign influence and colonial 
emulation.757 When al-Liwa’ accused the foreigners of spreading alcoholism, 
narcotics, gambling, and socialism/labor activism (as seen in Chapter 1), it subscribed 
to that same logic. The association between Western licentiousness and Western-
inspired political activism kept reappearing in Egyptian discourse up to Rami al-
I‘tisami; Rami and his comrades were Westernized elites enamored of Western 
exports (including a socially liberal lifestyle, gyms and nightclubs, facebook, and 
political activism). Similarly the licentious revolutionaries in the counterrevolutionary 
discourse of 2011 were Westernized elites carrying a Western agenda (signs of their 
Westernization in that discourse were abundant, from rumors that they were receiving 
free KFC meals, to the exclamation by a former pro-regime thug that he thought they 
were a “bunch of American University [in Cairo] pansies.”)758 
The articulations of the licentious West, predominant as they were in 
Egyptian discourse, consistently betrayed signs of the Fanonian neurosis; if al-
Shidyaq turned the charge of licentiousness back to the West while preserving some 
of the West’s hegemonic assumptions which abnegated their own crowds and 









licentious West while preserving the West’s abnegation of its racial others (sometimes 
closely re-producing Western anti-Arab tropes and stereotypes, other times using 
other savages as the markers of licentiousness), and sometimes implicitly admiring 
the licentious West as a cite of liberation.    
Perhaps the most famous articulations of a licentious West came from the 
writings of the Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb,759 where he characterized American 
society as immoral, sexually permissive, and hence degenerate.760 Striking in Qutb’s 
sexual polemic is how he used not only the language of degeneration (inhilal) but also 
that of primitivism: the sexual unruliness of the American man made him a primitive 
man, according to Qutb.761 This is clearly a response to and a reversal of Orientalist 
discourse that accused the Arab/Muslim/Oriental of being sexually permissive and 
therefore savage. This response, however, accepted the presumptions of Western 
civilizational discourse: there is a civilizational ladder marked by relative sexual 























Westerner, occupies this high rung.762 Qutb’s response failed to interrogate the racial 
foregrounding of the concept of the sexual savage; one is left to wonder where the 
referent to primitiveness lies, and whether Qutb, by labeling American sexual mores 
as primitive, was placing American society in the same category with the sexual 
“savages” of Africa or even of Native America. Qutb was not alone in that regard, 
even if we bracket the appearance of the Islamist-as-sexual-savage which we 
encountered in chapters 1 and 2, the ‘native savage’, the African and to a lesser extent 
the Native American, appeared prominently in Egyptian representations as the 
embodiment of licentiousness and sexual savagery and as markers of a state of 




































through projection: the Egyptian, always othered through the white gaze that 
conditions his or her very existence, can only become (comparatively) white through 
projecting otherness onto other racial others, especially ones of darker skin, and/or 
victims of genocidal and epistemic violence.764 
If Qutb (and many other Egyptian authors) mapped licentiousness to the 
primitive, Ruz al-Yusuf, especially in the 1990s, mapped licentiousness to the 
futuristic age of globalization and to an advanced West. If Qutb et al. needed to 
project this licentiousness to other racial others and thus rescue the Egyptian self from 
their civilizational abnegation, Ruz al-Yusuf’s surface reversal of the charge of 
licentiousness preserved, in many ways, the abnegation of the Arab/Egyptian self and 
the figures of the sexually perverse Arab/Muslim (which we encountered in the 
previous chapter).  The depictions of a licentious West were sometimes taken to 
absurd and extreme measures by Ruz al-Yusuf (always a good venue for researching 
such discourse, given how it served as the sensationalist voice of the regime— Ruz al-
Yusuf also happened to be the venue which published Qutb’s writings before his turn 
to political Islam). The reports of Ruz al-Yusuf, especially in the 1990s (at the onset of 
the age of globalization) drew an image of a licentious West wherein nudity and the 
potential of illicit sexual encounters lurk at every corner.  
For example, in 1995, Ruz al-Yusuf’s reporter Ayman al-Tuhami issued a 













Details of a Live Experience: 42nd, the Sex Street of New York).765 In this 
confessional, al-Tuhami recounts a 1988 visit to New York where he had to struggle 
with the temptation to attend a live sex show at a sex shop on 42nd Street. Al-Tuhami 
described his struggle with the temptation and his sense of guilt when he succumbed, 
only to find that the woman performing the show was a male-to-female transsexual 
(the licentious West turns out to be an indescribable orgy where sex is performed live 
and wherein men and women cannot be distinguished). Al-Tuhami then informed his 
audience that, if instead of heading to 42nd street they turned to Broadway, they would 
find no naked women hassling them (advice that has been rendered more recently 
obsolete by the semi-naked performers, known as the desnudas, in star-spangled body 
paint at Times Square) and that they might end up seeing performances of ‘high art’ 
(for which he mistook the musical Cats) featuring no nudity (again, a piece of advice 
rendered obsolete every time a musical with nude scenes is put on stage). Here al-
Tuhami, though subscribing to the propaganda that markets the modern West as a 
space for sexual liberation, is clearly (even if unconsciously) subverting the classical 
Orientalist fantasy of the Orient as a space for hidden and forbidden pleasures. It is in 
the United States and not in the Orient, and in a sex shop and not in a Harem, that 
forbidden voyeuristic pleasures are granted, condensing the sensual women and the 
effeminate boys of the Orient in one transsexual performer. The voyeur, however, is 
still Arab/Muslim, and so is his perverse desire (produced this time by a repressive, 






A few months later al-Tuhami wrote another informative essay on Paris titled 
“al-Hubb wa al-Jins ‘ala Arsifat Baris” (Love and Sex on the Sidewalks of Paris).766 
A few of the lessons we learn about Paris from this article are: that in Paris love is one 
thing and sex is another, that Parisians are “well versed” in treading the difference 
between the two “the same way Americans are well versed in devouring 
Hamburgers,” and that when a Parisian woman smiles at a man, it is not always an 
invitation for sex, sometimes it is, sometimes it is not, but when it is, it is often 
conditional. To enjoy this unique trait of Parisian women (the ability to solicit sex and 
give conditional invitations to men?), tourists flock to Paris from everywhere “even 
from the US and Israel.” The article then moves to describe how Arab tourists are 
especially interested in sexual tourism (presumably unlike al-Tuhami who writes 
about the cultural attractions of New York and Paris?) and how many Parisian 
prostitutes are of Arab origins. Perhaps al-Tuhami is conflating– or coupling- once 
again, the licentious West with the Arab pervert, and is subscribing to the tradition of 
Orientalism that renders the bodies of European women licentious through perverse 
Muslim desire (as encountered in the previous chapter)—though/especially that many 
of these licentious Parisian bodies are also Arab. Once again even as the stereotype of 
the licentious and permissive Orient is being reverse, abjection and perversion remain 















On the same issue ‘Asim Hanafi (a satirist with a playful style, who did not 
attempt to hide his erotic confessions with professions of guilt or moral lessons the 
way al-Tuhami did) wrote, under the title “al-Tublis Ya Jama‘ah” [Topless, People!] a 
report on London’s Hyde Park and how, when it is sunny, everyone there goes 
topless, including one (female, it is important to note) informant with whom Hanafi 
conducted an extended interview.767 The licentious and the political come together in 
the report; the topless informant turns out to be an Irish IRA supporter who hates 
British colonialism and sympathizes with Arab causes, and the meeting ground is 
Hyde Park, which is associated in Arabic representations with its Speakers Corner and 
therefore represents a withdrawal of state censorship and surveillance.  
The intersection between the sexual/licentious and the political(ly 
subversive) in Western territories (yet ones in which state surveillance retreats) 
appears more clearly in a short report on Ayman al-Zawahri (then an obscure Islamist 
leader with unknown whereabouts and before he rose to fame as the second in line in 
al-Qa‘idah after the attacks of 11/9/2001).  The report, titled “Sirri lil Ghayah: Akhtar 
Umara’ al-Irhab” [Top Secret: the Most Dangerous among Terror Commanders] 
(4/12/1995) and written by Sawsan al-Jayyar,768 alleged that al-Zawahri had been 
living on the Swiss-French border along with his “pretty wife.” It is curious that to 
represent the terrorist’s hideout in the West, a female body is needed (and the 
gendered body is important in the representation, it is not just the wife, it is the pretty 
wife); the female body here can be read not only as a metonym to the terrorist 









an index of the licentious West, which allows the terrorist to hide and copulate in its 
licentious spaces (here the West clearly replaces the Arab-Muslim other in the racially 
charged metonymic relation between the crowd and the female body which was 
described earlier). It is important how al-Zawahri was imagined to live in a liminal 
space: a place on the border, neither Swiss nor French. The terrorist’s hideout is in the 
West, but in a place that defines the limit of the Western (Nation-)State. I should note 
in this context that France promotes itself as a subject of the world’s sexual fantasies, 
and that Switzerland promotes itself as a haven where dissidents, millionaires, and 
secret bank accounts can hide from the gaze of other states. The terrorist’s hideout 
thus exists on the border of two already lax and permissive systems of sovereignty, 
and where political and sexual laxity intersect. 
While these reports can be located within a history of turning back the 
charges of license and inhilal (both as moral looseness and as degeneration) against 
the West from which these charges originated, there is hardly anything subversive in 
them. They come at a time when the West had stopped marketing itself as the site of 
puritanical sexual respectability, and started to market itself as a space of sexual 
liberation.769 In line with the Western hegemonic message, Ruz al-Yusuf’s reports on 
sexual liberation in the West are characterized with fascination – mixed with some 
sense of scandal, of guilty pleasure, and coded in an ambiguous language that 
simultaneously condemns and praises; Arabs feel guilty when they go to peep shows 
on 42nd street, and they are disgusted by Arabs who procure prostitutes in Paris, but 







miniskirts in Paris, and by their smiles, which signal conditional invitations, according 
to Ruz al-Yusuf’s reports.770 
Opposed to the Western attractions, cathected with horror and fascination, 
appears an abnegated self; we have already explored the appearance of the Arab 
pervert and the Arab prostitute in relation/opposition to attractive Parisian sexuality. 
In a similar vein, al-Tuhami’s confession to succumbing to his voyeuristic desires and 
attending a peep show can be read as a gesture towards the stereotype of the 
Arab/Muslim/Oriental voyeur (which we have encountered repeatedly in the previous 
chapters). More playful versions of self-abnegation in the face of fascination by the 
West appear in the report on partial nudity in Hyde Park. Towards the end of this 
report, ‘Asim Hanafi juxtaposes the scene of Western naked bodies to the 
hypothetical scene of his “aunt hippopotamus” getting naked on the beach “while she 
stuffs vegetables with rice.” This juxtaposition betrays in opposition to the male 
fascination with the West/Western female bodies, an abnegation of the Arab self and 
of indigenous Arab female bodies and culinary practices.  Similarly, a Ruz al-Yusuf 
report on satellite porn channels ends by disapprovingly citing how Egyptian 
television broadcasts a religious show every night, wondering how Egyptian 
















channels.771 In these examples we see the Arab/Egyptian (and the Egyptian man more 
specifically, since all accounts, except the one on al-Zawahri, were written by men 
and narrated desire from a male heteronormative standpoint), much like the black man 
in Fanon’s analysis “constantly struggling against his own image.”772  
The predominant presence of an abnegated version of the self in reports 
about the licentious West reveals something about the working of the Fanonian 
trauma and its articulation in the Egyptian context. We have already argued 
repeatedly that the othering from the white frame of reference and therefore othering 
from the self  had occurred in Egypt  prior to the first personal encounter with a 
colonizer/white person (always conditioned by the first encounter between Egypt and 
its European colonizer, French or English). The personal encounter with the colonizer, 
however, and on the colonizer’s own territory, highlights this trauma, and leads the 
(post)colonial subject to feel its density. Like Fanon’s Antillean who in the presence 
of the white gaze “feels the weight of his melanin,”773 and who experienced unease 
and a self-consciousness of acts priorly perceived as natural or habitual,774 Hanafi and 
Tuhami’s accounts reveal certain uneasiness about their presence and their bodies. We 
also perceive this in Hanafi’s hesitance to disrobe (against the white woman’s 
implorations, perhaps betraying a hidden abnegation or shame of the indigenous body, 
an abnegation which he only reveals at the end of his essay through projecting it onto 










Square, and of the desire of his Arab peers in Paris. This shame of being present (as a 
body and a desiring subject) in the metropole was summarized in Fanon’s painful 
proclamation: “I was taking up room.”775 
 
Blaming	Counterculture	
Depictions of the licentious West in Egyptian discourse also subscribed to the 
Western hegemonic discourse in another aspect: when licentiousness goes beyond the 
bounds of what the Western agenda of sexual liberation permitted, when 
licentiousness is to be depicted as dangerous and subversive, the Western dissident, 
the figure of Western counterculture, most notably the hippie becomes the epitome of 
licentiousness. The hippie is already located at the intersection of the licentious and 
the subversive, the sexually and politically active (one could even go as far as 
describing the hippie, side by side with the French 1968er, as a fulcrum around which 
the discourse on the licentious political activist has revolved since 1968/69). The 
licentiousness of the hippie connects to the licentiousness of the sexual savage, by 
way of the hippie appropriation of Native American culture (but also by way of the 
association of the hippie counterculture with the Black and Red liberation movements 
in the United States).  
In post-Nasserist Egyptian representations of licentiousness, the hippie 
surfaces as a marker of a Western licentiousness that threatens to infect Egypt. This 
appears as early as 1970 (during the final days of Nasir) when the government-owned 






that they chose West Germany rather than the United States, which was perhaps 
testimony to how the hippie counterculture was infectious, even beyond North 
America).776A few weeks later the same magazine published an alarmist and 
thoroughly sensationalist report on a hippie party in Alexandria. Imported 
licentiousness is highlighted in the article, beginning with the woman at the entrance 
of the house where the party was staged, wearing a towel “and nothing else,” a girl 
who drew hearts on her face with the help of her own mother, underage drinking, to 
an underage girl wearing a t-shirt marked with English obscenities. It is noteworthy 
how, in this article, licentiousness is gendered as feminine, and how the licentious 
female body serves as the metonym and the surface for the inscription of 
licentiousness, sometimes literally so.777 This article was referenced by Ruz al-Yusuf 
during the Satanists scandal (1996-97), as if to provide a genealogy for Western 
licentiousness in Egypt, thus initiating a trend of likening the Satanists to the 
hippies.778 Hippie licentiousness, in Akhir Sa‘ah and Ruz al-Yusuf, is not only sexual. 
Reference to Charles Manson (mistakenly identified as the leader of the hippies), 
were often made, to illustrate how something that could start as an exercise of 
personal freedom could lead to gruesome crimes.779 
It was not only Ruz al-Yusuf that resurrected the hippie as a model for 












its publisher as a series of “pocket novels”) that took upon itself the task of instilling 
military ideology in the minds of a young readership for a good part of the 1980s and 
1990s, and perhaps through the early 2000s, the hippie made an appearance as an 
index of a licentious West, a foil to the proper masculinity of the Egyptian military 
man/intelligence officer, and a target for his violent disciplining.780 Even in the 
discourse on the Islamists, the Islamist terrorist is comparable, according to a former 
minister of interior, to the hippie, inasmuch as both stage a juvenile rebellion against 
paternal authority and against society and its norms.781 
The figure of the hippie therefore indexed in Egyptian pro-State conservative 
discourse a Western licentiousness or a licentious rebellion. For our analysis, the 































hegemonic discourse, even as it aimed at directing the charge of licentiousness to the 
West. It is not the businessman on Wall Street782 or the US marine that are being 
charged with licentiousness, but rather the American hippie; not the dominant 
capitalistic and militaristic culture, but the rebellious counterculture. In fact all, or 
most, of the previous examples can be read as subscribing to a Western hegemonic 
discourse about “disorderly” conduct and morality. Even as these authors try to 
project licentiousness on the West, and as they attempt to denounce the West as 
unruly and licentious, it is the West’s internal others that are denounced. This is not 
new. As we already saw in al-Mufid’s coverage of the Alexandria riots and the British 
invasion in 1882, aside from the the incidents wherein al-Mufid blamed British troops 
for spreading chaos, what it ultimately denounced were the awbash among the 
Europeans, the lower classes and the lesser whites (the Greeks, the Maltese). Al-
Shidyaq as we showed clearly denounced the socialists, the revolutionaries, the lower 
class, and the crowd – all of whom already were represented by the figure of or 
produced in the image of the racial savage, the Arab included. Ruz al-Yusuf and Rajul 
al-Mustahil ultimately denounce the counterculture and not the hegemonic culture, 
and by way of denouncing the hippie they partake of denouncing the Native savage 
(native to America or other colonies). In his attempt to denounce what he thought was 
the American hegemonic culture, even Qutb, ultimately partook of an evolutionary 
discourse in which the sexual savage was denounced. When the self is not abnegated, 
abnegation is displaced onto other racial others (perhaps an attempt to identify with 
whiteness or compete with it over its place in the hierarchy of civilizations, at the 








class, the rebellious, the counterculture, usually while preserving Europe’s racial 
others as the referent for the licentiousness of these groups. The result is, at best, a 
deflected, delayed, deferred, and/or imminent Fanonian trauma.   
Through all these examples, the Western metaphysics of statehood, whereby 
what is upheld by the nation State becomes proper and what evades it is licentious, are 
re-produced. The national post-colonial State inherits these metaphysics and posits 
what falls outside of its purview – including that which falls in the West, as licentious. 
In many of the above examples furthermore, what falls outside the purview of the 
post-colonial State also falls outside the purview of the Western State. There are 
examples, of course, wherein licentiousness is sponsored by Western states as part of 
neocolonial design to undermine the post-colonial state, like foreign sponsored 
pornography in the discourse of Ruz al-Yusuf.783  But, aside from the examples where 
there is a depiction of a clear Western conspiracy, Western licentious spaces seem to 
defy even the gaze of the Western state:784 they are seedy sex shops on 42nd street, 


















Through the Egyptian representations of the licentious West, specifically 
representations by the regime’s sensationalist mouthpiece Ruz al-Yusuf, we see the 
preponderance of the white gaze and the figure of the sexual savage (whether through 
the figures of the African and Native American or through the figure of the Arab 
pervert). This preponderance also came to shape Egyptian statist and 
counterrevolutionary ideologies and representations. In their own right, these 
ideologies and representations were continuations of the colonial cultural impositions. 
The same gaze which enacts psychic violence against the non-white, was internalized 
in such writings, which worked hand in hand with the invention of a State gaze which 
mimicked its colonial predecessor. We may recall here our argument in Chapter 2 that 
the conception of the gaze of the state as a mechanism entitled to open up (even if 
forcefully) all segments of the societies, all hidden pockets, private affairs, and 
orgiastic spaces, is a symptom of a modern Western form of power. We may also 
recall that part of the impetus for colonization was constituted (or at least justified) by 
the urge to open up all hidden spaces to the gaze of the (colonial) State. Relevant here 
is Fanon’s analysis of the French campaign against the veil in Algeria, and how it was 
fueled by the colonizers’ anxiety about what is hidden, and their urge to visualize 
everything to their gaze.786 It should come as no surprise then that the representations 
of the licentious female body behind the veil in the Egyptian State’s anti-Islamist 
propaganda (which we encountered in Chapter 2) eerily resembles the French colonial 
representations of the veiled Algerian woman as explicated by Fanon: “The 
European’s aggressiveness will express itself likewise in contemplation of the 
Algerian woman’s morality. Her timidity and her reserve are transformed in 






and the Algerian woman becomes hypocritical, perverse, and even a veritable 
nymphomaniac.”787 More broadly, this persistence of the colonial gaze and its target 
figure of the perverse Arab/sexual savage in Egyptian representations explains the 
proliferation of the figure of the Islamist as a sexual savage/pervert according to the 
civilizational presumptions of European colonialism (and as seen in Chapters 1 and 2 
of this study). While this white-colonial gaze always produced the sexual savage as its 
other, or as one of the figures through which its non-white other is comprehended and 
represented, the appropriation of this gaze by the postcolonial state produced the 
Islamist as one of its internal others788 (which can also be explained through the 
process whereby the colonized projects licentious non-whiteness onto other colonized 
populations: the Antilleans onto the Senegalese, Egyptian mainstream media onto the 
Africans and Native Americans, Qutb onto the primitive man, etc.) 
The effect of the national adoption of the colonial gaze is not limited to the 
othering of Islamists-as-primitives/sexual savages, or to the occasional association of 




















of the “metaphysics of modernity” (as per Timothy Mitchell’s formulation),789 which 
only comprehends what it could structure through a plan, leaving out what does not 
follow a plan as devoid of meaning or value, is also at play. In Chapter 2 I have built 
on Mitchell’s conception of the metaphysics of modernity to argue that, against and in 
opposition to the institutions that embody the order or are structured according to a 
plan (the exhibit, the museum, the army, to name a few of Mitchell’s examples), 
social bodies or spaces that are not regimented into this order or do not lend 
themselves to the plan (most notably the crowd) become devoid of meaning, 
licentious, and Oriental. In Chapter 3 I have argued that these colonial epistemologies 
and metaphysics organize space into proper spaces – modeled on European bourgeois 
ideals, accessible to the gaze of the state – and licentious spaces (most notably the 
crowd) which are constantly referred to Europe’s racial other. In this chapter we have 
established how the colonial gaze is predominant in Egyptian representations. Taking 
these arguments side by side, it should not come as a surprise that the Egyptian public 
and especially pro-State discourse consistently posits institutions that are modeled on 
their European/colonial counterparts (e.g. the army and the family) as the proper 
spaces, while adopting the same colonial biases against crowds, and against the 
indigenous crowd, as constituting licentious spaces. Given how the proper spaces are 
modeled on colonial/Western/European bourgeois/white institutions, and how the 
licentious spaces were produced in mutual mapping with Europe’s others (including 
the Egyptian, the Arab, and the Muslim), we can see how the organization of space 
parallels and further sustains the psychic colonial trauma. In the next chapter we will 
further explore the tension between remnants, re-appropriations, and reinventions of 






the discourse on the family and the army in modern Egypt.Prior to moving to proper 
spaces, I want to trouble the above account of seemingly uninterrupted colonial 
epistemic triumph. First, if to argue that the colonial gaze persisted even when 
inflected, I picked examples wherein colonial biases and presumptions were re-
produced, this does not preclude the presence of other variances and exceptions. 
Indeed, there are various Egyptian cultural products and works of art that subvert the 
colonial gaze along with its underlying epistemologies: a notable case is Muhammad 
al-Muwaylihi’s Hadith ‘Isa ibn Hisham790 (originally published circa 1906) which not 
only subverts the colonial gaze but also deconstructs the whole notion that what is 
open to the gaze of the state is proper and what hides is licentious. Given the depth, 
complexity, and unique quality of this text, it will be impossible to do it justice in this 
chapter. This trend, however, remains almost entirely absent from the archives of this 
study, which speaks to the colonial nature of Egyptian nationalism, the Egyptian 
State, and Egyptian counterrevolution. Another exception which fails to subvert the 
colonial notions yet offers an interesting counterpoint to it, and which is crucial for 
this study, is the rhetoric of the Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir regime (1952- 1970).791 The 
Nasir regime, furthermore, proves that even as the indigenous crowd was recuperated 
																																								 																			 	
790	Hadith	 ‘Isa	 ibn	Hisham	 	 is	usually	 inaccurately	translated	as	The	Tale	of	 ‘Isa	 ibn	Hisham,	or	What	
‘Isa	ibn	Hisham	Told	Us,	neither	of	the	two	translations	capture	the	literary	valence	of	the	term	hadith	













through a nationalist and anti-colonial rhetoric, institutions of colonial modernity 




لایجلأا يحصیب يللا وھ ریھاجلا توص  
لاطبلأا مزع ضافتنا وھ ریھامجلا توص  
لاضن لك ارو لطبلا وھ مكحتیب يللا وھ ملكتیب يللا وھ  
(The refrain of Sawt al-Jamahir [roughly: the voice of the masses], a famous 
Nasserist mobilizational song written by Husayn al-Sayyid and composed by 
Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab)  
 
While never fully subverting the colonial structure of the State or its underlying 
epistemologies, notions, and presumptions, the rhetoric of the Nasir regime differed 
from the colonial cultural impositions in one major regard: the indigenous crowd was 
no longer licentious; instead, for the new regime that designated itself as 
“revolutionary,” the crowd comprised the venerated national mass. Despite the 
military background of Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir and his entourage, and the dictatorial, at 
times oppressive, nature of his regime, Nasserist ideology appealed to the masses in a 
manner that precluded the licentious crowd from surfacing in State discourse. While 
this is hardly a complete subversion of colonial notions (after all the veneration of the 
national mass is a phenomenon rooted in modern Western traditions, from the 
Rousseauian to the fascistic, let alone its imbrication with nationalism, a modern 
Western and colonial phenomenon par excellence), Nasir’s veneration of the masses, 




colonial biases. It is telling that, despite Nasir’s persecution of certain political 
crowds, his regime did not produce a discourse on the licentious crowd, and despite 
his persecution of the Muslim Brothers, his regime did not produce any discourse on 
the licentious Islamist.  
A brief study of the Nasir rhetoric will thus be an opportune moment to bring 
back the crowd to our analysis, and to complete our history of the licentious spaces by 
showing the alteration of the notion of the licentious crowd under Nasir, before the 
licentious crowd’s resurgence under Sadat. Furthermore the Nasir regime’s 
relationship to the crowd provides an opportunity for studying the peculiar 
relationship between the military and the crowd more generally, which is necessary to 
pave the way for the account of the opposition between the military (as one of the 
model proper spaces) and the licentious crowd in the next section. For this purpose I 
will conclude this section by comparing the rhetoric of the Nasir (military) regime 
with the rhetoric surrounding the 2013 military coup d’état, giving special attention to 
the relationship between the army and the crowds/masses in both.  
The intimate relationship between the Nasserist State and the Egyptian 
crowds, between Nasir and his masses, is best captured in the 
mobilizational/propaganda songs of the Nasir era. As a populist regime, which rested 
on a revolutionary legitimacy, and which aimed to use the masses internally to deter 
the powers of reaction and the ancien régime, and regionally in an attempt to 
destabilize colonialism, its allies, and reactionary Arab regimes, the Nasir regime 







the lead songwriters, musicians, and singers of the time; many of these songs were 
performed at public events attended by Nasir himself (most notably the anniversary of 
the 1952 revolution/coup and later the anniversary of the defeat of the tripartite 
aggression of 1956). The state-owned audiocassette and videocassette production 
company, Sawt al-Qahirah lil-Sawtiyyat wa al-Mar’iyyat, recorded these songs and 
made them available to the public. The recordings included commentaries narrating 
the struggle of the Egyptian people against colonialism and feudalism. These songs 
were filmed by the nascent Egyptian national television, sometimes in concert, 
sometimes in avant-la-lettre video clips (which included segments of Nasir’s 
speeches).  
These songs did not only address the masses, they also depicted them in a 
positive light. Instead of the licentious crowd, the stern, respectable, and commanding 
masses (usually signified as al-jamahir, and occasionally as al-malayin, lit. the 
millions) took centre stage. For example, the song Ya Ahlan bil Ma‘arik   ([Say] We 
Welcome Battles, written by the leading vernacular poet of the time Salah Jahin and  
composed by Kamal al-Tawil), which prophesied a future of a harsh yet successful 
struggle to industrialize the country, to achieve socialism and prosperity, and to defeat 
imperialism and Zionism, repeatedly referred to the role of the Egyptian masses in 
winning this struggle. The refrain of the song declares: “millions of people (malayin 
al-sha‘b) are marching (tidu’/taduqq al-ka‘b, lit. are digging in their heels) declaring 
their preparedness.” In another song titled Allah ya Baladna! (an expression of 
amazement and marvel that is impossible to translate to English, the nearest 








translation would be God Bless You, Our Country, or Our Country,{By} God {You are 
Amazing}, lyrics by Anwar ‘Abd Allah, music by Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab), 
celebrating the defeat of colonial forces of the tripartite aggression (1956), praises the 
people and the army as they stand together, and credits “the free” (al-ahrar which can 
be understood as a reference to the free people of Egypt, but also to the ‘Free 
Officers’, the name the military Junta had given itself) with defeating colonial armies 
through “the weapon of popular revolution” (bi silah al thawrah al-sha‘biyyah).  
It could be contended here that, even as the (civilian) masses of the Egyptian 
nation were celebrated, they were militarized in the process. In both Ya Ahlan bi al-
Ma‘arik and Allah ya Baladna, the people are depicted as standing side by side with 
the army, and, especially in the case of former, the masses/millions are depicted as 
marching in military formation. Other songs that celebrate the masses, including Sawt 
al-Jamahir (the Voice of the Masses), ‘Ash al-Jil al-Sa‘id ({Long} Live the Rising 
Generation), and al-Watan al-Akbar or Watani Habibi (My Beloved Homeland, 
which celebrates the masses not just of Egypt but of the ‘Arab homeland’, written by 
Ahmad Shafiq Kamil and composed by ‘Abd al-Wahab) are sung to what sounds like 
a Soviet-style socialist military march. It seems as if, for the crowd to become the 
respectable jamahir, a military antidote must be applied. Other examples of the Nasir 
regime applying the military antidote to the licentious crowd include the famous Abu 
‘Uyun Jari’ah incident when contestants of a male beauty pageant – named after a 
song by the famous singer ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz (the same singer who sang many of 
the nationalistic/propaganda songs cited above)-  were rounded up and sent to serve in 
the army to learn proper behavior (reportedly at the behest of Nasir himself who, 




let them become men}).793 The military antidote was applied more dramatically and 
brutally when the Free Officers regime used army troops to brutally put down a 
workers’ protest in Kafr al-Dawwar and tried and executed the leaders of the protest 
in a military tribunal soon after it came to power.  
It is true that militarism played various roles in the Nasserist rhetoric, 
especially in turning the licentious crowd into respectable masses, but even then, the 
epitome of this militarization was not always the disciplined soldier. Frequently it was 
the fida’i (roughly the freedom fighter, coming from the root fida’, to sacrifice, 
especially oneself). In addition to a famous song by ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz titled fida’i 
in Ya Ahlan bil Ma‘arik, the Egyptian population is interpellated as “30 million  
fida’i,” which was the number of the Egyptian population at that time. Even as the 
fida’i is mentioned in the song in the context of heeding calls of ‘Abd al-Nasir 
(“command and you will find, 30 million fida’i, across all fields”), there is a huge 


























the population as comprising 30 million freedom fighters, and declaring them as 30 
million soldiers.  
It remains, however, that the Nasserist discourse gave the masses a 
commanding voice (as opposed to the howling, noise, and faux Arabic of the 
licentious crowd). This is evident in songs like the early 1960s song Sawt al-Jamahir 
(roughly The Voice of the Masses), a revolutionary pro-Nasir anthem written and 
composed by two famous cultural figures of the time and sung by a number of leading 
singers hailing from Egypt and Syria. The national masses, appearing as the opposite 
of and threat to imperialism, are the true heroes paving the way to freedom and 
socialism. While even LeBon allowed for the crowds to be heroic at times, in 
Nasserist propaganda the masses are not only heroic, they also possess a voice that is 
stern, sober, normative, and commanding (evident by the very title of the song). The 
refrain of the song, quoted in the epigraph, tells us not only that the masses have a 
voice of their own, but that it is this voice that has the capacity to awaken the next 
generation, it is this voice that is entitled to “speak and to rule/control/command,” and 
it is the true “hero behind every struggle.” Indeed, the song asserts that only God has 
the power to “stop the current of the advancing masses.”794 Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir 
himself summarized this appeal to, nay faith in, the masses through his famous slogan 
“al sha‘b huwa al-qa’id wa al-mu‘allim” [roughly: the people are the leader and the 
teacher.]  
Other fields of state cultural production under Nasir shunned militarism 
altogether and showed, instead, a celebration of the political activist (classically 






surrogate as shown in Chapter 2).  To illustrate how the discourse was not fully 
militarized even as the military was playing an important role, and how the activist 
and the militant organization were celebrated, I will briefly discuss the play al-
Qadiyyah, written by Lutfi al-Khuli in 1960 and produced by state television in 
1961795  – at a moment when the Egyptian state’s cultural apparatus believed in the 
education of the masses and in funding and promoting sophisticated cultural-
ideological productions (a socialist achievement which speaks to a different 
relationship between the State and the masses that differs significantly from the 
relationship of abnegation between State and crowd we explored throughout this 
study). This moment also marked the rapprochement between the Nasir regime and 
segments of the Egyptian Marxist left, including the prominent leftist intellectual 
Lutfi al-Khuli (the playwright of al-Qadiyyah). Starting in 1961, al-Khuli was given a 
weekly column in the state-owned al-Ahram newspaper, and starting in 1965, he 
became the editor in chief of the state-owned al-Tali‘ah (the Vanguard) magazine. 
Consequently, his play was promptly produced by the State, only one year after its 
publication; and though not necessarily indicative of the mainstream rhetoric of the 
Nasir regime, the play was indicative of the leftist contingent of that regime, or of the 
leftist/revolutionary rhetoric this regime was ready to tolerate and at times promote. 
The play is set in pre-revolutionary Egypt, creating an illusion of anticipating the 
1952 coup and the revolutionary ideals it stood for. In this play, the main character, 
presented as the model subject (he is the dream husband of the lead female character; 










Nasir; he sports a Nasir-like mustache; and he wears a summer-suit similar to Nasir’s 
civilian uniform) is not a military man but a civilian. He belongs to a secret 
organization (the surrogate of the crowd). Throughout the play he uses a revolutionary 
rhetoric (which serves to further charm his lover) and seeks to subvert various 
hierarchical structures (including the family). The ideal subject in al-Qadiyyah 
therefore is not very far from the crowd-born(e) subject, believing in a revolutionary 
theory associated with the crowd, belonging to the crowd’s surrogate (the secret 
organization) and subverting a space that is the crowd’s other. While this play does 
not speak for the Nasserist propaganda or the cultural production under Nasir’s 
regime as a whole, it is telling of how state media allowed for the emergence of ideal 
subjects that are not militarized and that are almost crowd-born(e), and more 
significantly, that the political activist and crowd-born(e) subject appear not as 
licentious or bad egos, but as model subjects. 
Two underlying trends, therefore, can be observed in Nasserism as a state 
ideology through these cultural productions sponsored by it. First, even as the masses 
were celebrated, the militarizing trend was evident. The masses were depicted as 
respectable and heroic and given a commanding voice, but only after a military 
antidote was applied to them, after they were able to march to military tunes, and 
become interpellated, if not as soldiers, then as fida’is. This, however, is not 
militarism in toto and tout court, in which the good subjects are interpellated as 
disciplined soldiers, not as freedom fighters, and in which the crowd is subdued to 
military discipline. Rather, it is hybrid populism in which the masses and the army 
march hand in hand. Second, there is the civilian or revolutionary trend, most evident 
at a time when the Nasir regime was making peace with the Marxist left, and 




not a soldier but a political militant, a revolutionary reminiscent of the crowd-born(e) 
subject, and in which respect and faith is placed not in the army but in the militant 
organization.  
All this was reversed under Sadat, who restructured the regime to cater to a 
new comprador class and a new neoliberal project; the venerated jamahir disappeared 
and the licentious crowd reappeared. Opposed to Nasir who used the language of 
workers’ rights (even as he crushed the workers’ movement), and who announced his 
readiness to sit and talk with the protesting students in 1968 (even as he allegedly 
contemplated the use of the air-force against them),796 Sadat consistently 
characterized the crowd that opposed him as “thieves,” “thugs,” deluded or ill-
behaved “children,” and communist saboteurs.797 In addition, he reintroduced terms 
like ri‘a‘(riffraff) to the political discourse on the crowd. Demonstrators and their 
slogans were dismissed by Sadat as badha’ah (obscenity) and gur’ah/jur’ah 
(insolence, impertinence, impudence, license), while the demonstrators were “deluded 
children.”  These deluded children and their insolence, according to Sadat, warranted 
merciless disciplinary action by the president.798 Examples of Sadat’s infantilization 
of the crowd and the nation at large were presented in Chapter 1. A telling example in 
this context was the following incident: a female secondary school student, in a 












be immune to criticism, Sadat responded “eih el-halawa dih,”799(Such 
sweetness/loveliness!) a term of endearment (thus illustrating Sadat’s infantilization 
of the opposition) that can also be interpreted as a comment on the physical 
attractiveness of the female student (who was indeed physically attractive by the 
standards of our source on the incident).800 Understood this way, Sadat can be seen as 
setting the trend for producing female activists as licentious bodies and a fair target 
for external patriarchal/male desire and sexual harassment.  In addition, the secret 
organization as an alibi for sexual license, especially under the perversity of the 
Islamic Amir (leader, commander), was introduced by Sadat in a public speech 
(ironically, one that was re-posted in March 2011 by a YouTube user as a 
commentary on the 2011 demonstrations).801 The licentious crowd of 2011, though 
not a direct result of Sadat’s propaganda, was made possible through Sadat’s reversal 
of (or reaction to) the Nasserist rhetoric, his (re)introduction of the crowd-as-riffraff, 
and his promotion of various versions of the licentious crowd and its surrogate(s).  
We have come, then, full circle, and reached the return of the licentious 
crowd under Mubarak, a phenomenon that needs no further explanation after its 
exposition in Chapters 1 and 2. Instead of rehearsing the same argument again, I will 
end this discussion of crowds and masses by examining a 2013 work of parody that 
sheds light on what became of the venerated masses, the jamahir, and of the curious 












The work of parody I am about to examine comes from the show named al-Barnamij 
(lit. The Programme/ The Show), which was produced and presented by the Egyptian 
satirist (and former cardiothoracic surgeon) Basim Yusuf. The show started as an 
underground satire of the counterrevolutionary discourse during the 2011 uprising and 
was initially broadcast on YouTube. The show’s rising popularity propelled its move 
from YouTube to television. First the show aired on the Egyptian private satellite 
channel Ontv (owned by Egyptian tycoon Naguib Sawiris, who later played a role in 
funding and promoting the movement that led to the 2013 putsch). Eventually the 
show moved to CBC, a private media outlet owned by a businessman close to the 
ancien régime and the military. With the election of President Muhammad Mursi and 
the (at least nominal) rise of the Muslim Brothers to power, Yusuf and CBC made 
common cause; Yusuf, the professed liberal, took it upon himself to expose the 
shortcomings of the new democratically-elected government, which fit the agenda of 
CBC and the power centers it is linked to. Under President Mursi, Yusuf played a 
remarkable role in satirizing, exposing, and ridiculing the policies, mistakes, and 
transgressions of the Muslim Brothers, the president, and their allies and supporters. 
The complicity of the Islamists in the warfare of sexual libel with the opposition, and 
the public statements made by Islamists to the effect that protest spaces against Mursi 
witnessed inebriation, illicit sex, and/or rape (effectively that they were what I call 
licentious spaces), particularly came under Yusuf’s scathing fire (especially that these 




themselves up to).802 Eventually the Show joined the ranks of propagandists agitating 
for the 30th of June demonstrations, which functioned as a prelude to the coup. After 
the demonstrations and the 3rd of July coup d’état, Yusuf came back with one episode 
where he attempted to satirize the people’s enthrallment with (then General) ‘Abd al-
Fattah al-Sisi. This episode was perceived by many as irreverent to the army, to al-
Sisi, and to Egypt. It led to a public outcry by regime supporters and eventually to 
CBC terminating the show (it also led, according to Yusuf, to messages of 
intimidation from the regime).803 Yusuf then tried to move to other satellite channels 
and hosted the Show for a brief period on MBC Misr. Although Yusuf toned down the 
political satire (to the detriment of the comedic quality of the show), his program was 
not tolerated (neither by the regime nor by the owners of MBC),804 and eventually 
stopped.  
 The satirical piece I examine comes from Yusuf’s last episode on CBC 
before his move to MBC, the one where he attempted to satirize the enthrallment with 
al-Sisi, and which caused an outcry and led to the sacking of the show (intriguingly 
enough, the episode is not included in the list of episodes on the show’s YouTube 
page, but has fortunately been uploaded by another YouTube user).805After parodying 














Yusuf presented a mock phone call from a fictional character, called Gamahir 
(Cairene Egyptian rendering of Jamahir), which will be the focus of our analysis.  
Gamahir was a recurrent character on Basim Yusuf’s show. During the reign 
of Muhammad Mursi, Yusuf’s show hosted mock phone calls from her, in which she 
complained about her love problems with her new husband (i.e. President Mursi). In 
these phone calls, the political, social, and economic problems and the various 
governmental failures were narrated through sexual jokes, innuendos, and double-
entendres. Regardless of whether the show-makers were aware of it or not, the result 
was a brilliant satirizing/highlighting of the sexualized and gendered aspect of power, 
which posits the leader as masculine and active (or the failed leader as a failed man 
who is impotent), while feminizing the masses.  
This gendered and sexualized nature of this relationship is further highlighted 
and satirized through drag: Gamahir is played by a man who emphasizes and 
accentuates the demeanor typically understood as (lower middle class) feminine 
behavior, and who covers his hair with a makeshift wig while leaving his moustache 
intact and visible. This presentation doubly highlights and destabilizes the gendering 
of the masses,806 one may even go further and posit that the masses are rendered 
through double failure, a failure to be masculine (highlighted by the feminine 
demeanor of the actor) and a failure to be feminine (highlighted by the moustache of 
the actor), a transgender being who never made a full transition to either gender. In 
her mock call to the talk-show, Gamahir’s main complaint was that her husband, 









Egyptian tradition- as his gama‘ah (jama‘ah), thus playing on the word that may mean 
the jama‘ah (society/organization) of the Muslim Brothers and jama‘ah as wife, and, 
perhaps unwittingly, capturing the kinship between the crowd/masses/jamahir and the 
jama‘ah.807 
The ideology that produces the army as the embodiment of masculinity and 
the army man as the model male subject, along with the gendered and sexualized 
fascination with al-Sisi, provided the makers of the show with more material to 
parody in the episode following the coup. After showing footage in which a 
commentator described al-Sisi as “ma‘shu’ [ma‘shuq] al-gamahir/jamahir” (the idol 
of the masses/Gamahir), Basim Yusuf wondered (while romantic music played in the 
background) whether al-Sisi loved Gamahir back, only to be interrupted by a phone 
call from Gamahir. In the phone call Gamahir recounts how her problems with her 
(now ex) husband have been resolved thanks to the intervention of her (maternal) 
cousin, who happens to be an army officer (in allusion to al-Sisi, playing on the theme 
of kinship between the people and the army) adding the spin that it was her husband 
who introduced her to her cousin (alluding to the fact that it was Mursi who had 
appointed al-Sisi in the first place as his defense minister, and adding a hint of 
cuckolding to the conceit). The confrontation between Gamahir’s ex-husband (i.e. 
Mursi) and her officer-cousin (i.e. al-Sisi) is narrated through sexual terms: for 
example when the husband attempted to assault Gamahir in the presence of the 












explained that she meant the declaration (meaning the declaration issued by al-Sisi 
two days before the coup d’état threatening that the army would have to intervene if 
the situation were not resolved). In the same manner Mursi’s long speeches were 
satirized as “taking too long to finish[-off]” while the short speeches of ‘Adli Mansur 
(the interim president) as timely (though curiously, not as premature) finishing[-off]. 
Although she is now married to the “old guy” (i.e. the interim president ‘Adli 
Mansur), Gamahir yearns for her cousin, and recounts how he “swept [her] off” with 
his “gentle voice.” Although she likes the kind of respect her older husband musters, 
Gamahir declares: “I want someone who can kindle my fire, and fulfill my desires as 
a female.” When asked who could do so, Gamahir answers, in a lustful tone “my 
cousin!”808 
The masses (or Gamahir) as a feminized male body yearning for the military 
machismo of the eroticized general brilliantly subverts both the veneration of the 
masses and the military antidote. This skit also captures the eroticization of al-Sisi as 
part of his rise to power, and with it captures the relationship between the masses and 
the military in the dominant ideology—the relationship that was once characterized, 
in a different context, by Wilhelm Reich as follows: 
From the point of view of mass psychology, the effect of militarism is based essentially on a 
libidinous mechanism. The sexual effect of a uniform, the erotically provocative effect of 
rhythmically executed goose-stepping, the exhibitionist nature of militaristic procedure, have 
been more practically comprehended by a salesgirl or an average secretary than by our most 










This rise can be seen, thus, as a fulfillment of the prophecy of the all-boy band Cairo-
Ke, that a dhakar (a male, a manly man, a masculine figure, or a male organ) was 
needed to save the day. Although the opposition between the masculine army and the 
feminine crowds or masses were already at play during the events of 2011 (as shown 
in Chapter 1), the events of 2013 officiated the sexualized and gendered relationship 
between the army (or more specifically the army man, more specifically yet ‘Abd al-
Fattah al-Sisi) as masculine, dominating,810 and active, and the masses as feminine, 
submissive, and receptive (failure to meet the last two criteria would render the 
masses a licentious crowd). Even in representations bereft of hypersexualization and 
gendering, the same relationship between the masses and the military leader can be 
observed: the masses, though now celebrated for their role in the June 30th 
demonstrations (unlike their counterparts who participated in the 2011 uprising, 
though not unlike the attempt of some of the regime propagandists to flirt with the 
‘civil’ crowd that took it to the streets on January 25th 2011, as opposed to the unruly 
and licentious crowd that took it to the streets on January 28th and after) these masses 
were nothing like the commanding normative masses of the Nasir propaganda. 
Instead, they were masses yearning for a leader, a body yearning for a mind (again the 
gendering of the body as feminine and the mind as masculine is clear, though 
implicit), a space of chaos yearning for the orderly military to insert discipline. This is 
clear in many examples of the works of propaganda that emerged at that moment, but 
perhaps most evident in the footage that were broadcast on various television channels 







The night after the June 30th demonstrations, a video filmed and ‘directed’ by 
film director Khalid Yusuf (who identifies as a Nasserist) featuring aerial projections 
of the demonstrations was used to claim that this was the largest demonstration Egypt 
had ever witnessed and to justify the army’s intervention (allegedly on the side of 
these masses). Despite Yusuf’s intentions, the film works as a perfect satire for the 
relationship between the army and the masses, or for how the army and the dominant 
military ideology see the masses. Shot from an army helicopter, the film shows the 
masses from a military vantage point, distant, small and below, lending support to the 
army above. The masses, though celebrated, were literally and metaphorically looked 
down upon. The distance also served to show the masses as one homogenous unit 
(presumably wanting the army to interfere) effacing the differences in factions, those 
who joined out of spite for the Brothers but not necessarily to ask for military 
intervention, those who wanted a liberal regime, and those who wanted neither the 
Brothers nor the military to rule.  
Read as a mode of interpellation, this footage performs a double- somehow 
paradoxical- function. Inviting the audience to see themselves (as the people of Egypt, 
the supporters of the military regime, members of the national masses) through the 
vantage point of a military helicopter, the footage fixes the military as the seeing 
Subject, the valid national subject position, while presenting the people with the self-
image of a not-fully-formed subject: not properly individual, only existing through the 
point of view of the military, and only acquiring agency through military agency 
(indeed, a self in the third person, and only in the third person plural). The distance 






is highlighted, emphasized, and augmented, producing the redeemable, though not 
fully redeemed, national masses or not fully formed subjects on the side of the former, 
and the army, the military man, and ultimately ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi as the latter. 
Apparently the Nasserist director of the footage wanted to re-enact the populist 
Nasserist moment where the masses were redeemed through their relationship to the 
army. Yet, something is radically different between the two moments; the proximity 
between the army and the people in the Nasser rhetoric is transformed into distance in 
Yusuf’s footage. Whereas Nasserist propaganda typically invited an almost complete 
identification between the people and the army (as we saw with how the term al-
ahrar, the free, conflated the free people of Egypt with the Free Officers), sometimes 
even between the people and Nasir – “you are all Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir” the latter 
thrice proclaimed in a famous speech (allegedly after being shot at by a member of 
the Muslim Brothers),812 for Khalid Yusuf’s footage and other works of pro-Sisi 
propaganda, maintaining the distance between the people and the leader, between the 
army and the masses, was necessary. Propaganda songs glorified the army and looked 
up to it (as it was slaughtering the opposition) but never invited a full identification 
with it. Al-Sisi was identified as the model leader, the model subject, kin to the nation 
(maternal cousin to Gamahir), cathected with erotic investment by masculine and 
feminine men alike and by women, promoted as the model male subject, but never 
identified with. 









army and the masses reveal the distribution and organization of space into good and 
bad, proper and licentious, a century and a few decades after this organization was 
inaugurated by colonialism and the nascent (colonial) state. The effect is not simply 
the opposition between the licentious crowd (standing for and roaming the licentious 
spaces) and the proper army (standing for and spreading the proper State) – this point 
has already been established in Chapter 1. What we see here is the army, standing 
next to – or atop of- the masses, simultaneously highlighting the (potential) 
licentiousness of the crowds and producing them as redeemable through this curious 
relationship with the military. This relationship promotes and sustains an 
identification and erotic cathexis with the figure and imago of the military man as the 
ego ideal, as the Althusserian Subject to the national subjects being formed. Despite 
the differences in modes of identification and in representations of the relationship 
and hierarchy between the masses and the army, what the Nasserist propaganda and 
the 2013 representations have in common is positing a proper and respectable version 
of the crowds (which I have been intentionally referring to as the masses, to 
distinguish it from the crowd as a space of licentiousness), made possible through a 
proximity to the army and its values. In 2013 – perhaps because of the distance 
between the subject and the military imago, the subject and Subject (in Althusserian 
terms), the redeemability of the masses seemed contingent, as its potential relapse into 
the licentious crowd is always imminent (perhaps due to the recent memory of the 
2011 events).  Gamahir’s skit exposed the fragility of this identification-redemption, 
showing how, in a dominant military ideology, underneath the venerated masses, 
there is still the licentious body, the crowd. The outcry against the skit can be thus 
interpreted as denial and resistance to this exposition; perhaps the crowds in rebellion 




venerated masses, the ones that marched under army tutelage, raised the army to 
power, and thus became the national masses par excellence, the personification of 
Egypt, could never be licentious.  
Although the phenomenon of attempting to recuperate the crowds/masses 
through the curious relationship with the army slightly differs from the attempt to turn 
the charge of licentiousness back to the West, we have not departed from the running 
theme of Western models of subjectivity, propriety, and proper spaces pervading 
Egyptian discourse through various modes of cultural imposition. Nor have we 
departed from the Fanonian explication of the colonial trauma: in his explication of 
the cultural imposition of Western modes of subjectivity in the colony Fanon posits 
militarization as one of these modes, which he ties to subjectivation through the 
parallel familial figure of authority, the father in the bourgeois nuclear family.813 
“Militarization and a centralized authority in a country,” Fanon notes, before he goes 
on to explicate the Western specific nature of Oedipal subjectivation,  “automatically 
result in a resurgence of the father’s authority.”814 Indeed, throughout this study, 
militarization and the family have appeared as modes of proper subjectivation, 
antithetical and antidotal to the licentious crowd, and the authority figures of both (the 
military general, the father) as proper Subjects through which subjects are produced 
and/or interpellated. In the next chapter we will examine more closely the cultural 
imposition of the family and the military in Egypt and how both oppose the licentious 

















The Cultural Imposition of Proper Spaces 
 
Two	Model	Proper	Spaces:	The	Family	and	the	Army	
Throughout this study, licentious space emerged in opposition to or in a dialectical 
relationship with the proper space sanctioned by the State; it was sometimes posited 
as a threat to or neutralized and/or redeemed by proper spaces. In contrast to 
licentious subjects ensconced within licentious spaces, proper spaces host, foster, and 
produce good and proper subjects exhibiting proper behavior and upright allegiance to 
the State—sometimes to the extent of recuperating bad subjects who willingly heed 
their call and exit licentious space. The State sanctions these spaces as proper, and 
delegates to them the task of incubating good subjects, monitoring their behavior, and 
upholding their good subjectivity. 
Two institutions that have so far recurred in the various archives this study 
consulted with as the other of licentious space are the family and the army. In the 
early 20th century, these two institutions appeared in various journalistic and other 
sources, side by side, sometimes only a few pages apart, as the embodiment and 
paragon of good subjectivity, producers of good norms and good subjects, and pillars 
of the nascent nation. The concern with strengthening both the army and the family 
dominated Egyptian nationalist thought of the time. This remained the case in the late 
20th century, wherein the army (and to a lesser extent the police) was depicted as the 
highest embodiment of Egyptian nationalism, and wherein the family was depicted as 
the custodian of national values, the incubator of national subjects, and the guard 




This remained the case in the post-2011 moment, when the unruly behavior of the 
‘revolutionaries’, especially women, was attributed to bad or absent parenting, and 
whereby the confrontation between the licentious revolutionary and the proper 
army/army-man played a prominent role in media representations and official state 
ideology. In this chapter I aim to chart the key moments in the history of these 
oppositions, and of the emergence of the family and the army as model proper spaces. 
Concluding our account of licentious spaces with a brief account of the proper spaces, 
their rise, their cultural imposition, and the ideological role they play, will enrich our 
understanding of the opposition between licentious spaces/bad subjects and the modes 
of proper subjectivity.  
This running concern with the family and the army, however, presents a 
departure from the archive of the first wave of Egyptian nationalism (i.e. the ‘Urabi 
movement), wherein militarism played a less significant role (despite the military 
background of its leaders and the military nature of its government), and which 
showed no interest whatsoever in reforming or strengthening the family. That the 
family and, to a lesser extent, the army, or militarism proper, were not of concern in 
1882 but became so in the 1900s in the wake of the British invasion gestures toward a 
colonial role in inventing, re-modeling, transforming, inciting concern in, and/or 
strengthening these institutions. The colonial nature of these two institutions as 
colonial effects of the British invasion will be our focal point. 
Whereas these two institutions appear all of a sudden in the 20th century 
archive of Egyptian nationalism, their emergence and later recurrence were 
anticipated and further supported by a plethora of colonization-modernization 
policies—the same policies that made the organization of space possible. Many of 




presented a model of discipline and order, based on which the new polity and the 
whole society were to be structured.815 Similarly, many of the policies redefining 
space, re-organizing practices related to space, and especially those re-designing 
households, aimed to produce a space for nuclear families modeled on the European 
domestic, and in the process erasing pre-colonial formations (particularly the 
extended family).816 This transformation of space was followed, in the early 20th 
century, by important ideological transformations that sustained the cultural 
imposition of the two institutions. I will first examine these transformations and their 
lasting effect through the lens of the family and then move to examining them in 
relation to the army, its fraught history and contentious relationship with colonialism.  
Many of the colonial interventions in the field of the family were designed 
for the purpose of bringing the family, along with the members and practices it hosts, 
within the fold of the State and under its gaze– for example through designing homes 
in a manner that makes it easier for the state to count family members and establish 
their respective position in the family network,817 and through mandating the 
registration of marriages and births with state institutions. The role of the modern 
family (the precondition of the domestic) in exposing the intimate lives of the subjects 















realm of the private, shielded from the gaze of the public and the intervention of the 
State. The subsequent account of the family, however, will dispel this myth, showing 
how even the domestic and the private are key domains of state intervention and 
recognition.818 The modern family, the family that is sanctioned by the State to 
organize the intimate lives of its subjects and make these lives transparent to the State, 
stands in opposition to the indescribable orgy. The family is monogamous whereas 
the orgy is the antithesis of monogamy. The family is a structure that forms under the 
gaze of the State and renders mating and reproductive habits legible to it, whereas the 
orgy unfold beyond the State’s gaze (to the extent that the State cannot ascertain 
beyond doubt whether orgiastic activities are sexual, leaving the matter to the 
imagination of state ideologues and propagandists). In opposition to collectivities that 
constitute crowds, indescribable orgies, and licentious spaces, the family produces 
individual members, endows them with individual names, accords them individual 
positions in its structure of kinship, and thus facilitates state-recognition and the 
interpellation of the resulting offspring as individual subjects.819 
To play this role as a proxy for the gaze of the State, or as an ideological 
state apparatus, the Egyptian family needed to be transformed into something nuclear, 
ideally monogamous, legible to the State and sanctioned by it. This ideological and 
















Shari‘ah and shar‘i courts within the fold of the state, inventing the category of 
personal status (originally a category of French law) as a category of Egyptian law 
and the domain to which the state applies shari‘ah,820it was further solidified (and 
codified) through a number of laws regulating marriage, most notably Law no. 56 for 
the year 1923 and Law no. 78 for the year 1931, which mandated that all marriages 
must be registered with the State.821 The new family and the new marital practices 
that inaugurate it were further sustained by an ideological offensive that promoted the 
nuclear monogamous family as the model family,822 the place where national subjects 


































familial and conjugal formations. The colonial and state-sponsored struggle to impose 
the modern family, whether in the early or the late 20th century, was largely a struggle 
over the nature of marriage and divorce. In line with 18th and 19th century European 
bourgeois and Victorian ideals, marriage was to be dissociated from pleasure and 
restricted to the formation of families that would ideally resemble their European 
middle class counterparts: nuclear, monogamous, and permanent. As such, both 
polygyny and divorce were to be abhorred, as they defeated the very purpose of 
modern marriage.  
 
Colonizing	the	Family	
When the British came to Egypt, the indigenous conjugal and matrimonial practices, 
as evidenced by various pronouncements on the subject, appalled them:825 both 
marriage and divorce were easy, a man could marry many women, whether at once or 
over the course of time, whereas women were able to marry many men over the 
course of time (though not at once); families were not nuclear but extended, and 
lacked the compulsory impetus to be permanent- contrary to the modern Western-
Christian model that the purpose of marriage should be to form families rather than to 
fulfill sexual pleasure, and contrary to the modern ideological and legal norms in 
Northern and Western Europe – not to mention the older European Christian regime, 
which left little space for divorce. In Britain, divorce was not legalized until the early 











19th century and even then it became a contentious issue.826 In France, the French 
Revolution legalized divorce, but the Bourbon Reaction outlawed it again in 1816, 
and it was not legalized again until 1884.827 Divorce also played a role in the debates 
surrounding the Paris Commune, both as a demand put forward by the revolutionaries 
(especially the female contingent), and as an ideological tool to malign and 
delegitimize the revolutionaries and add an aura of license to the depiction of 
revolutionary women.828  The anxiety of Western conservative forces regarding the 
question of divorce was not only on account of the disdain they felt toward sexual 
pleasure and their need to restrict marriage to the formation of families rather than to 
sexual consummation, but was furthermore and foremost about the permanence of 
social contracts. In his comprehensive (albeit brief) study of the history of French 
divorce laws, Samuel Stoljar noted how “a Christian union between man and woman 
became part of a divinely established order, as permanent in its own way as the world 
and God were permanent in theirs”829 (emphasis added), in other words, to the same 
order we identified in Chapter 1 as underlying (some of) the mythologies of the State. 




















but largely the supporters of monarchy championed the permanence of all contracts 
(whether between sovereign and subject or between man and wife), whereas 
revolutionaries and supporters of the Republic championed the right to divorce which 
they rooted in the larger right to abolish contract, which in turn they rooted in the 
newfound concept of individual liberty.830 It was for this reason that the French 
Revolution understood marriage to be terminable and divorce to be permissible, and 
for which one of its earliest legal reforms (as early as 1792) was to allow divorce 
(citing the notion of individual liberty). For the same reasons, one of the first 
reactions of the Bourbon Restoration was to re-outlawed divorce.831 
Appalled by indigenous marriage practices, especially polygyny and the ease 
with which marriage and divorce were conducted (which effectively led not only to 
polygyny but also to serial female polyandry), the British colonizers sought to 
transform marriage practices as part of their mission to transform Egypt. It fell to the 
British colonizers to write about the subject with Orientalist/ethnographic disdain and 
to draft laws to regulate it, but to Egyptian authors to carry out the requisite 
ideological work, and so they did. Egyptian nationalists, even the ones of the anti-
colonial variety, spearheaded an ideological campaign to transform marriage practices 
along colonial lines, to repudiate divorce,832 and to depict the permanent nuclear 









modern nation.833 Among the proponents of reforming the family and marriage was 
none other than al-Liwa’ newspaper, whose fierce anti-colonial and pan-Islamic 
sentiments did not inoculate it against coding its ideological campaign in terms of 
disdain for indigenous and Islamic marriage and divorce practices.  
A most emblematic article of this discourse, the ideology behind it, its 
colonial biases, its disdain for local practices, and its modernist-colonialist agenda, in 
short, of cultural imposition appeared in al-Liwa’ on 12/1/1904 under the telling title 
“al-Zawaj fi al-Sharq” [Marriage in the Orient], written by their Alexandria reporter. 
The article opens with the dramatic proclamation that “in most of the Oriental 
countries/regions, marriage has become a form of commerce (tijarah): you seldom 
find a couple who joined together (iqtarana) due to mere compassion between them” 
ردن امیف لاإ امھنیب فلاتئا ضحمل انرتقا نینثا دجت لاف اھھبس وأ ةراجت ةیقرشلا راطقلأا بلغأ يف جاوزلا. This 
enchantment with the Western ideal/myth of the romantic couple and companionate 
























stage. Al-Liwa’s reporter identifies the ease with which divorce is conducted “in the 
Orient” (i.e. in Islamic Shari‘ah) as the reason not only behind the “parting of ways” 
[al-firaq] among couples, but also behind rushed marriages. After denouncing the 
“Oriental” ease of contracting marriage and dissolving it through divorce, the reporter 
then prescribed making both marriage and divorce more difficult, and although he did 
not suggest outright the outlawing of divorce, he found it to be a matter worthy of 
emulation: “criminalizing divorce is one of the strongest incentives for couples to 
think about/assess their situation before concluding a [marriage] contract.”  میرجت نإ
 قلاطلاامھنیب دقاعتلا لبق امھرمأ يف نیجوزلا ثحب ةدشل ثعاوبلا ربكأ نم دعی  
After implicitly suggesting (or admiring) the criminalization of divorce, the 
reporter fell back on calling for finding ways to make divorce difficult, all the while 
identifying easy divorce as an Oriental vice that led Orientals to ruin and 
dishonor/shame (in awkward Arabic phrasing, suggesting that the reporter might have 
thought in French while writing the article in Arabic, or that he was attempting to hide 
his call to criminalize divorce behind ambiguous phrasing).835 
This avoidance, limiting, and/or outlawing of divorce, according to the logic 
of al-Liwa’s Alexandria reporter, is bound to lead not only to a decline in the breaking 
up of couples and families, but also to a decline in non-pre-meditated and easy 






835	The	full	sentence	reads:	 يف نیجوزلا ثحب ةدشل ثعاوبلا ربكأ نم دعی قلاطلا میرجت نإ
لبق امھرمأ  اذھك رابتعلااب اریدج ارمأ نییقرشلا رشعم نحن لعفن فیكف امھنیب دقاعتلا
 ىھتنمو رامدلا ةیواھ ىلإ انب راس دق ھب ذخلأا يف طارفلإا نإ لب انیدل روملأا برقأ قلاطلاو
بأ نإ فیرشلا ثیدحلا يف ءاج .راعلا رمأ انلامھلإ اذإ يعادلا امف قلاطلا الله دنع للاحلا ضغ




marriages, as it deterred youngsters from rushing into marrying (the fact that these 
easy nuptials were allowed, nay sometimes encouraged, in Islamic thought 
notwithstanding). Limiting divorce would also paradoxically lead to a decline in 
divorce lawsuits and court cases; it was left unexplained, however, how this would be 
the case. One would expect a limiting of divorce to lead to an increase, not a decrease, 
in divorce-related lawsuits, as the more difficult divorce would be made, the more 
likely that dysfunctional couples would take their problems to the courts. The author 
perhaps thought that lawsuits would decline because these marriages would not be 
contracted in the first place (which was most likely based on the unsubstantiated 
assumption that a rushed marriage would necessarily or likely end in divorce while a 
pre-meditated one would not). The author, however, seemed less interested in the 
wellbeing of the couple and more in the civilizational appearance (before the colonial 
gaze); when describing divorce lawsuits, he found them “bizarre and embarrassing 
(gharibah mukhjilah).”836 Although the author did not specify to whom it would be 
“embarrassing,” it is easy to infer a colonial civilizational gaze before which the 
educated/colonized native would be embarrassed by his compatriots. If al-Liwa’s 
reporter was silent on the colonial-civilizational gaze before which divorce would be 
embarrassing, a later nationalist writer, Ahmad al-Sawi, who was a French-educated 
journalist, was explicit about the civilizational and classist nature of this sense of 
shame and embarrassment. After ascribing easy marriages and divorces to the lower 








proclaimed: “If Parisians heard about what happens every day amongst us … their 
mouths would drop open in astonishment.”837 
Although the article in al-Liwa’s appealed to a discredited Prophetic tradition 
proclaiming divorce to be the “most detested to God of all that He sanctioned,”838 the 
colonial biases of the article were unmistakable (nor did the reporter try to mask 
them). As is obvious from the above exposition, the article showed disdain for 
indigenous practices of marriage and divorce (identified as Oriental and condemned 
as leading to ruin and dishonor/shame). The article also expressed admiration for 
Western-Christian models whereby marriage was conceived as a complicated affair 
and divorce was not easily accessible (or sometimes completely inaccessible).  Al-
Liwa’s argument presented number of Orientalist stereotypes including that of the 
Easterner who followed his or her whims in opposition to the calculating 
Westerner.839 The calls to reform marriage, to deter un-pre-meditated marriages, and 
to make divorce difficult were made, early on in the article, on the authority of sahib 
usul al-Shara’i‘ (lit. the author of the fundamentals of shara’i‘ – laws, theories of 
jurisprudence, etc.). Sahib Usual al-Shara’i‘ is none other than Jeremy Bentham, and 



















Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.840 The irony here is not only 
that a newspaper with anti-colonial standpoints and pan-Islamist/Ottomanist leanings 
used the writings of a British social thinker to supplant – to the effect of complete 
erasure— indigenous and Islamic practices, but also that al-Liwa’ cited a translation 
by its arch-enemy Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul (whose role as a colonial functionary was 
discussed in Chapter 3, and who was repeatedly attacked alongside his famous 
brother, Sa‘d Zaghlul, as agents of British imperialism). The words of the colonial 
reformer via the colonial functionary become, according to the article “pearls of 
wisdom [belonging to/addressed to] a nation who knew the meaning of life, and we 
are worthy of following it” (hence adding the Orientalist and colonialist stereotype of 
a lively West versus an East that is dead or not worthy of living, and that of a 
knowledgeable West able to discern ‘the meaning of life’ versus an East that only 
lives haphazardly).  Opposed to the colonial pearls of wisdom, Muslim scholars were 
heading, according to the article, to an abyss, and taking with them the entire 
Egyptian community. The article ended with an appeal to writers to “delve into the 
matter” (i.e. to carry out the ideological campaign of cultural imposition, to transform 



















This article comes as part of a litany of articles turning indigenous marriage 
practices into objects of public scrutiny, and often into objects of denunciation. Al-
Liwa’s purpose was not merely modernization; a more direct material and opportunist 
purpose was also in play. Later in 1904, one of al-Liwa’s adversaries, al-Shaykh ‘Ali 
Yusuf, the editor-in-chief of al-Mu’ayyad (which competed with al-Liwa’ for 
khedival patronage) was involved in a divorce lawsuit that brought the issue of 
marriage and divorce to the centre of public discourse (partly through the heavy 
coverage al-Liwa’ dedicated to the lawsuit). ‘Ali Yusuf was betrothed-to-be-wed to a 
much younger noble woman named Safiyyah, the daughter of the notable al-Shaykh 
al-Sadat.842 The latter, though initially consenting to the betrothal, kept delaying the 
conclusion of the nuptials. In response, the couple eloped. The angry father retaliated 
by filing a lawsuit against his new son-in-law, demanding the marriage contract be 
declared void. The court hearings (which were highly publicized, mainly through al-
Liwa’), scrutinized the conditions under which the marriage contract was conducted, 
the compatibility of the spouses, and ultimately the legality of the contract, further 
inciting a public discourse on marriage and divorce as objects of State and public 
scrutiny and targets for the State’s legal intervention.843 


















This is not to argue that the case of ‘Ali Yusuf single-handedly incited the 
discourse on marriage as a State affair. Rather, it served as a point of articulation and 
further incitement for a transformation that had already been under way since the late 
19th century (if not earlier), a product of the emergent biopolitical state concerned 
with the reproductive habits of its subjects, and accessing these subjects and their 
reproduction (their very biological reproduction, let alone their re-production as 
subjects) through official documents and statistical figures. The novelty of the debate 
on marriage and divorce notwithstanding, these biopolitical transformations were 
already underway; the nascent biopolitical state had already been striving to bring 
conjugal and reproductive practices within the fold and gaze of the State since the 19th 
century. The biopolitical state, though a colonial imposition, found at its disposal 
traditions within Islamic thought that favored the documentation of marriages 
(especially the Hanafi school, from which Egyptian ‘personal status’ law is derived). 
According to Kenneth Cuno, by the end of the 19th century the legal transformations 
that Egypt witnessed gave credence to and capitalized on this tradition of 
documentation: “the Hanafization of the courts had a significant impact as a result of 
the second major aspect of the procedural laws, namely the encouragement and, 
eventually, requirement of the use of documentary evidence in legal proceedings, 
including family matters.”844The state created its prop, the ma’dhun (lit. the permitted, 
sanctioned, or delegated, meaning the person delegated by the State to officiate and 
register marriages and divorces), often dressed him in religious garb, and through this 






and the annulment of marriages.845 Even before registering marriages became 
mandatory, the set of legal transformations more than encouraged it: “By the turn of 
the twentieth century civil registration of marriage and divorce was all but required, as 
the courts would not hear any claims regarding marriage or divorce that were not 
supported by official documents.”846 Marriage was no longer a private or communal 
affair, a contract (oral or written) between two people or two families, but a matter of 
public scrutiny, a site for legal intervention, and an exclusive domain of state power, 
now invited through its judiciary to sanction or nullify marriage contracts. These 
transformations were codified, in the 1920s and through 1931, into the set of laws 
bringing marriage, divorce, and the family to the fold of the state, and making 
mandatory the official registration of marriages, divorces, and births.847 Marriages not 
sanctioned by or registered with the State from then on were referred to as ‘urfi or 
customary marriages.848 Marriages that did not produce nuclear monogamous families 
on the Western model, and marriages that evaded the gaze of the voyeuristic State 
became forms of license that the State and the bourgeois morality it embodies could 


















ideological apparatus, was engaged in a struggle against ‘urfi/“customary” and other 
non-state-sanctioned forms of marriages.  
 
Licentious	Matrimonies		
Forms of marriage not sanctioned by the state: customary contracts, ephemeral and 
short term nuptials, serial marriages, polygamous arrangements, underage marriages, 
in short, marriages that do not subscribe to the modern colonial ideals of marriage and 
the family, persist to the present as a problem in pro-State representations (a century 
after the inauguration of the effort for their cultural imposition and seven decades 
after the withdrawal of British troops) —jihad al-nikah849 being the latest incarnation 
of these licentious matrimonies. It is as if the State’s ideological apparatus continues 
to be engaged in the struggle to bring marriage within the fold of the State. It is either 
that these kinds of marriages were practiced in orgiastic spaces, thus contributing to 
their production as orgiastic and licentious and as a problem for State power, or 
conversely that as State-sanctioned modern marriages became the spaces where good 
subjects are produced, bad subjects can only be imagined to be produced by licentious 
matrimonies, thus making these kinds of para-state marriages readily available as a 
tool in the hands of pro-regime propagandists to discredit enemies of the State. 
As we saw earlier in Chapter 2, the horror at licentious marriages 
(undocumented, frequent, and polygamous) played a central role in the propaganda 
against Islamist organizations– bear in mind Sabir Shawkat’s denunciation of these 






than terror, killing, and looting). At one point Shawkat went to the extent of 
describing these marriages as kinds of  “relationships that no religion or society on the 
face of earth would approve of”850 (of course he neglected to add: except for Islam). 
The absence of certification in these licentious nuptials led, according to the account 
given by Shawkat and explored in Chapter 2, to a suspect form of polygamy of which 
not only men but also women partook.  
The campaign against undocumented marriages in the 1990s was not limited, 
however, to anti-Islamist propaganda. Ruz al-Yusuf, which spearheaded anti-Islamist 
propaganda, was simultaneously engaged in a campaign against all forms of licentious 
matrimonies, whether practiced in underground and insurgent Islamist organizations 
in the form described earlier, by university students in the form of customary 
marriage,851 in Iran and other Shi‘i majority countries in the form of mut‘ah852 (a 
temporary marriage contract endorsed by some Islamic schools of jurisprudence, 
especially by the school of Twlever Shi‘ism, but denounced by others), or customary 





















depicted as insurrectionary in nature, as if invested with agency to resist the State and 
defy its gaze (even when not practiced by insurgent Islamists).  An alarmist report 
about customary and underage marriages expressed this horror: it is significantly 
titled “Qaryah Tarfud Zawaj al-Hukumah: Atfal Yatazawwajun ‘Urfiyyan.”854 The 
title itself suggests a certain defiance of or resistance to the State in ‘urfi marriage; it 
translates to “a village rejects governmental/state marriage: children are contracting 
customary marriages.” The report depicts an insurrectionary situation wherein 
villagers wait for representatives of the State to be absent in order to be able to 
conduct their communal unofficial nuptials as they please. The villagers are described 
as “administering ‘urfi marriage like hashish.” This kind of marriage, according to the 
article, is “spreading like a plague.” Ruz al-Yusuf’s alarm is emblematic of how 
colonialism, persistent through colonial paradigms even after the official ending of the 
colonial era, and the gaze of the State work together (more than three decades after 
the withdrawal of British troops and about at least a decade and a half after the 
opening up of the country for US cultural imposition). As evident in the title, the 
situation in this village was alarming because of how it resisted the power of the State 
to sanction marriage; people were taking their intimate lives into their own hands and 
resisting the infringement of the State on their marriage practices. The alarm was also 
about the colonial ideal of marriages, and how Western modernity defines marriage, 

















the age of consent, and adulthood.855 This report is also a clear example of how, 
almost a century after colonialism had imposed both state-marriage and the modern 
State itself, the State persists in its struggle to take control of marriage and transform 
it along modernist-colonial lines. In another essay, journalist ‘Abd Allah Kamal 
(mentioned earlier as the propagandist who incited the scandal of the Satanists in 
1996), went to the extent of declaring ‘urfi and mut‘ah marriages as constituting a 
“parallel regime” (nizam muwazi).856 
In the 1990s, licentious matrimonies that defy the modern/official 
understanding of marriage and that are not conducive to modern/monogamous/nuclear 
families were thus more than just a tool to besmirch and malign Islamist 
organizations. Although they were recurrently associated with the Islamists and the 
rural population, and although they seem to acquire enhanced subversiveness in the 
hand of Islamist terrorists (licentious matrimonies being one of the terrors Islamists 
visit on society), these licentious matrimonies and para-State nuptials were, in 
themselves, and even when not practiced by terroristic or subversive organizations, 














We have so far explored how matrimonies and conjugal practices that do not abide by 
the models of modern marriage and the bourgeois family are invested with an 
insurrectionary agency. Now I will turn to the opposite side of the same coin: how 
political and/or armed insurrection is depicted as a threat to the family, indeed, how 
activism or militancy against the State is perceived, in various pro-State 
representations, as an insurgency against the family.  
Even before the licentious revolutionaries of Tahrir Square walked out on the 
paternal authority of Mubarak and of their families, and even before Rami al-I‘tisami 
and his comrades in lewdness walked out on their upper class families, Islamist 
organizations in the 1990s were depicted as undertaking an insurrection not only 
against official matrimonial practices that were conducive to the production of nuclear 
families but also against the parental and paternal authorities and filial bonds of the 
family.  We have repeatedly revisited the example where a former ministry of interior 
official described the Islamists as “hippies” who rebel against their parents and their 
societies. This theme was repeated by other propagandists: militants who join these 
organizations, according to the ‘investigative report’ of Shawkat and the confessions 
of ‘Adil ‘Abd al-Baqi, the ‘repentant terrorist’, end up “forgetting their fathers, 
mothers, and children.”857 
This insurrection against the family takes the form of class warfare in the 
testimonies of Shawkat and ‘Abd al-Baqi. According to ‘Abd al-Baqi, recruitment to 
Islamist organizations appears as a ploy by poorer youth, harboring class resentment 







this is mere classist propaganda (which assumes, first, that the poor do not have 
functional families, that the poor want to sabotage the lives of the rich, and that the 
Islamists are predominantly poor – thus denying the existence of, or even absolving, 
rich terrorists as the naïve victims of a lower-class Islamist conspiracy against the 
family), this propaganda and this ideological representation allude to the nature of the 
modern family as a bourgeois achievement. There is a difference, of course, between 
claiming the modern family as a bourgeois construct that is universalized to other 
classes, or one which other classes are wont to emulate due to the dominance of 
bourgeois ideology, and proclaiming the family to be the exclusive privilege of the 
upper class. Despite positing the family as an exclusive upper class privilege, Shawkat 
acknowledges the lower class yearning for a similar lifestyle (perhaps it was this 
yearning that fueled their resentment). This is where the insurrection against the 
family backfires. ‘Abd al-Baqi reports how whilst trying to assimilate to mainstream 
society after his own repentance, he was overwhelmed by regret once he saw one of 
his former school colleagues driving his family in his own “luxurious car,” thinking 
that he could have been in a similar position had he not pursued the path of extremism 
and terror.859 The bourgeois dream of living with one’s family, parenting one’s 
children (in addition to the dream of sheltering them in bourgeois households, driving 
them in luxurious cars, etc.) haunts the Islamist, according to the recurrence of the 
image in ‘Abd al-Baqi’s confessions and Shawkat's reports. ‘Abd al-Baqi, according 
to Shawkat, “dreamed of working, like every other young man, in the morning, and of 
returning home at the end of the work day to find that his wife had prepared food for 
																																								 																			 	
859Shawkat,	Irhabitaht	al-Tamrin,	149:	 ھتجوز عم ... نوبز ّيلإ ءيجی امدنع اریثك تیكب مكو
طأوف شیعأ نأ نكمی ناكو ... ةساردلا يف يلیمز ناك ھنأ أجافأو ...ةرخاف ةرایس يف ھلا






him, so that he could rest after a day’s toil, and to stay up at night helping his children 
with their schoolwork.”860 The bourgeois dream here seems to be based on two 
pillars, the Protestant work ethic and domestic marital bliss (which ties to my earlier 
argument that the two proper spaces that emerge in this discourse are domestic and 
work spaces. The licentious space, including the Islamist orgy, is of course inimical to 
both). The latter is emphasized but the former is important, especially for the purpose 
of producing men as fathers and providers, thus producing the domestic as its (good) 
other to which the father-homofaber can retreat at the end of the day.  
It was this bourgeois dream of marital bliss, in fact, that redeemed ‘Abd al-
Baqi and that was thought to act as an antidote to extremism that could redeem 
terrorists. Shawkat concluded that it was this dream that triggered ‘Abd al-Baqi’s 
repentance. It was also the fear that ‘Abd al-Baqi would lose his children to “the 
empire of extremist organizations” that led ‘Abd al-Baqi to defect and confess.861 Just 
as the family worked as an antidote to ‘Abd al-Baqi’s extremism, it could also work to 
redeem and recuperate other terrorists: when presenting his vision of how to 
recuperate and re-assimilate young extremists who defect from their terrorist 
organizations, ‘Abd al-Baqi declared that he wanted to “retrieve our children from 
their caves, [so that they could] return once more to the embrace (ahdan) of society, 
and enjoy the warmth and security (dif’ wa aman) of the nuclear family (al-usrah) and 
of a safe/secure (al-amin) society,”862— (note here that by being described as the 
domain of security and safety, the family, and the nuclear family specifically, the  








The opposition between the terrorist organization and the family, the 
former seen as engaged in a struggle to destroy the latter, and the latter as an antidote 
to the former, was not unique to Irhabi taht al-Tamrin. The other two main works of 
anti-Islamist propaganda that were produced in the same year (1994) carried the same 
theme: a television drama dealing with the theme of Islamist extremism and terrorism, 
titled al-‘A’ilah (the family, though here it can either mean the nuclear or the 
extended family, and can be seen as a metaphor for Egypt), was written by Wahid 
Hamid (long time pro-State and anti-Islamist propagandist, though occasionally 
directing moderate criticism to the regime and the ministry of interior) and aired 
during the holy month of Ramadan of that year.863 The other work of the year was 
‘Adil Imam’s blockbuster al-Irhabi (which we already discussed in Chapter 1, and 
which was released to theatres during the ‘Id/feast immediately following the month 
of Ramadan during which al-‘A’ilah was aired). In al-Irhabi, the themes of the family 
vis-à-vis the terrorist dominate the plot. In this film, the terrorist organization is pit 
against the family from the onset when the commander of the organization (branded 
as Amir al-Jama‘ah) promises to wed the protagonist to a woman who had just run 
away from her “infidel husband” and who was then declared divorced of him by the 
Amir (this scene precedes immediately the scene when the terrorist engages in the 
masturbatory push-ups, discussed in Chapter 1).  Eventually, the protagonist was 
dispatched to carry out a terrorist attack, during which he was injured but fled the 
scence. He was picked up by an unsuspecting upper class family who took pity on 










they encounter an injured lower class bearded man on the street). The upperclass 
family’s loving care creates a dilemma for the terrorist:  should he remain loyal to the 
family or to the terrorist organization and cause? The dilemma is highlighted by the 
socially liberal (sometimes ostentatious) lifestyle of his host family: they allow him to 
mingle with their daughters who, by the terrorist’s standards, are not decently clothed, 
and they host parties where liquor flows and people indulge in alcohol (including the 
terrorist himself)—the only person who shares the terrorist’s social conservatism turns 
out to be a Christian friend of the host family. The family, expectedly, opposes the 
terrorist and his organization’s political views. One of the members of the family 
hangs a picture of Che Guevara in his room (though he proclaims not to be a 
Communist, only an admirer of Guevara’s struggle), and the family befriends a liberal 
journalist and intellectual who writes against Islamist organizations and is presumably 
on their kill list (modeled on the anti-Islamist intellectual Faraj Fudah who was indeed 
assassinated by Islamist extremists in 1991).  
This presents one of the greatest dilemmas for the terrorist. Faced with his 
organization’s intent to kill the friend of his host family, and unable to pick sides 
between the terrorist organization and the family, the terrorist makes an anonymous 
phone call and warns the journalist against the attempt to be made on his life. The 
journalist interprets the phone call as a threat and declares himself not to be one who 
succumbs to intimidation. The terrorist then tries to make an appeal in the name of the 
family and asks the journalist to think of his children (who would become orphaned if 
he were to be killed) and wife (who would be widowed). The journalist proclaimed 
“and if we only worry about our children, who will worry about our country!” (it 




that is above the family, and that is the country).864 The terrorist eventually chooses 
the family over the jama‘ah. In a telling scene, we see the former terrorist, now 
reformed as a family man (manifest in his shaven beard and modern Western suit) 
telling his organization that he could not bring himself to carry out any new 
operations. The members of the organization wondered what had changed, since he 
had always been the first to volunteer to carry out operations. One of the members 
accused him of liking “their” lifestyle and becoming “one of them” (the infidels? The 
urbanites? The family?).865 In a final attempt to rescue the terrorist from succumbing 
to urban and family life, the Amir promises to wed him to a virgin girl “not yet 15,”866 
but to no avail. The Islamist animosity to modern/normative state-sanctioned marriage 
and bourgeois family is not only highlighted through their intention to wed a grown 
man to a not-yet-15 year old girl, but also in suggesting that they would live together 
in the house of another terrorist-couple; the rules of marriage and sexual norms are 
subverted while the privacy of the domestic is denied, and a regression to a time when 
the household and the family were not compartmentalized into nuclear units is 






















gradually succumbs to the infidel-family lifestyle and is eventually killed by his own 
organization.  
We see, therefore, a theme of depicting political insurrection/terrorism as 
inimical to the family emerging in various representations under Mubarak:867 in news 
reports about marriage practices that defy the government, in journalistic investigative 
reports about terrorists, in confessions of repentant terrorists, and in television and 
film representations. That these representations, in various fields, some of them 
“factual,” others fictional, emerged simultaneously (many during the same year, 
sometimes less than a month apart as was the case between al-‘A’ilah and al-Irhabi) 
may suggest that there was one state apparatus responsible for propaganda, or for 
issuing directives to various authors and media figures to focus on certain themes, but 
may also suggest that pitting the family against the terrorist organization, political 
insurrection, or the licentious space more broadly is a theme, or topos, dictated by an 
ideology or an ideological formation that weighs heavily on mainstream (cinematic, 

























prevalence of the theme in various forms of representations that transcend one genre 
and transgress the boundary between fact and fiction attests to the presence of a state 
ideology that upholds marriage and the family, and that conversely associates 
terrorism and insurrection with assaults on state-sanctioned marriage and the 
bourgeois family (and vice versa). 
 
Dysfunctional	Families	Breed	Activists,	Terrorists,	and	Other	Bad	Subjects	
We have so far explored two facets of the ideological opposition between political 
dissidents and the family. First we showed how licentious matrimonies are the sign – 
perhaps the sin(e) qua non -  of the political dissidents-qua-bad subjects. Second, 
whereas licentious matrimonies in themselves constituted an insurrection, dissidents 
(and especially terrorists) were depicted in opposition to, as if waging their own 
insurrection or struggle against, proper state-sanctioned marriage and against the 
modern (bourgeois, nuclear, state-sanctioned) family. A third facet, which we are 
about to explore, is how failed families produce failed, bad, and licentious subjects, or 
how bad subjects are almost always produced due to a failure of the family: Sydney 
Carton, the female communard (and the Arab women of/victims of insurgent tribes to 
whom she is compared), and the licentious revolutionary in Tahrir Square, much like 
the Islamist terrorist, were all uprooted from the domestic and the family, and this 
uprooting was the precondition of their dwelling/wandering in licentious space. 
In the Egyptian State’s and media’s ideological representations, dysfunctional 
families continually produce bad offspring who become political activists, Satanists, 
or Islamist terrorists. That dysfunctional families breed terrorists is a staple of 




normative behavior and lifestyle of the terrorist, and the terrorist’s pathologization 
through normalizing the bourgeois family and positing it as the other of the terror 
breeding ground.868 This ideology appeared in (or was culturally imposed on) 
Egyptian counterterrorism discourse as early as 1989. After the violent confrontations 
between the police and an Islamist organization that year (an event that set the tone 
for the confrontations, both material and discursive, between the State and the 
Islamists throughout the 1990s), the newspaper Akhbar al-Yawm invited a panel of 
experts (psychologists, criminologists, political commentators, etc.) to contribute to 
an extended report on terror psychology. These experts’ opinions all concurred that 
the dysfunctional family was a major factor in the etiology of the deformed 
psychology of the terrorist.869  
A similar report, less grounded in pop-psychology but similarly looking for 
the etiology of terror and identifying the family’s failures as a principal factor in the 
etiology of terror, appeared in Ruz al-Yusuf three months later.870 In both reports a 
famous psychiatrist of the time, Muhammad Sha‘lan, was invited to provide his expert 
opinion, and in both reports he blamed terrorism on the dysfunctional family. A few 
months later Ibrahim Si‘dah, the editor of Akhbar al-Yawm, recapitulated this same 
logic by blaming dysfunctional families, negligent parents, and bad parenting, for 
breeding terrorists; the family should be, according to Si‘dah, the “the first fortress” 










writer Luwis Jurays took this logic beyond terrorism to political dissent as such: bad 
parenting, according to Jurays, was responsible for all forms of bad youth behavior, 
including demonstrations and “revolutions.”872 The same dysfunctional family and 
bad parenting that produced the terrorists that took up arms against the state in 1989 
and through the 1990s, and simultaneously bred Satanists (in one incident, presented 
in chapter 2, Ruz al-Yusuf took the ideological metaphor literally, showing how one of 
the Satanists actually came from a family who belonged to the Muslim Brothers)873 
would produce prodigal children-cum-activists in 2011. We have already encountered 
examples to that effect in earlier chapters: Dalia from al-Sifarah fi al-‘Imarah was the 
product of a dysfunctional Communist family that resembled the working class 
crowd, Rami and his “comrades in licentiousness” produced through an escape from 
the hold of the already loose upper class family, the ribald ‘girl’ of Tahrir Square in 
the discourse of Murtada Mansur produced by a failure/refusal to recognize paternal 
authority, and the activist women of May 9th 2011 whose virginity were in question 
given that they were not “like your daughters or my daughters.”  
 
The	Family	and	State	Ideology	
The anxiety about the family is therefore not only about a proper space that is 
opposed to and threatened by licentious space, not only about sexual practices that 
escape state sanction, but also about the family as a mode of subjectivation. This is 









January-February 2011– that they failed to recognize Mubarak as their father because 
they never learnt to recognize and/or respect their own fathers. The same 
representational strategy appears in Luwis Jurays’ 1989 article attributing “the youth’s 
revolution” to the failures of the family. Proper subjectivation through a proper family 
with proper paternal authority would have taught these prodigal subjects to identify, 
internalize, and heed the (paternal) authority of the president and the government.  
In addition, the discourse on the infantile/pubescent crowd, through its 
insistence on infantilizing the members of the crowd, invites the political activists to 
accept their position as children. Once they accept their position as children, they 
need to identify their elders, not only in terms of age but also in terms of political 
rank: government officials, army men, and the president, as paternal authority.874 The 
family thus, through paternal identification, produces subjects that are successful and 
docile, and produces subjectivities/psyches that submit to the State as a paternal mode 
of authority.875  
Clearer than Murtada Mansur’s denunciation, and clearer than Ana Asif Ya 
Rayyis’ filial apologies, was Sadat’s patronizing interpellation. On various occasions 
Sadat (who re-introduced the infantilization of the masses as I argued in Chapters 1 
and 4) explicitly invited his critics to recognize him as their father and thus to refrain 
from criticizing him (in other words to become good docile obedient children-













temper when debating with a young ‘Abd al-Mun‘im abu al-Futuh (then an activist 
within the ranks of the extremist al-Jama‘ah al-Islamiyyah, and later a “moderate” 
Islamist presidential candidate in 2012). In response to Abu al-Futuh’s criticism, 
Sadat fired back: “Abide by your [filial] station, I am the elder of the family.”  
A calmer and more meticulous elaboration of family ideology and its role in 
interpellating children-as-subjects (or subjects-as-children) manifested in Sadat’s 
encounter with the female secondary school student discussed in the previous chapter. 
The student challenged Sadat on the need for a democratic system whereby the 
president would be held accountable to the people “just like in America.” Sadat 
responded: “what you say is true, but [true only] in America. Here we are a family, 
and I am the elder of the family. It is impertinent for someone to challenge the elder 
of the family.”876 The metaphor of the nation-as-family (in a way a staple of modern 
nationalisms, Western and otherwise) is extended here by Sadat into full ideological 
conceit, reserving for himself the position of the father, while casting the citizens as 
children, and coding political docility as family values. Thus, Sadat reified the family 
and the State both at once, entrusting both with the production of good obedient and 
docile subjects. This good national-family is opposed to the dysfunctional and/or 
licentious American family (or American nation which does not resemble the family). 
While the metaphor of the nation as family is hardly innovative, Sadat’s reign marks 
the instilment of this metaphor as almost-official State ideology. Furthermore, Sadat’s 
innovation lies in this indigenization of the family-as-nation ideology by opposing the 
national-family to (alleged) American democracy.  It is ironic that Sadat represented 







subjectivation, let us not forget, is a colonial creation.877 Of course my claim here is 
not that colonialism created the family ex-nihilo, but rather that colonialism redefined 
and transformed the family along modernist-colonialist lines, thus assimilating, 
suppressing, and sublating other indigenous formations that predated colonialism.  
The anxieties we observe in the various examples above closely resemble 
colonial anxieties about the family, most clearly the anxiety about non-normative 
marriage practices, directed against the entire Egyptian population by British 
colonialists and their epistemic allies at the early 20th century, and against Islamist 
terrorists by the post colonial state and its ideological apparatuses at the turn of the 
20th- 21st century. We also observe an anxiety about paternal identification within the 
family, to wit, about the Oedipus complex, and its capacity to produce successful and 
docile subjects. In his foundational Black Skin White Masks, Frantz Fanon posited 
how the Oedipus complex was specific to a certain Western mode of the family, 
arguing that, in the Antilles, there was no Oedipus complex.878 My analysis here takes 
up Fanon’s historicization of the Oedipus complex without attempting to replicate it 
for Egypt. This is not an argument about the presence or absence of the Oedipus 
complex in Egypt: in a society that experienced two centuries of Western colonialism, 

















followed suit, and second through British colonization, and third through US 
economic and cultural imperialism, it would be absurd to argue for a total absence of 
the Oedipus complex, especially after we have shown how the modern Western 
nuclear family was imposed, internalized, and promoted by Egyptian intellectuals and 
state bureaucrats, including anti-colonial nationalists, in the early 20th century, and by 
state propagandists in the late 20th century and through the 21st. What we have, 
however, juxtaposed to this hegemonic institutionalization of the family, is a history 
of contingency, precarity, and failures (even if limited ones) wherein the State needs 
to continuously intervene to restore the Western bourgeois family, lament the 
distortion thereof, and single out bad subjects that are not produced through proper 
Oedipal identification.879 These modes of subjectivation, their failures, and their 
relationship to colonialism and to the state will become clearer once we examine the 




In the discourse on the crowd, the army emerges as the crowd’s other; its discipline 
functions as an antidote to the crowd’s licentiousness. In place of the chaotic, 
orgiastic, convulsive, and potentially subversive movement of the crowd, the army 
introduces a calculated, meticulous, and purposeful march. The opposition of crowds 










in LeBon’s writings and career)880 as well as to an emerging military theory that 
adopted and built on crowd theory.881 Two influential French generals and military 
theorists, namely Henri Bonnal and Louis de Maud’huy, took up LeBon’s ideas and 
subsequently started infusing LeBon’s thought into the École de Guerre. Hence, they 
envisioned the regeneration of France through its military, by way of countering the 
chaos and degeneration of the crowd.882  
Paraphrasing de Maud’huy’s thought, Robert Nye writes “The employment of 
artificial measures such as discipline, habitual training, long association, and stable 
leadership cause a ‘foule’ to be transformed into a ‘troupe’.”883 Nye then concludes 
(and it is not entirely clear when his paraphrase of early 20th century French war 
theory ends and where his own adoption thereof starts) that “Unlike the ‘feminine’ 
and very mobile crowd, this troop has enough ‘masculine’ character to be accessible 
to reason and control; a wise chef, drawing on the high emotional content of the troop 
could compose his unit into a ‘moral force’ of great solidarity and power”(emphasis 
in original).884  The effect of LeBon’s theory on military thought did not end with 


















disciplined crowd began to appear with increasing frequency in military writings.”885 
In the subsequent exposition I will briefly show how this opposition appeared in 
Egypt.  
 In our earlier analysis of the crowd, it has been shown (building on Timothy 
Mitchell’s thesis on the metaphysics of modernity and the world-as-exhibition) how 
the military is one of the institutions (alongside/modeled on the Exhibition), which 
turns the crowds into disciplined troops and individuals.886 The same opposition 
between crowds and troops can be observed, to various degrees, throughout Egyptian 
military history. When introducing both the military and the police (as national agents 
of order) to Egypt and other Arab speaking territories, the disciplining role of the 
institution and of its officers was coded in the very Arabic term for officer, dabit, 
literally the one who adjusts, puts things in place, disciplines, or sets things right. The 
term also carries the connotation of tying things to their place. In the Egyptian 
manifestations of the ideology of Order, since the late 19th century and up to this very 
moment, the noun dabt is usually associated with rabt (tying or linking), and 
discipline is usually referred to as dabt wa rabt (adjusting and tying).887 Incidentally, 
the linguistic antonyms of dabt wa rabt include inhilal (dissolution, coming undone, 
degeneration) and infilat (setting loose), which recur as signifiers of the physics and 
metaphysics of political and social disorder as explained in Chapter 1, and which also 












The confrontation between orderly militarism (through its agent, the dabit) 
and licentious disorder, in other words between the licentious space and the 
disciplined uniformed space, took many forms throughout modern Egyptian history. 
We have seen how, in 1882, the ‘Urabist military government, understanding itself as 
the agent of order (coded as rahah, lit. comfort), threatened to shoot rioters and 
saboteurs. As military ideology progressed and took more sophisticated forms, this 
confrontation became more subtle and symbolic (though the shooting of dissidents 
was never ruled out, as evidenced by recent Egyptian history). 
One of the major symbolic forms the confrontation between the army and the 
licentious crowd would take later was a gendered form; whereas in 1882 no sign of 
gendering whatsoever appeared in the confrontation between the army of order and 
the licentious crowd, later confrontations would be largely (through not exclusively) 
coded in gendered terms. In Chapter 1, we witnessed the confrontation between the 
military man, the embodiment of military valor, discipline, and masculinity, on one 
side, and the crowd-born(e), licentious, feminine or feminized body on the other. We 
have seen this opposition in the army officer trying to emasculate male demonstrators 
in front of the Israeli embassy, in social media depictions of “depraved” and 
“hysterical” women screaming and yelling at army men, and in the army’s subjection 
of female demonstrators to virginity tests in March 2011.888 This last example shows 
not only the opposition between the army and the licentious and feminine crowd-
born(e) subject, but also how the former can, through phallic intervention, cure (a 
paradoxical position wherein the army both violates and protects, or violates in order 







much a phallic object as the paraphernalia of modern militarism),889 acts here in 
compliance with militarism. It replaces, in a way, the guns, bullets,890 and torture 
equipment which militaries use when quelling licentious crowds (and which Egyptian 
military police used when dealing with demonstrators on March 9th 2011, whether 
through the violent breaking up of the sit-in and the kidnapping of activists, or 
through forms of torture other demonstrators were subjected to in the chambers of the 
Egyptian museum at the same time as the virginity tests were being administered). 
This opposition between the army and the licentious crowd culminated in the army’s 
putting an end to the revolutionary situation and usurping power in 2013, and the 
coming to the fore of the military man, ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, who took centre stage 
and became the de facto ruler, and later the ‘elected’ president, of Egypt, depicted 
then through tropes of masculine attractiveness and sometimes hypermasculinity. On 





















military ordnance took a more literal turn with the slaughter of demonstrators in 
Rabi‘ah al-‘Adawiyyah and al-Nahdah Squares.891 
Of course one cannot reduce a massacre of that scale to the opposition 
between a licentious effeminate crowd and a proper masculine army – nor should we 
let intellectual musings and theoretical representations mask the bloodletting of 817-
3000 victims. Even in the pro-State discourse, the representations of the 
confrontation, and the representations of the Rabi‘ah and Nahdah crowds more 
generally, steered away from gendered tropes; the army needed to avoid feminizing 
the Rabi‘ah and al-Nahdah crowd lest it be depicted as the murderer of women and 
children rather than their protector.  
While there was no clear gendering in the discourse on the massacre of 
Rabi‘ah and al-Nahdah, depictions of licentious crowds played a role in justifying the 





























and unruly; spreading noise and trash, harassing women, and sometimes firing 
random bullets at the surroundings. 892 Unmistakable here is the opposition between 
the precise army gunfire (which, at least on some level of the imagination of the 
regime and its supporters, only finds its way to members of the Muslim Brothers – 
understood as a belligerent party and excluded from the category of civilians, while 
sparing innocent civilians) and the stray bullets fired by the Muslim Brothers (an 
accusation that was also heralded against an earlier protest in al-‘Abasiyyah, 2012, 
which was one of the last incidents wherein Islamist and secular activists marched 
hand in hand against the military). This opposition is reminiscent of the opposition 
between the fire of order (Versaillais in 1871 and British in 1882) to the wildfire of 
the revolutionaries and natives, explored in Chapter 1. It seems that Egyptian 
demonstrators in 2011- 2013 Egypt also stood at the threshold of fire; with the 
exception of course of the demonstrators marching in support of and in coordination 
with the army. For those, alliance with the army seems to have cured them of their 
crowd-born(e) licentiousness. Opposed to the stray bullets of the Muslim Brothers, 
these demonstrators were constantly depicted as using laser pointers – perhaps the 
most precise of phallic gadgets.  
More than their stray fire, the most stark characterization of Rabi‘ah and al-
Nahdah as licentious crowds was the rumor of jihad al-nikah/nikah al-jihad, which 
presented the marital and mating practices within the sit-ins as an abomination of the 
proper family, and which was used to justify the massacre, especially after the fact.893 









(and, in this example, lethal) piercing served to cure and expunge the crowd’s 
licentiousness (and in the case of jihad al-nikah, protect the family and its values 
against non-normative coupling), to the effect of expunging the crowd itself.   
The year 2013 can therefore be read as more than a mere military takeover. It 
was the moment of the triumph of order, discipline, and propriety, embodied in the 
army, over the chaotic, dirty, and licentious space (be it the revolutionary crowd or 
the Islamic jama‘ah). It was also the moment of the triumph of military ideology, 
engendered by the military-qua-proper space, and embodied in the figure of the army 
man, posited as the model subject, or ego ideal. In fact, the Sisi cult of personality that 
engulfed the Egyptian media during and after the coup, and the erotic twist which this 
cult sometimes featured, can be explained (at least partly), in terms of the rise of the 
army man as model subject/ego ideal,894 and of militarism as antidote to 
licentiousness.  
My description of 2013 as a moment of triumph for military ideology 
confirms that this ideology was not created ex nihilo in 2013, but had already been 
present and/or pervasive (if not necessarily dominant) before. Yet, to describe it as a 
moment of triumph is to argue implicitly that it had not been completely triumphant 
before. Indeed, to say that 2013 is the moment of the triumph of military ideology is 





Liveright Publishing, 1967), esp	37-	42-	for	how	this	ego	ideal	harks	back	to	the	image	of	the	father	
see	Freud,	The Ego and the Id, (London: Hogarth Press,1927), 23-33. For	a	further	elaboration	on	the	
role	this	identification,	internalization,	and	cathexis	plays	in	the	rise	of	‘populist’	leaders	see	Ernesto	








In his seminal work on the Egyptian army, Khalid Fahmy shows, beyond the shadow 
of doubt, how the Egyptian army under Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha did not enjoy any 
popularity among Egyptians.895 It was not uncommon, according to Fahmy, for 
potential conscripts to maim themselves in order to escape military service.896 What 
Fahmy observed in the archive of the early to mid 19th century remained true in the 
early 20th century. Even as he was trying to rehabilitate the image of the army, 
Mustafa Kamil (the founder of al-Liwa’ newspaper and of al-Hizb al-Watani or the 
National Party) noted its unpopularity; Egyptians often went to military service “with 
tears in their eyes,” “as if they were being led to their deaths.” Kamil then recounted 
the extremes to which Egyptians went in order to avoid military service; Kamil 
lamented how Egyptians were ready to go as far as “cutting their own fingers off or 
maiming themselves” to dodge conscription.897 This begs the question of when the 













The first attempt to make the Egyptian army popular was the ‘Urabi revolt: 
the army, under ‘Urabi, presented itself as the representative of the Egyptian people 
and that it adopted their demands, and later proved its willingness (though not its 
efficacy) to fight foreign invaders on behalf of Egyptians, the Ottomans, and dawlat 
al-khilafah. On the eve of the confrontations with the foreign invaders, the popularity 
of the Egyptian army peaked to the extent that al-Mufid proclaimed, in the context of 
responding to the London Times’ anti-‘Urabi propaganda: “kulluna jaysh” (we are all an 
army, which could also be conversely read as “the army is all of us.”).898 ‘Urabi, as 
the leader and representative of the movement, was often referred to as al-shahm al-
humam.899 The word shahm denotes chivalry, virtuousness, and the ability to stand up 
for what is right and/or for the weak. Humam means spirited, mettlesome, and/or 
audacious. The construction al-shahm al-humam can be easily translated into the 
English word gallant (a word that was later used in the academic literature about the 
Egyptian army and soldiery, sometimes to the effect that academic works seemed to 























the army leader connects two disparate figures. It brings the figure of the noble 
warrior (an archetype that predates modern soldiery and that is common in many 
cultures, including Egyptian culture) with the figure of the modern soldier (belonging 
to a different newer species for whom discipline is crucial, and for which courage and 
valor are less of an essence);901 it puts the warrior of epics and folk tales in a modern 
military uniform. The rhetoric on the ‘Urabi movement and the gallantry of its leader, 
however, with very few exceptions, lacked the trappings of modern military 
ideologies; there was hardly any fascination with his uniform, or with military 
masculinity, and military discipline, let alone sexualized references to the country’s 
honor, or tropes of rape and/or emasculation (on the contrary women were allowed a 
heroic role in the emerging nationalist narrative as shown in Chapter 1, and as 
opposed to the damsels in distress that appeared in British reports). Soon enough, the 
whole movement was defeated, and ‘Urabi’s surrender left little chance for him to 
survive as a hero (that is, until his later appropriation by the Nasir regime).  
The khedival restoration project, under Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi II and in 
alliance with the second wave of Egyptian nationalism, attempted to reinstate the 























image of the army as part of the new nationalist project, and in the process adopted 
the French and British notions of militarism, military masculinity, and proper 
subjectivity as heeding (sometimes literally sometimes metaphorically) a call to arms 
by the nation. French notions found their way to Egyptian nationalist rhetoric at the 
hands of the cohort of Egyptian nationalists who formed (under khedival patronage) 
al-Liwa’ newspaper and later the National Party. They were mostly French-educated 
middle class professionals (mainly lawyers and teachers, with the notable exception of 
Shaykh Muhammad Jawish); gone are the days when Azhar-educated thinkers were in 
charge of the ideological struggle. Early in its tenure, al-Liwa’, in an article titled “al-
Sayf wa al-Qalam” (the sword and the pen) expressed its admiration for the 
Napoleonic model and praised the French for valuing both Victor Hugo and 
Napoleon902 equally.903 This French ability to value both intellect and militarism 
equally (both the pen and the sword as the title of the article suggests) is juxtaposed  
to an indigenous meekness that overvalues intellect and fails to value might and 
militarism, for which the article finds emblematic a famous line of poetry by the 
classical Arab poet al-Mutanabbi that places sound opinion above courage904 (a line of 
poetry that was repeatedly invoked by the ‘Urabi movement,905 signaling the shift 
from the ‘Urabists’ over-valuing of restraint to al-Liwa’s overvaluing of military 
resolve). What the author of this article missed, however, was that al-Mutanabbi was 












one side and forwardness and resolve on the other,906 and that he was given the epithet 
rabb al-sayf wa al-qalam (the wielder/lord of the sword and the pen) which the very 
title of al-Liwa’s article echoes. This invocation of al-Mutanabbi’s line might have 
been an oblique reference to the ‘Urabi movement (thus juxtaposing ‘Urabi, or, once 
again, Arabi, the embodiment of indigenous meekness that values sound opinion over 
the sword, to French militarism—just like the Gazette de France juxtaposed the 
unruly lot, the émeute that constituted the ‘Arabi movement to what a military model 
should have looked like). The final words of the article were less oblique in their 
reference to ‘Urabi: the author ended the article by wishing that the sword of the 
“Orientals” not be like “the sword of ‘Urabi.”907 The model for proper militarism and 
proper subjectivity was therefore French and Napoleonic, not Arabi.908 
British notions, obviously, had a similarly important role to play. The 
conquering British brought with them notions of militarism and military masculinity 
as models of heroism and subjectivity, while the defeat in the face of the latter 
emphasized to the Egyptian nationalist the role a nationalist army could play/could 
																																								 																			 	
906	For	example	one	of	his	famous	verses	praises	his	patron,	Sayf	al-Dawlah,	for	being	good	at	both	
wielding	and	sheathing	the	sword:	 فویسلاو ھیلإ ترظن دقلو ...ةدمغم دنھلا فویسو ھترز دقلو
 ُمیشلا نسحلأا يف ام نسحأ ناكو ...مھلك الله قلخ نسحأ ناكف /ُمد.	On	a	different	occasion	al-
Mutanabbi	warned	that	patience	and	generosity,	while	necessary	at	times,	can	be	detrimental	at	
others,	just	like	violence	can	be	harmful	if	applied	in	a	context	that	requires	patience	and	generosity:	















have played in fending off the occupiers.909 From then on, the Egyptian nationalist 
rhetoric began to adopt militarism and military masculinity/virility as tools for 
national regeneration and for defeating the occupier. In fact one of the earliest 
references to national virility in the archive of Egyptian nationalism (incited by a 
militarized context, though not exclusively referring to military masculinity) appeared 
in al-Liwa’s rendering and response to a note given by Lord Cromer in Khartoum 
during a military ceremony in honor of a departing British commander (one Captain 
Bailey) and wherein Cromer reminisced about his British military and civil tenure in 
the Sudan. Towards the end of his speech, Cromer noted: 
The Sudanese are a fine race. Many of those I am now addressing have had ample 
opportunities of testifying to the fact that they possess in a very marked degree the 
virile quality which is the foundation-stone of all other national qualities. They are 































The awkward Arabic rendering of al-Liwa’ (a salient feature of the rhetoric of 
the French-educated second wave of Egyptian nationalists, as opposed to the eloquent 
Arabic of the first wave) reads as follow: 
 لساوب ناعجش موق مھف ةملأل ةموقملا ناكرلأا مظنأ يھ يتلا ةیلوجرلا تافصلا مھیف تققحت ... بعش نوینادوسلا
نویمأ فسلأل مھنكل911  
The article then goes on to juxtapose the virile Sudanese to the Egyptian collaborators 
who lack kull sifat al-rujuliyyah (all virile/masculine/manly traits), and who as a 
result lost any respect even among the occupiers they served (i.e. they did not receive 
an acknowledgement of virility from the British High Commissioner like the 
Sudanese who fought and earned that honor). The discourse on nationalist 
masculinity, or to be more faithful to the lexicon employed by Cromer, on nationalist 
virility, appeared in Egypt as a response to a British incitement to discourse, a 
response to British notions that virilize both the conqueror and the resistor (it is 
important to note, however, that the other of virility in al-Liwa’s discourse is not the 
effeminate man but rather men who lack virtue, or virtu; the collaborators, according 
to al-Liwa’s article, have flooded the country, not with feminization and effeminacy, 
but rather with weakness and death, and therefore, they have become, not effeminate 











and vehicles/animals to be ridden/mounted and controlled by others al-alat 
mutaharrikah fi yad al-ghayr wa al-matiyyah zimamuha biyad rakibiha).912 
The British occupation and its ideology and discourses therefore provided the 
incitement to a nationalist masculinist and militarized discourse in Egypt. But more 
importantly, the British brought militarism into the everyday lives of Egyptians 
through the reality of military occupation. Egyptians, at least in the major cities, were 
made to (literally and metaphorically) see the British tank, British troops, and the 
various paraphernalia and emblems of British militarism, and every anti-colonial 
Egyptian nationalist was made to dream of defeating this military presence – it was 
only natural then that Egyptian nationalist dreams would then include military troops 
and terror networks (and while the story of the latter may be more interesting, our 
concern in this chapter is only with the former).  
In the light of these transformations, Egyptian nationalist discourse began to 
concern itself with emblems of militarism that had no value in the discourse of the 
‘Urabi movement and its military government. The very title of the mouthpiece of the 
second wave of Egyptian nationalism, al-Liwa’, is a military reference: it means the 
flag, the emblem, the banner, but also the military formation, the brigade, and more 
recently it has come to mean the rank “Major General” (deriving from the earlier 
Ottoman rank Amir Liwa’, which is Arabic for commander of a brigade, commander 
of a banner, or banner-man). All the mouthpieces of the ‘Urabi movement, on the 
other hand, did not reference military notions; even when ‘Urabi wanted a more 








(the mouthpiece/spokesparty of the ummah/nation) and eventually the title changed to 
al-Ta’if (the roamer). Members of the second wave, however, despite their civilian 
background (but perhaps due to their French education, or because they were defeated 
and were preoccupied with organizing resistance to the invader, whether peaceful or 
violent) were thinking of banners and brigades. The other emblem, paraphernalia, or 
fetish of militarism that emerged in the discourse of al-Liwa’ was the military 
uniform.913 Military emblems, particularly the uniform, consecrate the modern 
military models of subjectivity; whereas warrior courage has always been part of most 
cultures’ conception of the hero or even the model subject, militarism places this 
warrior model into a very particular mode of discipline, it uniforms this warrior. 
Even as various signs of military glory started to invade Egyptian nationalist 
rhetoric, in most of al-Liwa’s articles on armies and militarism, the Egyptian army 
appeared as a source not of glory but rather of pity. The Egyptian army was 
consistently depicted as deprived of the glory it was due as a result of British 
dominance, and the miserable conditions of Egyptian officers were often lamented914–  
valor and honor, on the other hand, were reserved for the Ottoman army, including its 
Egyptian contingent.915 While there is an implicit militarization-through-negation in 
this discourse – that armies should be glorious, that soldiers should be heroic, and that 













glamorized Egyptian soldier (enjoying military rank, uniforms, decorations, and other 
forms of military paraphernalia and fetishes) as a model nationalist subject and as a 
source of glory would not appear in Egyptian representations until the third decade of 
the 20th century. The soldier as the ideal Egyptian subject appears all of a sudden in 
the 1921 musical Shahrazad, which tells the story of the rise and fall of an Egyptian 
soldier, named Za‘bullah, serving in an imperial army, who incites the lust of the 
eponymous queen through his military glamour and uniform, and who brings military 
glory while singing the praises of his Egyptian homeland and his Egyptian ancestry 
(the musical was revived a number of times, most notably through another theatrical 
production in 1923, and through an audio-performance produced and broadcast by 
Egyptian national radio in 1957 and available in the Egyptian market via Sawt al-
Qahirah lil Sawtiyyatwa al-Mar’iyyat. This happens to be the only fully recorded 
version of the musical. Unless otherwise specified, my subsequent discussion is based 
on this recorded version). 
But before we examine the sudden appearance of the glamorized and 
eroticized male-soldier in Shahrazad, a curious earlier example (which celebrates a 
soldier but does not produce a celebration of militarism in the model conditioned by 
modern military ideologies) appears in the oeuvre of the important Egyptian poet, 
Hafiz Ibrahim. Ibrahim was associated with the nationalist movement and second in 
fame only to the poet Ahmad Shawqi.916 He himself served in the Egyptian army and 
wrote numerous paeans to the Ottoman army. While Ibrahim’s oeuvre lacks any 
paeans to the Egyptian army, a few curious lines (written circa 1906) describe the 






Malih (roughly: For a Pleasant Looking Soldier)917–  these lines were identified by 
Joseph Massad as one of the last instances of modern mainstream poetry written by 
male poets for the love of young males.918 The eroticization of the boy-soldier in 
Ibrahim’s poem, however, is radically different from the eroticization of soldiers in 
military ideology. While the latter tends to (hyper)masculinize the soldier, Ibrahim’s 
depiction is rather feminizing. The first two lines appearing underneath the 
subheading fi Jundi Malih point out the ‘ajab (wonder, bemusement, irony) that they 
gave the soldier a sword to hold while the gaze of each of his two eyes is a sword in 
its own right. Whether he raises or sheathes the sword of his gaze, the poem tells us, 
the soldier kills: 
ودنھم فیس كنم ظحل لك يفو ... ادنھم كودلق نأ بجع نم   
دمعتی لا ظحللاو ھب تلتق ...ھتدمغ وأ ھتدرج تنأ اذإ 
The sword reference here is not phallic at all. A common trope in classical Arabic 
literature is to describe the gaze of the female beloved as a cutting weapon, and her 
effect on her male beholders as cutting or killing. In this poem, Ibrahim, who was well 
versed in classical Arabic literature, was feminizing rather than masculinizing the 
gaze of the soldier, through using the feminine trope of the gaze-qua-cutting sword. In 
addition, if we accept my earlier argument that precise weaponry, the domain of 
modern soldiery, are also the prerogative of the white man, leaving women, savages, 
adolescents, and revolutionaries with imprecise weaponry/fire, we can see in this 
poem how the (feminine) gaze of the soldier is an imprecise weapon. It kills 
indiscriminately, without intent, whether sheathed or unsheathed (unlike the precise 







It is not entirely clear whether the heading fi jundi malih applies only to these 
two lines of poetry or to this and subsequent poems (the next heading appears two 
pages later). Another poem that may have been part of the poetry dedicated to the 
young soldier addresses someone (the soldier? The beloved?) as zabi al-hima (the 
deer of the homeland):  
اكفیط ىركلا يف انیأر اذإ ..اكرض ام 5اب ىمحلا يبظ  
؟اكدبع ادغ دق نلاف اولاق ..مھنأ ول هاشخت يذلا امو  
اكدنع ىوھلا قر اومرح ام ..مھنكلو قرلا اومرح دق  
ل حارم اشحلأا يف تنأو ..مھل احارم رصم تحبصأواك  
اكظحل انفایسأ يف نأ ول ..اھلین اوری نأ لاھس ناك ام  
Again here the beloved (who might have been the same soldier, and who was 
described in the linguistic masculine but could have been a woman given that the 
linguistic gender in Arabic does not have to correspond to the gender of the person 
being described— the signified does not solely determine the gender of the sign) is 
feminized. In Arabic poetry, the deer is a common reference to a woman with 
beautiful eyes. Once again Ibrahim, who was well versed in classical Arabic 
literature, could not have been oblivious to this motif. Regardless of whether the 
poem is for the soldier or someone else (male or female), the last verse serves to 
ridicule the Egyptian army. If the army had swords like that beloved’s gaze, Ibrahim 
tells us, the British would not have even been able to see Egypt’s Nile. This line does 
not only highlight the defeat of the Egyptian army in the face of the British, but also 
shows how their weaponry were even weaker than the feminine gaze of the beloved. 
Or, if we want to maintain the imposition of the phallic metaphor on Arabic poetry, 




enemies, womanly phallus which injures men with manly phalluses, and the Egyptian 
army phallus which defeats no one and injures no one. 
The sudden appearance of the eroticized and glamorized boy soldier starting 
in the 1920s (in Shahrazad) is thus singular. The emergence/invention of this 
glamorized and eroticized figure appears not only against a complete absence of any 
precedent, but furthermore against a tradition of ridiculing rather than venerating the 
Egyptian army. This was the case even when love was declared for boy-soldiers (as 
seen in the poetry of Hafiz Ibrahim).  
Given the singularity of Shahrazad and its unprecedented depiction of the 
glamorized boy-soldier as the model national subject, we will now turn our attention 
to the musical. Yet the singularity of the musical goes beyond its content and themes. 
Indeed, Shahrazad was no marginal work of Egyptian culture; the playwright and 
director, the Lebanese-Egyptian ‘Aziz ‘Id, was one of the major figures of Egyptian 
theatre at the time. Many of the songs were written by the famous Tunisian-Egyptian 
poet Bayram al-Tunisi (an iconic figure of Egyptian vernacular and protest poetry). 
The music was composed by Sayyid Darwish, who is generally credited for 
revolutionizing Arabic music and is considered the main inspiration for later famous 
musicians like Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab (who later composed the music for a 
number of songs we encountered in the previous chapter, including Sawt al-Jamahir), 
the Rahbani Brothers, and the underground protest singer al-Shaykh Imam (who sang 
many tributes to Darwish).  Darwish was part of the Egyptian anti-colonial nationalist 
movement and composed many protest, proletarian, and nationalist songs (many of 
which are still sung in political protests today). In a way, his work can be seen as a 
continuation of the legacy of the National Party; indeed, he is believed by music 




after the events of 1919 (with speculations of a return to the National Party by the 
time he was working on Shahrazad).919 He famously composed the music for 
Muhammad Yunis al-Qadi’s poem inspired by Mustafa Kamil’s speech “biladi biladi” 
(my homeland my homeland), which was adopted as the Egyptian national anthem in 
1979 and has remained so since. The duo, Dariwsh and al-Qadi, also composed songs 
for ‘Abbas Hilmi II, including ‘Awatfak dih Ashhar min Nar wherein they defy the 
British ban on mentioning Hilmi’s name (after his ouster and exile). Though a love 
poem, the first letter of every verse put together would make the sentence ‘Abbas 
Hilmi [is] the Khedive of Egypt.920 Shahrazad is therefore not unrelated to the 
nationalist project of the national party and the restoration project of ‘Abbas Hilmi (a 
project that was aborted some seven years before the production of Shahrazad, when 
the British ousted and exiled Abbas II and severed Egypt’s ties with its Ottoman 
suzerain).  
In Shahrazad we see the full-fledged advent of military-ideological 
representations, including the fetish of the uniform, of military rank, and decoration, 
the association between militarism and masculinity, and producing ideal military 
masculinity as a model for the nation. As soon as Za‘bullah appeared before 
Shahrazad, the queen became infatuated with his appearance and asked him where he 
hailed from. In response, he burst out into a song about his Egyptian origins. Falling 
in love with his Egyptian military masculinity, Shahrazad decided to promote 








her father’s sword,921 and tried by all means to keep him close to her- causing 
jealousy and dismay among members of her court, especially her Lebanese922 vizier 
and her Tartar/Turkish army commander, who then began to conspire against 
Za‘bullah (producing in the process a new nationalist trope of foreigners plotting to 
get rid of Egyptians, though this may be a new layer of meaning our modern moment 
imposes on the text). Feeling spurned by his refusal to abandon his Egyptian fiancée, 
Huriyyah, the queen decided to demote him and joined his rivals in a conspiracy to 
discredit him. Eventually Za‘bullah decided to take Huriyyah and return to Egypt.923  
 The musical is thus singular in its broaching of the themes of militarism and 
nationalism. Not only is the model subject presented as a glamorized soldier for the 
first time, but furthermore the model subject is engaged in a monogamous romantic 
love affair with his Egyptian fiancée (and therefore with Egypt for which Huriyyah is 
a surrogate). His model subjectivity is emphasized through his rejection of the foreign 


























homeland (herself) in opposition to the queen (herself), declaring:  “she [my 
homeland] is more worthy of my struggle [jihad] than your pretty face.” While the 
model national subject is male (and a male soldier), the nation is female (evident here 
through the gendering of her surrogate (Huriyyah) and her rival (Shahrazad), but also 
through the gendered reference by Za‘bullah in the final number, producing the 
homeland not only as a linguistic she but also as the female rival of Shahrazad and the 
competitor over Za‘bullah’s romantic love) and the love for the nation is a romantic 
monogamous love (similar to the one that produced families discussed in the earlier 
sections of this chapter).  
Shahrazad also introduced a gendering of spaces that was new to Egyptian 
discourse but in line with the dominant European notions of the time. The opposition 
between the military as a space of masculine discipline and the licentious spaces of 
dances and festivities as feminine is evident throughout the play; for example, in 
addition to the queen’s (feminine) lust for Za‘bullah and for his military allure, 
whenever there are festivities the women chorus comes in. Throughout the play, and 
especially in the first scene of the second act, wherein a mailman arrives with news 
from the battlefront and delivers the soldiers’ letters to a chorus of women; the female 
chorus appears as the realm of license and lust: they dance, giggle, flirt with the 
mailman, express their longing for the soldiers who are away fighting, and in 
anticipation of the return of the troops they declared that once the soldiers were back 
they would welcome them with kisses, bites, and hugs (though in the 1957 version 
this erotic anticipation was toned down into/euphemized as “returning the favor”).924 
																																								 																			 	






This opposition is also evident in a scene early on in the play wherein Huriyyah tried 
to convince Za‘bullah to dance with her. On duty, Za‘bullah repeatedly replied 
“unfortunately I cannot, as long as I am on duty” (though the feminine-licentious 
eventually triumphs, Za‘bullah ends up cursing military service and joining Huriyyah 
in dance, only to be caught by his Tartar commander who was scandalized by this 
blasphemy of military discipline).  
Given our earlier account of the seeds of militarism sowed by the National 
Party and ‘Abbas Hilmi’s restoration, and the connection between the makers of the 
musical (especially its composer Sayyid Darwish) and these two projects, Za’bullah 
can be seen as the culmination of these two projects. This reading is supported by a 
later musical number, reportedly composed by Sayyid Darwish and written by 
Badi‘ Khayri, titled “Misafir al-Jihadiyyah” (roughly: traveling for conscription, using 
the term jihadiyyah– derived from the root jihad to describe military conscription).925 
The musical number takes the form of a dialogue between a mother and her son who 
is being taken for military service. While the mother weeps for her son, the son tells 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 												 	























his mother about military glory. The son’s speech, which calls on the mother not to 
weep in the name of patriotism, and which genders military courage as masculine and 
the peaceful cowardly life of luxury as feminine,926 ends with the son proclaiming the 
sacrifice of oneself for the homeland (in the context of war) to be the 
foundation/essence of patriotism (asas al-wataniyyah). This song functions as a 
musical echo of the discourse that emerged almost two decades earlier in al-Liwa’ 
which called on Egyptians to respect military service and to seek military glory. 
Yet the ‘Abbas Hilmi-Nationalist Party project does not explain all the 
singularities of this musical, especially the emergence of the masculine soldier 
through a romantic trope that masculinizes the model subject and feminizes the 
nation. It also does not explain the sudden popularity of Egyptian soldiery after the 
Egyptian army had been pitted by the British against the Ottoman army in WWI, at a 
time when the Egyptian cultural and political spheres, and many of the Egyptian 
cultural and political figures, including al-Tunisi and Darwish, were largely pro-
Ottoman.927 
Alternatively, one may read the whole play as a parody of militarism.928 An 
important piece of information supports this reading: Shahrazad is a scene-for-scene 
																																								 																			 	















adaptation of Jacques Offenbach’s opera bouffe La Grande Duchesse de Gérolstein 
929 which parodies the militarisms of Prussia and of the Second Empire.930 Shahrazad 
can also be read as parody, Za‘bullah (the name itself sounds like a parody)931 quickly 

















































rises yet quickly falls, and his fall is farcical and humiliating. The final conspiracy, 
whereby his adversaries are finally capable of outsmarting and humiliating him, 
highlights this farcical aspect especially as the main conspirator, the Tartar general 
Qara Adamughli, recounts it in extreme excitement, in accented Arabic/stage Turkish, 
and in formal military diction.  Qara Adamughli starts explaining the conspiracy by 
recounting how, for ten years, he had maintained a love affair with haram masun haji 
baba tubji Abi Shanab (the faithful/respectable wife of His Excellency Tubji Abi 
Shanab). We are already in parodic territory; the woman who cheats on her husband 
with Qara Adamughli is the “faithful wife” of her husband, and the man who is being 
cuckolded is a manly abi shanab (literally a man with a moustache). Furthermore, the 
cuckolded husband is a tubji, i.e., he works in one of the most phallic divisions of the 
army, the artillery. To add another layer of parody, tubji in the modern Lebanese 
dialect means a man who is effeminate, male lover, or (usually passive) 
homosexual—perhaps ‘Aziz ‘Id, who studied in Beirut and whose family hails from 
Lebanese origins,932 was adding another layer of comedy by rendering the 
moustachioed artillery man a cuckolded effeminate sexually passive man (which, 
admittedly, may also be an over-reading on our part). Qara continues to narrate the 




















conspiracy and the parody of militarism becomes clearer: after realizing that Abi 
Shanab, suspicious of his faithful wife, had decided to ambush her lover, he 
announced to Za‘bullah (and his tone and rhythm become more like those of military 
commands as he quotes himself) “Head immediately to the Palace of Tubji Abi 
Shanab! There you will find troop 35 of column 40, and column 40 of troop 35.” This 
description of divisions, and the mixing of numbers, parody and render absurd the 
importance of organization, division, and numbering in modern militaries.933 Instead 
of the organized and glorious military effort for which this organization, division, and 
numbering were originally intended, this mock-organization is used for a petty prank. 
Qara anticipates the success of his prank with excitement (stressing every syllable in 
the 1957 recording): “And instead of troop 35 of column 40, and column 40 of the 
troop 35, there he [Za‘bullah] will find the husband of the wife of Abi Shanab!” The 
success of the plot/prank further insulted military honor, Za‘bullah returned disgraced 
not only by the suspicion that he was spending his time womanizing instead of 
observing his military duties,934 but also with his uniform torn and the queen’s 
father’s (phallic) sword broken. Za‘bullah was then disgracefully demoted before he 
decided to head back to Egypt.  
But before the above account moves us to wholeheartedly endorse the 
















songwriter, the famous vernacular poet Bayram al-Tunisi, reveals yet another layer. In 
his essay on Sayyid Darwish, al-Tunisi refers to the songs he wrote for Shahrazad as 
nationalistic songs.935 This of course does not rule out parody, yet it suggests that 
there is a serious aspect to the musical, not captured by the category of parody.  A 
third possible reading, therefore, is that the play takes the side of nationalism over 
militarism; it is not the uniform but rather the Egyptian man who wears the uniform 
who is celebrated. He is worthy of decorations and promotion, but when not 
appreciated by his superiors, he can simply return home and serve his country in other 
ways. Once taken away from the Egyptian, military glory is nothing but a parody of 
itself.  
The contradictory nature of these readings notwithstanding, I propose them 
as multiple layers of a work that is already polyphonic in many ways. The very 
making of the musical involved multiple layers of artistic and social-political 
struggles between the poet, Bayram al-Tunisi, and the composer, Sayyid Darwish, of 
which al-Tunisi provides an account in his essay on Darwish. Earlier in their careers, 
the two artists had been at odds with one another; Darwish had been a target of al-
Tunisi’s scathing criticism due to his work with the theatre company of Najib al-
Rihani, which was seen by al-Tunisi (and apparently also by ‘Aziz ‘Id)936as overtly 









characterization of Najib al-Rihani and his troupe,938 was ready for reconciliation with 
al-Tunisi (during their first meeting in 1921, while al-Tunisi’s campaign against 
Darwish and al-Rihani was at its height, according to al-Tunisi’s recollection).939 This 
reconciliation culminated in their collaboration on Shahrazad later in the same year. 
Yet, some form of artistic rivalry persisted in their collaboration. Al-Tunisi would 
challenge Darwish with difficult lines of poetry and unfamiliar meters that do not 
easily lend themselves to musical composition,940 only to be surprised by the 
spectacular music Darwish was able to compose for these difficult lines.941 What we 
have here, therefore, is not merely a parody or a celebration of nationalism and 
militarism, but rather a collaboration/battle of two of the great artistic minds of the 
time (three if we include ‘Aziz ‘Id) wherein intentions and artistic form collided and 
coalesced. This textual polyphony of Shahrazad makes it difficult to provide a 
monolithic reading of it. 
Instead of such a reading, therefore, I propose, in the Saidean tradition, a 
contrapuntal reading of the musical, which is sometimes credited with introducing 

















elements come in: militarism along with the parody thereof (via French militarism and 
the parody thereof, through the adaptation of Offenbach’s opera), budding Egyptian 
nationalism (perhaps with the Ottomanism it inherited, and to which both al-Tunisi 
and Darwish continued to subscribe), and a conflicting attitude towards the Egyptian 
army, the role it played, and the role it could/should play against the invaders. I am 
proposing counterpoint here not only as a metaphor for the various textual layers of 
the play, but rather as the literal characterization of the textual-musical texture of the 
play. Indeed, the musical counterpoint and polyphony of the play sometimes allowed 
contradictory things to be said all at once, on top of one another.  The first scene of 
Shahrazad ends with a remarkable musical counterpoint943(during which the lyrics are 
almost unintelligible): the soldiers sing the praises of Za‘bullah, Za‘bullah sings a 
military hymn, and the conspirators ridicule what he says (as nothing more than 
chatter and dreams) all at once. The words of Za‘bullah, hidden within these layers of 
counterpoint and thus difficult to discern, sound like an anti-colonial fantasy, an 
instigation to violent revolt even: 
قلاب يداعلأا اوسودراظتنلاا تقو يف شانحام ...مد  
ران ضرلأاو امسلا اولماو ...ممھلاب مكسوفن اولماو  



















راع يأو راع يف عقی ...مزھنی يللا يركسع ای  
 نإواصتنلااب لیفك كبر ...مجھو سفنلا ىلع سادر944  
 
The first of these lines is an instigation to violence: to step over the enemies 
(the invaders, perhaps? The British?) and the four lines, especially the first and last, 
carry a sense of urgency: in the first line we are told it is “no time for waiting” and in 
the last there is a call for endurance and offense, as if calling to arms someone who is 
reluctant to rise. It is difficult to imagine, in the insurrectionary atmosphere that 
followed WWI (which had already escalated into the 1919 uprising, and which will 
further escalate later into campaigns of terror and guerrilla warfare), and at the hands 
of anti-colonial nationalists like Darwish and al-Tunisi (both well versed in protest 
art), that this call to arms was not, at least on some level, a serious one. One could 
even go as far as reading the textual and musical counterpoints as a means to evade 
censorship; the buried call to arms by Za‘bullah may have been missed by the censors 
but caught by keen anti-colonial nationalist ears. We need not privilege an anti-
colonial nationalist reading though also we should not ignore it.  
With Shahrazad, therefore, we see the coming together of the elements of 
military ideology: the eroticized boy-soldier epitomizing national masculinity, the 
dichotomy between the stern masculine army and the licentious feminine spaces of 
singing, dancing, and flirting, various forms of uniform and rank fetish, phallic 
swords being passed by women from fathers to male lovers, etc. Some of these motifs 
appeared for the first time on the Egyptian stage in this musical, while others were 







discourse of al-Liwa’. Yet even in Shahrazad, there is no clear triumph of military 
ideology, warped as it is in layers of parody. Although militarism is being 
appropriated here to deliver an anti-colonial message (stomp on the enemy with your 
feet, this is not the time to wait), there is no clear-cut adoption of militarism; 
militarism proper is in fact ridiculed through the figure of the warmongering 
Tartar/Turkish general, while the protagonist sometimes serves to insult rather than 
celebrate military values. Even the call to violence, hidden in the counterpoint of the 
final number of Act I, is not necessarily a call to militarization: it can also be 
understood as a call to revolutionary warfare, or even to terror (and indeed it was 
heeded through campaigns of revolutionary guerrilla warfare and terror in the ensuing 
years). 
It is also important to note, through Shahrazad, the foreign genealogy of 
military ideology. Military ideology and its components: the boy-soldier, the division 
of space between what is stern and licentious, the trope of romantic monogamous love 
that binds the boy-soldier to his homeland through her surrogate, and accordingly the 
very gendering of the homeland as female and its ideal son as a male soldier, all come 
through French parody.  These French tropes resonated well with the epistemically 
Francophile945 birth of the second wave of Egyptian nationalism; we should bear in 
mind that the epistemically Francophile al-Liwa’ dreamed of a proper Egyptian army 
and, while its loyalty lied with the Ottoman army, looked up to the French army as a 












sought in how Egyptian militarism was a response to British colonialism: an 
internalization of British ideals of military masculinity, a response against the 
humiliation of an army run and kept from glory by its British overlords, and a fantasy 
that an Egyptian army could “step over” the invaders.  
In the 1957 state-sponsored production, parody is largely elided and the 
motifs of militarism are largely presented to celebrate rather than spoof military 
ideology (one exception that remained an intentional parody in the 1957 production 
was the Tartar general Qara Adamughli. However, in the light of post-1952 Egyptian 
nationalist ideology that attempted to erase the pro-Ottoman roots of Egyptian 
nationalism, Qara Adamughli appeared as a parody of foreign/Turkish rule rather than 
of a military mind. Hence, we can see how even for the nationalist post-colonial 
regime of 1952, epistemic francophilia was relevant: the motifs of the glamorized 
boy-soldier and his eroticization, of patriotism as a monogamous romantic love affair 
with the homeland (or/through her surrogate), motifs that belong to European 
(especially French) romanticism and European (especially French and Prussian, and 
later British) nationalism-militarism, and that were originally intended as a parody of 
the militarisms of Prussia and the Second Empire, became adopted by Nasir’s 
ideological state apparatus and indigenized as tropes for Egyptian nationalism-
militarism. The remake of Shahrazad by the state radio, therefore, signifies not only 
the trajectory of Egyptian militarism-nationalism, budding in the early 20th century 
and becoming part of official state ideology in the post-1952 era, but furthermore 
exemplifies the role of cultural imperialism, or colonial cultural imposition, in this 
trajectory.  
But before addressing the question of post-1952 militarism, I want to address 




significant role in bridging the gap between the second wave of Egyptian nationalism 
and the Free Officers Movement, namely Misr al-Fatah.  
By the 1930s, the military cure envisioned by LeBon and his interlocutors in 
the French army had become a global phenomenon. Countries, economies, and state 
institutions were militarizing, and army boys were appearing almost everywhere in 
the West (as well as in Japan) as model national subjects.946 In Egypt, the movement 
of Misr al-Fatah (commonly though inadequately translated as Young Egypt) carried 
the banner of militarizing the nation.947 Taking inspiration from various nationalist 
movements (including the Young Ottomans of the 19th century, the Young Turks of 
the early 20th century, and the 19th century Young Italy movement, in addition to 
Fascism and Nazism, both of which it cut ties to as they revealed their imperialistic 





























The turning of the crowds into disciplined troops was a recurrent theme in the rhetoric 
of the movement and its founder, Ahmad Husayn. Husayn debuted his political career 
by calling for a “Pharaonic militia” that would “restore the glory” of Egypt.  This 
militia would become, in Husayn’s vision, the “army of salvation” that would 
regenerate  “Misr al-Fatah” the same way Turkya al-Fatah did.950 This vision for 
regeneration included the employment of military theatrics – for example the 
movement planned to camp between the pyramids through the night and march on the 
city “in organized columns” (a plan which in fact was never realized).951 Militarizing 
the national crowd into organized troops and militias was therefore central to the 
project of Husayn. For this purpose, he created a para-military organization, the Green 
Shirts (modeled on Mussolini’s Black Shirts), and demanded of all the party members 
that they own a militia uniform.952 Party publications highlighted and glamorized the 
image of the militia-boy in green uniform as the ideal son of Egypt (one of these ideal 
para-military sons of Egypt in green uniform was none other than Jamal ‘Abd  al-
Nasir).953 The uniformed boy was being posited, perhaps for the first time, as the 
national imago (if we bracket Za‘bullah as at least potentially parodic, and as 
contesting the value of the uniform through his final departure from the military camp 
and return to Egypt). The gendering of the Egyptian national subject as masculine is 













achieved here through the imagery of military masculinity (and through the 
movement’s explicit avowal to stem out national effeminacy, or takhannuth).954 On 
the other side, Egypt is produced as a woman, as evident in the very name of the 
party: Misr al-Fatah a gendering that is lost in the translation of the name as Young 
Egypt. Al-Fatah means the young woman; literally the name of the party means Egypt 
the Young Woman or Egypt is the Young Woman. Gendering the nation as a female 
and a woman is a staple of nationalist-military ideology, conscripting and mobilizing 
national masculinity in protection of the helpless woman that is the homeland, 
sometimes portrayed as the beloved, sometimes as the mother, and in all cases as a 
damsel-in-distress.955 
Misr al-Fatah also called for militarizing the Egyptian political and social 




























fashion, and the whole of Egypt was to be transformed into “military barracks.”956 
Militarization was envisioned as a force that would regenerate/resurrect Egypt,957 and  
was thus opposed to, or set as the cure/antidote for, the various setbacks that caused 
Egypt’s degeneration/death. Militarization was also opposed to moral degeneration 
and licentiousness, or tahattuk, in the discourse of Misr al-Fatah.958 The opposition 
between militarized space and licentious space, and the military as antidote to 
licentiousness, is evident in the kind of conduct the movement expected of its 
members/soldiers who endorse a military spirit, ethos, and way of life: they should (in 
addition to owning the uniform and contributing money to the organization) preserve 
a healthy body, abstain from drinking alcohol or visiting “dur al lahw” (lit. the houses 
of amusement/pastime: a generic term that usually means bars, brothels, and gambling 
parlors, though it may also be extended to mean cafés and other leisurely hangouts), 
and to only eat, drink, and buy Egyptian products.959 
This opposition between licentious spaces and military discipline is also the 
opposition between chaos and order; a declaration by the party proclaimed “We live 
in a state of disorder, but we must live in a state of order. We therefore have to gather 
the youth in one place, habituate them to order and obedience, have them don one 












purpose.”960 Misr al-Fatah’s vision thus fetishized order, but it was military order, or 
order modeled on the military, and not the order-qua-harmony and comfort that 
existed in the discourse of al-Shidyaq or the ‘Urabi movement. This new form of 
order was no longer coded as rahah, (lit. comfort), a term that does not match the 
sternness, asceticism, and masculinity of military discipline. By then, the signifier of 
order had become the word nizam, which literally means organization and invokes a 
sense of a top-down ordering (and which classically referred to the organization of the 
poetic meter; although it is rarely used in that sense in contemporary Arabic, the term 
conjures the strict organization of humans and things as if they were syllables in a 
poetic meter). More importantly, the term nizam in Ottoman Turkish (and modern 
Persian) referred to military order or the military as such, ever since the modern 
Ottoman army was named nizam jadid (Arabic for new order). This is testament to 
the understanding of order as modeled on the military or the military as the paragon of 
order since the early 19th century. This was also the term used by Muhammad ‘Ali to 
denote the army he created and the military order he introduced. Instead of rahah, 
therefore, which mystifyingly connected order to comfort and which referred to order 
as a harmony of things rather than their strict organization, nizam came in with its 
invocation of a strict ordering, discipline, and hint of (Ottoman) militarization. The 
change in terminology mirrors the change in the conception of order and discipline, 
the coming to fruition of the modernizing-colonizing effort to model the organization 










In spite of these clear signs of military ideology (down to the marching 
uniformed troops), one major difference remains: it was the militia, not the military, 
that was celebrated by Misr al-Fatah. The party called not for the subjugation of the 
country by the military, but rather for the militarizing of the nation. It is not the march 
of a regular army that the party celebrated and called for, but rather the march of the 
nation in the form of paramilitary troops. Its model subject was not the conscript, the 
regular soldier, but rather the militiaman. Finally, its call for militarizing state 
institutions was never a call for the army to take over these institutions.  
Although Misr al-Fatah’s efforts to (para)militarize the nation was met with 
little success,962 the movement represents a clear link between early (second wave) 
Egyptian nationalism and Nasserist nationalism (a link through which we can trace, if 
partially, the trajectory of military ideology from the former to the latter). Misr al-
Fatah was in many ways inspired by Mustafa Kamil and the National Party. The name 
of the party was inspired by a speech by Mustafa Kamil calling for the regeneration of 
Egypt, proclaiming: “I want to stir up, within senile Egypt, the Young Egypt.”963 













963.ةاتفلا رصم ةمرھلا رصم يف ظقوأ نأ دیرأ	See	“al-Za‘im	al-Watani	Ahmad	Husayn,	Sani‘	Misr	
al-Fatah	wa	al-Munadi	al-Awwal	bi	al-Istiqlal	wa	Rafd	al-Taba‘iyyah”	al-






Faithful to the project of Mustafa Kamil, Misr al-Fatah (especially after it outgrew its 
Pharaonic phase) maintained a mixture of Egyptian Nationalism and Pan-Islamism 
reminiscent of the line of the National Party. Later the second man in Young Egypt, 
Fathi Radwan, defected from Misr al-Fatah and joined the National Party, and then 
formed al-Hizb al-Watani al-Jadid (the New National Party) and claimed it to be the 
true heir of the legacy of Mustafa Kamil. This is the same Fathi Radwan who served 
as ‘Abd al-Nasir’s Minister of National Guidance and was one of his close advisers; 
the career of Fathi Radwan thus exemplifies and personifies the link between the 
National Party, Misr al-Fatah, and ‘Abd al-Nasir. The link of course goes deeper than 
the hiring a former member of Misr al-Fatah as a chief propagandist; ‘Abd al-Nasir 
himself, as mentioned above, was a member of Misr al-Fatah and received training as 
a member of its militia.964 
As with the Nasserist rhetoric (discussed in the previous chapter), Misr al-
Fatah prescribed a military antidote that did not necessarily subdue the nation to the 
army, but prescribed the military march to turn the licentious crowd into the glorified 
national masses. The difference remains, however, that in Misr al-Fatah’s fantasies, 
the national masses marched like the army, in the Nasserist rhetoric the national 
masses marched side by side with the army (this was before the pro-Sisi national 
masses marched underneath the army and the army helicopter that provided Sisi’s 















Nasserist film director with a military vantage point, surrendering power to the army 
and giving it a mandate to kill).965 
But even under Nasir, we do not see the rise of a military ideology in toto. It 
is true that the Nasir regime applied the military antidote to the crowds (turning them 
into troop-like masses), and it is true that the Nasir regime took militarization a step 
further than the role it played in the rhetoric of Misr al-Fatah (militarization was 
transformed from an ideal, or a fiction, of good governance and good discipline, into 
the actual control of state institutions and society at large by an oligarchy of army 
officers), but even then the state ideology did not uniformly centre itself around a 
military Subject and/or imago through which national subjects were interpellated. 
Nasir himself appeared sometimes in civilian clothing, sometimes in military uniform. 
Even in the aftermath of the 1956 war, works of state propaganda and state cultural 
production allowed for civilian and/or paramilitary ideal images to appear side by side 
with, or at the expense of, the military imago; the citizen-in-arms, the  fida’i in ‘Abd 
al-Halim Hafiz’s songs and the political activist in al-Qadiyyah (as shown in the 
previous chapters) are cases in point. It is, evidently, beyond the purpose of this study 
to establish the extent to which Nasir’s regime was a military regime.966 My point 
here, however, is that in terms of rhetoric, of regime discourse, and its ideological 
representations, a military ideology that subdues the masses and promotes the army 













not present in toto, and was often mitigated by the veneration of the civilian masses 
and the promotion of the political activist and/or militant.  
It was under Sadat, however, that militarism became the dominant state 
ideology. Parallel to the demise of the venerated masses in regime discourse and the 
re-emergence of the licentious crowd and licentious infantilized activists, Egyptian 
state ideology witnessed a rise in venerating, valorizing, and submitting to the 
military, along with a proliferation of military imagoes.  Under Sadat- and especially 
after the October 1973 war, Egyptian cinema started producing, en masse, films about 
the Egyptian army, and circulating the image of the soldier as a model, idealized, 
glamorized, and sometimes eroticized national subject, and about the 1973 war as a 
moment of national and personal redemption.967 Unlike Nasir who sometimes 
appeared as a military man in uniform and sometimes as a revolutionary leader in 
civilian clothes, Sadat, till the hour of his death, appeared in an elaborate military 
uniform – reportedly designed by Pierre Cardin, as if emulating his Nazi forerunners 
who turned to Hugo Boss to produce their fetishized military imago. Sadat’s (almost 
Nazi) fascination with military paraphernalia was not limited to his uniform fetish; he 
also showed an interest in the goose-step and in swinging his marshal’s scepter-like 
baton (the phallus of the father?). Perhaps like the Nazis and like Wilhelm Reich’s 
“salesgirl [and] average secretary” and in line with “political reaction that consciously 
exploits these sexual interests,” Sadat understood “the sexual effect of a uniform, the 








exhibitionist nature of militaristic procedure.”968  Military parades became an integral 
part of the regime’s theatrics of power. Whereas the important annual event for Nasir 
was the commemoration of the 1952  ‘revolution’ (an event that necessitated 
providing a populist civilian cover for the 1952 military takeover), Sadat made the 
commemoration of the October War his main annual event, and hosted an annual 
elaborate military parade for the occasion. Time and again, Sadat emphasized, 
through explicit theatrics, the military nature of his regime—or at least of the ideology 
this regime rested upon. 
 
Militarism	and	the	Family	
In fact Sadat’s rule provides an apt occasion to bring in family and military ideologies 
together. It was under Sadat that both militarism and the family became (almost 
official) state ideologies. Sadat himself embodied, or strove to embody, both the 
figure of the military commander and of the father/head of the household; in a way he 
tried to hold the phallus of the father both in its familial form and its military form—
in addition to the various military phallic objects that were raised in his honor and 
saluted him during these parades; for example, the manassah, the platform, where he 
stood to watch these parades, was built in the shape of a missile platform ready for 
launch, emulating the scores of missiles and armed troops which marched in its 
vicinity. Furthermore, it is difficult not to consider Sadat’s marshal’s baton as a 
phallic object. Both figures, the father and the army man, and both phalluses, the 







female activist who asked about democratic rule and which we examined earlier. 
Sadat’s response was to infantilize her and declare himself the elder of the family, 
while commenting on her physical attractiveness; he acted both as the exhibitionist 
military man sharing his military virility with the attractive school-girl, and the 
protective father who was beyond questioning (thus producing the young woman’s 
body as simultaneously the fair target of military violation as well as the object of 
military protection, a paradoxical position which the army tried to assume in the 2011 
virginity test’s incident and in its justification by army generals).  
It is not a coincidence that these two ideologies appeared together, or that 
their embodiment, the Subject through which subjects are interpellated, coincided in 
the same figure (i.e. the ruler acting as both the Father and the military commander, as 
the case was with Sadat). Both family and military ideologies are similar at the core, 
with a clear line of command, a rigid hierarchy, and a masculine figure at the apex.969 
If we believe the psychoanalytic account or its Althusserian derivatives of how 
subjectivity is elicited within the family, where authority is initially experienced as 
the law of the father, and where the law of the father is internalized through the 
Oedipus complex and its eventual resolution, and where the phallus of the father plays 
a central role in constructing the authority of the father through love (the father has a 
more pleasing phallus than the mother’s breasts) and fear (the father is capable of 









a role in producing) the subjugation to paternal authority that lies outside the 
family.970  
If we furthermore accept Freud’s argument in Group Psychology that 
leadership is produced through identification with the ego ideal (itself a product of the 
Oedipus complex and its resolution and therefore an effect of the father, his law, and 
his phallus) then we see how the nuclear/oedipal family prepares the subject it 
produces to identify the models of masculinity (i.e. army men) as ego ideals and ideal 
leaders.971 It is as if the modern family produces the subjects that are docile to modes 
of patriarchal/paternal power and that could be thus readily inserted into systems of 
militarism (whether through joining the army and heeding the commands of the unit 
leader, who replaces the symbolic father and resonates with the ego ideal now 
internalized as a superego, or through becoming subjects of political systems that 
glamorize and idealize the military along with other models of power and authority). 
Or conversely, it may be that family ideology is itself a product – or is further 
maintained and intensified by- modes of power that exist outside the family.  
Power, especially (though not exclusively) in the Western tradition has used, 




authority)	is	based	on	the	thought	of	Sigmund	Freud,	especially	The Ego and the Id, 23-33. For 
Freud’s application of this theory on the level of political authority, see Freud, Totem and Taboo, 
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Meaning of the Phallus,” in Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the École Freudienne, ed. Juliet 
Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose, 74- 85, and “Guiding Remarks for a Congress on Feminine Sexuality,” 
in Feminine Sexuality, 86- 98. My approach to the writings of Freud and Lacan as describing (and to an 
extent deconstructing) the ideologies of masculinity and patriarchy rather than reaffirming and 
essentializing these two phenomena, derives from Juliet Mitchell’s inventive reading/reformulation of 
Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis in Psychoanalysis and Feminism: A Radical Reassessment of 
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sovereign’s ‘power of the sword’ to modern weaponry. The commonplace critique of 
masculinist militarisms is to highlight how these phallic symbols are overvalued 
because of their resemblance to the male organ; but what if we reverse the critique? 
What if it is the male organ, in the first place, that is overvalued because of its 
resemblance to emblems of power?972 Perhaps the phallic object produced the phallus, 
rather than vice versa. My point here is not to choose one direction of critique (the 
phallic object produced the phallus, or the phallus produced the phallic object) but to 
highlight the intertwining between family ideology and other modes of power (most 
notably militarism). Historically, both appeared in the 19th century, and both were 
universalized through the colonial moment. In Egypt, both appeared together, at the 
beginning of the 20th century, and both became official or semi-official state 
ideologies in the 1970s under Sadat (at a time when the Egyptian regime decided to 
act as a client for Western and imperialist interests, and at the moment of the 
unrestrained and unchecked colonial cultural imposition in/on Egypt).  
Yet, the Sadat regime did not represent an unchallenged triumph of family 
and military ideologies. Even Sadat’s propagandists could not help but notice how he 
“dressed like Hitler and acted like Charley Chaplin.”973 It was, eventually, within his 
armed forces, amidst his October military parade, in his military uniform, and under 
his phallic manassah that Sadat was assassinated (the irony is more compelling when 
one realizes that Sadat refused to wear a bullet-proof vest under his military uniform 
because he wanted to look slim in his uniform; Sadat was literally killed, rather than 








not deter rebellion; it was ‘his children’ who eventually killed him. The Oedipal 
drama did not lead to the complete internalization of the law of the father, but rather 
to the literal killing the father. Once again the irony is complete by the accounts 
reporting the last words of Sadat to be, addressing his assailants: leih keda ya ibni 
(why did you do this, my son?). Other accounts suggest that his last words were mish 
ma‘qul (unbelievable, unfathomable, impossible), highlighting how the delusional 
dictator was oblivious to public resentment against him, perhaps masked by his self-
interpellation as father.  
From then on, pro-regime propaganda tried repeatedly to reinstate and 
sustain family and army ideologies, with varying emphasis on either, to varying 
degrees of success, and simultaneously to sustain political authority through the 
coalescing and congealing of these two ideologies. The description of the facebook 
group Ana Asif Ya Rayyis invoked both Mubarak’s alleged fatherly figure side by side 
with his military past. Because he is like a father, and because he fought in 1973, his 
people should not, according to Ana Asif Ya Rayyis, go against him. This logic was 
rehearsed by a number of Mubarak propagandists and by Mubarak himself.  In his 
speech on February 1st 2011, Mubarak opened by stating that he addressed the 
Egyptian people “the way a father addresses his children.” He concluded the speech 
by reminding his audience that he fought for Egypt. Once again Mubarak was 
attempting to bring together the figures of the military man and the father. Just like 




prevent Mubarak’s downfall; instead it provided his opponents with rich material that 
was used to ridicule him, his delusions, and his failed paternal status.974 
Of course this should not be confused with revolutionary success. That some 
of the demonstrators were willing to march hand in hand with the army, chanting “the 
people and the army are one hand,” that the opposition was divided on whether to 
support the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), that a 
significant part of the opposition supported the 2013 coup and subsequent massacres, 
are all testaments to the momentary triumph of military ideology. In addition, these 
‘revolutionary failures’ can be read as testament to a deep internalization of paternal 
authority, a deeply rooted Oedipus complex acting as a vector for outside authority, a 
superego entangled with inherent guilt that constantly stops the good subject short of 
complete revolt, as suggested by the psychoanalytic variants of the Frankfurt 
School975 and of 70s feminism.976 Military and family ideologies might have therefore 
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masculinity never stopped. Even the rise of ‘Abd  al-Fattah al-Sisi, who played the 
figure of the military man (and potential male lover to Egyptian men and women) 
more than he did the father, was accompanied by parodies of military masculinity 
(including ones presented by the very comedian who played a major role in 
mobilizing his audience for the June 30th demonstrations, Basim Yusuf).977 
Let us then return to and rephrase the question with which I started the 
inquiry into the history of militarism in Egypt; if the question remains “when did the 
army become popular?” the answer is that an incremental process that started with 
‘Abbas Hilmi’s restoration (and sblated the ‘Urabi project), along with the influence 
of British, French, and German models of militarism, eventually led to the popularity 
of the army, but that the unparalleled popularity of the army was not evident until the 
Sadat years (especially after the 1973 war). But if we rephrase the question, however, 
as “when did military and family ideologies triumph?” the answer is that both enjoyed 
momentary triumphs, especially under Sadat, and that both came together to play a 
role in undermining the revolutionary cause in 2011, not only through providing 
regime propagandists with rhetorical tools to use against the opposition, but also 
through the hegemonic effect they played on a political opposition and a (failed) 
revolution that were not able (or did not want or seek to) to challenge the hegemonic 
















subjectivity (chanting from day 1, that is from January 28th 2011, “the people and the 
army are together one hand”) or to imagine alternative societal formations and 
coupling/kinship other than the modern nuclear family in response to claims that they 
were not heeding the moral and sexual codes of the family. If we are, however, 
speaking of an uncontested triumph of the two ideologies, then the answer is never.  
This means that, in Egypt the Oedipus complex, along with the various 
figurations of the psyche that are products of modern Western/colonial institutions of 
subjectivation, is neither fully triumphant nor completely absent, neither fully 
indigenized nor fully foreign, but is in a contentious position, engaged in a struggle to 
impose itself.  The same could be said about the situation of institutions of modern 
subjectivation; it would be absurd to argue that the modern nuclear family has not 
been internalized and indigenized as a paragon of social organization and as the 
upholder of morality. Equally absurd would be to argue that the army has not become 
the symbol of the nation, the epitome of nationalism. And yet, both institutions face 
contentiousness, resistance, and ridicule, a fact that sometimes forces the authorities 
to intervene, sometimes by force, to reinstate these institutions, only to face more 










The modern State, in Egypt and elsewhere, sustains a discursive division of space into 
proper spaces that open themselves to the gaze of the State and regiment themselves 
within its order, and licentious spaces that evade this gaze and escape this 
regimentation. This division of space in a (post)colonial context symptomatizes and 
sustains a colonial psychic trauma and neurosis.  
This dissertation has argued that in Egyptian pro-State ideological 
representations since the late 19th century (much like in its Western forerunners and 
counterparts), the State was entrusted with upholding proper behavior, and thus 
proper subjectivity, whereas subjects and social spaces that defy or are imagined to 
defy the State or to evade its gaze were produced as licentious. The terms of the 
production of this conception of the State and the licentious were dictated by colonial 
cultural impositions (a term which I take after Fanon and read in an Althusserian and 
psychoanalytic light): the conceptions of the licentious were almost always predicated 
on Europe’s racial other (and the Arab/Muslim figured prominently among the litany 
of racial others), whereas proper spaces and proper subjectivities were produced 
through institutions and psychic formations/modes of subjectivation which were 
imposed by colonialism.  
In Chapter 1 we explored the conception of the State as the upholder of the 
upright order of things. We have also explored how challenging the State or evading 
its gaze is imagined as the collapse of order, and as the spread of chaos, abomination, 




pubescent, and of the feminine (all understood as lower evolutionary forms 
corresponding to the category of degeneration) persistently stood for this chaos, and 
thus became the metonyms par excellence of the revolutionary/licentious crowd. The 
chapter concluded with a discussion of the recurrence of sexual chaos as both a trope 
and a telos of revolution and revolt in pro-State and counterrevolutionary 
representations. Building on the recurrence of the trope of sexual chaos, Chapter 2 
argued for a paradox in the logic of the voyeuristic State, wherein the State and the 
public proclaim their ignorance of what transpires in the licentious space, and yet by 
virtue of this very ignorance produce these spaces as licentious (usually invoking a 
licentiousness of a sexual nature). The State simultaneously is ignorant of what is 
hatched behind its back and certain that what is hatched is subversive, licentious, and 
sexual: an indescribable orgy.  This paradox was sustained through the continuous 
appropriation and reinvention of the topos of the ancient Greek Dionysian orgy and, 
in a (post)colonial context, through the cultural imposition of this topos. In various 
manifestations and appropriations of the Dionysian orgy and against various modes of 
state-gaze, the Oriental appears as the model for what escapes the gaze of the State 
and defies the modes of signification which are necessary for the operation of this 
gaze. The Oriental, therefore, is in many ways the quintessentially orgiastic. This 
mutual mapping of the Oriental and the orgiastic, or more broadly of Europe’s racial 
other and its conception of the licentious, has operated, at least since the 19th century, 
as I showed in Chapter 3, to produce Europe’s own licentious crowd. Europe saw the 
menace of the racial other not only in the colonies, but also in its own metropolitan 
crowd, especially when rioting or revolting. A colonial revolving door thus exists 
through which Europe’s racial other is mapped onto its own crowds, and its 




racial others. In Chapter 4 I turned to this imposition in an Egyptian context and 
explored the colonial traumas this imposition sustains and/or reflects. Through a 
Fanonian lens, Chapter 4 showed how Egyptian and Arab representations of the 
licentious space internalize the Orientalist and colonialist presumptions of the West, 
and how the colonial neurosis is evident even in accounts which try to reverse the 
Orientalist dichotomy of respectable Occident and licentious Orient. The application 
of this colonial cultural imposition in Egypt has thus sustained a colonial trauma and 
neurosis in which various versions of the self are always produced as licentious, 
whereas the model proper subject, and by extension the ideal ego and ideal imago, is 
always modeled on the white-other. Cultural imposition, furthermore, works not only 
through the imposition of a white imago and ego ideal, but also through imposing 
specifically European-bourgeois institutions as the spaces of proper subjectivation, or, 
to borrow from the Althusserian diction, as “ideological state apparatuses” (most 
prominently the family and the army)—which I have shown in Chapter 5. 
The State, then, produces the modern, proper subject (ideally white or 
modeled on a discursively-produced whiteness); it represses the collective for the 
individual to emerge, the feminine (which it classically contained in the domestic) for 
the masculine to emerge and for proper distinction between the sexes and their gender 
roles to be maintained, the infantile for the adult, the canaille for the properly behaved 
citizens, modeling their behavior on bourgeois notions of propriety and of proper 
social distinction (often embodied in a system of private property sanctioned by the 
State); it represses the licentious for the proper to emerge, and it represses Europe’s 
racial other (most notably, for the purpose of this study, the Arab, but also the 
Oriental, the savage, the indigenous, the backward who fails to assimilate into 




repression/emergence, colonial in its essence (or conversely forming the essence of 
colonialism) was at work in the metropole as much as in the colonies: repressing the 
Native American, the African, the Turk, the Muslim, and the Arab was as important in 
the Statist/counterrevolutionary discourses surrounding the French Revolution and 
(especially) the Paris Commune, as much as it was necessary for the civilizing 
mission the colonialists, their local clients, and even their political adversaries, sought 
to implement in the colonies. In a way, the repression of (the) ‘Arabi (the figure 
through which Ahmad ‘Urabi was represented and with which he was conflated, but 
also the figure that stood for everything that was wrong and Arab in the émeute) was 
the common goal of British colonial authorities, of Egyptian authorities, and of the 
20th century Egyptian nationalists, a repression which was necessary for the 
production of 20th century Egyptian nationalism. This was evident both in the 
institutional political project sponsored by ‘Abbas Hilmi II, and in the rhetorical and 
discursive political and social project inaugurated by Egyptian nationalists who 
orbited Hilmi’s restoration project. For example, as we saw in the last chapter, as well 
as in Chapter 1, Egyptian militarism was predicated on the repression and abnegation 
of ‘Arabi (of Ahmad ‘Urabi, of his peasant background and his traditional education–
seen as opposed to Western military education, of Oriental meekness and nepotism, 
etc.) and the modern family was predicated on the repression and abnegation of other 
indigenous formations (polygamy, polygyny, customary marriages, etc.). The 
repudiation of Egypt’s Arabness in the discourse of Anwar al-Sadat and of 
contemporary Egyptian isolationist-nationalists can be seen as a continuation of the 
repression and abnegation of (the) ‘Arabi.  
Later, the figure of the Islamist figured prominently in the pro-State 




savage) replaced that of ‘Arabi. The Islamist, in the imagination of the State and its 
propagandists, condensed the figure of the dissident who disrupts the moral, 
metaphysical, and civilizational order of the State (i.e. the figure of the modern 
dissident/terrorist) along with the figure of the pre/anti-modern savage who refuses to 
live in a world conditioned by (colonial) modernity (the acquiescence of many 
Islamists in modernist and colonial notions notwithstanding).  
Egyptians were thus made to see themselves through a civilizational gaze 
that is essentially white European and colonial, not only in its biases concerning the 
kinds of subjects it privileges, but also in its very constitution as a gaze with an 
impetus to invade all social spaces; one that characterizes modern/liberal modes of 
power, inherits the Christian Confessional, and is opposed to the extant Arab-Islamic 
historical practice of leaving what is hidden hidden as examined in Chapter 2. This is 
the same gaze that worked hand in hand with colonial violence. Anxious about the 
spaces that it cannot reach or visualize (e.g. the female body behind the veil, secluded 
spaces produced by Orientalism as the Harem, indigenous – sometimes polygamous- 
marital practices not registered with or legible to the State, collectivities that defy the 
modern State’s mode of individual interpellation), this gaze provided the European 
State with a drive to open up these spaces, if violently. This violent opening up for 
spaces to the gaze of the State has been taken up by the postcolonial State. The 
epistemic forms this violence took included self-abnegation (as explored in Chapter 
4), and seeing the self through the lens of the colonizer, and even the reversal of 
colonial charges while failing to subvert the colonial assumptions or crack the 
colonial lens (Chapter 4). That the Egyptian vernacular often makes reference to al-
mazhar al-hadari (civilizational/civilized appearance) and to manzarna quddam al-




civilizational gaze through which we came to see ourselves. The same acceptance of 
the Western civilizational gaze as a mode to represent and see oneself was made 
evident by the billboards on the highway to and from the Cairo International Airport 
after the 2011 Uprising and until 2013, with real and apocryphal statements by world-
leaders and international news agencies about the alleged civilizational worth of the 
Egyptian people and their ‘revolution’ of 2011. Traces of this white/colonial 
civilizational gaze through which the self is seen, assessed, and often abnegated, can 
be observed especially in the counterrevolutionary discourse about the licentious 
dissident, whether in depicting the Islamist through the colonialist trope of the sexual 
savage and through Orientalist horror toward Islamic mating and matrimonial 
practices, or in depicting political activists (secular and Islamist alike) along with 
Satanists and other bad subjects as escaping from or signifying a failure of the 
colonially and culturally imposed modern family. 
The dominant mode of subjectivation, thus, both replicates the Western 
model of subjectivity and sustains the psychic dependency on the Western model 
through persistently imposing the figure of the white man as the ideal ego: the ideal 
image is always white, while, for Egyptians and other colonized/postcolonial people 
the image of the self is always a bad image, a counter-imago. Throughout this study, 
there has been scarcely an occasion when the depiction or production of the licentious 
was not enmeshed, in one way or another, with the indigenous. The psychic trauma of 
the colonized, elaborated by Frantz Fanon in Black Skin White Masks, has been 
present in nearly all the conceptions of the licentious which this study surveyed. The 
result was sometimes an outright abnegation and repudiation of the self and an 
attempt to assimilate oneself to the white imago, in others a projection of certain 




saw with the discourse that attempts to depict the licentious space as a Western 
phenomenon, or to other racial others, as we saw with Sayyid Qutb and the primitive 
man), but always a colonial neurosis worthy of a Fanonian analysis.  
Through this process of projection and assimilation, Western subjectivity, 
Western spaces and institutions that produce good subjects, and the Western 
organization of space and interpellation of subjects was largely indigenized. The topos 
of the orgy, which was initially conceived as an Oriental menace, was widely used in 
Egyptian counterrevolutionary discourse, sometimes to the effect of associating the 
licentious and the orgiastic with the West. Even Islamists who claimed to adhere to an 
indigenous tradition that predates and transcends colonialism used the topos of the 
orgy and made allegations of adultery against their opponents (contrary to Islamic 
precepts that would prohibit such allegations in the absence of four witnesses). 
Similarly the concept of a national body was indigenized (first as Ottoman and second 
as Egyptian) and the ‘foreign body’ that infects the national body became an 
‘interloper’, a foreigner or an agent of foreign interests. More notably, the bourgeois 
monogamous family and the army were imagined as indigenous structures, fortresses 
of the nation in the face of foreign influences, and their others were imagined as 
foreign. This can be read as a Foucauldian ‘tactical polyvalence of discourse’ in 
which a discourse can be appropriated and made to serve an opposite strategy (i.e. a 
Foucauldian mode of limited resistance that realigns rather than escapes power).978 It 
can also be read as a sign of the profound colonization of Egyptian ideology and 






Throughout this study, I have been arguing the latter, which does not necessarily 
preclude the former.    
This, however, is not to be confused for a narrative of clear and uninterrupted 
colonial success story. Throughout this study we have seen how in the late 20th 
century and through the 21st, after two centuries of colonization, the State in Egypt 
continued to identify ‘pockets of resistance’, waging an ongoing insurrection against 
the moral codes that the State embodies and especially against the models of marriage 
and family (whether through failing to be properly subjectivated/subjected as Oedipal 
subjects that recognize paternal authority, or through engaging in insurrectionary 
marital and matrimonial practices that transgress bourgeois European monogamy, 
State-recognized marriage, and the nuclear family). The State’s response was to 
attempt to impose, through (sometimes epistemic, sometimes physical) violence, the 
proper modes of marriage, matrimony, and family that it inherited from its colonial 
predecessor. This recurrent form of violence reveals, as I argued in Chapter 5, some 
of the failures rather than the total success of the modern-colonial-statist project; even 
after two centuries of colonization the State still needs to interfere, not only through 
ideological appeal but also through various modes of violence, to impose the colonial 
model. To borrow from Joseph Massad’s concluding remarks in Desiring Arabs, “It is 
at these rare [but not so rare in our case, I would add] moments when the imposition 
and seduction of Western norms fail that the possibility of different conceptions of 
desire, politics, and subjectivities emerge.”979  
My purpose, of course, is not to romanticize ‘urfi/customary marriage, 






Satanic rituals, the licentious, or even sit-ins (in the 2011 fashion) as successful 
modes of resistance or to endow them with a transgressive agency; this study was not 
concerned with the ‘actual’ practices within these spaces but rather with how the 
dominant ideology imagines and produces them, and with examples of the 
complicities and capitulations of political dissidents (including the Islamist 
organizations and the ‘revolutionary’ crowd of 2011 with its Islamist and secular 
contingents) to the dominant ideology. My purpose however is to use the moments of 
tension and confrontation between the State (through both its ideological and 
repressive apparatuses) and these pockets to highlight the contingency of the colonial 
model of propriety, of proper spaces, and of proper subjectivity, which in turn can be 
the starting point for imagining alternatives that do not uphold or take for granted the 
colonial/Statist model and do not romanticize, idealize, or reify the others that this 
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